

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A



# AD-A133165

90-4233 265

GENERAL URBAN WARFARE AMPHIBIOUS LOGISTICS APPLICATIONS VOLUME IV: OPERATIONAL PLANS

LIEUTENANT COLONEL R. J. YEOMAN
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR DEVELOPMENTAL COORDINATION
DEVELOPMENT CENTER
MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

**TUNE 23, 1983** 

PINAL REPORT

UNLIMITED DISTRIBUTION

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS CODE RD HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380



**83** 09 26 0**57** 

FILE COP



# UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

D 034/RJY/jmf 3913 10 August 1983

From: Commanding General To: Distribution List

Subj: General Urban Warfare Amphibious Logistics Applications Study

- 1. The objectives of the study were:
- a. Identify the role of logistics during combat in an urban area and isolate logistic peculiarities.
- b. Identify requirements for specialized logistic concepts and systems for urban warfare.
- c. Analyze present equipment inventories and mid-range equipment characteristics to satisfy urban area performance requirements and provide adequate throughput in an urban port facility.
- d. Examine level of effort and support required by both the Naval Force and Landing Force/MAF to maintain command, control and coordination of logistics systems and equipment in an urban environment.
- e. Evaluate performance capabilities and requirements of combat service support systems to function efficiently and effectively during operations in urban port areas.
- f. Evaluate the capability of present state-of-the-art logistics systems to survive and operate in urban areas through all tempos of combat.
- g. Develop land management techniques to provide combat service support in urban environments.
- 2. The objectives of the study were met.
- 3. The recommendations as set forth in the study are concurred in with the exception of recommendation 7.4.9. It is neither appropriate nor necessary to designate specific types of ships or aircraft to perform shuttle functions between the AOA and theater support facilities.
- 4. A copy of this letter will be affixed inside the front cover of each copy of the final report prior to its distribution.

J. E. HOPKINS
Deputy for Development

General Urban Warfare Amphibious Logistics Application Study Subj:

Distribution: CMC (LPP) (2) CG FMFLANT (2) CG FMFPAC (2) CG MCDEC (6) CG 4th MARDIV (2) CDR, Berlin Brigade U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory DTIC (2) DLSIE (2)

Acces	sion For	
DTIC Unant	GRA&I T\B  iounced  ification	
By Dist	ribution/	
Ava	ilability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special	



GENERAL URBAN WARFARE AMPHIBIOUS LOGISTICS APPLICATIONS

VOLUME IV: OPERATION PLANS

June 15, 1983

BDM/W-82-306-TR

Prepared for Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, CA.

#### **PRECIS**

#### A. BACKGROUND

The Marine Corps has identified a likelihood of combat in urban environments during the mid-range period. A requirement may exist initially for deploying amphibious forces to conduct amphibious assault operations against urban targets located along the litterals of the world and then defending objectives seized during assault operations. This volume has been prepared to identify logistic requirements peculiar to defensive operations in a highly urbanized environment. The urban area designated is Synthetic City (SYN City) consisting of; a map product and data book which provide an unclassified urban setting for examining tactical and logistical problems. Operations and certain logistic concepts contained herein have been continued from an earlier effort, Volume II, in which the same force executed on amphibious assault against the targeted urban area.

Volume III of this investigation is a technical report in which the combat service support functions are defined in relation to their applicability to defensive urban combat. That examination is based upon the operational and logistical planning reflected in Volume IV.

#### B. OBJECTIVE

This investigation was undertaken to determine Marine Corps land, equipment, supply, and organizational management guidance in the defense of a hostile urban environment and in the presence of an Aggressor force.

#### C. METHODOLOGY

The government provided six mission statements derived from Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) Study 30-77-01. Broadly stated, these missions are as follows:

- Defense Outside the City
- Defense Inside the City
- Defend Key Sectors
- Entrapment and Ambush
- Defense in Depth
- Mobile Defense

Concepts of operations were developed for each mission statement for the current time frame and for the mid-range period. BDM analysts have continued the use of a composite Marine Amphibious Force, described in Volume II

of this investigation, for the simulation of a Marine element conducting defensive operations in the targeted urban environment.

The Defense Inside the City mission in the current time frame was A detailed operation plan with appropriate selected as the base case. logistic annexes was developed for this case. Outline plans were then prepared for the remaining five missions in the current time frame. A concept plan was developed for the Defense Inside the City mission in the mid-range period and, again, outline plans were prepared for the remaining five mis-In this regard, the DOD Dictionary definition of outline plan was considered: A preliminary plan which outlines salient features of a course of action prior to initiation of detailed planning. The definition of a concept plan appears in JOPS Volume I: An operation plan in abbreviated format, i.e., the basic plan. An outline plan is prepared by the J-3/J-5(G-3/G-5) and a concept plan is prepared by the J-3/J-5 (G-3/G-5) with inputs from other staff agencies and, when required, other participants in the plan.

To distinguish between the various planning documents, plans for the current time frame are numbered Oplan 6-81 through Outline Plan 11-81 and referred to as Operation BREAKER SIX through Operation BREAKER ELEVEN. The mid-range plans are numbered Concept Plan 6-88 through Outline Plan 11-88 and are referred to as Operation MID-BREAKER SIX through Operation MID-BREAKER ELEVEN.

The summary and bibliography for this analysis are in Volume III. It should be noted that selected Marine Corps educational publications (ECPs) were used as references in each of the OPLANs. Although they are not doctrinal references, ECPs contain some source material not found in doctrinal publications but deemed important for analysts to use in devising operational and logistical concepts of operation.

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

		<u>Page</u>
OPERATION PLAN 6-81		1 to 6
ANNEX A, TASK O	RGANIZATION	A-1 to A-4
ANNEX B, INTELL	IGENCE	B-1 to B-6
	Essential Elements of Information Signals Intelligence (Limited	B-1-1 to B-1-2
Appendix 3	Distribution; to be issued separate Counterintelligence	B-3-1 to B-3-14
	Countersigns Collection Priorities and Targets	B-3-A-1 B-3-B-1 to B-3-B-3
	Target Intelligence Mapping, Charting and Geodesy	B-4-1 to B-4-2 B-5-1 to B-5-2
Tab A -	Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map Coordinates	B-5-A-1/2
Tab B -	60 Kilometer Supplemental Map Coordinates	B-5-B-1/2
Tab C -	200 Kilometer Supplemental Map Coordinates	B-5-C-1/2
Appendix 6 Appendix 7	Human Source Intelligence (Omitted) Intelligence Estimate	B-7-1 to B-7-23
Tab A -	Terrain Analysis	B-7-A-1 to B-7-A-8
Appendix 8	Tactical Study of Weather and Terrain (Omitted)	
	Beach Study (Omitted) Helicopter Landing Zone Study	B-10-1 to B-10-9
Tab A - Tab B -	Helicopter Landing Zones - Close Helicopter Landing Zones - Distant	B-10-A-1/2 B-10-B-1/2
Appendix 11	Survellance and Reconnaissance Plan	B-11-1 to B-11-2
Tab A -	Ground Reconnaissance Plan	B-11-A-1 to B-11-A-4
Enc	losure 1 - Deep Reconnaissance Missions B	-11-A-1-1 to B-11-A-1-4
Tah B -	Sensor Surveillance Plan	B-11-B-1 to B-11-B-3

# TARLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) -

<u>Page</u>

		<u>, 430</u>
Tab C -	Aerial Reconnaissance Plan	B-11-C-1 to B-11-C-3
Enc Enc	losure 1 - Aerial Imagery Plan losure 2 - Observation	B-11-C-1-1 B-11-C-2-1 to B-11-C-2-3
	Attachment A - Preplanned Aerial Obser- vation Missions	B-11-C-2-A-1 to B-11-C-2-A-2
ANNEX C, OPERAT	IONS	C-1 to C-4
Appendix 2 Appendix 3 Appendix 4	Nuclear Operations NBC Defense Electronic Warfare Psychological Operations (Omitt Unconventional Warfare (Omitted Search and Rescue (Omitted)	
Appendix 7		C-7-1 to C-7-5
	Notional Order of Battle Deception Implementation Schedu (Omitted)	C-7-A-1 le
Tab D - Tab E - Tab F -	Deception Operation Overlay Electronic Deception Measures (Omitted) Sonic Olfactory-Visual Deceptio Measures (Omitted) Notional Unit Call Sign and Frequency Plan (Omitted) Notional Unit Emission Plan (Omitted)	C-7-C-1/2 n
Appendix 8	Rules of Engagement Reconnaissance (Omitted)	C-8-1 to C-8-5
	Operations Overlay	C-10-1
	Operations Overlay Security Forces Operations Overlay Forward Defense Area and Reserve Area	C-10-A-1/2 C-10-B-1/2
Appendix 11	Concept of Operations	C-11-1 to C-11-5

# TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

	Page
Appendix 12 Fire Support	C-12-1 to C-12-5
Tab A - Air Fire Plan	C-12-A-1 to C-12-A-3
Enclosure 1 - Preplanned Close Air Support (Omitted)	
Enclosure 2 - Air Target List Enclosure 3 - Air Fire Plan	C-12-A-2-1 to C-12-A-2-2
Target Overlay	C-12-A-3-1/2
Tab B - Artillery Fire Plan	C-12-B-1 to C-12-B-3
Enclosure 1 - Target Overlay Enclosure 2 - Fire Support Table (Preparation Fires) (Om	C-12-B-1-1/2
Enclosure 3 - Fire Support Table (Groups of Fires) (Omit	·
Tab C - Naval Gunfire Plan	C-12-C-1 to C-12-C-4
Enclosure 1 - Naval Gunfire Support Operations Overlay Enclosure 2 - Schedule of Fires	C-12-C-1-1/2 C-12-C-2-1 to C-12-C-2-2
Attachment A - Schedule of Fires	
Table	C-12-C-2-A-1
Enclosure 3 - Naval Gunfire Reports ( Enclosure 4 - Radar Beacon Plan (Omit Enclosure 5 - Shore Fire Control	Omitted) ted)
Communications Enclosure 6 - Naval Gunfire Antimech Plan (Omitted)	C-12-C-5-1 nized
Tab D - Chemical Fire Plan	C-12-D-1 to C-12-D-3
Enclosure 1 - Chemical Fire Support	
Table/Target List Enclosure 2 - Chemical Target Overlay	C-12-D-1-1 C-12-D-2-1/2
Tab E - Target List Tab F - Fire Support Coordination Tab G - Fire Support Communications Plan (Omitted)	C-12-E-1 to C-12-E-4 C-12-F-1 to C-12-F-3

vii

# TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

		<u>Page</u>
	Countermechanized Fire Plan (Omitt Nuclear Fire Plan	ced) C-12-J-1 to C-12-J-4
Enc	losure 1 - Nuclear Fire Support Table/Target List losure 2 - Target Overlay losure 3 - Weapon Readiness	C-12-J-1-1 C-12-J-2-1/2 C-12-J-3-1
Tab K - Tab L -	Special Ammunition Logistics Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Fire Plan (Omitted)	C-12-K-1 to C-12-K-2
	Countermechanized Operations Obstacle Plan	C-13-1 to C-13-4 C-14-1 to C-14-3
	Overlay Barrier Location Concept Demolitions (Omitted)	C-14-A-1/2
ANNEX D, LOGIST	ICS	D-1 to D-6
Appendix 2 Appendix 3	Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply Mortuary Services Medical Services Mobility/Transportation Civil Engineering Support Plan	D-1-1 to D-1-3 D-2-1 to D-2-4 D-3-1 to D-3-4 D-4-1 to D-4-3
Appendix 6	(Omitted) Nonnuclear Ammunition	D-6-1 to D-6-3
ANNEX E, PERSON	NEL	E-1 to E-6
Appendix 1	Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons	E-1-1 to E-1-3
Appendix 2	Processing of Formerly Captured. Missing, or Detained US Personnel	E-2-1 to E-2-2

ANNEX F, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Omitted)

	Page
ANNEX G, CIVIL AFFAIRS	G-1 to G-16
Appendix 1 Task Organization Appendix 2 Public Safety	G-1-1 to G-1-2 G-2-1 to G-2-5
Tab A - Police and Penal Functions and Operations Tab B - Firefighting Operations Tab C - Public Safety Overlay	G-2-A-1 to G-2-A-3 G-2-B-1 to G-2-B-3 G-2-C-1/2
Appendix 3 Public Health and Welfare	G-3-1 to G-3-6
Tab A - SYN City Public Health Facilities	G-3-A-1 to G-3-A-3
Appendix 4 Information and Education (Omitted) Appendix 5 Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees	G-5-1 to G-5-8
Tab A - DPRE Plan	G-5-A-1/2
Appendix 6 Civil Affairs Logistics	G-6-1 to G-6-6
ANNEX H, ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (Omitted)	
ANNEX J, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS	J-1 to J-5
Appendix 1 Command Relationships Diagram	J-1-1
ANNEX K, COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS	K-1 to K-6
Appendix 1 Communications Security	K-1-1 to K-1-5
ANNEX L, OPERATIONS SECURITY (Omitted)	
ANNEX M, AIR OPERATIONS	M-1 to M-3
Appendix 1 Air Defense:/Antiair Warfare Appendix 2 Air Support Appendix 3 Assault Support (Omitted) Appendix 4 Air Control (Omitted) Appendix 5 Search and Rescue (Omitted) Appendix 6 Armament (Omitted) Appendix 7 Aircraft Schedules (Omitted)	M-1-1 to M-1-3 M-2-1 to M-2-5

		Page	2
	munications (Omitted) crations Overlay (Omitted)		
ANNEX P, COMBAT SERVICE	SUPPORT	P-1 to	P-9
Appendix 2 CSS Ove Appendix 3 CSS Ins Appendix 4 Reports Appendix 5 Bulk Fu Appendix 6 Medical Appendix 7 Enginee	tallation Defense Plan (Omitted) eel /Dental er Support Plan	P-1-1 to P-2-1 P-3-1 to P-5-1 to P-6-1 to P-7-1 to	P-3-3 P-5-5 P-6-5 P-7-5
	asks, Unit Assignments, and ies d Bridge Plan	P-7-A-1 to P-7-B-1 to P-7-C- P-7-D-1 to	P-7-B-3 -1/2
Enclosure 1 Enclosure 2	- EAF Diagram (Omitted) - Minimum Short Airfield Configuration (Omitted)		
Tab E - Control (Omitte	led Class IV Engineer Items		
Support Appendix 9 Personn Appendix 10 Support Appendix 11 Landing	ed Data Processing Systems (Omitted) el Agreements (Omitted) Force Support Party (Omitted) or Landing Supplies (Omitted)	P-9-1 to	P-9-4
ANNEX R, AMPHIBIOUS OPE	RATIONS (Omitted)		
ANNEX X, EXECUTION CHEC	KLIST (Omitted)		
ANNEX Z, DISTRIBUTION (	Omitted)		
OUTLINE PLAN 7-81, OPERATION	BREAKER SEVEN	7-1 to	7-12
Enclosure 1 - Opera Enclosure 2 - Logis		7-1- 7-2-	

....

	<u>Page</u>
OUTLINE PLAN 8-81, OPERATION BREAKER EIGHT	8-1 to 8-12
Enclosure 1 Operations Overlay Enclosure 2 Logistics Overlay	8-1-1/2 8-2-1/2
OUTLINE PLAN 9-81, OPERATION BREAKER NINE	9-1 to 9-2
OUTLINE PLAN 10-81, OPERATION BREAKER TEN	10-1 to 10-12
Enclosure 1 Operations Overlay Enclosure 2 Logistics Overlay	10-1-1/2 10-2-1/2
OUTLINE PLAN 11-81, OPERATION BREAKER ELEVEN	11-1 to 11-12
Enclosure 1 Operations Overlay Enclosure 2 Logistics Overlay	11-1-1/2 11-2-1
CONCEPT PLAN 6-88, OPERATION MID-BREAKER SIX	6-88-1 to 6-88-10
ANNEX A, TASK ORGANIZATION ANNEX B, INTELLIGENCE	6-88-A-1 to 6-88-A-4 6-88-B-1 to 6-88-B-9
Appendix 1 Situation Overlay	6-88-B-1-1/2
ANNEX C, OPERATIONS	6-88-C-1 to 6-88-C-9
Appendix 1 Operations Overlay - GOPL	6-88-C-1-1/2
Appendix 2 Operations Overlay - Forward Defens Area	6-88-C-2-1/2
ANNEX D, LOGISTICS	6-88-D-1 to 6-88-D-4
Appendix 1 Logistics Overlay	6-88-D-1-1/2
OUTLINE PLAN 7-88, OPERATION MID-BREAKER SEVEN	7-88-1 to 7-88-13
Enclosure 1 Operations Overlay Enclosure 2 Logistics Overlay	7-88-1-1/2 7-88-2-1/2
OUTLINE PLAN 8-88, OPERATION MID-BREAKER EIGHT	8-88-1 to 8-88-12
Enclosure 1 Operations Overlay Enclosure 2 Logistics Overlay	8-88-1-1/2 8-88-2-1/2

	<u>Page</u>
OUTLINE PLAN 9-88, OPERATION MID-BREAKER NINE	9-88-1 to 9-88-2
OUTLINE PLAN 10-88, OPERATION MID-BREAKER TEN	10-88-1 to 10-88-12
Enclosure 1 Operations Overlay Enclosure 2 Logistics Overlay	10-88-1-1/2 10-88-2-1/2
OUTLINE PLAN 11-88, OPERATION MID-BREAKER ELEVEN	11-88-1 to 11-88-13
Enclosure 1 Operations Overlay Enclosure 2 Logistics Overlay	11-88-1-1/2 11-88-2-1/2

# OPERATION PLAN 6-81 OPERATION BREAKER SIX

#### MISSION 2

#### DEFENSE INSIDE THE CITY

INNER DEFENSE LOCATIONS ARE SELECTED WHEN HOSTILE FORCES ARE ESPECIALLY STRONG IN LONG-RANGE FIRES FROM ARMOR AND ARTILLERY AND A DEFENDER WISHES TO LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE FIRES. STRENGTH OF THE DEFENDING FORCE MAY ALSO INFLUENCE SELECTION OF THE INNER-DEFENSE CONCEPT AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE MEASURE RESULTING IN SHORTENED DEFENSIVE LINES AND LOCs. (OH 8-7, Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain, MCDEC, Quantico, Virginia, November 1980)

#### Defensive Force Mission

のでは、100mm

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force; with priority to the Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; until follow-on forces are landed.

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981 ERI-73

Operation Plan 6-81 (Operation BREAKER SIX)

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas

- (c) LFM 04/NWP-17, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone
- (d) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
- (e) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense

Time Zone: P

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. General. This operation plan constitutes the VII Composite MAF Operation Plan 6-81 (OPLAN 6-81). It outlines the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10, the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. The unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region. This plan will be executed on order.
- b. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. See Annex B (Intelligence).

#### c. Friendly Forces

- (1) Amphibious Task Force 51 (TF 51), less several assigned ships, supports VII MAF.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force 57 (TF 57) provides air cover and support to TF 51 and VII MAF.

- (3) Follow-on forces will arrive in the MAF area of influence on or after D+30.
- (4) See Annex C (Operations).
- (5) See Annex D (Logistics).
- (6) See Annex E (Personnel).
- (7) See Annex M (Air Operations).
- d. Attachments and Detachments. Effective 261000P May 1981. See Annex A (Task Organization).

#### e. <u>Assumptions</u>

- (1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km and deploying toward the FBHL/GOPL will not be materially reinforced.
- (2) That the three Aggressor divisions will be delayed sufficiently by friendly airstrikes so that they will require approximately 48 hours to reach the GOPL.
- (3) That, aside from occasional isolated acts of sabotage, terrorism, or guerilla warfare, the populace of SYN City will not rise en masse against elements of VII MAF.

₹ ...

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force; with priority to the Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; until follow-on forces are landed.

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. <u>Concept of Operations</u>. See Appendix 11 (Concept of Operations) to Annex C (Operations).

#### b. Tasks

- (1) GOP, Northern Sector: Task Force A
  - (a) Establish northern portion of VII MAF general outpost by 261000P May 1981.
  - (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the FEBA from the north and northwest.

- (c) Delay the Aggressor forces as far forward of the FEBA as possible for at least 24 hours.
- (d) Recommend to CG VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
- (e) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission, on order, assume mission of MAF reserve.

#### (2) GOP, Southern Sector: Task Force B

- (a) Establish southern portion of VII MAF general outpost by 261000P May 1981.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the FEBA from the south and southwest.
- (c) Delay the Aggressor forces as far forward of the FEBA as possible for at least 24 hours.
- (d) Recommend to CG VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for with-drawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
- (e) Subsequent to termination of GOP Southern Sector mission, detach Co C, 7th Recon Bn to parent unit. On order, revert to opcon of 3rd Marines.

# (3) 7th MARDIV (-)(Rein)

- (a) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration, or penetration in force.
- (b) Prepare blocking positions to protect Airfields 1 and 2 and CSSAs 1 and 2.
- (c) Provide units to GOP in accordance with Annex A (Task Organization).
- (d) Notify this headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (e) Notify this headquarters of the deployment of division units to assigned blocking positions or the commitment of division reserves; contain enemy penetrations for counterattacking force.
- (f) Support withdrawal of GOP forces through FEBA in northern and southern sectors.

(g) Prepare plans for artillery raids forward of GOP and between FEBA and GOP; be prepared to execute plans on order.

#### (4) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 261000P May 1981; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Designate TADC as TACC on order. Be prepared to implement coordination of air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA) when so designated by the unified commander.
- (c) Conduct air operations in accordance with the provisions of Annex B (Intelligence) and Annex M (Air Operations).
- (d) Provide support to 1st Force Recon Co as directed.
- (e) Provide helicopter lift and other air support to GOP as requested.
- (f) Be prepared to provide helicopter lift and other air support to 7th MARDIV for artillery raids behind the FEBA or GOP.
- (g) Priority of air support initially GOP northern and southern sectors.
- (h) Be prepared to redeploy selected aviation combat units and aircraft from the SYN City area to Theater Air Bases (TABs) and to conduct air operations in support of VII MAF from TABs.
- (5) <u>lst Force Reconnaissance Company</u>. Conduct deep reconnaissance missions in accordance with provisions contained in Annex B (Intelligence).

# (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.
- (b) See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

- c. MAF Reserve. When the forces assigned as MAF Reserve are committed, lesser engaged units will be designated as the Reserve.
  - (1) 1st Tank Bn (-)
    - (a) Be prepared to assume Operational Control (OPCON) of the 1st Bn. (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines, and conduct mobile strike force operations south of South River to destroy Aggressor penetrations of the forward defensive area or phase lines COBRA, HABU, or PYTHON.
    - (b) Be prepared to detach 1st Bn. (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines to Operational Control (OPCON) of CO, 3rd Marines.
    - (c) Be prepared to deploy 1st Bn. (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines, by LVT or helicopter, anywhere inside the FEBA to reinforce main defensive forces.
    - (d) Prepare plans to deploy across South River to the northern sector; be prepared to execute plans on order. Submit bridging, rafting, or other requirements to this headquarters As Soon As Possible (ASAP).
    - (e) Be prepared to revert to OPCON of CG, 7th MARDIV.
- d. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) Contact left to right.
  - (2) EEIs: Annex B (Intelligence).
  - (3) All units be prepared to conduct offensive operations beyond the FEBA.
  - (4) See Appendix 12 (Counterattack Plan) to Annex C (Operations).
  - (5) VII MAF will control GOP operations separately in the northern and southern sectors.
  - (6) The code name for this operation is BREAKER SIX.
  - (7) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the amphibious assault on 15 May.
  - (8) This plan is effective on order.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex D (Logistics) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- b. Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).
- c. Command Posts
  - (1) See Appendix 10 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations).
  - (2) Subordinate units report changes in locations of displaced command posts once established ashore.

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### ANNEXES:

- A Task Organization
- B Intelligence
- C Operations
- D Logistics
- E Personnel
- F Public Affairs (Omitted)
- G Civil Affairs
- H Environmental Services (Omitted)
- J Command Relationships
- K Communications-Electronics
- L Operations Security (Omitted)
- M Air Operations
- P Combat Service Support
- R Amphibious Operations (Omitted)
- X Execution Checklist (Omitted)
- Z Distribution (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no.

of

copies

```
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
                                     (VII MAF)
                                     SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
                                     250830P May, 1981
ANNEX A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 6-81
Ref: (a) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
Time Zone: P (All attachments effective 261000P May)
VII MAF
                                               Lt Gen JONES
     H&S Co., VII MAF
     Radio Bn
     Special Security Communications Grp. (2 Tms)
     C I Grp. (4 Tms)
     Topographic Plt.
     Communications Bn.
     4th Civil Affairs Grp.
     FIIU
     7th FSSG
          H&S Bn.
          Supply Bn.
          Maint. Bn.
          Engr. Support Bn.
          LS Bn
          MT Bn
          Medical Bn.
          Dental Bn.
     Naval Support Forces
          Division Beach Party
          Mobile Construction Regt.
          Cargo Handling/Port Terminal Unit
     GOP: Northern Sector, TF A
                                                    Lt Col SHUFORD
          2nd Tk Bn (Rein)
          2nd Bn. 1st Marines (-)
          Composite Artillery Bn
               5th Bn, 10th Marines (2-8" SP HOW Btrys)
               Btry D, 1st Bn, 10th Marines (1 Btry 155mm HOW (T))
          Co A (Rein), 1st AAV Bn
          Co A (-) (Rein), 7th Cbt Engr Bn
Det, FSSG (Maint/Supply/Marg Terr Veh)
          1st Sec, 1st Plt, FAAD Btry (D/S)
```

```
Lt Col WHITE
     GOP: Southern Sector, TF B
           1st Tk Bn (Rein)
           1st Bn, 2nd Marines
           Composite Artillery Bn
           4th Bn, 10th Marines (2-155mm HOW (SP) Btrys)
Btry H, 2nd Bn, 10th Marines (1 Btry 155mm HOW (T))
Co B (Rein), 1st AAV Bn
           Co B (-) (Rein), 7th Cbt Engr Bn
           Det, FSSG (Maint/Supply/Marg Terr Veh)
           1st Sec, 1st Plt, FAAD Btry (D/S)
7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)
                                                  Maj Gen SELFRIDGE
     Hq. Bn., 7th MARDIV
     1st Marines (3 Bns)
     2nd Marines (2 Bns)
     3rd Marines (3 Bns)
     10th Marines
     7th Combat Engr. Bn.
     1st Assault Amphib. Bn.
     1st Recon. Bn.
     2nd Tk Bn (Attached)
1st Force Recon. Co.
                                                  Maj DUNNING
7th MAW (Forward)
                                                  Maj Gen MOORE
     HQ., 7th MAW
     MWHS 7
     MACG 18
     H&HS 18
           MASS 2
           MACS/MTDS 4
           MACS/MTDS 18
           MWCS 18
           MATCS 1
           2nd LAAM Bn.
           1st FAAD Btry.
     Det. MWSG 17
          Hq. Sqdn. 17
WES 17
           MT Sqdn.
     MAG (VH) 36
           H&MS 36
           MABS 36
           HML 367
           HMA 369
           HMM 261
           HMM 262
```

```
HMM 164
     HMM 165
      HMH 464
HMH 363
MAG (VH) 26
     H&MS 26
     MABS 26
      HMA 269
      HMM 161
      HMM 163
      HMM 263
      HMM 264
      HMH 461
      HMH 462
      HMH 463
MAG (VF/VA) 15
      H&MS 15
     MABS 15
      VMFA 115
      VMFA 232
      VMA (AW) 224
      VMO 1
      VMA (V) 1
MAG VF/VA) 24
H&MS 24
     MABS 24
     VMFA 333
     VMFA 122
     VMFA 451
     VMFA 212
     VMA (V) 513
MAG (VF/VA) 14
     H&MS 14
     MABS 14
     VMFA 312
     VMA (AW) 533
     VMA (AW) 332
     VMA (V) 542
```

#### Theater-Based Aviation (7th MAW Rear)

Det VMFP 3 Det VMAQ 2 VMGR 152 VMGR 352

# VII MAF Reserve

Lt Col WHITE

1st Tk Bn (-) (Rein) 1st Bn, 2nd Marines Co B, 1st AAV Bn Co B, 7th Cbt Engr Bn

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

A-4

JNCLASSIFIED

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000, 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map, 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

(c) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action (d) FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance

(e) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense

(f) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Intelligence (Constructive)

(g) Synthetic (SYN) City Information Book

(h) Annex B (Intelligence) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

#### 1. INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

- a. <u>Mission</u>. To collect, analyze and process information and disseminate intelligence to facilitate the accomplishment of VII MAF and subordinate element missions in defense of the SYN City area.
- b. Concept of Operations. All intelligence data collected for Operation BREAKER SIX and generated by or made available to VII MAF will be disseminated to appropriate subordinate units of VII MAF by daily INTSUM in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f). EEI of critical importance will be disseminated by FLASH message or by air courier services provided for by 7th MAW. All subordinate units of VII MAF are integral elements of the intelligence collection effort and will report data as set forth in paragraph 4, below, in consonance with reporting procedures established in reference (f).

#### c. Intelligence Support Available

- (1) Unified Commander (CINCPAC) provides Daily Intelligence Summaries (DISUMS); data provided in response to VII MAF EEI by FLASH or OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE precedence as appropriate.
- (2) Commander Attack Carrier Striking Force 57 (CTF 57) provides visual, multisensor imagery and electronic aerial reconnaissance and surveillance support in response to requests for

EEI and in accordance with provisions contained in Appendix 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan).

#### 2. SITUATION

- a. Characteristics of Weather and Area of Operations. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate).
- b. <u>Summary of Enemy Situation</u>. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate).
- c. <u>Estimate of Enemy Capabilities</u>. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate).
- 3. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. See reference (f).
- 4. ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS
  - a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units
    - (1) GOP, Northern Sector: Task Force A
      - (a) Conduct reconnaissance to the northwest and north up to 75km beyond the GOP and establish observation over Aggressor forces.
      - (b) Capture Aggressor prisoners and interrogate for information on enemy OOB, nuclear capabilities, and reinforcements.
    - (2) GOP Southern Sector: Task Force B
      - (a) Conduct reconnaissance to the southwest up to 75km beyond the GOP and establish observation over Aggressor forces.

100

- (b) Capture Aggressor prisoners and interrogate for information on enemy OOB, nuclear capabilities, and evidence of any preparation for airborne operations.
- (3) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company
  - (a) Conduct reconnaissance of South River inland to at least 100km.
  - (b) Establish observation posts on the mountain ranges NW, WNW, WSW and S of the GOP and maintain surveillance over the avenues of approach to SYN City.
  - (c) Be prepared to move to alternate or supplementary positions, as directed, to establish LP/OPs.

- (d) Be prepared to stay behind, if Aggressor forces move to attack the GOP, and continue reporting on movements, reinforcements, and other threats to VII MAF.
- (e) Be prepared for helicopter redeployment or evacuation or for exfiltration on foot.

#### (4) 7th MARDIV

- (a) Conduct reconnaissance within sectors of responsibility to the GOP; subsequent areas of reconnaissance responsibility to be assigned.
- (b) Capture Aggressor prisoners taken during reconnaissance operations and interrogate for enemy 00B information, nuclear capabilities, combat support, and combat service support capabilities.
- (c) Maintain surveillance over indigenous population in assigned sector and report unusual activity, sabotage efforts, or indications of major unrest or uprising.

#### (5) 7th MAW

- (a) Conduct preplanned visual, photographic, and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance missions in accordance with responsibilities assigned in Appendix 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan).
- (b) Be prepared to conduct other surveillance and reconnaissance missions as directed.
- (c) Conduct ECM support operations in accordance with responsibilities assigned in Appendix 3 (Electronic Warfare) to Annex C (Operations).
- (6) 7th Force Service Support Group. Report, as observed, evidence of civilian support of enemy forces with particular emphasis placed on support of unconventional warfare activities.

### (7) 4th Civil Affairs Group

- (a) Establish close contact with and surveillance of local government officials and persons/agencies participating in food distribution programs.
- (b) Maintain and report up-to-date assessments of public and private attitudes, problem areas of concern to the

MAF, and any potential for spontaneous or deliberate sabotage, civic disorder, or overtly hostile acts by the populace.

- (c) Identify and develop rosters of indigenous personnel for possible screening to serve as interpreters or informants or to conduct special operations as directed by this headquarters.
- (d) Be prepared to recruit personnel who have been screened and approved by intelligence or psychological agencies.
- (e) Maintain continuous liaison and exchange of information with the ACofS, G-2.

#### b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Supporting Units

- (1) Commander Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57)
  - (a) Provide aerial photography of southern Aggressorland in accordance with specifications set forth in Appendix 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan).
  - (b) Provide current and predicted weather data to supplement VII MAF weather forecasts.
  - (c) Provide data as obtained on the movement of additional enemy forces toward the GOP.
  - (d) Provide information as obtained on Aggressor tactical airlift, air cushion vehicles, and naval forces.

#### c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Priority of collection efforts will be directed toward the collection of data to satisfy the EEI contained in Appendix 1 (Essential Elements of Information).
- (2) Report information as obtained on Aggressor NBC weapon employment, airborne force deployments, and armor/mechanized forces.
- (3) Other data collection efforts will be assigned as the tactical situation develops and as directed.

#### 5. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Material
  - (1) Prisoners of war, deserters, repatriates, and civilian internees will be handled in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f) and Annex E (Personnel).
  - (2) Captured documents and material will be handled in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).

#### b. Reports

- (1) Subordinate units will continue to provide INTSUMS for successive six-hour periods and will disseminate INTSUMS in accordance with Annex Z (Distribution). Reference (f) applies.
- (2) MAF PERINTSUMS will continue to be provided by 2000 daily with distribution made to all CPs to battalion/squadron level. Reference (f) applies.
- (3) DISUMS will continue to be transmitted by 2400 daily with an "as of" time for information content of 2245. Reference (f) applies.
- c. <u>Aerial Photography</u>. Submit requests and reports in accordance with provisions contained in Appendix 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan).
- d. Reconnaissance and Observation. Accomplished by VII MAF units as set forth in Appendix 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

#### APPENDIXES:

- 1 Essential Elements of Information
  2 Signals Intelligence (Limited distribution; to be issued separately).
  3 Counterintelligence
- 4 Target Intelligence
- 5 Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
- 6 Human Source Intelligence (Omitted)
- 7 Intelligence Estimate
- 8 Tactical Study of Terrain and Weather (Omitted)
- 9 Beach Study (Omitted) 10 Helicopter Landing Zone Study
- 11 Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Essential Elements of Information) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

Time Zone: P

#### 1. INDIGENOUS POPULATION CONSIDERATIONS

- a. Identify existence, source and level of supply, and level of training of insurgents/guerrillas within the SYN City population.
- b. Identify groups within the population of SYN City that pose a potential threat to friendly operations, would oppose the continuation of MAF operations within SYN City and southern Aggressorland, or would support insurgents/guerrillas.

#### 2. ENEMY MILITARY UNIT CONSIDERATIONS

- a. Determine strength and disposition of enemy pockets of resistance near the FBHL.
- b. Determine the existence and extent of continued or potential enemy unconventional and psychological operations within SYN City particularly as Aggressor reinforcements close on the AOA.
- c. Determine the existence and extent of continued counterintelligence activities in the AOA.

#### 3. ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITIES

THE REPORT OF THE PROPERTY OF

- a. Determine the number and location of enemy tactical airlift and current disposition and activity of airborne units.
- Determine the location and current activity of enemy naval forces with particular emphasis on air cushion vehicles.
- c. Determine the deployment, current activities, supply-support status, movement, and morale of Aggressor divisions in southern Aggressorland.

- d. Determine the nature and extent of enemy barrier activity identified northwest and southwest of SYN City.
- e. Determine the existence, nature, and extent of enemy sea or beach mining north and south of SYN City from E105-N107 to E118-N200 and from E103.5-N93 to E90-N5 on the 200 km supplemental map.

#### 4. ENEMY OOB

- a. Determine new weapons technology and supporting doctrine for units outside the AOA.
- b. Determine enemy tactical air support capabilities.
- c. Determine the location and status of artillery and surface-tosurface rocket and missile systems capable of interfering with the defense and security of MAF installations within the FBHL.
- d. Determine the location and status of surface-to-air missile systems capable of interfering with friendly air operations within the AOA.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID
Colonel, US Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

L:

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 3 (Counterintelligence) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 2-4, Counterintelligence
  - (d) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Counterintelligence (Constructive)
  - (e) Annex B (Intelligence) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81
  - (f) OPNAVINST 5510.1F
  - (g) OPNAVINST 5510.48G
  - (h) MCO 3850.1E
  - (i) MCO 05511.11

Time Zone:

Ρ

#### PURPOSE

To provide planning guidance concerning procedures and responsibilities of commanders for counterintelligence activities within their area of responsibility.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF plans and implements those measures designed to discover, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness of actual or potential hostile intelligence, sabotage, and subversive activities by Aggressor forces in southern Aggressorland, and small units or remnants, DPRE or the general populace within SYN City, and provides necessary counterintelligence protection for VII MAF information, personnel, and installations.

#### 3. EXECUTION

#### a. ACofS, G-2

- (1) Plan and supervise VII MAF Counterintelligence Plan.
- (2) Maintain liaison with NIS and other investigative services, as appropriate.
- (3) Expand the current HUMINT plan to the maximum degree possible.

(4) Provide CI direct support to 7th MAR DIV, 7th MAW (Forward), and 7th FSSG as directed; provide CI general support to VII MAF.

### b. 4th CAG

- (1) Identify key Aggressor and SYN City officials and provide biographic data to VII MAF ACofS, G-2 as obtained.
- (2) Report identities and locations of all DPRE that are actual or potential enemy agents, saboteurs, or subversives.
- (3) Report status and assure that adequate security is provided for military and civil government archives and other sources of intelligence/counterintelligence information.

## c. 7th Communication Battalion (7th Comm Bn)

- (1) Report all intelligence information acquired while supervising or controlling public communications, public safety nets, and other governmental communications.
- (2) Be prepared to assume control of the SYN City telephone system and the separate telephone system in the naval station; through control of the telephone exchange and switchboards, deny the use of all telephone communications by indigenous persons except as authorized by this headquarters; within capabilities, monitor telephone communications and report information of counterintelligence interest as obtained.

\* ....

### d. CI Team A

- (1) Conduct counterintelligence survey of western sector of metropolitan limits of SYN City and recommend measures to establish counterreconnaissance screens and protect against espionage, sabotage and subversion.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct preliminary CI screening of any additional civilians that may be evacuated.
- (3) Direct support of 7th MAR DIV on order.

### e. CI Team B

- (1) Conduct counterintelligence survey and technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) of Airfield 1 and surrounding area, to include ASP, and recommend measures to establish counterreconnaissance screens and protect against espionage, sabotage and subversion.
- (2) Request TSCM support, if necessary.
- (3) Direct support of 7th MAW (Forward) on order.

### f. CI Team C

- (1) Conduct active and passive counterintelligence operations in 7th FSSG area of operations.
- (2) Continue screening DPRE in assembly areas.
- (3) Direct support of 7th FSSG on order.

### g. CI Team D

- (1) General support of VII MAF.
- (2) Continue screening civilian internees and POWs.
- (3) Be prepared to augment CI Teams A and C in screening DPRE.
- (4) Collect and maintain information to identify, locate, and recover friendly personnel captured, missing (nonhostile), and missing in action.
- (5) Debrief all friendly personnel returning to VII MAF custody after having been captured, MIA, or unaccountably absent.
- (6) Maintain liaison with SYN City law enforcement agencies in coordination with ACofS, G-2 and CO, 4th CAG.

### h. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Staff counterintelligence officer exercises control and assignment of CI teams as principal advisor to ACofS, G-2.
- (2) Teams operate in general support of VII MAF in assigned areas of responsibility, prepared to revert to direct support of resident units, if directed, in which case teams respond to tasking by those units.

- (3) Counterintelligence threat is high.
- (4) Report by the most expeditious means using the most secure system or means available.
- (5) Priority to gaining information of civilian uprisings, plans for sabotage or subversion, and threats to sensitive areas, particularly special weapons storage sites.
- (6) Report violations of security/OPSEC and laxity in handling/transmitting classified materials.
- (7) All subordinate units of VII MAF will establish physical security such as guards, roadblocks, checkpoints, roving patrols, OPs, etc., to deny access by unauthorized persons to unit positions or areas.
- (8) Insofar as possible, use will be made of existing cover, public and private structures, wooded areas, etc., to deny Aggressor observation by aerial reconnaissance. Appropriate camouflage screens and techniques will be used to provide concealment from observation when covered facilities are not available or their use is not feasible.
- (9) CI violations will be corrected expeditiously.
- 4. MILITARY SECURITY. Reference (d).
  - a. Safeguarding Military Information and Equipment
    - (1) Use of couriers will be stressed.
    - (2) No civilians will be permitted in sight of any encryption/decrytion devices. ASPs and bulk fuel farms will be defended in depth, and civilians will be prevented from approaching or entering all Class III and V facilities.
    - (3) Pickup of relief supplies by approved civil agencies will be accomplished only under the direct supervision of the issuing unit, which is responsible for local security, prevention of sabotage, and prevention of theft.
  - b. Security of Troop Movements and Concentrations
    - (1) Conduct tactical and logistic operations as required, major movements during darkness or inclement weather if feasible.
    - (2) Make maximum use of covered routes for movement and provide alternate routing for repeated moves where possible.

- (3) Place all static positions and perform functions under natural cover or inside appropriate structures insofar as possible.
- (4) Report hostile acts against troop movements, positions, CPs, and other facilities and installations.
- Countersigns. Tab A (Countersigns).

### d. Communication Security

- (1) PARKHILL secure voice equipment will be required for JINTACCS OED circuits.
- (2) Circuits using PARKHILL will operate in the secure mode at all times.
- (3) Air and vehicular messenger service will be established to minimize radio transmissions.
- (4) Commanders holding crypto material will provide physical safeguards and will prepare and maintain emergency destruction, evacuation, and disaster plans.
- (5) Net control stations (NCS) or senior commanders in a free net will exercise strict, positive net control to prevent disclosure of sensitive and classified information.
- (6) Indigenous personnel will <u>NOT</u> be permitted access to any sensitive or classified facility under any circumstances.

### e. <u>Counterespionage</u>

- (1) CG VII MAF will exercise overall coordination of counterespionage efforts through ACofS, G-2 and CI Team D.
- (2) Unit commanders are responsible for denying opportunities for the enemy and indigenous persons to conduct espionage activities in their areas of responsibility.

### f. Countersabotage

(1) Sabotage is a principal weapon of guerrillas and partisan groups and is an increasing threat to rear area logistic installations.

(2) Unit commanders will develop comprehensive defensive plans and physical security to protect their units, equipment, and facilities. Aggressive patrolling and other active measures will also be taken to deny the opportunity to penetrate and attack friendly installations.

### g. Countersubversion

- (1) POWs and civilian internees (CI) will be held in the SYN City prison, thus limiting their capabilities to direct or support subversive actions. Civilian guards retained at the prison to oversee the inmates will NOT be permitted access to cell blocks or other areas of the prison where POW/CI are being held.
- (2) DPRE will be screened, and rescreened as required, to detect potential subversives, but the minimal security accorded to their assembly areas will not be adequate to detect or prevent subversive activities by any DPRE that are permitted to leave designated assembly areas on MAF-approved business. Security forces assigned to the DPRE assembly areas will rigidly enforce detention provisions and will verify the authenticity of all civilian passes that permit entry or departure.

### h. Special Handling of POWs of Counterintelligence Interest

- (1) ACofS, G-2 in coordination with VII MAF Provost Marshal will identify, segregate, and provide for interrogating POWs of counterintelligence interest.
- (2) Priority for interrogation: Tab B (Collection Priorities and Targets).
- (3) Unit commanders capturing or taking custody of POWs that are of counterintelligence interest will report that fact to AC of S, G-2 by rapid and absolutely secure means, giving name, grade, other identification, condition of the POW, and basis for concluding that there is CI interest.
- (4) Dissemination of information gained will be made on a needto-know basis as determined by CG VII MAF.

### Special Handling of Enemy Agents

(1) Enemy agents are most likely to exist among officials in SYN City and the bulk of the population that has not been evacuated.

- (2) Penetration of Aggressor cells or functions in SYN City will be accomplished by special counterintelligence support assets; VII MAF CI units will NOT attempt any such penetration without specific, case-by-case approval by this headquarters.
- (3) Aggressor military or civilian personnel suspected of being agents will be reported immediately to VII MAF, ACofS, G-2, and discrete surveillance will be maintained over suspects until action has been taken by appropriate CI teams.
- (4) Once taken into custody, enemy agents will be interrogated and safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of references (c) and (d).
- j. <u>Security Control of Visitors and Press Representatives</u>
  - (1) Reference (d) applies.
  - (2) Visits by Members of Congress, official US or UN delegations, or other distinguished visitors will be coordinated by VII MAF Public Affairs Officer.
  - (3) All briefings or other disclosure of information will be provided by the Command Information Bureau (CIB), in coordination with ACofS, G-2.
  - (4) Security at the source will be emphasized.

### k. Reports of Security Violations

- (1) Correct violations as they occur, reporting nature and circumstances to cognizant unit commander.
- (2) Report to this headquarters serious violations that endanger tactical or logistic operations, threaten life or general security, or provide the enemy with intelligence information.
- 1. <u>Counterintelligence Targets</u>. Tab B (Collection Priorities and Targets).

### 5. CIVIL SECURITY

## a. Registration of Civilians

- (1) Existing civilian registration system remains in effect and current photo identification cards are adequate for routine identification purposes.
- (2) Civilian registration cards do  $\underline{NOT}$  authorize access to any VII MAF installations.

### b. Control of Circulation

- (1) VII MAF photo identification cards have been issued to selected civilian officials. These cards do not permit blanket admission to VII MAF facilities; rather, access requirements and rosters are prescribed at each individual facility or installation.
- (2) Indigenous persons will not be permitted to leave assembly areas or areas that have been cordoned off, nor will they be permitted past check points, road blocks, roving patrols, or other security posts without specific authorization from VII MAF ACofS, G-1; ACofS, G-2; CO 4th CAG; or CG, 7th FSSG.
- (3) Unit commanders will limit all traffic of VII MAF personnel to that which is essential to mission accomplishment.
- (4) Stragglers without bona fide authorization will be detained by apprehending authorities who will immediately report the circumstances to VII MAF ACofS, G-1.

### c. Passes and Permits

(1) The following may authorize issue of VII MAF passes and permits:

ACOFS, G-1: ACOFS, G-2: CO, 4th CAG: CG, 7th FSSG

(2) Subordinate units submit requests for issue of civilian passes or permits, as required, to the appropriate authorizing authority.

### d. Curfew

(1) Civilian curfew continues in effect: all civilians off the streets from 1800 to 0800. Violators will be apprehended and attempted evaders will be shot.

(2) Exceptions to curfew may be ordered by this headquarters to permit civilian officials to implement food relief and other emergency support during darkness, if the tactical situation so dictates. Such exceptions will be communicated to appropriate unit comanders together with a description of security measures and proper credentials.

### e. <u>Labor</u>

- (1) CI Team C will screen files and records of the local labor bureau and other labor-oriented organizations to identify labor leaders, work-bosses, and laborers for possible labor support of VII MAF requirements.
- (2) 7th FSSG, in coordination with ACofS, G-2, schedules, and coordinates all civilian labor activities and provides or arranges for appropriate security, supervision and control of labor gangs.
- (3) Unit commanders using civilian labor are responsible for security and for taking measures to prevent sabotage or espionage.
- (4) Report labor incidents of potential counterintelligence interest to this headquarters (ACofS, G-2) by the most expeditious and secure means.

## f. Communication Monitoring

(1) Communications systems consist of TV, major radio (4 stations); minor government and public service, commercial, common carrier, aeronautical, maritime, amateur, and citizens band (CB). The TV station and two radio stations were damaged severely and are not expected to be operable until after follow-on forces arrive and extensive repairs can be made. The remaining two radio stations are under the control of the 4th CAG (Public Communication Team) and are used in support of the CA civil information program. Government and public service equipment is used by local authorities under VII MAF monitoring and supervision. Other minor radio systems are too numerous to be controlled effectively but they are monitored on a broad random basis by a team of the Special Communications Security Group.

- (2) Telephone service is strictly controlled. Public phones, such as those at stores, markets, public buildings, and schools, are all operator-assisted and no calls are permitted except official business calls from schools or other facilities in which evacuees are billeted. Government and commercial installations have dial phones, and these have been put in commission on a selective basis with random monitoring. The separate phone system in the naval station is operable and is used exclusively by VII MAF units.
- (3) Enemy military or civilian efforts to gain and transmit intelligence are simplified because of their knowledge of the city and its communication systems. They can easily tap telephone communications and intercept our military radio communications. The numbers of private and commercial radio transceivers and experienced communications personnel facilitate these kinds of efforts. Assume that all radio and telephone transmissions are being monitored by the enemy.

## g. Diplomatic Personnel Control

- (1) Neutral, friendly, and hostile diplomats will be accorded courteous treatment at all times.
- (2) Hostile diplomats will be segregated as soon as possible; after initial screening and verification of their status by CI personnel, these diplomats will be evacuated to an appropriate ship in accordance with CATF 51 instructions.
- (3) Neutral and friendly diplomats will be screened, given the opportunity to provide intelligence information, and evacuated to an appropriate ship in accordance with CATF 51 instructions.
- (4) Diplomatic personnel and their families will be escorted at all times, coordinated by CO 4th CAG and ACofS, G-1.

### h. Security Control of DPRE

(1) Civilians placed in assembly areas will not be permitted to leave those areas unless given authorization to do so in the form of a VII MAF special pass and photo ID card issued by ACofS, G-1; ACofS, G-2; CO 4th CAG; or CG, 7th FSSG.

- (2) CO, 4th CAG will assure that DPRE rosters are prepared and kept current at each assembly area.
- (3) Relief supplies will be delivered to assembly areas by local agencies; delivery and unloading will be supervised by VII MAF personnel to prevent theft or exchange of contraband.
- (4) Sick call may be held at assembly areas or at nearby clinics; in the latter case, civilians will be escorted by one or more MPs or other Marines, but the number of individuals in any one group will be limited to that which can safely be monitored by available escort personnel.

## i. Interrogation and Detention Centers

- (1) Interrogation facilities will be designated in or near each DPRE assembly area (ACofS, G-2/OIC CI Team D).
- (2) VII MAF Provost Marshal controls SYN City prison, provides or arranges for proper security guards and security measures, and provides interrogation facilities for use by MP, CI, and G-2 interrogators, as required, for interrogating POWs and civilian internees.

## j. Control and Utilization of Civilian Police Agencies

- (1) Approximately 75% of the SYN City police force responds to the orders and direction of the Police and Justice Commission. Local police appear to be cooperating in the maintenance of law and order, prevention of looting, and security of assembly areas.
- (2) The augmentation Public Safety Team (Police) of 4th CAG monitors and coordinates civilian police activities.
- (3) Local police have assisted in relocating evacuees, and their cooperation is expected in the event additional evacuation is decreed for the western suburbs.
- (4) Police assistance at major fires has helped limit damage and casualties; that assistance will be essential in VII MAFs defense of SYN City.

## k. Prohibited, Regulated, and Restricted Areas

(1) Civilians will <u>NOT</u> be permitted in CPs, CSSA 1 and 2, ASPs, or Airfield areas, except as provided herein.

- (2) Civilian labor gangs may be used in CSSAs after proper screening and provision, by the requesting unit, of appropriate security.
- (3) Exception may be made to the "No Civilians" rule in the main port area, nonsensitive areas of CSSA 2, and container marshalling yard by CG 7th FSSG if use of civilian specialists is deemed necessary to facilitate effective combat service support.
- (4) Access to electric power stations, water purification plants, and primary sewerage treatment will be strictly regulated to prevent sabotage; only authorized US military and designated (screened) SYN City public service personnel may be admitted to these sensitive areas.
- (5) VII MAF personnel will <u>NOT</u> fraternize with the local populace. All civilian-occupied areas, buildings, and other facilities are <u>OFF LIMITS</u> to military personnel except for those duly authorized to conduct liaison for official purposes. Special passes will be issued to identify individuals so authorized.
- 1. <u>Counterintelligence Target Lists</u>. Tab B (Collection Priorities and Targets).

### 6. EMBARKATION SECURITY

- a. Embarkation will generally occur in the main port area (CSSA 1) or the naval station, both of which are under the jurisdiction of CG, 7th FSSG.
- b. Harbor traffic is controlled by CTG 51.7, Amphibious Task Force Administration Group.
- c. Merchant seamen are not permitted ashore.
- d. All pilots are provided by TG 51.7.
- e. Civilian laborers used as stevedores and dockhands must be screened before being admitted to the port area and kept under security observation while in the port area.
- f. Commanders of all ships and craft are responsible for providing lookouts to detect or prevent swimmer attacks or other acts of sabotage. Dockside security and roving patrols provided by CG, 7th FSSG.

g. Report security problems or violations to port control office in dock area.

### 7. CENSORSHIP

- a. Unless otherwise directed, there will be no unit, area, or field press censorship.
- b. This headquarters will conduct briefings for news correspondents as required. Subordinate commanders will be prepared to provide similar briefings on request.
- c. Nonreleasable information includes all data with a security classification, information or indications of pending military operations, intelligence data and sources, and casualty information not specifically provided to the media. Photographers will be advised that taking photographs of classified material is in violation of federal law and that Federal Criminal Statutes 18 USC 795 and 797 may render them liable for criminal prosecution.
- d. All communications from Aggressor POWs and civilian internees, if permitted, will be censored by CI Team D.
- e. The indigenous postal system will not be restored to operation prior to the arrival of follow-on forces, therefore, no censorship of civilian mail will be required by VII MAF.
- f. All public TV, radio and press in SYN City are controlled by VII MAF. These media agencies are used in the civil information program, and all public service functions are controlled by CO, 4th CAG.

### 8. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

- a. Limited distribution.
- b. Special CI operations will be undertaken only with authorization from this headquarters.
- c. Requests for special CI support, investigations, or operations to this headquarters in accordance with reference (d).

### 9. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Counterintelligence will be integrated into intelligence planning and activities at all levels of command. Direct liaison is authorized between agencies in the intelligence/counterintelligence communities to prevent duplication of effort.

- b. Counterintelligence reports will be submitted through normal channels in standard formats as prescribed in references (c) and (d).
- c. Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICF) will be requested from this headquarters (Attn: ACofS, G-2). Specify type currency, amount, purpose and expected results.
- d. Subordinate commanders will identify and request special CI support requirements that cannot be satisfied by Marine Corps assets. Submit requirements by secure communications systems or by courier.
- e. Urgent requests for interpreter/translator support to this headquarters (ACofS, G-2) giving full justification.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

82 ....

#### TABS:

○ 関係はおいたという。 日間になることになることは、関系のできるできます。 関係なる

A - Countersigns

B - Collection Priorities and Targets

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

of copies Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB A (Countersigns) to APPENDIX 3 (Counterintellience) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 2-4, Counterintelligence (b) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Counterintelligence (Constructive)

P Time Zone:

CODE	CHALLENGE	PASSWORD
01	Green	Mist
02	Fresh	Wind
03	Muddy	Bush
04	Soft	Hill
05	Blue	Ground
06	Fine	Leaves
07	Strong	Air
08	Gentle	Water
09	Steep	Rain
10	Black	Trail

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

(A.C.12)

Constitution

となって 日 とうこうじょうけん

•

TAB B (Collection Priorities and Targets) to APPENDIX 3 (Counterintelligence) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map FMFM 2-4, Counterintelligence (Constructive) Ref: (a)

**a**0

Time Zone:

PERSONALITY/INSTALLATION: OPERATION BREAKER SIX

AGENCIES	VII MAF	1st Marines
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AGENCIES	Complete screening DPRE; priority to developing black and white lists.	Conduct civilian 1st screening, counter- Marines sabotage, and counterreconnais- sance operations.
SUBTEAM	1, 3/8	3/A
PRIORITY	-	
LOCATION/DESCRIPTION	University of Schools near CSSA 1 and 2 and Airfields 1 and 2.	Coastal Community Centered at E105-N114 low density populated area of approximately l sq. km. 1/
TARGET	Refugee/Evacuee Assembly Areas	Coastal Community
TARGET		~

B-3-B-1

AGENCIES	2nd Marines er- a- to	3rd Marines	3rd Marines	2nd Marines 10th Marines
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AGENCIES	Conduct civilian 2nd screening, counter- Marines sabotage, and counter-reconnaissance operations. Screen civilian labor at industrial complex to be used as MAF storage facility.	Conduct civilian 3rd screening, counter- Marines sabotage, and counterreconnais-sance operations.	Conduct civilian 3rd screening, counter- Marines sabotage, and counterreconnais-sance operations.	Conduct counter- sabotage operations and screen popula- lation for partisans.
SUBTEAM MISSION	2/A	4/A	4/8	1, 3/8
PRIORITY	<b>-</b>	1	8	~
LOCATION/DESCRIPTION	Centered at E69-N103.8 low density populated area of approximately 4 sq. km. <u>1</u> /	Civilian Community Centered at E60-N3.5 Low density populated area of approximately 30 sq. km. 1/	Centered at E103-N85 Low density populated area of approximately 2 sq. km. <u>1</u> /	Centered at Ell.8-Nll. High density populated area located on penin- sula. 2/
TARGET	Industrial Community	Civilian Community	Coastal Community	Old City
TARGET	m	4	S	ø

B-3-B-2

AGENCIES	2nd Marines
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AGENCIES	Conduct counter- sabotage opera- tions and screen population for partisans.
SUBTEAM MISSION	1, 2/8
PRIORITY	2
LOCATION/DESCRIPTION	Centered at E9-N7. High density populated area located on left bank of South River. 2/
TARGET	New City
ARGET	7

The state of the s

The second of the second second second

Not intended to represent a complete document. If Coordinates from 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map. Coordinates from Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map; 1:20,000.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

B-3-B-3

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 4 (Target Intelligence) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

(c) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination
(d) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Fire Support Coordination (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### **PURPOSE** ١.

To provide general targeting guidance to be employed by VII MAF forces upon implementation and execution of this OPLAN.

#### TARGET CONCEPT 2.

- CATF 51/CTF 59 Target List, as modified by target bulletins (TARBULs), remains in effect as the basic VII MAF Target List.
- CG, 7th MARDIV will function as the senior targeting authority b. and will be responsible for consolidating and coordinating target intelligence in the VII MAF operations area.
- CG, 7th MARDIV will maintain and control the VII MAF Target List and promulgate TARBUL's as required.
- CG, VII MAF will monitor all target intelligence traffic through the FSCC and will provide target planning guidance as required.
- Attack Carrier Striking Force, TF 57, will provide air e. intelligence for targets outside the FBHL/GOPL.
- Amphibious Task Force TF 51, will provide target intelligence in coastal areas of southern AGGRESSORLAND.

### 3. RESPONSIBILITIES

### a. <u>CG. VII MAF</u>

- (1) Continues to provide representation within CATF 51 and CTF 57 SACC as required, while those TFs remains in the area.
- (2) The VII MAF Target Intelligence Officer (TGTINTELO) will maintain liaison and coordinate target intelligence data with the 7th MARDIV TGTINTELO and will monitor subordinate targeting functions.

### b. CG. 7th MARDIV

- (1) Coordinate directly with CTF 57 all data pertaining to target intelligence in accordance with provisions contained in references (b) and (d).
- (2) Maintain and update ATF 51 and TF 57 Target Lists in support of MAF defensive operations within the AOA in accordance with provisions contained in references (b) and (d).

### 4. PROCEDURES

- a. References used for data base format and target nomination format are contained in unit SOPs.
- b. TARBULS and TGTINFOREPS will be used for target reporting and updating the ATF 51 and TF 57 Target Lists.
- c. Target classifications and priority lists are contained in Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations).

### 5. **DEFINITIONS**

- a. <u>Target List</u> A list of targets maintained and disseminated by CG, 7th MARDIV which includes those targets that are to be engaged by supporting arms.
- b. <u>List of Targets</u> A listing of targets maintained by any echelon as confirmed, suspected, or possible targets.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID
Colonel, US Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81 B-4-2

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 5 (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence
  - (d) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Intelligence (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

## 1. MAP DESIGNATION AND CHARACTERISTICS

- a. Synthetic (SYN) City
  - (1) Scale: 1:20,000
  - (2) Type: Military City, large scale
- b. 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (1) Scale: 1:70,000
  - (2) Type: Special, large scale
- c. 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (1) Scale: 1:250,000
  - (2) Type: Special, medium scale

### 2. DISTRIBUTION

THE PARTY OF THE PROPERTY OF T

- a. Per unit TO and E
- b. Alterations to TO and E will be requested by unit commander through VII MAF ACofS, G-1 and G-4.

#### 3. **REPORTS**

Report immediately through tactical channels, the seizure of enemy and/or supplemental map products in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d). Service station city maps are priority items.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

### TABS:

A - Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map Coordinates B - 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map Coordinates C - 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map Coordinates

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.


Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Merine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

TAB A (Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map Coordinates) to APPENDIX 5 (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: None

Time Zone: P



**ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT** 

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L.R. DAVID
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81


Note Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
VITHETIC (SYN) CITY. AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May. 1981

TAB 8 (60 Kilometer Supplemental Map Coordinates) to APPENDIX 5 (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy) to ANNEX 8 (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref. (a) Map. Synthetic (SYN) City: 1.20,000

Time Zone P



\*To pinpoint and convert a coordinate from the map listed as reference (a) on this map, add 91.15 to the E coordinate and 91.5 to the N coordinate.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L.R. DAVID Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G.2

DISTRIBUTION Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81


Note: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no. \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

TABIC (200 Kilometer Supplemental Map Coordinates) to APPENDIX 5 (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref. (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City; 1:20,000

Time Zone P



\*To pinpoint and convert a coordinate from the map listed as reference (a) on this map, add 91.15 to the E coordinate and 91.5 to the N coordinate.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L.R. DAVID Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

of copies Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Ref: (a) Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

FMFM 2-1, Intelligence (b)

(c) FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence

(d) FM 30-102, Opposing Forces Europe

The Warsaw Pact Armies; Friedrick Weiner and William J. Lewis, Ueberreuter Publisher, Vienna, 1977.
Annex B (Intelligence) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

- (g) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Intelligence (Constructive)
- (h) Synthetic (SYN) City Information Book

Time Zone:

#### 1. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force, with priority to the Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs, until follow-on forces are landed.

#### 2. AREA OF OPERATIONS

During the period of assault operations within the AOA, VII MAF as the Landing Force, TF 59, conducted an amphibious assault at SYN City in southern Aggressorland. The Force Beachhead Line (FBHL) was secured By D+10, the immediate Aggressor ground force threat ended and amphibious assault operations were terminated. CG, VII MAF chopped OPCON to the Unified Commander on D+10 and elements of ATF 51 remained in support of VII MAF. Beginning on D+6, the Aggressor Air Force had achieved air parity in southern Aggressorland. Intelligence reports indicated the deployment of three additional Aggressor divisions toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD approaching from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of the Aggressor division were generally within 150 km of SYN City. Taking into consideration the military situation worldwide by D+10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Unified Commander undertake the deliberate defense of SYN City, without delay, until the arrival of follow-on forces. The Unified Commander further directed CG, VII

MAF to prepare plans for, and implement on order, the defense of  ${\sf SYN}$   ${\sf City}.$ 

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operations. The geographic features that exert the greatest influence on Aggressor attack options and a VII MAF defense of SYN City are the broad, open plains that provide avenues of approach to SYN City from the northwest and southwest. These plains are bounded by mountainous terrain that hinders but does not prevent movement by mechanized forces. South River delineates the major geographic fault that separates the northern and southern halves of the AOA. Outside of SYN City, the river can only be crossed by swim-capable vehicles or rafts; it is too wide to be bridged tactically except in the immediate vicinity of the city. The treacherous swamps north of SYN City and coastal mountains to the south generally restrict movement to all but dismounted troops.

# (1) Military Geography.

- (a) <u>Topography</u>. See Tab A (Terrain Analysis).
- (b) Hydrography. The deep-water channel into the port is not severely obstructed. MSC shipping can navigate the channel and inner harbor to the usable portions of docks 25 and 29 and the operating piers. disabled landing craft and landing vehicles have been removed from the approaches to RED and BLUE Beaches. permitting unobstructed access to the beaches. offshore islands were significant obstacles during the assault landing, and they would make it difficult for the Aggressor forces to attempt a counterlanding in the vicinity of SYN City, particularly in view of the limited amphibious assets available to the Aggressor Navy. The air cushion vehicles (ACV) in the Aggressor inventory are not constrained by hydrography, however, and, therefore, constitute a continuing threat to VII MAF rear areas. North River is navigable to vessels with less than four meters draft throughout the  ${\ensuremath{\mathsf{SYN}}}$ City limits. South River is impounded by the dam, but it is navigable by small vessels west of the dam and from the sea to the naval station east of the dam by combatant and merchant marine ships.
- (c) Climate and Weather. Air temperatures are expected to range between a mean minimum of 50 degrees (F) and a mean maximum of 92 degrees (F) during the period of operations. Water temperatures are usually 59 to 60 degrees (F) in May and June. About four inches of rain can be expected, and two days of fog per month are

normal at this time of year. Weather ceilings less than 1500 feet and visibility less than three miles may occur 5 to 6 percent of the time. Daylight hours ranging from 13.4 to 14.5 can be expected. Strong winds are not normally experienced during May and June, except in conjunciton with rain squalls. The general weather conditions for this period favor the use of smoke and chemical munitions and do not generally restrict air or surface operations.

### (2) Transportation

- Surface Road Networks. Several secondary and tertiary roads within Old City and New City are impassable due to rubble. All main roads in the city are open, and bypasses have been constructed around heavily damaged Several of the highway bridge spans that were damaged by enemy demolitions and combat action during the assault phase have received temporary, fieldexpedient repairs. Bridges 1 and 2 over South River and 5, 6, and 8 over North River have been restored to service. Bridges 2 and 6 can support class 60 loads at risk. Roads outside of SYN City but within the FBHL/ GOPL suffered light damage during the assault phase, and they are usable by all wheeled vehicles. Bypasses have evolved around the few large craters currently exist. Roads extending beyond the GOPL suffered considerable damage from artillery fires and aerial bombardment directed against the MRD that was defending this area of southern Aggressorland. external roads also have bypasses, however, and tracked and wheeled vehicles can traverse the LOCs without undue difficulty within the GOPL.
- (b) Local Transportation. Approximately 25 civilian buses and 200 privately owned general cargo trucks from 1 to 15-ton capacity are available to local authorities for use in food relief efforts and other functions approved by VII MAF.
- (c) Rail systems. The ABC and XYZ rail lines are heavily damaged outside of SYN City except for the ABC spur line that extends 30 km due west from SYN City, terminating in the agricultural/industrial community at the base of the mountains. One diesel locomotive, several boxcars, a dozen flat cars, and two fuel tanker cars are at the mountain community and appear to be in operable condition. Within SYN City the north-south line from the main port to Airfield 1 and the east-west line

to the western industrial area are usable for one-way traffic in alternating directions. One diesel locomotive, 10 boxcars, 6 flat cars, and 8 tanker cars are available to service these lines. Rolling stock on Old City peninsula, New City railyard, and on the XYZ line in the south is either severely damaged or is isolated by major cuts in the track or by destroyed bridges. Sections of highway and rail bridge 3 (E4.1-N6.0) and the rail bridge at (E9.3-N12.7) have been dropped and the bridges are currently unusable.

(d) Airways. Airfield I suffered heavy damage during the assault, but it is now sufficiently repaired to support friendly air operations. Airfield 2 is functioning as an EAF. There are no other airfields within the AOA, but there are sufficient airfields in southern Aggressorland to support major enemy air attacks against VII MAF and fleet assets offshore.

### (3) <u>Telecommunications</u>

(a) Radio. The public radio stations in SYN City and their current status are as follows:

Old City (E12-N11.1) 10 KW, 1370 KHz, 16 km Range. Operable. Controlled by 4th CAG.

New City (E9.9-N7.7) 100 KW, 1524.5 KHz, 160 km Range. Heavily damaged. Not operable.

New City (E7.5-N7.1) 3 KW, 1124 KHz, 8 km Range. Destroyed. Not operable.

Naval Station (E8.3-N4.1) 10 KW, 1484 KHz, 16 km Range. Minor damage. Operable. Controled by 4th CAG.

The two operable radio stations are used for the VII MAF civil information program. Other government, public service, and public safety radio equipment is used by civil authorities for administration of government, police and firefighting activities. Common carrier, amateur, and citizens band radios are too numerous to be controlled effectively. They are monitored on a random basis by a team of the Special Communications Security Group.

(b) Television. The only television station, located in New City (E8.6-N7.2), was heavily damaged during urban combat operations. It is not expected to be returned to service during the period of defensive operations.

- (c) Telephone. Telephone service is available in the naval station solely for units of VII MAF, and approximately 100 of the 300 phones are capable of functioning. Power loss has eliminated all dial service for the 18,000 commercial phones installed in the city. Battery operation is possible but has not been implemented. Selected government, public safety, and public welfare subsystems have been restored to operation on an operator-assisted basis under VII MAF control. All DPRE assembly areas can be serviced by a near-by commercial telephone. The 50 trunk lines into the city have been cut, and no public telephone communication is available to any location outside of SYN City. Four lines exclusively for use by VII MAF have been activated between the city and the FBHL/GOPL.
- (4) Politics. The current government of SYN City remains loyal to the central Aggressorland Government, but it is cooperating with VII MAF in matters of public safety and emergency relief. No overt political activity is permitted. Units of VII MAF will report all indications of political activity as that information is required.
- (5) Economics. VII MAF has not been involved in economic matters within SYN City except to determine that government regulatory bodies are generally in place and capable of emergency economic management. Preliminary surveys by 4th CAG are now being conducted to determine current levels of agricultural and industrial production and the potential impact on maintaining a desirable level of supply. It is estimated that as long as the GOP remains deployed, sufficient vegetables and fruits can be made available to SYN City residents by local farms to provide a bare-minimum level to prevent scurvy or other similar diseases, the prevention of which requires fresh foods.
- (6) Sociology. The 250,000 people in SYN City are almost entirely in sympathy with the Aggressor cause. Overt hostility has been minimal from D-day to D+10, however, largely due to the speed of operations and the fact that half of New City and large areas in suburban sections did not experience combat operations.

Within SYN City, key areas at Airfields 1 and 2, CSSAs 1 and 2, and the suburban area north of Old City have been cleared of civilians who were evacuated from those areas and relocated in nearby assembly areas. The adults and teenagers among the 34,000 refugees/evacuees have exhibited significant irritation with being held in school buildings and other structures and provided with only a subsistence diet.

Currently, these groups are the most unruly and are the most prone to support or participate in sabotage or subversive operations.

Civilians residing in the western metropolitan sections of the city have not been evacuated. They are in an extremely hazardous area if the trace of the FEBA that is selected coincides with the metropolitan boundary. Their presence hinders friendly maneuver and poses a security threat to defensive forces operating in that area.

Food shortages are now becoming apparent. Government officials of SYN City have reluctantly cooperated with VII MAF efforts to prepare and initiate food relief operations. Food supplies programmed for civilian consumption are being offloaded and stockpiled in the container marshalling yards. The initial allotment of these supplies is now available for distribution by SYN City authorities. Provision of relief food supplies is expected to reduce the probability of major overt opposition to VII MAF, at least by the majority of the population.

Two small populated areas are located near SYN City within the FBHL/GOPL. A village, with a population of about 450 people, is located approximately 7 km to the north. second village, with a population of about 1,350 people, lies 5.5 km to the south. To date, these civilians have not caused any problems, and they appear to be more receptive to VII MAF civil affairs operations than the SYN City populace. Due west of SYN City, but outside of the FBHL/GOPL, there is an agricultural/industrial town of about 4,500 people. That town is served by a spur of the SYN City ABC railroad that terminates within the town. The attitude of these civilians is guarded but not overtly hostile. The only other populated area within the AOA is a medium-sized city located 90 km SSW of SYN City and believed to have a population well in excess of 70,000, which is strongly supportive of the Aggressor government.

# (7) Public Utilities

- (a) Electric Power. Electric power is available for about 12 hours per day to most areas of the city as a result of indigenous repair efforts under VII MAF supervision.
- (b) Potable Water. The SYN City dam and water purification plants are damaged but operable. Potable water is available for pumping to storage towers from where it is fed by gravity throughout the communities. Two water towers were destroyed during assault operations;

these are located at (11.3-N11.2) immediately west of Old City and one at (E8.1-N4.2) south of the naval station. Four of the remaining eight towers received damage and are still leaking moderately to heavily, but they are providing at least minimum requirements for the residents normally serviced by them. Local authorities have established a water delivery/rationing system for the two areas affected by the loss of water towers.

- (c) <u>Garbage</u>. Pickup and disposal service is operating at about 25% of its former level. There is adequate unused capacity in the two garbage dumps to service SYN City for five years. Pickup and disposal are presenting problems to the civil authorities in collection areas 10 (suburbs north of Old City) and 11 (Old City) because of the increased usage due to evacuee relocation and reduced services.
- (d) Sewerage. Sewage disposal is presenting serious problems to the local sanitation commission. Damage to the three primary treatment and chlorination plants is being repaired by local sanitation employees under supervision of the Public Works and Utilities Team augmenting 4th CAG. Machine shop assistance is being provided by Maintenance Battalion, FSSG and CTF 51 within capabilities. Full service is not expected to be restored for approximately 10 days.
- (8) Science and Technology. There are no indications that any recent Aggressor science or technology programs have materially affected their military capabilities. The high state of the art of their current inventories of weapons, communications, and other electronics equipment must be taken into consideration at all levels of command, however, and important new information on scientific and technological matters will be promulgated as obtained.
- b. Enemy Military Situation. Due to the successful assault and lodgment of American forces on Aggressorland soil, the Aggressorland High Military Command is estimated to have committed major elements of its Southern Aggressorland Command to the destruction of MAF forces now defending a foothold in southern Aggressorland and to prevent the insertion of follow-on forces through the port city, SYN City. Beginning on D+6, the Aggressor Air Force had achieved air parity in southern Aggressorland. Intelligence reports have indicated the deployment of three additional Aggressor divisions toward the FBHL. These forces consist of an MRD moving from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. The advance elements

CALL DOCUMENTS OF SECTION AND SECTION OF SECTION ASSESSMENT


of each Aggressor division are currently within 150 km of SYN City.

- (1) Strength. The Southern Aggressorland Command consists of a Combined Arms Army (-) reinforced with an airborne division from the Aggressorland Central Front. The remaining ground combat elements consist of two MRDs each with a T/O strength of 11,921 personnel. The airborne division has a T/O strength of 8,008 personnel.
  - (a) Committed Forces. No major Aggressor units are currently committed against VII MAF. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City and sniper and sapper teams are still present in the city in unknown numbers. Current intelligence information provides a basis for estimating that a portion of the 64 sniper teams, generally of 3 men each, and 100 5-man sapper teams known to be conducting insurgent operations on or about D+4 may still be active in the city. Units of the MRD (-) that was encountered outside of the FBHL have been destroyed or driven off, and no combat units of company size or larger are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL.
  - (b) Reinforcements. Three Aggressor divisons have been identified moving toward SYN City. These divisions are currently in an approach march posture with their leading elements about 150 km from SYN City. Each division is advancing in multiple columns with average frontages of 30 kms. An MRD is closing from the northwest. A second MRD and an airborne division are advancing from the southwest. The entire Southern Aggressorland Command has been deployed and due to operational commitments in other regions of the country, there are no other large-scale reinforcements available to support operations in southern Aggressorland. The same level of commitment is estimated to be true for the TAA, therefore, the Air Order of Battle (AOB) has not changed in southern Aggressorland except through attrition. The time and strength of major reinforcing deployments is to be determined.

1

- (2) <u>Composition</u>. See Tables 1 and 2, which depict the estimated composition of the divisions closing on SYN City. See Table 3, which depicts the supporting TAA without regard to recent losses.
- (3) <u>Location and Disposition</u>. See Subparagraph 2.b.(1) (a) and (b).

# MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION




"MAY BE REPLACED BY SA-8 OR SA-6 UNIT

	PE	RSON	NEL	WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT																		
UNITS	OFFICER	ENLISTED	TOTAL	TK MDM 55 62 72	TANK PT 76 AMPHIBIOUS	APC BTH BMP BROM	MTRCL	7 62MM LMG PKM	23MM AA GUN 25U 23-4	ATGM VEHICLE AT 2 3	ATGM MANPACK AT 3	S7MM AA GUN' S 60	73MM PCL GUN SPG 3	BSMM AT GL	100MM AT GUN 1 12	120MW MORTAH	122MM HOW	THEM HOW:	122MW RL BW 21	TEL FROG, "	AA RAII	11, 46.1
DIV HQ	93	223	316													ĺ				Г		
MTR RIFLE REGT (3)	531	5814	6345	120	9	351	27	513	12	27	18		18	243		54	18				188	٠,٢
TANK REGT	133	883	1016	95	3	15	7	3	4					8							27	4
ARTY & AA	195	1989	2184			15						24			18		36	18	18	4		
RECON BN	44	256	300		7	19	33							5		$I^-$				$\Box$		
ENGR BN	35	350	385			10														Г	$\Box$	
SIGNAL BN	27	253	280	_		•	13						Г								$\vdash$	
CHEMICAL BN	12	138	150			4										1						
MEDICAL BN	32	168	200										Г									
MAINT BN	20	180	200													<del>                                     </del>						-
TRANS BN	25	350	375																			
SERVICE ELEMENTS	16	154	170			5	20							Г		Г						
TOTAL	1163	10758	11921	215	19	423	100	516	16	27	10	24	18	256	18	54	54	18	18	1	135	19

<sup>\*</sup>MAY REPLACED BY A SA 8 OR SA 6 UNIT


# AIRBORNE DIVISION



	PEF	RSONI	NEL																		
UNITS	OFFICER	ENLISTED	TOTAL	7 62mm LMG RPK PK	23mm AA GUN ZU:23	57mm AT GUN (SP) ASU-57	85mm AT GUN (SP) ASU-85	ATGM VEH AT-23	ATGM MAN- PACK AT 3	73mm REL GUN SPG-9	85mm ATGL APG-7	82mm MORT M1937	122mm HOW D:30	140mm RL RPU- 14 WP-8	AFV BMD	AFV BDRM 2	ARVT 54-1	TRK	MTRCL	RADAR (Gnd Survi) GS-12	SA 7 GRAIL
HQ AND SVC ELM	101	527	628												2		2	230	5		
ABN REGT (3x)	555	<b>543</b> 3	5988	243	18	27		27	27	81	270	54	18		321	63	18	495	27	1	105
DIV ARTY ELM	114	672	786		18		18						18	18	7	4	1	147			6
RECON CO	6	50	56								9				3	9		1	5	П	4
ENGR BN	28	270	298												13	6	1	28			2
SIG BN	21	178	199	Г														40	3		П
CML CO	5	48	53													5		17			2
TOTAL	830	7178	8008	243	36	27	18	27	27	81	279	54	36	18	346	87	22	958	40	1	119
						_		$\vdash$			-		_	-	_	_	_			-	Н

B-7-10

# TACTICAL AIR ARMY



**67** 

- (4) Movements and Activities. The three Aggressor divisions are receiving air support from the Central Front's southern Tactical Air Army (TAA) as they move on SYN City. At their current rate of advance, despite the attrition they are suffering, lead elements of all three divisions can close the GOPI in approximately 4% hours. There are no immediate indications that the airporne division will be used in an airborne or heliborne role, but they have the capability to conduct these types of operations and can do so with extremely short notice.
- (5) <u>Logistics</u>. Aggressor combat service support units associated with the three divisions have been well protected by air defense units and are not known to have suffered any serious attrition to date. The appearance of these divisions and their rate of advance indicate that they are well supplied.
- (6) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. The Aggressor forces have a variety of nuclear weapons ranging from sub-kiloton to multimegaton yields. These weapons can be delivered by tube artillery, rockets, guided missiles and aircraft. Tactical nuclear weapons can be delivered by the TAA, by a surface-to-surface SCUD missile battalion (believed to be supporting the forces converging on SYN City), or the FROG battalions organic to the two MRDs. The SCUD battalion has those NOTE SS-1C missiles with a range of 230 km. The FROG-7 battalions each have four FROG-7 TELS with a range of 15 to 70 km. The SCUDs and FROGs can deliver HE, nuclear or chemical warheads.
- (7) Servicability and Operational Rates of Aircraft. Aggressor air forces suffered heavy losses during the period from D-5 through D+10, but managed to achieve air parity by D+6. They also inflicted heavy casualties on US forces, including severe damage to several ships and downing over two dozen aircraft. The TAA units currently operating in the general AOA are believed to be capable of maintaining over 70% availability and a sortion rate of at least 3 per day per operational aircraft for the next 20 to 30 days. Those figures indicate a continuing status of air parity with both sides having the capability of establishing air superiority temporarily.
- (8) Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels. Naval combatants evacuated the naval station prior to the amphibious assault and moved to naval sacrifies outside the AOA. The Aggresson Navy is known to have several frigates, destroyers, and patrol craft available at defended ports on the east coast, and at least three diesel-powered attack submarines are believed to be available. These ships are at

UN ASSIFIED

a disadvantage against the naval power of TF 51 and TF 57, however, and are not expected to conduct any operations against our surface forces beyond occasional harassment. The most threatening capability of the Aggressor Navy, with respect to SYN City operations, is that of their air cushion vehicles (ACV). An undetermined number of ACVs are operational, but their specific locations are not known. These ACVs have the capability of lifting at high speeds and landing substantial numbers of troops and equipment at numerous locations at or near SYN City. These ACVs may also be capable of deploying across the swampy area north of SYN City.

- (a) AIST Class: 65 kts, large naval hovercraft. Mounts 4 (twin) 30mm guns. Can lift 5 light tanks or 4 light tanks and 150 troops.
- (b) LEBED Class: 5 kts, hovercraft. Mounts 2 (twin) 30mm guns. Can lift 2 light tanks, or 120 troops.
- (c) GUS Class: 58 kts, military version of civilian craft, 230nm cruising range. Can lift 25 troops and equipment.

Their high speed and maneuverability give them the capability of moving among the islands along the coastline where the background clutter makes them very difficult to detect. By landing light armored forces within the FBHL/GOPL, the enemy would pose a serious threat to VII MAF CSS installations, headquarters, and security forces.

- (9) Technical Characteristics of Equipment. See reference (f).
- (10) Electronics Intelligence. Aggressor forces are capable of conducting ESM and ECM operations to support offensive tactical maneuvers as they close on the VII MAF area of influence. Based on Aggressor tactical doctrine, Radio-Electronic Combat (REC) units from the Aggressor Southern Command's CAA attached to one or more of the divisions will attempt to determine VII MAF communication keystones to target them for destruction or jamming; priority will be directed toward the following:

Artillery and aviation units capable of delivering nuclear fires.

Emitter concentrations estimated to be command posts and radar installations.

Artillery, tactical air, and air defense units limited to conventional firepower.

Reserve concentrations and CSSAs.

Specific or point to sets capable of interdicting or altering the enemy column advance.

Aggressor forces utilize Soviet patterned doctrinal ESM to fix emitters and ECM to discust communications. Such means include:

SIGINT monitoring of clear text radio transmissions.

Direction finding of radio transmission and radar emissions for targeting.

Barrage jamming, even at the expense of their own C<sup>3</sup>, to disrupt VII MAF command channels.

Intrusion of false or deceptive traffic to create confusion and disrupt command and control channels.

Based on historical accounts of previous combat actions and intelligence gained during assault operations, Aggressor REC units will be deployed immediately behind the lead elements of each divisional column to conduct communications interception and direction finding operations. Aggressors are capable of conducting both intercept and DF operations to detect and locate artillery ground radars out to 25 km in advance of the column, VHF traffic out to 40 km, HF ground waves out to 80 km, and HF skywave traffic at unlimited distances in advance of the column. Aggressor fighter and bomber aircraft equipped with signals intercept equipment and/or standard tactical communication equipment can extend the range of signals intercept capabilities out to 450 and 600 km respectively.

In addition to tactical REC operations conducted against the MAF from outside the MAF area of influence, and as a part of the overall ESM/reconnaissance threat to internal security, partisans and sympathetic residents of SYN City can be expected to attempt to monitor tactical communications through land-line wire taps and utilizing indigenous radio and television equipment and to attempt interdiction of tactical communications by cutting land-lines and raiding switching stations.

The second of th

- Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. See reference (f) and paragraphs 2b.(7) above. The Aggressor forces have the nuclear capability to destroy SYN City and all its inhabitants, to include VII MAF personnel operating within Biological weapons known to be available to the enemy can contaminate all open water supplies in and near In general, the prophylaxis provided by chemical warfare protection is sufficient to protect against biological agents, but it must be noted that the civilian populace in SYN City does not enjoy this measure of protection. Up to 5% of the Aggressor artillery and rocket munitions may These chemical weapons, both contain chemical agents. persistent and nonpersistent, are particularly suitable for causing personnel casualties without damaging facilities such as port, docks, warehouses, MHE, airfields, or terrain. Aggressor forces are well trained and equipped for fighting on an NBC battlefield.
- (12)Air Defense. The airborne division has light mobile air defense weapons in its 36 23mm ZU-23 guns and 119 SA-7 Each MRD is authorized 16 23mm ZSU 23-4, 24 57mm S-60 AA guns, 135 SA-7 GRAIL, and 16 TEL SA-9. weapons system of an MRD provides point protection for an area of about 54 square kilometers and route air defense for a distance of about 30 km. Additional front or Army surface-to-air missiles provide zonal cover. In Southern Aggressorland, these are believed to consist of a composite SAM brigade comprised of one SA-4 GANEF battalion with 8 launchers and one SA-6 GAINFUL battalion with 6 launchers. The SA-4 medium-to-high altitude system has a slant range of 70 km with an effective ceiling of 24 km. The SA-6 low-tomedium altitude system has a 30 km slant range and 17.7 km This family of antiaircraft guns and missile systems provides the Aggressor force with the capability of defending their march columns throughout their advance on SYN City.

CARL MICHAEL MARKET MAR

(13) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses. Aggressor force commanders know the terrain over which they are advancing. They are also familiar with SYN City and can expect overt and covert support from individuals and organizations in the city. Their only apparent weakness stems from the 100 km distance over which they have to move to attack our GOP forces and the additional 40 to 50 km from the GOP to the FEBA. Their units will be exposed to air attacks throughout that movement and will inevitably suffer some attrition. The soft-skinned CSS units may also be more vulnerable during this phase, giving 7th MAW and other US supporting air forces the opportunity to interrupt their logistic effort.

Recent and Present Significant Activities. The determined effort by Aggressor air forces to gain air parity, with occasional periods of air superiority, and the weight of their air effort to protect the divisions advancing on SYN City characterizes their principal recent activities. Air attacks against the GGPL have taken place, usually in conjunction with strong CAP activity and an aggressive aerial reconnaissance effort. During these types of operations, the Aggressor TAA has not relaxed its defensive efforts in protecting the movement to contact by the ground combat element.

## c. Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation.

Guerrilla. There are no indications that any guerrilla bands have formed in the hinterland, and there is no threat from irregular forces in the countryside. Urban guerrillas are active within SYN City, however. Remnants of the MRB that was defending the city, an undetermined number of military personnel from the Army ceremonial garrisons and naval station, and civilians have formed sniper and sapper Sniper teams, generally consisting of about three persons, are currently active in urban and suburban areas. It is estimated that up to 64 such teams may be operating throughout the metropolitan area. It is further estimated that up to 100 5-man sapper teams have been formed. Several sapper incidents have occurred recently, with the majority of the enemy attacks directed against CSS installations. The frequency and results of these attacks shows that they are well planned and coordinated and constitute a serious threat.

12. . . . .

- (2) Psychological. Aggressor leaflets have been dropped over the city to incite the populace to commit sabotage, sniping, and other violent acts. Short-wave radio broadcasts have been intercepted, some of which are designed to incite the populace and others of which are an apparent effort to confuse and alarm VII MAF. It is believed that several officials of the SYN City government, while ostensibly cooperating with VII MAF, are using their relative freedom of action to disseminate information, disinformation, and material in support of Aggressor PSYWAR activities.
- (3) <u>Subversion</u>. The civilian populace is expected to support intelligence, sabotage, and subversive operations against VII MAF whenever they have a low-risk opportunity to do so. The number of refugees/evacuees and remaining population make it extremely difficult to identify individuals or groups that pose a threat to friendly forces. The need to use indigenous officials to administer the local government

B-7-16

and public safety operations provides those officials with considerable mobility and opportunity to exploit their positions in gaining information about VII MAF activities and transmitting that information to Aggressor military units or agents. Subversive actions to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of US forces are always a danger when there is any degree of fraternization between civilians and military personnel. This problem will exist throughout SYN City, but mainly in the areas where evacuees are housed, where small units are involved in cordoning-off populated areas, and where military personnel interface with indigenous persons or agencies, such as food relief operations.

(4) Sabotage. Sabotage of electric power, potable water distribution, and garbage pickup and disposal would impact severely on the local populace. The results could be mass violence against the MAF units or epidemics that might threaten the health of MAF personnel. International censure of the US would probably result, making home front and allied support more difficult. While military operations are not dependent on use of indigenous facilities, the need to commit more personnel and assets to prevent or combat sabotage efforts would detract from VII MAF's ability to continue with its mission.

An activist, hostile population would present military and counterintelligence problems of such a magnitude as to overwhelm our CI capabilities, forcing the MAF to impose virtually Draconian measures by all units to maintain operational security. The civil affairs program would be endangered and any opportunities for enhancing the social environment to facilitate long-term CA operations by follow-on forces would be jeopardized.

Enemy Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities. Aggressor photo and electronic survelliance aircraft have penetrated the airspace over the FBH area several times. They are believed to have acquired extensive aerial photography and ECM data reflecting the current dispositon and general activities of the MAF. Within SYN City, many indigenous officials have been used by VII MAF to conduct essential governmental and public safety functions. They have greater mobility than the average citizen, who is required to remain in his/her assigned area. These officials have access to places where they are apt to gain military information, and the limited restrictions imposed give them considerable opportunity to conduct intelligence or counterintelligence activities. VII MAF CI personnel have reported that in at least half of the DPRE assembly areas underground leadership cells have been active in organizing the people to defeat our HUMINT efforts within those assembly areas.

#### 3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

The estimate of enemy capabilities is based on feasible enemy courses of action that can affect accomplishment of VII MAF's mission to defend SYN City.

- a. Attack From the Northwest in Division Strength. An MRD, currently located about 150 km northwest of SYN City, can close the northern sector of the GOP in approximately 48 hours under cover of Aggressor TAA air support.
- b. Attack From the Southwest in Two-Division Strength. An MRD and an airborne division, currently located about 150 km southwest of SYN City, can close the southern sector of the GOP in approximately 48 hours under cover of Aggressor TAA air support.
- c. Attack SYN City With Two MRDs and an Airborne Division. In conjunction with airborne or heliborne assaults in SYN City by elements of the airborne division, two MRDs can attack the northern and southern sectors of the GOP simultaneously in approximately 48 hours under cover of TAA air support.
- d. Attack, Raid, or Harass Friendly Rear Areas. Aggressor light armor forces, up to a reinforced battalion in strength, can be landed by air cushion vehicles (ACV) at coastal areas within the FBHL/GOPL to attack, raid, or harass CSS installations, CPs, and other facilities.
- e. <u>Defend</u>. Aggressor forces in southern Aggressorland can defend in place at a time of their own choosing.
- f. <u>Withdraw</u>. Aggressor forces can withdraw from southern Aggressor-land at any time of their own choosing.

### 4. ANALYSIS OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Attack From the Northwest in Division Strength. The Aggressor MRD in the northwest can attack the northern sector of the GOP in about 48 hours independent of other Aggressor forces in southern Aggressorland. Such an attack would pit over 200 enemy tanks and 400 armored fighting vehicles against Task Force A on the GOPL and subsequently against about two reinforced regiments inside the city. If they succeed in forcing the withdrawal of the GOP, the Aggressor forces would be unable to cross the South River fault, therefore, the weight of their attack would be limited to those areas north of South River. It would take at least an additional 24 hours for an attacking force to move tactically from the general trace of the GOPL to the COPL and FEBA to begin attacking VII MAF positions in SYN City.

This course of action would enable the enemy to exert combat power quickly against the key areas of SYN City. The port area and Airfield 1 are vital to VII MAF for resupply and preparations for attacking to the northwest later. Conversely, it would not be easy for the Aggressor MRD to bring pressure to bear against MAF units and installations south of South River. Airfield 2 and V/STOL sites would probably be available for operations in support of MAF forces north of the river.

By attacking unilaterally without coordinated supporting attacks by the other Aggressor divisions in the general region, this MRD would face the concentrated fires of all of VII MAF's organic and supporting firepower. In conjunction with a skillfully executed delaying action by the GOP, the resulting attrition could be expected to degrade the assault capability of the MRD to a significant degree before it approached the COPL and FEBA. The current numerical superiority in tanks and APCs enjoyed by that MRD would be reduced markedly. If the MRD should succeed in reaching the FEBA, it would suffer further losses before effecting any penetrations. The advantage would be with the defender when the attacking force attempted to penetrate the urban area, where the tank/APC threat is minimal and the vehicles are increasingly vulnerable.

Adoption of this course of action by the enemy would favor the accomplishment of the VII MAF mission, mainly because of its limited nature and an associated force ratio that gives the advantage to the defenders.

This enemy course of action is the least effective attack option open to him and is the least likely to be adopted.

b. Attack From the Southwest in Two-Divison Strength. The Aggressor MRD and the airborne division in the southwest can attack the southern sector of the GOP in about 48 hours independent of the MRD in the northwest. Such an attack could pit well over 200 tanks and 800 armored fighting vehicles against the tank-infantry GOP force and subsequently against about one reinforced regiment south of South River. After forcing the withdrawal of the southern sector GOP and closing the COPL/FEBA, calculated to take about 24 additional hours, Aggressor supporting arms would be well within range of all of SYN City. Airfield 2 would be untenable and observed fire could be employed to deny use of port facilities, CSSAs, and other key facilities.

This enemy course of action establishes a combat power ratio heavily in his favor. The limited depth of defensible urban terrain in this sector would enable the enemy to interdict by fire some of VII MAF's resupply activities in the port area even before achieving penetrations of the southern FEBA. The princi-

pal disadvantage to the Aggressor force is the obstacle presented by South River. If the river is properly defended, a crossing by large forces would be extremely costly, if not impossible, and seizure of the main port and Airfield I would be delayed or prevented.

By attacking without support from a coordinated MRD attack in the northwest, these two divisions would face the concentrated fires of all of VII MAF's organic and supporting firepower, amounting to about one-third more than that which might be allocated to the southern sector by the MAF if three divisions were attacking simultaneously. The numerical superiority in tanks and APCs currently enjoyed by those two Aggressor divisions should enable them to pose a very serious threat to the southern sectors of the GOP and FEBA, even after suffering 48 to 72 or more hours of attrition. If they succeed in penetrating the FEBA, the tactical advantage will be held by the defenders, but the numerical odds are likely to be with the Aggressors. The training and equipment of the airborne personnel are well suited to urban warfare, and they constitute the greater threat to our forces if they enter the southern suburbs.

Adoption of this course of action by the enemy would make it difficult for VII MAF to continue essential resupply, but, unless the enemy can effect a major crossing of South River, the VII MAF mission can be accomplished. This enemy course of action is more effective than a., above, but it is not the most likely to be adopted.

Attack SYN City With Two MRDs and an Airborne Division. Launching an attack by three divisions simultaneously would enable the Aggressor forces to split our defensive effort to the maximum degree, reduce the amount of firepower that VII MAF organic and supporting firepower can direct against each separate division, limit our flexibility of maneuver, and conceal the identity of his chosen breakthrough point. Given temporary air superiority, elements of the airborne division can be parachuted or helilifted into SYN City to seize critical installations, destroy key stocks, create diversions, and mobilize civilians against the MAF. As in the other courses of action, the attacking forces can close the GOP in about 48 hours and the COPL and FEBA in an additional 24 hours.

This course of action enables the enemy to establish the best combat power ratio which regional Aggressor forces are believed to be capable of achieving. It forces the MAF to fight separate ground combat actions north and south of South River. Both airfields are vulnerable and both can be rendered untenable to VII MAF even before the COPL or FEBA are directly threatened. The civilian populace would be subjected to the greatest hazard in

this course of action, giving rise to the possibility that large numbers of civilians would actively oppose MAF operations. Increased dissidence or sabotage within the city would pose serious security problems for the MAF. Civil affairs requirements would be extensive. Providing shelter, subsistence, emergency medical care, and public safety would be exceptionally difficult.

Adoption of this course of action by the enemy would force VII MAF to conduct an amphibious withdrawal, which would prevent accomplishment of the mission, or to conduct defensive urban warfare--house-to-house, street-to-street--against numerically superior forces, in the midst of a hostile population, and in the face of severely constrained logistic support.

This enemy course of action, with minor modification, is the most likely to be adopted.

Attack, Raid, or Harass Friendly Rear Areas. A light armor force, up to battalion in strength, can be landed by ACV at coastal areas within the FBHL/GOPL in a single lift at any time during darkness or inclement weather to attack, raid, or harass This type of operation can be executed friendly rear areas. unilaterally or in conjunction with attacks by other forces. The offshore islands provide an excellent screen for movement by ACVs, making them exceedingly hard to detect. The naval task forces are sufficiently far at sea to make it impractical for them to detect or react to a sudden, high-speed, ACV deployment. The number of ACVs locally available is not known, but the prehostilities posture leads to the assumption that only about one reinforced, light armor battalion can be lifted at one time. Even such a small force can inflict considerable damage in the comparatively vulnerable CSS areas of VII MAF. The combination of ACV-launched raids and sniper/sapper attacks by urban guerrillas would present annoying problems to the MAF and probably interrupt some aspects of CSS, but would not seriously hinder accomplishment of the MAF mission. When employed ancillary to major MRD attacks, this type of operation would be more threatening.

This course of action is not likely to be adopted in isolation; rather, it is very likely to be used in conjunction with an attack by at least one and probably three divisions.

e. <u>Defend</u>. There are no indications nor is there any logic in the three Aggressor divisions assuming a defensive posture at this time. The defensive course of action would greatly favor accomplishment of the MAF mission, but it is not considered a likely possibility.

f. <u>Withdraw</u>. A withdrawal by all or part of the three Aggressor divisions would be most favorable to the accomplishment of the MAF mission. Such a course of action is considered highly unlikely.

### 5. CONCLUSIONS

- The Aggressor force is most likely to attack the GOP and SYN City using two MRDs concurrently with battalion-sized airborne and/or heliborne attacks in SYN City and with an ACV-lifted light armor battalion from the airborne division raiding VII MAF CSS installations in rear areas. This course of action gives the enemy the best numerical and combat power ratio he can expect to achieve in the near term. Further, it carries the action to the MAF before it is fully prepared to meet a major counterattack and before extensive barrier preparations can be completed. The enemy's principal vulnerabilities in this case stem from the difficulties in coordinating a three-division attack involving airborne, heliborne and ACV operations in conjunction with heavy mechanized To achieve the requisite density of aviation assault support to protect and support the advance of large ground combat elements, the Aggressor CSS elements may be uncovered. this situation result, regimental trains, division/army supply echelons, and second echelon tactical forces will be exposed to air attack by 7th MAW, TF 57, and other friendly and allied air Airborne or heliborne landings in SYN City will be forces. difficult. Small, isolated units would pose only a minor irritation to the MAF. Major attempts to land forces will be vulnerable to VII MAF air defense and counterlanding preparations. Movements along the coast by ACV, if detected in time, can be countered readily. If Aggressor ground combat elements succeed in penetrating the metropolitan boundaries of SYN City, their armor vehicles become less useful and they will have to rely mainly on dismounted, urban warfare tactics and techniques. this case, the attacker is at a disadvantage.
- b. The Aggressor forces are unlikely to launch ACV-borne raids in VII MAF rear areas on an isolated and unsupported basis. They will, in all probability, launch up to a reinforced light armor battalion in ACVs in conjunction with a three-division assault.
- c. The Aggressor force commander could elect, as a second choice, to attack only from the southwest, using an MRD and an airborne division. He is less likely to adopt this course of action because of the lower probability of success than in the three-division assault. The enemy's principal vulnerabilities in this case are the increased exposure of second echelon tactical forces and CSS elements to VII MAF and supporting air attacks and the possibility that VII MAF can oppose his ground assault in greater

strength in the south by virture of not having to defend in the north at the same time.

- d. The Aggressor forces are not likely to attack only from the northwest with one MRD. This course of action would increase the vulnerability of that division by a subtantial factor. It would be subject to maximum attrition before closing the GOPL and FEBA and would be vulnerable to defeat in detail while attempting to penetrate the urban areas of SYN City.
- e. The Aggressor forces are not expected to defend in place. They would be vulnerable to continuing attrition from air attacks without seriously threatening the VII MAF lodgment.
- f. The Aggressor forces are not expected to withdraw. Doing so would uncover the deep objectives of VII MAF, and, while withdrawing, the enemy would be subject to air attacks and further attrition.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT


BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

TAB:

A - Terrain Analysis

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81



Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB A (Terrain Analysis) to APPENDIX 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

(c) Synthetic (SYN) City Information Book

(d) Annex B (Intelligence) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. The AOA is dominated by mountain ranges with fingers oriented generally northwest to southeast, west to east, and an escarpment oriented north to south paralleling the coastline. The coastline rises gently to the piedmont and further to the fingers and the escarpment near to SYN City. SYN City proper was once located on one finger oriented west to east from the mountains in southern Aggressorland. A fault caused the separation of this finger and created two fingers oriented west to east/ seaward and the southernmost of two important water throughfares. northernmost of these two fingers, from southeast to northwest, extends from the port area to a corridor flanked by fingers of the western mountain ranges and North River. This finger includes both Airfield 1 and New City. The southernmost of these two fingers includes the naval base and Airfield 2. This finger is flanked to the north by the southernmost water throughfare, South River, which is immediately backed by a western mountain range finger; to the east by an escarpment, offshore islands, and SYN City suburbs; and to the south by a coastal plain which extends north to SYN City through a corridor created by the finger extension of western mountain ranges and the escarpment to the east. The northernmost finger in southern Aggressorland, from northwest to southeast, is flanked by North River to the south which is immediately backed by a finger extension from the western mountains; to the east by offshore islands and the sea which are immediately backed by marsh and to the south by a peninsula on which Old City is located. The two major water throughfares are the North and South rivers. The north river flows from northnorthwest to south-southeast from the western mountains. The South River flows from west to east from the western mountains. The two rivers meet to form a natural harbor that is approximately 3,000m at its widest point. The metropolitan area of SYN City encompasses some 100 km<sup>2</sup> and is bordered to the north and south by suburban and

industrial areas respectively; to the west by an industrial area, farmland, and wooded areas; and to the east by uninhabited islands and the ocean.

### 2. <u>TOPOGRAPHY</u>

- a. <u>Coastal Terrain</u>. The geological pattern of the SYN City coastline is neutral in nature and created by a fault. The shoreline is irregular and has formed a natural harbor. There are no other natural harbors north of SYN City to the limits of the AOA, however, a small harbor is located approximately 88 km south of SYN City.
- The shoreline in southern Aggressorland is irregular Shoreline. and is protected by groups of islands of varying sizes which create a complicated system of waterways immediately offshore. Special provisions were required to conduct and support the amphibious assault and considerable reliance is now placed on use of the port facilities, although RED Beach continues to support LOTS operations. Should the attacker seize the western mountain fingers and the escarpment, the advantage would rest with the attacker who would have unrestricted observation and fields of fire. Tactical gambits such as surface landings to the north of SYN City to conduct amphibious raids on the flanks of an attacker would be severely restricted by the presence of an intricate network of offshore islands while similar operations could be conducted 80 km south of SYN City where offshore islands do not impose major restrictions on surface landings.
- <u>Tactical Aspects of Terrain</u>. The northernmost finger contains a number of distinct terrain features but can generally be characterized as a very gentle slope rising from the coastline inland. At the northwestern limits of the AOA, the finger begins with finger-like land projections from the western mountains. A saddle exists between these finger-like projections centered at E40-N190, on the 200 Km supplemental map with terrain rising to an elevation of 75m to the west of the saddle and to a peak height of 79m to the east. It is bordered to the south by the North River, which flows from the northwest limits of the AOA southeast to the SYN City harbor area. From the northeastern limits of the AOA along the coastline to the peninsula projection within SYN City proper, the terrain is primarily marsh. marsh area is at sea level extending inland about 30 Km in some places. Drainage occurs naturally from the higher elevations to North River and the marsh. A peninsula on the southeasternmost tip of this finger has a maximum elevation of 8m above sea level. Drainage occurs either naturally by runoff or by sewer and drainage lines throughout the urban and suburban areas of Old City on the peninsula. Surface materials on the peninsula include sand and loamy soil in surrounding beaches and marsh to

B-7-A-2

the north with only reed clumps as indigenous vegetation. Wood, steel, masonry, and concrete structures are interspersed throughout Old City and its suburban sprawl. Vegetation northwest of the peninsula ranges from sporadic thin forestation parallel to the marsh to densely forested areas in the higher elevations.

- (1) Western Finger. The western finger is bordered to the north by the North River and to the south by South River. are a number of distinct terrain features on this finger, but it is essentially gently rolling terrain to the limits of the AOA. A finger-like projection extends west to east from the western mountains. The maximum elevation on the finger, within the limits of the AOA, is 115m above sea level near South River. The north flank of this finger-like projection has a very gently rolling convex slope and forms the southern flank of a corridor/river valley. This corridor ranges in elevation from 60m above sea level at the limits of the AOA to 12m above sea level near the metropolitan boundary of SYN City. Within SYN City this western finger includes Airfield 1, the harbor port area, and New City. Contour relief is slight in SYN City ranging from 12m at Airfield 1 to sea level in the port area. This is the most densely populated area in SYN City with suburban, urban, and industrial complexes on the North and South River banks. Drainage occurs in three principal ways: natural drainage into inland bodies of water, sewer systems in suburban and urban areas, or downward from higher terrain elevations on the finger to the North and South Rivers. Vegetation ranges from dense forestation in the higher elevations and river valley to reed grass in open areas of SYN City and marsh reed clumps in marsh areas also within SYN City. Surface materials in SYN City range from sandy, loamy soil to wood, steel, masonry, and concrete structures in the suburbs, port, and industrial areas.
- (2) South Finger. The northern flank of the south finger contains a finger-like projection extending from the westernmost limits of the AOA east to the coastal plain west of SYN City. The maximum elevation on this finger is 160m above sea level. The north flank is bordered by the south bank of South River with gentle slopes ranging from concave to convex. The south flank of this finger-like projection is bordered by a coastal plain to the southeast, an escarpment to the east, and a coastal plain backed by the metropolitan boundary of SYN City to the northeast. This flank has gentle concave slopes in the vicinity of the plain to the southeast, gradually changing to moderate slopes paralleling the escarpment to the east. Trafficability in southern Aggressorland is influenced more by vegetation than by changes in elevation of the terrain. The southeastern

coastal plain (palisades) ranges in elevation from sea level The coastal plain contains a vast expanse of moderately forested palisade-like terrain with numerous ground transportation LOCs and trafficable beaches on the coast. A corridor exists between the finger-like projection and the escarpment to the east. The corridor is moderately forested. Its width ranges from 33 km in the south to 12 km in the North. Elevations are from 15m above sea level in the south to 10m above sea level in the north. finger is bordered to the east by the intricate network of offshore islands and runnels extending from SYN City to the southernmost flank of the escarpment. The escarpment parallels the coastline from E103-N85 to E90-N25 on the 200 km supplemental map with gentle convex slopes on its eastern and western flanks and gentle concave slopes on its northern The plateau is cut into thirds by and southern flanks. saddles/corridors and individual plateau heights reach maximums of 95m, 90m, and 135m north to south respectively. The southern portion of SYN City is located on the northernmost end of this finger with a terrain elevation maximum of 12m above sea level. This area includes the naval station and Airfield 2. Drainage from runoff in the higher elevations will occur naturally into the South River to the north and the ocean to the southeast and east. Runoff will occur naturally in SYN City into the rivers and the ocean. Vegetation ranges from moderate to dense forestation in the higher elevations and the corridor to very sparse on the plateaus of the escarpment. Surface materials in SYN City range from sandy, loamy soil in open areas and interspersed in the suburbs to wood, steel, masonry, and concrete construction in the suburban development, naval station, industrial area, and at Airfield 2. Vegetation consists of reed grass in open areas within the metropolitan boundary of SYN City.

- (3) Old City and Suburbs. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to reference (d).
- (4) Metropolitan Center and Suburbs. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to reference (d).

## 3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN

a. Observation and Fields of Fire. Key highground areas surrounding SYN City are currently under MAF control, therefore, there are no current enemy concerns. OP/LPs and electronic surveillance devices established forward of the MAF FLOT and located on the highground on each finger and the escarpment will provide VII MAF with excellent observation over all major avenues of approach. Similarly, forward deployed artillery units located

B-7-A-4

near the metropolitan boundary of SYN City and larger-caliber artillery in rear areas will be able to place indirect fires on all approach corridors. Should penetration occur, protected observation posts can be established within urban and suburban areas of SYN City in fortified structures in the port area, and on the peninsula. Except for the deliberate use of obscurants, excellent observation will be afforded along primary LOCs and open areas. Indirect and direct fires will be restricted in urban and suburban areas to the trace of primary, secondary, and tertiary LOCs. Open spaces within the metropolitan boundary can be covered by direct and/or indirect fires from fortified or prepared building structures.

- Cover and Concealment. Forestation in the mountain ranges west of SYN City and natural vegetation to the west and south of SYN City will provide marginal to good concealment to GOP and COP forces positioned outside the metropolitan boundary of SYN City. Movement on the reverse slope of each of the fingers and the escarpment will be screened from Aggressor ground observation and direct-fire weapons providing a degree of protection and freedom of action for GOP forces. Within the metropolitan boundary of SYN City, maximum use will be made of existing building structures that are of substantial construction to provide both cover and concealment and offer protection for defensive strongpoints. Open areas within SYN City offer little cover and concealment because of the lack of substantial vegetation and favorable relief for cut-and-cover positions. Direct support counterintelligence advisors will provide assistance to unit commanders in establishing deceptive measures, such as false or dummy strongpoints, for counterreconnaissance purposes.
- c. <u>Obstacles</u>. The preponderance of obstacles prepared earlier by the enemy defending force in and near the metropolitan boundary of SYN City have been breached, reduced, neutralized, or will be used for MAF defensive purposes.

Inland Obstacles. Most of the inland terrain is trafficable. The largest barrier to tactical maneuver exists north of SYN City. The marsh north of SYN City extends from the metropolitan boundary north for approximately 90 km. This terrain is generally at or below sea level and is reported to be untrafficable for tracked, wheeled, and foot movement. GOP forces will be restricted to the use of terrain at the summit of the northermost finger and unimproved road on either flank of the finger for maneuver purposes. The north river extends from the metropolitan boundary of SYN City northwest beyond the limits of the AOA and imposes a major obstacle for GOP forces in that it restricts movement between the nurthernmost and westernmost fingers within the AOA. In the face of MAF assault operations, enemy forces

damaged the bridge located at E97-N110.5 on the 60 km supplemental map in an attempt to cutoff pursuit. South River extends from the metropolitan boundary of SYN City due west to the limits of the AOA. There are no manmade or natural crossing points on South River except within the metropolitan boundary. This river imposes another major obstacle to tracked, wheeled, and vehicular movement north-to-south within the MAF defensive security zone. A river exists south of the metropolitan boundary of SYN City and extends from the coastline at E92-N7 on the 200 km supplemental map to the limits of the AOA. Although it is outside of the trace of GOP positions, it still poses a significant obstacle to forward ground deployments and ground reconnaissance operations. Six bridges spanned the river, but each has been destroyed or severely damaged by a combination of friendly air attacks to cutoff enemy retrograde operations during the assault and by enemy engineers to prevent friendly pursuit. These bridges are at the following coordinates on the 200 km supplemental map:

E22.4-N26.4 E42.8-N18 E24.9-N26 E56.9-N16.9 E28.9-N24 E70.5-N11

d. <u>Urban and Suburban Areas</u>. Four coastal and/or industrial communities exist north, west, and south of SYN City. The communities are centered at the following coordinates on the 200 km supplemental map:

E105-N113.5 E102.6-N85 E60-N3.5

Each has a predominantly grid pattern array of tertiary streets which are extremely narrow and would canalize tracked or wheeled vehicular movement for GOP and/or reconnaissance forces. Within the Metropolitan boundary of SYN City, freedom of vehicular movement for the displacement of defensive forces and the deployment of the reserve/counterattacking forces will be restricted and/or canalized by friendly barrier/obstacle emplacements and building and street patterns.

**t**... ...

- e. <u>Key Terrain Features</u>. See Tab A (Key Terrain Features) to reference (d).
- f. Ground Avenues of Approach. Enemy attacking forces will find ground trafficability north of SYN City extremely difficult due to the presence of the marsh to the north and North River. The finger-like projection on the north finger has extremely gentle relief and trafficability will be restricted only by forestation and vegetaion of the highland areas. Highways 1 and 2 are connected by two minor unimproved roads. The points of origin of these roads branch off at Highway 2 northwest of the metropolitan

B-7-A-6

boundary. These roads extend on either flank of the northernmost finger-like projection and meet at E74-N143.5 on the 200km supplemental map. From this junction a single road extends southeast and eventually becomes Highway 1. This is the only road system leading into the FLOT on the northern finger that enemy vehicles can traverse and can be interdicted by air and naval gunfire attacks. The corridor northwest of SYN City is a vast expanse of rolling terrain and is one of two major enemy ground avenues of approach leading into the MAF FLOT. Elements advancing on MAF forces will be restricted to movement on the westernmost finger by North and South River. Highway 2 and a railroad line paralleling Highway 2 track the length of the Inte finger movements will require tactical bridging and/or expedien engineer preparation of existing bridges. Terrain proximate to either flank of South River will provide an unlikely yet feasible ground avenue of approach from the west. South River will have a canalizing effect on vehicular movement and interdiction of LOCs between and within forces attempting to penetrate the FLOT can be achieved in the lowlands. major ground avenue of approach is the corridor flanked by the escarpment south of SYN City and the finger-like projection southwest of SYN City. Relief on either flank is moderate to steep but not untrafficable. Highway 3 and a parallel railroad line track the length of the corridor. The corridor is flanked to the east by an escarpment and the escarpment is flanked to the east by the coastline south of SYN City which represents an unlikely yet feasible ground avenue of approach. Relief on the western flank of the coastline in this area is moderately steep and the eastern flank or seaward flank is backed by an intricate series of offshore islands and runnels. Saddles exist on the escarpment providing west to east access of the coastline. Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to reference (d).

g. <u>Helicopter Landing Zones</u>. See Appendix 10 (Helicopter Landing Zone Study) to this annex.

#### h. Transportation

(1) <u>Highways</u>. There are two primary highways entering the AOA and the major ground avenues of approach leading into the metropolitan boundary of SYN City. Highway 2 tracks the length of the northwest corridor and is generally parallel to North River. It is a 4-laned road, each lane has a minimum width of 3.5m, and is composed of asphalt and macadam. Highway 3 tracks the length of the southwest corridor and has the same road width and composition. A number of minor, unimproved, roads enter the metropolitan boundary of SYN City from the north, southwest, and southeast. Another minor road begins at a coastal community,

north of SYN City, at E105-N113.5 on the 200 km supplemental map and tracks south for 7 kms to the metropolitan boundary. Similarly another primary but limited access road enters the metropolitan boundary due west of SYN City from an inland community at E68.5-N103.5 on the 200 km supplemental map. An unimproved minor road is located on the western flank of the corridor southwest of SYN City. It tracks the length of the corridor for approximately 27.5 kms before heading east toward the metropolitan boundary where it joins Highway 3. Highway 1 continues down the coastline south of the metropolitan boundary of SYN City where it branches off into minor limited access roads serving coastal communities located at E102.5-N92.5 and E102.6-N85 on the 200 km supplemental map. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to reference (d).

- (2) Rail System Networks. Rail lines parallel the primary road system in the two major approach corridors leading to SYN City. Damage from sabotage and previous battle actions has yet to be determined, however, intermittent sections require repairs both northwest and southwest of SYN City. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to reference (d).
- (3) <u>Airways</u>. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to reference (d).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.

B-7-A-8

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 10 (Helicopter Landing Zone Study) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 3-3, Helicopterborne Operations

(c) Annex B (Intelligence) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

1. <u>HLZs FROM OPLAN 1-81</u>. Each of the HLZs described in reference (c) will be used to support tactical and logistical requirements for this plan. The following additional HLZs will be established to meet the total requirements of Operation BREAKER SIX.

## 2. LANDING ZONE OAK

- a. <u>Location</u>. Centered at E104.5-N113.1., 8 km northeast of Bridge 8 on the 60 km supplemental map.
- b. Elevation. Sea level.
- c. Orientation and Landmarks. The HLZ is bordered to the north by a small coastal community centered at E105-N113.8. It is flanked to the east by marsh, to the west by offshore islands and the ocean, and it is bordered to the south by Old City and its suburban outgrowth.
- d. <u>Size</u>. The landing zone is rectangular with its long axis oriented north to south. It is 1200 m long by 900 m wide; all of which is usable for landing sites.
- e. <u>Surface Materials</u>. Sandy, loamy soil with natural grass cover. The surrounding terrain is essentially marsh that is unsuitable for both wheeled and tracked vehiclular traffic except on the existing minor road net which runs north to south.
- f. <u>Obstacles</u>. There are no overhead obstacles near the HLZ. Ground vehicular movement will be restricted to the use of a secondary road which eventually becomes a minor, unimproved road extending from SYN City to the coastal community. Convoy movement will be canalized by the ocean to the east and marsh to the west.
- g. Slope. The surrounding terrain is relatively flat.

- h. <u>Local Use</u>. The extensive bay area is used primarily as a source for peat and cranberries.
- i. Exits. There are two exits branching off the secondary road which delineates the HLZ. Both lead to the coastline. One road runs due south from the HLZ; the second runs to the north from the HLZ, providing access to the coastal community.
- j. Adjacent Terrain. The HLZ is opposed to the north by a small community backed by lowland coastal terrain and marsh. It is flanked to the west by a vast, untrafficable, marsh area which is backed farther to the west by North River; the first contour break occurs 9 km due west of the HLZ. It is opposed to the south by lowland coastal terrain and the coastal offshore islands and further backed by the peninsula on which Old City was built. The HLZ is flanked to the east by offshore islands and the ocean.
- k. <u>Prevailing Winds</u>. The following data specify wind velocity and direction for periods observed during the months of May and June.

	MAY							
	Knots:	4-10	11-16	17-27	28			
Direction:	N0000	3	3	3				
	0450	4	4	3	1			
	E0900	5	3	2	_			
	1350	4	3	ī				
	S180º	8	5	3				
	2250	6	6	5				
	W2700	4	4	2				
	3150	2	ĺ	ī				
Calm 14 period		_	-	-				
		119	N E					

	JUNE						
	Knots:	4-10	11-16	<u>17-27</u>	<u>28</u>		
Direction:  Calm 15 periods	N0000 0450 E0900 1350 S1800 2250 W2700 3150	2 3 5 4 8 9 4 2	2 3 3 2 6 9 4 1	2 2 2 1 3 5 2	0 0 0 0 0		

## 3. LANDING ZONE MAPLE

- a. Location. Located at E81-N119.5 on the 60 km supplemental map and is 22 kms northwest of Airfield 1.
- b. Elevation. 5 meters.
- c. Orientation and Landmarks. HLZ MAPLE is opposed to the north by a North River inlet, to the east by North River, to the south by an extension of the rail line serving SYN City and Highway 2, and to the west by the highway and rail line.
- d. <u>Size</u>. HLZ MAPLE is rectangular in shape and oriented east to west. The land area designated as the HLZ has been prepared and is suitable for landing both helicopters and V/STOL aircraft.
- e. <u>Surface Materials</u>. The HLZ is composed of fertile soil with natural grass cover and oak trees. Portions of the HLZ have been cleared during HLZ preparations. Overland trafficability is estimated to be good at all times and can support all forms of wheeled or tracked vehicular movement.
- f. Obstacles. Forestation within and surrounding the HLZ will present the only vertical obstacle to helicopter operations. Oak trees of substantial height will force landings to be conducted in marked landing sites. Enough sites have been cleared to accommodate a maximum of one heavy or medium helicopter squadron. There are few obstacles, if any, to ground vehicular traffic.
- g. Slope. The surrounding terrain is relatively flat.
- h. Local Use. The surrounding terrain has not been used for any significant purpose; cultivated land and industrial areas are located southeast and on the western border of SYN City.
- i. <u>Exits</u>. This HLZ is located in a forested area, remote from any road or rail LOCs. Surface access to the HLZ will require cross-county movement or use of North River.
- North River inlet which extends 3 km inland and is 1 km wide at its widest point. The inlet is backed to the northwest and west by uncultivated, forested land extending the length of the corridor created by coastal mountain fingers. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to this annex. The HLZ is opposed to the south by similar terrain and is flanked to the east by North River and forested terrain which decreases in elevation to the marsh northwest of SYN City. Its principal value is to provide a readily camouflaged area to locate supply stocks for the GUP forces which is accessable by both air and river LOCs.

k. Prevailing Winds. See LZ OAK.

### 4. LANDING ZONE SPRUCE

- a. <u>Location</u>. Centered at E83.1-N85.5 on the 60 km supplemental map, approximately 18 kms southwest of Airfield 2.
- b. Elevation. 20 meters.
- C. Orientation and Landmarks. HLZ SPRUCE is opposed to the north by South River, to the east by a small coastal community centered at E102.5-N85, to the south by a corridor created by the palisades south of SYN City and to the west by a finger-like projection from the western mountains.
- d. <u>Size</u>. HLZ SPRUCE is rectangular in shape with its long axis oriented northwest to southeast and 2 km in length. The HLZ is 1 km wide. Sufficient land area has been cleared to accommodate a single squadron of heavy or medium lift helicopters.
- e. <u>Surface Materials</u>. The HLZ is composed of fertile soil with natural grass cover and substantial oak forestation. Overland trafficability is estimated to be good at all times, and the terrain will support all forms of wheeled or tracked vehicular movement.
- f. Obstacles. The forestation within the HLZ and surrounding areas impose the only significant vertical obstacle to helicopter operations. The HLZ is flanked to the west by a finger that is oriented west to east from the nearby western mountain region. The finger has a very mild slope and is not a significant obstacle by itself, but when combined with the oak trees, the finger imposes restrictions on a flight profile. There are no significant obstacles to ground vehicular movement.
- g. Slope. 0.5% incline east to west.
- h. Local Use. Terrain within and surrounding the HLZ has not been developed or cultivated. Developed and/or cultivated areas are located northwest and east of the HLZ. It is estimated that it has been used for occasional recreational purposes.
- i. Exits. The HLZ can be serviced by a minor, unimproved road on its southeastern flank which links it to Highway 3. Highway 3 is 6.5 kms east of the HLZ and is the major LOC leading to SYN City.
- j. Adjacent Terrain. HLZ SPRUCE is opposed to the north by South River which is 9 km away from its northernmost edge. The terrain on its immediate eastern flank can still be considered an element of the palisades bordered by a finger projection to the west and

an escarpment to the east. Similarly, the HLZ is opposed to the south by the finger and the palisades. It is flanked to the west by the convex hill mass projecting from the western mountains. The slope immediately opposing the HLZ is very gentle at 2%; incline calculated east to west.

k. Prevailing Wind. See LZ OAK.

## 5. LANDING ZONE BIRCH

- a. <u>Location</u>. Centered at E101.5-N82.5 on the 60 km supplemental map, 12 kms southeast of Airfield 2.
- b. Elevation. 20 meters.
- c. Orientation and Landmarks. The HLZ is opposed to the north by a small coastal community located at E102.5-N85 on the 60 km supplemental map. It is flanked on the east by the coastline and offshore islands and to the south and west by the northernmost extension of an escarpment.
- d. Size. The HLZ is 1.5 km square.
- e. <u>Surface Materials</u>. It is composed of sandy, loamy soil with natural grass cover and scrub oak. The surrounding terrain will support both wheeled and tracked vehicles.
- f. Obstacles. The HLZ is flanked to the north by pole-mounted electrical power lines which present only a minor hazard to helicopter operations because the HLZ is located 1.5 kms south of these power lines. There are no other significant vertical obstructions.
- g. Slope. 1% incline from north to south.
- h. Local Use. The HLZ is flanked to the east by a secondary road extending north to south, and there are minor, unimproved roads that branch off from the secondary road in an easterly direction to the coastline. The HLZ and surrounding areas are traveled mainly by fishermen and may also be used to provide access to the coastline for recreation seekers.
- i. Exits. The HLZ can be approached from the east along a secondary road which branches off from Highway 1. Further access can be obtained from minor beach roads entering the secondary road.
- j. Adjacent Terrain. A coastal community opposes the HLZ to the north; see Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to this Annex. It is within 2 km of the irregular coastline which is backed by a number of offshore islands. The HLZ is in the foothills of the escarpment to the south.

B - 10 - 5

k. Prevailing Wind. See LZ OAK.

### 6. LANDING ZONE PINE


- a. <u>Location</u>. Centered at E12-N11.3 on the Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map.
- b. Elevation. 4 meters.
- c. Orientation and Landmarks. HLZ PINE is centered in an open field within Old City. It is surrounded by commercial, municipal and residential structures and is the northernmost of the two open fields in Old City.
- d. <u>Size</u>. The HLZ is rectangular in shape measuring 400 by 200 meters with its long axis oriented northeast to southwest. All area included within the rectangle is usable.
- e. <u>Surface Materials</u>. The HLZ is a large, open courtyard composed of fertile soil and natural grass cover. Surface material will support both wheeled and tracked vehicles.
- f. Obstacles. Flight profiles will be limited primarily to vertical takeoffs and landings by the adjacent buildings. There are no overhead obstructions at the HLZ. A number of secondary streets can service the HLZ.
- g. Slope. The HLZ is located on relatively flat terrain without any break in contour.
- h. <u>Local Use</u>. The courtyard was used primarily for recreational purposes prior to the commencement of assault operations.
- i. Exits. There are a total of 10 secondary roads that can service the HLZ from any direction.
- j. Adjacent Terrain. The HLZ is surrounded by blocks of municipal, commercial, and residential structures. Portions of Old City and its suburban outgrowth extend north of the HLZ for 5 kms. It is flanked to the east by RED Beach. To the south are the port facilities of SYN City harbor. It is flanked by North River to the west and is within 1.6 kms of Bridge 5.
- k. Prevailing Wind. See LZ OAK.


#### 7. LANDING ZONE POPLAR

a. <u>Location</u>. Centered at Ell.6-N10.7 on the Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map, due south of LZ PINE.

B-10-6

**JNCLASSIFIED** 





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

- b. <u>Elevation</u>. 4 meters.
- c. <u>Orientation and Landmarks</u>. HLZ POPLAR is within one block south of HLZ PINE. It, too, is surrounded by commercial, municipal, and residential structures. It is opposed to the north by the suburban outgrowth of Old City, to the east by RED Beach, to the south by the SYN City harbor, and to the west by North River.
- d. <u>Size</u>. The landing zone is rectangular, measuring 500 by 250 m, with its long axis oriented northeast to southwest. The entire quadrangle is usable.
- e. Surface Materials. See LZ PINE.
- f. Obstacles. See LZ PINE.
- q. Slope. See LZ PINE.
- h. Local Use. See LZ PINE.
- Exits. A total of 16 secondary roads can service this HLZ. See LZ PINE.
- j. Adjacent Terrain. Like LZ PINE, this LZ is surrounded by buildings. LZ POPLAR is located within 150 m of LZ PINE to the north, within 300 m of RED Beach to the east, within 500 m of port facilities to the south, and within 1.3 kms of Bridge 5 to the west.
- k. Prevailing Wind. See LZ OAK.

#### LANDING ZONE CHERRY

- a. <u>Location</u>. Centered at E4-Nll on the Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map, north of Industrial Area 1.
- b. <u>Elevation</u>. 12 meters.
- c. <u>Orientation and Landmarks</u>. LZ CHERRY is located on the western municipal boundary of SYN City using land cultivated for farm use. A cemetery is located at E4.9-N10.5. HLZ CHERRY is about 2.5 km south of the junction of Highways 2 and 3 at E3.3-N13.8.
- d. <u>Size</u>. The HLZ measures 850 by 250 m with its long axis oriented northwest to southeast. All area within the rectangle is usable.
- e. <u>Surface Materials</u>. The HLZ is located on fertile, partially cultivated farmland. Trafficability is good except that a limited amount of compaction will be required in sections that have been tilled.

B-10-7

- f. Obstacles. A major powerline from the SYN City hydroelectric plant is located within 450 m south of the HLZ. There are no other overhead obstacles to impede helicopter traffic; however, ground vehicular traffic will be restricted to the use of cleared lanes due to barrier preparations.
- g. Slope. The HLZ is located on relatively flat terrain.
- h. Local Use. Farmland normally cultivated with seasonal crops.
- i. Exits. A secondary road immediately to the north serves the farm area, linking it with Highway 3 and the nearby suburbs and industrial area.
- j. Adjacent Terrain. Substantial forestation lies to the north, broken only by Highways 3 and 2. The HLZ is flanked to the east by the suburban outgrowth of New City and to the west by woods to the limits of the AOA. Industrial Area 1 is about 900 m to the south.
- k. Prevailing Wind. See LZ OAK.

## 9. LANDING ZONE APPLE

- a. <u>Location</u>. Centered at E5.6-N7.6 on the Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map, due west of New City.
- b. Elevation. 8 meters.
- c. Orientation and Landmarks. LZ APPLE is located on the western municipal boundary of SYN City. It is southwest of an athletic stadium located at E6.5-N8.1 on the Synthetic (SYN) City Base Map; west of New City; north of an inland pond located at E6.4-N6.4; and is flanked by Highway 3 to the west.
- d. <u>Size</u>. The HLZ is rectangular, measuring 800 by 200 m with its long axis oriented east to west. Most of the landing zone surface contains railroad track but is usable provided that sufficient terminal guidance is allocated.
- e. <u>Surface Materials</u>. The HLZ is located on open, shallow-sloped, sparsely vegetated, firm land. The railroad tracks are standard guage steel track with wooden ties and crushed stone ballast. Macadam-surfaced roads delineate the northern and southern boundaries of the HLZ.
- f. Obstacles. It is flanked to the north, south, and east by residential structures of varying heights. These structures will not impose any significant restrictions on flight profile. There are no other overhead obstructions. Wheeled vehicular traffic may be

B-10-8

restricted due to the rail lines; however, with minimal engineer preparation, crossing points can readily be established.

- g. Slope. The terrain has a very mild slope of (-)0.4% north to south.
- h. Local Use. The HLZ is located on a railroad switching yard which will be cleared of rolling stock as required.
- i. Exits. Nine street intersections service traffic into and out of the HLZ leading north, east, and south. The HLZ is flanked to the east by Highway 3 servicing north/south traffic. There are no exits to the west, and cross-country will be restricted in that direction to the use of cleared lanes due to mine barriers.
- j. Adjacent Terrain. The HLZ is flanked on three sides by suburban areas which are backed to the north by Industrial Area 1 and Airfield 1, to the east by New City and to the south by South River. It is flanked to the west by substantially forested areas to the limits of the AOA.
- k. Prevailing Wind. See LZ OAK.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID
Colonel, US Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

TABS:

A - Helicopter Landing Zones - Close

B - Helicopter Landing Zones - Distant

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81


Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City Map is used in lieu of overlay for easy handling.

TAB A (Helicopter Landing Zones—Close) to APPENDIX 10 (Helicopter Landing Zone Study) to ANNEX 8 (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: None

Time Zone: P



**ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT** 

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES


L R. DAVID Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Note: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no. \_\_\_of\_\_\_copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

TAB B (Helicopter Landing Zones — Distant) to APPENDIX 10 (Helicopter Landing Zone Study) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81



L.R. DAVID Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence (b) FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance

(c) FMFM 5-6, Air Reconnaissance

Time Zone: P

ACTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE

#### SITUATION ١.

- <u>Enemy Forces</u>. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate).
- b. Friendly Forces.
  - (1) CTG 51.7 will augment MAF collection efforts by conducting aerial reconnaissance operations and imagery analysis within the area of responsibility.
  - (2) CATF 51 will provide for the employment of remote sensors seaward of MAF defensive installations to protect against infiltration and attack.
  - (3) CG, FMFPAC, in coordination with the Unified Commander, will provide for overflights of southern AGGRESSORLAND and provide multisensor data to supplement that which can be obtained from within the area.
- Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization). c.
- Assumptions. None.

#### 2. **MISSION**

Elements of VII MAF will conduct reconnaissance and surveillance roperations by employing an integrated multidiscipline and multiplatform approach to satisfy EEI regarding enemy positions and activities, terrain analysis, and astronomical/climatological data.

#### 3. EXECUTION

- a. <u>Concept of Operations</u>. <u>Elements of VII MAF will conduct reconnaissance and surveillance within southern AGGRESSORLAND in accordance with provisions contained in references (a-c) and Tabs A through C to this appendix.</u>
- b. Tasks. See Tabs A through C to this appendix.
- c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. See Tabs A through C to this appendix.
- 4. <u>ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS</u>. See Tabs A through C and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. <u>Command</u>. See Tabs A through C and Annex J (Command Relation-ships).
  - Signal. See Tabs A through C and Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

tt...:

L. R. DAVID
Colonel, US Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

### TABS:

- A Ground Reconnaissance Plan
- B Sensor Surveillance Plan
- C Aerial Reconnaissance Plan

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

B-11-2

L.ICLASSIFIED

of copies Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB A (Ground Reconnaissance Plan) to APPENDIX 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

  - (b) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence(c) FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance

Time Zone: P

#### ١. SITUATION

- See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) and current INTSUMS and DISUMS.
- Friendly. See Appendix 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan).

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of VII MAF will conduct ground reconnaissance within the MAF areas of interest to satisfy EEI and OIRs regarding enemy locations and disposition, collect data updating the tactical study of terrain, and be prepared to conduct other missions as directed.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. Ground reconnaissance will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in references (b) and (c) and unit SOPs. The primary agency for deep reconnaissance will be the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. The primary agency for the close reconnaissance will be 7th MARDIV. 7th FSSG and 7th MAW will continue to conduct reconnaissance within AORs to provide for local security.

#### b. Tasks

#### (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A

Conduct reconnaissance by vehicle and helicopter beyond the GOPL to the north and northwest to locate and establish observation over Aggressor forces.

B-11-A-1

- (b) Maintain surveillance of Aggressor reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance units/screens.
- (c) Establish LP/OPs as required to detect and report any Aggressor activity in or through areas considered to be untrafficable; priority to the northeast swamp/bog area and South River fault within the GOPL.
- (d) Maintain observation and surveillance of the mining town (E68-N103 on 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to SYN City Base Map).

#### (2) GOP Southern Sector: Task Force B

- (a) Conduct reconnaissance by vehicle and helicopter beyond the GOPL to the south and southwest to locate Aggressor forces.
- (b) Maintain surveillance of Aggressor units.
- (c) Establish LP/OPs as required to detect and report any Aggressor activity in or through areas considered to be untrafficable; priority to South River fault within the GOPL and the southeastern palisades.

## (3) 7th MARDIV (Rein)

- (a) Conduct close ground reconnaissance within the FBHL/ GOPL with forces assigned.
- (b) Maintain surveillance of likely avenues of approach, Aggressor troop concentrations and villages, and provide local security for CSS and airfield installations as directed.
- (c) CG, 7th MARDIV will continue to implement the remote sensor relay plan in accordance with provisions contained in Tab B (Sensor Surveillance Plan).

## (4) 7th MAW (Forward)

- (a) Conduct ground reconnaissance as required to maintain local security of airfield installations and supply stocks.
- (b) CG, 7th MAW will be prepared to augment forces implementing the remote sensor plan by providing support aircraft to air-deliver remote sensors as required.

- (c) Provide air transportation for the insertion of Force Reconnaissance Company teams in accordance with provisions contained in Enclosure 1 (Deep Reconnaissance Missions) to Tab A (Ground Reconnaissance Plan).
- (5) 7th FSSG. Conduct ground reconnaissance as required to maintain local security of CSS installations.

#### (6) 1st Force Reconnaissance

- (a) Conduct deep reconnaissance missions in accordance with provisions contained in Enclosure 1 (Deep Reconnaissance Missions) to this tab.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct other such missions as assigned by ACofS, G-2 and as directed.
- (c) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company will conduct ground sensor implantation in accordance with provisions contained in Tab B (Sensor Surveillance Plan).
- c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. Submit ground reconnaissance plans and support requirements by 1700 daily; negative reports are required.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Patrol reports will be submitted in accordance with provisions contained in unit SOPs and reference (c).
- b. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command. See Annex J (Command Relationships).

#### b. Signal

- (1) CG, 7th MARDIV will establish those communications nets required to support ground reconnaissance operations within the FBHL/GOPL.
- (2) The MAF CEO, in coordination with ACofS, G-2, will establish and maintain those nets required to support deep reconnaissance missions.
- (3) See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID
Colonel, US Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

**ENCLOSURE:** 

CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY OF

1 - Deep Reconnaissance Missions

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

B-11-A-4

**NCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 1 (Deep Reconnaissance Missions) to TAB A (Ground Reconnaissance Plan) to APPENDIX 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

(c) FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance

Time Zone: P

- 1. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company will prepare and distribute orders to effect the accomplishment of the following missions. Reconnaissance Areas of Operation (RAO) are listed; however, changes can be implemented to support mission requirements. See Tab A (Ground Reconnaissance Plan).
  - a. <u>Mission 1</u>. Insert two teams on D+10 to accomplish the following tasks: (RAOs vic E110-N150)
    - (1) Establish LP/OPs near the coastline within RAOs to commence and maintain surveillance of coastline and marsh area to the west.
    - (2) Be prepared to direct supporting fires and/or airstrikes against any ACVs that might threaten the MAF area from the north.
  - Mission 2. Insert two teams on D+10 to accomplish the following tasks: (RAOs vic E67-N180)
    - (1) Establish LP/OPs within RAOs to commence and maintain surveillance of the minor road which extends in a north/south orientation parallel to and on the northernmost finger and the marsh area east of the finger.
    - (2) Conduct reconnaissance patrols within RAOs to determine the presence, strength, and disposition of enemy forces attempting to penetrate MAF defenses from the north.
    - (3) Be prepared to direct air or naval gunfire attacks on enemy as directed.
    - (4) Be prepared to emplace ground sensors as directed.

- c. <u>Mission 3</u>. Insert one team on D+10 to accomplish the following tasks: (RAO vic E44-N194)
  - (1) Establish LP/OPs within RAO to commence and maintain surveillance on road junction located at E43-N193.
  - (2) Conduct reconnaissance patrols within RAO to determine the presence, strength, and disposition of enemy forces attempting to penetrate the MAF defensive security zone from the northwest.
  - (3) Be prepared to direct airstrikes on enemy attempting to close on the MAF defensive security zone as directed.
  - (4) be prepared to emplace ground sensors as directed.
- d. <u>Mission 4</u>. Insert one team on D+10 to accomplish the following tasks: (RAC vic E23-N176)
  - (1) Establish LP/OPs within RAO to commence and maintain surveillance of the bridge and road junction located at E22-N172 and E20-N170 respectively.
  - (2) Conduct reconnaissance within RAO to determine the presence, strength, and disposition of enemy forces attempting to penetrate the MAF defensive security zone from the north and northwest.
  - (3) Be prepared to direct airstrikes on Aggressor concentrations and columns.
  - (4) Be prepared to emplace ground sensors as directed.
- e. <u>Mission 5</u>. Insert two teams on D+10 to accomplish the following tasks: (RAOs vic EO-N100)
  - (1) Establish LP/OPs within RAOs to commence and maintain surveillance over South River and LOCs north of the river.
  - (2) Conduct reconnaissance of RAO to determine the presence, strength, and disposition of enemy forces attempting to penetrate the MAF defensive security zone from the west.
  - (3) Be prepared to emplace ground sensors as directed.
- f. <u>Mission 6</u>. Insert two teams on D+10 to accomplish the following tasks: (RAOs vic E2-N82)
  - (1) Establish LP/OPs within RAOs to commence and maintain surveillance over South River and LOCs south of the river.

B-11-A-1-2

- (2) Other tasks are the same as for teams tasked in Mission 5.
- g. <u>Mission 7</u>. Insert one team on D+10 to accomplish the following tasks: (RAO EO-N45)
  - (1) Establish LP/OPs within RAO to commence and maintain surveillance over a minor road oriented west to east, continuing southwest to northeast, which extends parallel to the southernmost finger projection south of SYN City.
  - (2) Conduct reconnaissance within RAO to determine the presence, strength, and disposition of enemy forces attempting to penetrate the MAF security zone from the southwest.
  - (3) Be prepared to direct airstrikes on Aggressor troop concentrations and advancing columns.
  - (4) Be prepared to emplace ground sensors as directed.
- h. Mission 8. Insert two teams on D+10 to accomplish the following tasks: (RAO E92-N40)
  - (1) Establish LP/OPs within RAO to commence and maintain surveillance over coastline to the east and LOCs extending north to south and west to east on the palisades south/southwest of the escarpment.
  - (2) Conduct reconnaissance within RAO to determine presence, strength, and disposition of enemy forces attempting to penetrate the MAF security zone from the southwest.
  - (3) Be prepared to direct airstrikes and NGF on enemy force concentrations and advancing columns.
  - (4) Be prepared to emplace ground sensors as directed.
- 2. <u>Mission 9</u>. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company will augment, rotate, or extract teams subsequent to D+10 in accordance with provisions contained in unit SOPs and as directed.
- 3. Any modification of assigned missions must be approved by this Head-quarters.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

B-11-A-1-4

**INCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

TAB B (Sensor Surveillance Plan) to APPENDIX 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 2-2, Amphibious Reconnaissance

(b) FMFM 5-6, Air Reconnaissance

- (c) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Constructive)
- (d) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Intelligence (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) and current INTSUMS.
- b. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. See Appendix 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) and Annex C (Operations).
- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).
- d. Assumptions. None.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of VII MAF will deploy remote sensors and establish requisite arrays to maintain continuous surveillance in depth of enemy likely avenues of approach and collect near-real-time data of intelligence and target acquisition value.

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. <u>Concept of Operations</u>. Remote sensors, monitors, and associated equipment will be employed to provide data required in the defense of security and main defensive zones from coastal and inland infiltration and penetration attempts. 7th MARDIV will conduct and coordinate all remote sensor operations within the MAF defensive zone of operations; all remote sensors and relays seaward of SYN City will be provided for and operated by elements of TF 51. Data collected by sensor arrays will be processed and disseminated to higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands in accordance with provisions contained in references (c) and (d).

#### b. Tasks

### (1) 7th MARDIV (Rein)

- (a) CG, 7th MARDIV will be responsible for the deployment, monitoring, control, and management of remote sensor and support requirements for VII MAF.
- (b) CG, 7th MARDIV will coordinate the preplanned and dynamic implantation of remote sensors by aircraft with CG, 7th MAW.

## (2) 7th MAW (Forward)

- (a) CG, 7th MAW will conduct aerial sensor implantation operations to satisfy the requirements established by CG, 7th MARDIV.
- (b) CG, 7th MAW will provide aircraft to fly Multichannel Inband Airborne Relay (MIBAR) and Forward Pass relay missions in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c) and remote sensor employment operations contained in this tab.

### c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Remote sensor arrays will remain activated in place to support defensive operations until otherwise directed.
- (2) CG, 7th MARDIV will publish MIBAR and Forward Pass relay schedules for implementation by CG, 7th MAW.
- (3) Unit sensor implantation requirements will be submitted to CG, 7th MARDIV for consolidation/tasking utilizing the appropriate request format contained in reference (c).

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Administration. Data collected from sensor arrays and processed as intelligence will be disseminated by CG, 7th MARDIV via dedicated intelligence nets or by other expeditious means utilizing INTREPS and INTSUMS.

#### b. Logistics

(1) CG, 7th MARDIV will be responsible for stocking applicable Class IX supplies required to perform organic and limited intermediate maintenance of ground sensor equipment.

- (2) CG, 7th MARDIV is responsible for organic and limited intermediate level maintenance for organic remote sensors and associated equipment.
- (3) CG, 7th FSSG is responsible for stocking the balance of supplies and performing maintenance on the balance of remote sensor equipment.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. <u>Command Relationships</u>. CG, 7th MARDIV will be responsible for the employment of all remote sensor operations in the AOA; less the seaward extension of the surveillance plan. See Annex J (Command Relationships).

#### b. Signal

- (1) Sensor frequencies, Forward Pass Data Link frequencies, and MIBAR uplink/downlink channels will be issued by CG, 7th MARDIV.
- (2) See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ENCLOSURES: (All Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

of copies Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB C (Aerial Reconnaissance Plan) to APPENDIX 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence (b) FMFM 5-6, Air Reconnaissance

(c) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Intelligence (Construc-

Time Zone: P

#### SITUATION

- Enemy Forces. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate).
- Friendly Forces.
  - (1) ACofS, G-2, in coordination with the Unified Commander, will request and utilize strategic MSI to support MAF operations within the AOA.
  - (2) CG, 7th MAW, with augmentation from elements of CTF 57, will conduct all aerial reconnaissance and surveillance within the landward portion of the AOA.
  - (3) CTF 57 will augment 7th MAW capabilities by providing aircraft to conduct reconnaissance missions in accordance with requests to satisfy EEI and OIRs.
- Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization). С.
- d. Assumptions. None.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of VII MAF will conduct aerial reconnaissance and surveillance utilizing visual and MSI assets to satisfy EEI regarding enemy strength, disposition, and movement.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. CG, 7th MAW will conduct visual and MSI reconnaissance and surveillance missions in response to requirements generated by this Headquarters to obtain data gathered from multisensor platforms. ACofS, G-2, will exploit data/imagery

obtained to satisfy EEI regarding the location, strength, and disposition of enemy forces and to update the tactical analysis of surrounding terrain and manmade installations of interest.

#### b. Tasks

(1) 7th MAW. Conduct aerial reconnaissance and surveillance operations in accordance with provisions contained in this tab and missions in accordance with Enclosure 1 (Aerial Imagery Plan) and Enclosure 2 (Observation).

#### (2) All Major Subordinate Commands

- (a) Determine imagery and observation support requirements and submit requests to this Headquarters.
- (b) Outstanding surveillance and imagery support requirements should be reviewed to determine priorities and mission cancellation should be initiated for missions no longer required.

#### c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Subordinate commands will utilize existing MSI to the maximum extent feasible for planning purposes.
- (2) Aerial reconnaissance and MSI requests will be made in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c).
- (3) ACofS, G-2 will coordinate with CTF 57 the execution of outof-area MSI and aerial reconnaissance coverage in support of VII MAF.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administration. All IPIRs and SUPIRs will be submitted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c).
- b. Logistics. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. <u>Command Relationships</u>. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- Signal. See Annex M (Air Operations) and Annex K (Communication-Electronics).

B-11-C-2

**JNCLASSIFIED** 

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

1 - Aerial Imagery Plan2 - Observation

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

B-11-C-3

Copy no. of cornes Auphibious Force VII Composite Marine Auphibious Force (VII MAE) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORIAND PROMARY 1981

ENCLOSURE I Sevial Lwagery Plan) to TAB C (Merial Recommaissance Plan) to Applying a Surveillance and Recommissance Plan) to Apply B (Intellinence) to operation risk book

門所以於四種的經濟的學學院的物學的學院的

Ref. (a) Map: 200 Kilometer Supplemental Tap to Synthetic City Base Map (b) FMFM 5-b, Air Reconnaissance Time Zone:  $\mathbb R$ 

												_			
2 - 4 - 4 - 4 - 5	COASTA, MFCON	POS 106s vem ACT	POS : OI • VEH &CT	RIVERALCON	BRIDGE ALPHA ONE A'	POE LOCA	PREAMORPHY C COMMISSION FF	Bryf m mf c DA	POS 100.	#0\$ 10Ks	CONCERTED ROAD JUNCTION	BIVE B RECON	HALAND COMMUNITY	A COASTAL RECOV	MACO
0) 0	-			-			_	-	$\overline{}$			•		•	
<b>6</b> 1 G		<b> </b>									∤				
86 0					_		_	$\longrightarrow$					$\vdash$		
110	L												-		
97 (1	-									<b>├</b>	∤			-	
\$1 O	-					-					$\rightarrow$				
M Q	-		_	$\overline{}$				-					-		
(( a										-			-		
IE O	$\vdash$			-				$\vdash$							~
ot a	$\vdash$									<del>-</del>			$\vdash$		
67 G	-	∤								<del>-</del>			$\vdash$	<del>-</del>	
87 G	$\vdash$			$\dashv$	-					├─┥	$\dashv$				
11.0	-								<u> </u>	<del>                                     </del>					
97.0	-	$\rightarrow$	4						_	-					
96.0		$\dashv$												- 1	$\neg \neg$
PE U	<del>-</del> -				_										
0 13														-	
22 a	<b>├</b> ───┤					-	<u> </u>								
+2 0	-	$\vdash$											$\vdash$		
0 30				-		-		-	-		_	-		•	
61 0	-			-				-	<u> </u>	-	$\vdash$				$\neg \neg$
*1 0	-	$\overline{}$						-							
(10		_						$\vdash$							
91 0	-	-						┢	<del></del>				<del>-</del>	-	
91 a	-	$\cdot$		-	-		-	-	-		-		<del>  -  </del>		-
91 G	-							├─	-			<del></del>			
() 0	<del> </del>	$\vdash$		$\vdash$				-	_						
110	1.			*		-	•	-					-	-	·
11 0				_				<del>├</del>	<del>                                     </del>	-			<del> </del>	-	
0, 0	<b>†.</b>			-	_	-	-	-		,	•	•	1.	-	
<b>-</b>	ĝ	û	;	ŷ	ĝ	ş	ç	ŷ.	1	ş	Q.	ŷ	1	į	,
											1				j.
100M	ĝ	Š	÷	ŷ	Ow	o P	9	ç	5	3	ç	ş	,	į	1 1
SCALE	State # # 7.20.000	000 02 1 4010 2 41815	000 UZ 1 #0100 #1815	\$1819 • • 1 20 000	TANDANIA TANDANIA	900 UZ ,	CHICANIA BIG I W B	900 OF 1	478.P	400 07 1 41 8 41843	1 4 000	4 4 5 4 7 4 7	And a second	5 e .	To the second se
OVERLAP	;	,	,	;	,	;	;	,	,	,	;	,	,	,	
i	31 25 24 24 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34	APD OBL	\$0.00 \$18.00 \$18.00	180 OF 1	3 ;	100 cm	1 t	1811 (1844) 1811 (1844)	# 1 i	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1	111	
awon -	0118 NO. 1 0118 NO. 1	00256-2-3-03	118404111	4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	*********	1012.4	*	See Clin	4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	4		1		,,,1,
;	÷	ş	Į.	ğ	ş	1	ì	# C	ž.	:	:				1

BY COMMISSION OF LIEUTENAMY GENEUAL ONE

L. B. DAVID Colonel, D. S. Marine Corp. Assistant (Nict of Staff, or

The market market and the constitution of the

B-11-C-1-1

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 2 (Observation) to TAB C (Aerial Reconnaissance Plan) to APPENDIX 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

(b) FMFM 5-6, Air Reconnaissance

(c) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate).
- b. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. See Tab C (Aerial Reconnaissance Plan).
- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).
- d. Assumptions. None.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of VII MAF will conduct aerial observation and/or reconnaissance and forward air control perations throughout the AOA until termination of combat operations or as directed.

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. <u>Concept of Operations</u>. CG, 7th MAW will exercise operational control of all airborne observation missions flown within the MAF area of interest (formerly the landward extension of the AOA). Elements of 7th MAW (Forward) will provide observation aircraft and ground crew support for the conduct of missions in support of MCATF operations within the MAF defensive security zone and in support of 7th MARDIV defensive operations within the main defense area.

#### b. <u>Iasks</u>

(1) <u>GOP</u>. Prepare an aerial observation plan and submit requirements in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c).

B-11-C-2-1

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

(2) 7th MARDIV (Rein). Prepare an aerial observation plan and submit requirements in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c).

### (3) 7th MAW (Forward)

- (a) Provide observation aircraft and aircrews for the conduct of preplanned missions and missions in response to immediate tactical air requests.
- (b) Provide hand-held photography of installations in support of defensive ground operations as directed.
- (c) Conduct Force Recon Team insertions and remote sensor implantation in accordance with provisions contained in Tab A (Ground Reconnaissance Plan) and Tab B (Sensor Surveillance Plan).
- (d) Process and distribute data obtained from aircrew debriefings in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c).

### c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Preplanned, general support observation missions will be assigned by CG, 7th MAW in coordination with ACofS, G-2.
- (2) In-flight frag orders initiating the conduct of direct support observation missions will be assigned by the DASC.
- (3) 7th MAW aircraft and aircraft of CTF 57 will check in and out of controlled airspace in accordance with provisions contained in Annex M (Air Operations).

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

CANADARY BENEVICES ASSAURT PROPERTY STRUCTURE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE

- a. <u>Command Relationships</u>. CG, 7th MAW will be responsible for the conduct of all aerial observation missions within the MAF area of interest. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- b. <u>Signal</u>. See Annex M (Air Operations) and Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ATTACHMENT:

A - Preplanned Aerial Observation Missions

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

B-11-C-2-3

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

ATTACHMENT A (Preplanned Aerial Observation Missions) to ENCLOSURE 2 (Observation) to TAB C (Aerial Reconnaissance Plan) to APPENDIX 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

Time Zone: P

MISSION NO.	AREA, SPECIFIC, ROUTE SEARCH	TYPE OF AIRCRAFT	FREQUENCY & DURATION	REMARKS
001	Route (from E102.7- N107 to E103.5- N119)	VMO	Daily, commencing D+10-BMNT to EENT.	Report enemy activity and obstacles as observed.
002	Route (from E102.7- N103.5 to E82- N125)	VMO	Daily, commencing D+10-BMNT to EENT.	Report enemy activity and obstacles as observed.
003	Route (from E95- N101 to E65.5-N101.5 to E78.2-N115 to E90-N109 to E96.3- N109 to E96.5-N111 to E102.7-N107)	VMO	Daily, commencing D+10-BMNT to EENT.	Report enemy activity, obstacles, and condition of bridge located at E95.3-N110.1.
004	Route (from E94- N97.5 to E79.8- N78.9 to E75-N97 to E71-N93.2 to E72-N91.4)	VMO	Daily, commencing D+10-BMNT to	Report enemy activity and obstacles as observed.
005	Route (from E93.8- N92.5 to E92.5- N86.8 to E83.5- N84.2 to E80-N78.5)	VMO	Daily, commencing D+10-BMNT to EENT.	Report enemy activity and obstacles as observed.

B-11-C-2-A-1

006	Route (from E100.2- N91.5 to E100-N85 to E89.5-N82)	VM0	Daily, commencing D+10-BMNT to EENT.	Report enemy activity and obstacles as observed.
007	Route (from E100.2- N91.5 to E100-N85 to E102.8-N80 to to E99-N72.5)	VMO	Daily, commencing D+10-BMNT to EENT.	Report enemy activity, obstacles, movements from beach entrance/exits, lateral movements parallel on trace of coastline and escarpment to the west.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L. R. DAVID Colonel, US Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

B-11-C-2-A-2

**UN...ASSIFIED** 

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City; 1:20,000

(b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

(c) OH 8-7, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)

Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. This annex sets forth the details for the conduct of Operation BREAKER SIX by the VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF).
- b. Mission. See paragraph 2 of Operation Plan 6-81.
- c. Area of Operations. See Appendix 10 (Operations Overlay).
- d. Situation. See paragraph 1 of Operation Plan 6-81.

#### 2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

VII MAF immediately undertakes the deliberate defense of SYN City to prevent Aggressor infiltration or penetration in force. The GOP will be established along the trace of the FBHL. GOP responsibilities will be divided between two task forces to minimize control problems that otherwise would occur because of the South River obstacle which divides the defensive area. The 2nd Tank Battalion MCATF will be responsible for the northern sector of the GOP and the 1st Tank Battalion MCATF will man the southern sector. The COP will be the responsibility of units in the Forward Defense Area (FDA). The FEBA will be located within the metropolitan boundary of SYN City. Defensive positions will be prepared within urban and suburban areas along the trace of and within the FEBA. Maximum use will be made of outer structures to reduce the effectiveness of enemy fires and canalize attacking forces into terrain more favorable for mechanized counterattacks. Priority of fires to the GOP initially, then to friendly forces under attack in the COP and FEBA, and finally friendly counterattacking forces. Priority for the defense will be the retention of the airfields, CSSAs, and port areas to ensure uninterrupted resupply of VII MAF, including the delivery and distribution of emergency food supplies for the civilian populace, thereby assuring control over the civilians and minimizing the risk of an uprising. Instructions for

supporting the landing and deployment of follow-on forces will be promulgated by frag order. See Appendix 11 (Concept of Operations).

#### CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

- a. Nuclear Operations. See Appendix 1 (Nuclear Operations).
- b. NBC Defense. See Appendix 2 (NBC Defense).
- c. <u>Electronic Warfare</u>. See Appendix 3 (Electronic Warfare).
- d. <u>Psychological Operations</u>. See Appendix 4 (Psychological Operations).
- e. Unconventional Warfare. See Appendix 5 (Unconventional Warfare).
- f. <u>Search and Rescue</u>. See Appendix 6 (Search and Rescue) to Annex M (Air Operations).
- g. <u>Deception</u>. See Appendix 7 (Deception).
- h. Rules of Engagement. See Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement).
- i. Reconnaissance. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- j. Fire Support. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- k. Air Operations and Air Defense. See Annex M (Air Operations).
- 1. Amphibious Operations. None; see OPLAN 1-81.
- m. <u>Countermechanized Operations</u>. See Appendix 13 (Countermechanized Operations) and Appendix 14 (Obstacle Plan).
- n. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) EEI's; see Annex B (Intelligence).
  - (2) Nuclear and lethal chemical munitions will be employed by authority of this Headquarters only.
  - (3) Report by FLASH precedence any indication of enemy NBC, airborne, or mechanized activity.

#### OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

See Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement).

#### 5. LIMITING FACTORS

- a. Lack of sufficient dispersed airfields within the FEBA limits the number of 7th MAW aircraft that can be supported ashore. Considerable reliance must be placed on use of TABs, which are approximately 170nm from SYN City.
- b. Deep penetrations of the FEBA could result in Airfields 1 and 2 becoming untenable for basing fixed-wing aircraft. In that event, 7th MAW fixed-wing squadrons at those fields will redeploy to TABs with as many supporting personnel as can reasonably be evacuated. To the maximum degree possible, consistent with prudent risk, V/STOL aircraft and helicopters will continue to operate from within SYN City.
- c. Use of fixed-wing air, artillery, and naval gunfire support within the FEBA will be limited. Greater reliance will be placed on mortars and direct-fire weapons if the Aggressor forces penetrate suburban and/or urban areas.
- d. The danger of fires will be more acute in the constricted spaces utilized for the defense than was true during the assault. All defensive positions must be cleared of flammable materials to the maximum degree possible and stocked with sand, dirt, water or other firefighting material or equipment prior to the Aggressor attack. Unit commanders will provide for alternate positions to accomplish assigned missions in the event primary positions are made untenable by fires.
- e. The population still residing in SYN City is so large that massive evacuation and relocation is not feasible. Commanders will make provisions for selective, local evacuation as required, coordinating the selection of relocation areas with local authorities to assure that emergency supplies will continue to be distributed.

#### COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- b. Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigad er General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### APPENDIXES:

- 1 Nuclear Operations
- 2 NBC Defense
- 3 Electronic Warfare
- 4 Psychological Operations (Omitted)
  5 Unconventional Warfare (Omitted)
- 6 Search and Rescue (Omitted)
- 7 Deception

- 7 Deception
  8 Rules of Engagement
  9 Reconnaissance (Omitted)
  10 Operations Overlay
  11 Concept of Operations
  12 Fire Support
  13 Countermechanized Operations
  14 Obstacle Plan

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Nuclear Operations) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City; 1:20,000

(b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

- (c) FMFM 11-4, Staff Officer's Field Manual Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures
- (d) ATF Operation Plan 1-81, Nuclear Weapons Employment Plan (Constructive)
- (e) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedure for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapon Employment (Constructive)

Time Zone:

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces
  - (1) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) provides nuclear attacks against designated targets, if authorized, in support of VII MAF.
  - (2) Theater-based USAF aircraft are prepared to attack targets in Aggressorland subject to requests by CG, VII MAF with NCA/CINCPAC approval.
  - (3) CG, 7th MARDIV will be prepared to conduct tactical nuclear fire missions with elements of the 10th Marines on order.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

#### d. Assumptions

- (1) That, because of the large and supportive civilian population in SYN City, the Aggressor forces will not employ NBC weapons within the city except as a last resort.
- (2) That the use of nuclear or lethal chemical weapons by VII MAF will be authorized on or after D+10 if those weapons are first employed by Aggressor forces.

(3) That if authorized by NCA, final approval for execution of any nuclear or lethal chemical fire mission will remain vested in CG, VII MAF.

#### 2. MISSION

When approved by the NCA, VII MAF will employ tactical nuclear weapons against selected targets and, when authorized, targets of opportunity to destroy or neutralize advancing Aggressor division concentrations closing on the defensive security zone.

#### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Nuclear Operations. Upon authorization by the National Command Authority, nuclear fire missions will commence on order to destroy or neutralize enemy division columns at locations on LOC's which are on-call preplanned targets and targets of opportunity. See Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- b. Weapon Allocation. See Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- c. Targeting. See Enclosure 1 (Nuclear Fire Support Table/Target List) to Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- d. <u>Tasks</u>. See Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- e. <u>DGZ/Weapon/Target Information</u>. See Enclosure 1 (Nuclear Fire Support Table/Target List) to Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- f. <u>Limitations</u>. See coordinating instructions contained in Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- g. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. See Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS, See Tab K (Special Ammunition Logistics) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Release Procedures. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).
- b. Execution Authority. After a decision has been rendered by the National Command Authority regarding the employment of nuclear or lethal chemical weapons, and when authorized by CINCPAC, CG, VII

MAF will order the execution of nuclear fire missions in support of defensive operations within the VII MAF area of influence.

- c. Command and Control. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- d. <u>Communications-Electronics</u>. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).
- e. Execution Checklist. In accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 2 (NBC Defense) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

- (b) FMFM 11-1, Nuclear, Chemical, and Defensive Biological Operations in the FMF
- (c) FMFM 11-4, Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures
- (d) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. SITUATION

a. Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence).

#### b. Friendly

- (1) The MAF NBCD Control Center will be located at the MAF Command Operations Center (COC) and the alternate Control Center will be co-located with the division COC.
- (2) CATF 51 will provide for the defense and protection of casualties and supply/equipment stocks afloat within the AOA.
- (3) Designated TF 51 shipping will provide mass casualty treatment facilities afloat.

#### c. Assumptions

- (1) That any Aggressor nuclear attacks against VII MAF within the metropolitan boundary of SYN City will maximize radiation and minimize thermal and blast effects to preserve the city's port area and other facilities for their own use.
- (2) That any Aggressor nuclear attacks against VII MAF outside SYN City will use high-yield weapons maximizing blast or thermal effects against MAF tanks and mounted infantry.
- 2. MISSION. Elements of VII MAF will employ both active and passive measures to destroy enemy nuclear delivery systems and minimize the effects of direct and collateral damage as a result of hostile nuclear attacks.

#### 3. EXECUTION

CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR

#### a. <u>Tasks</u>

### (1) VII MAF NBC Control Center

- (a) Continue to implement the NBC Warning and Reporting System.
- (b) Be prepared to deploy Control and Assessment Teams to augment or assume control of any of the subordinate major commands that have become a casualty.
- (c) Be prepared to direct the efforts of subordinate Monitor/Survey, Decontamination, and NUDET teams in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).

## (2) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

- (a) Be prepared to assume the responsibilities of the MAF NBC Control Center in the event the MAF COC becomes a casualty.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct personnel, equipment, and terrain decontamination operations within subordinate unit's sectors of defense.
- (c) Provide for NBCD control center teams, monitor/survey teams, decontamination teams, heavy rescue and labor squads, and NUDET teams in accordance with unit SOPs.
- (d) Be prepared to conduct mass casualty evacuations in the event of nuclear attacks.

## (3) 7th MAW (Rear)

- (a) Conduct airstrikes in accordance with provisions contained in Tab A (Air Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support) and Annex C (Operations).
- (b) Provide for airborne NUDET elements as required and in accordance with provisions contained in unit SOPs.

### (4) 7th MAW (Forward)

(a) Provide for airborne NUDET elements in accordance with unit SOP and provisions contained in Annex M (Air Operations).

(b) Be prepared to assist in mass casualty evacuations anywhere within the VII MAF area of influence.

#### (5) 7th FSSG

- (a) Be prepared to conduct decontamination operations within each CSSA, at each airfield, and to augment 7th MARDIV, as required, in establishing and operating forward deployed decontamination stations.
- (b) Be prepared to receive and/or evacuate mass casualties within the AOA.
- (c) Provide for protection and distribution of supplies and equipment in accordance with provisions contained in Annex P (Combat Service Support) and unit SOPs.

### b. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>

- (1) Unit commanders will maintain an NBC MOPP level posture commensurate with the current tactical situation and levels of contamination within TAORs. As a minimum, unit commanders are directed to maintain MOPP- level 1; a higher protective posture will be ordered when required by the developing tactical situation.
- (2) 7th FSSG will provide additional medical teams at personnel decontamination stations as required and in accordance with provisions contained in Annex D (Logistics) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- (3) In the event of extensive decontamination requirements, the following priorities for decontamination will be adhered to in descending order:
  - (a) Personnel
  - (b) Class I stocks and water
  - (c) Critical equipment and supplies
  - (d) Vital terrain

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The second of the second secon

- a. <u>Logistics</u>. See Annex D (Logistics), Annex E (Personnel), and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- b. Administration. Reporting procedures and formats are contained in reference (d).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command. The MAF NBC Control Center will be co-located with the  $\overline{\text{MAF COC}}$ ; an alternate will be located at Headquarters, 7th MARDIV.
- b. <u>Signal</u>. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics) and current CEOIs.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 3 (Electronic Warfare) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

(b) FMFM 2-3, Signals Intelligence/Electronic Warfare(C)

(c) FM 32-30, Electronic Warfare Tactics of Defense

- (d) FM 100-32, Tactical Electronic Warfare
- (e) OH 3-4, Electronic Warfare Operations Handbook (f) TC 32-30, Electronic Warfare Tactics of Defense

q) TC 100-33, Tactics of Electronic Warfare

(h) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Electronic Warfare Operations (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly
  - (1) All airborne and ground ESM, ECM, and ECCM operations within the VII MAF area of influence will be coordinated by the VII MAF S/EWCC throughout the period of defensive operations; elements of the 7th MAW and Radio Battalion will conduct all such operations as directed by the S/EWCC.
  - (2) CTF 57 will augment VII MAF by providing ESM and ECM platforms to support the defense of the MAF area of influence and the seaward extension of that area until the termination of defensive operations or as directed by the Unified Commander.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).
- d. Assumptions. None.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of VII MAF will conduct EW operations to determine the extent of Aggressor use of the electromagnetic spectrum; destroy or deny the utility of collection equipment; and take measures to protect MAF use of the electromagnetic spectrum in support of defensive operations within the AOA.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. The S/EWCC will be responsible for the coordination of all EW operations within the VII MAF area of influence. Data collected by all subordinate commands will be processed and, when combined with other EEI, will provide targeting information for the conduct of fire missions, ground tactical missions, and/or ECM. Based on decisions regarding the method of attack by senior MAF staff members, subordinate commands; i.e., 7th Mar Div, 7th MAW, Radio Bn, will be tasked with the conduct ground tactical, fire support, and/or ECM missions. Should attack means other than ground ECM be chosen to attack targets identified by ESM, the S/EWCC will provide target data to the Division COC, the DASC, or the FSCC for the deployment of tactical forces or the conduct of fire missions as appropriate. All subordinate commands will implement SIGSEC and emergency EMCON procedures upon implementation of this plan and in accordance with unit SOPs. Instructions will be provided by 4th CAG for the implementation of restrictions on civilian commercial, public, and private communication networks, and such networks will be monitored for violations of acceptable use throughout the period of defensive operations.

#### b. Tasks

- (1) GOP Forces (Task Forces A and B)
  - (a) Ensure all radar have been adjusted for maximum frequency diversity within parameters of equipment.
  - (b) All combat actions will be conducted under strict EMCOM procedures to reduce emission signatures.
  - (c) Satisfy EEI within capability and report data in accordance with provisions contained in this appendix.

### (2) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

- (a) Establish ESM/ECM support requirements and forward them to VII MAF via the S/EWCC.
- (b) Provide security for Radio Bn detachments in G/S or in D/S as required.
- (c) Implement EMCON plans set forth in reference (h) as required for reduction of target identification.
- (d) Coordinate ECM operations conducted from defensive installations with the VII MAF S/EWCC. See paragraph 3.c.(1) and (2).

C - 3 - 2

## (3) 7th MAW (Forward)

- (a) Conduct ESM operations to satisfy EEI and develop the current Aggressor EOB.
- (b) Conduct ECM operations in support of preplanned CAS missions, on-call or redirected CAS missions, and in support of BARCAPs as directed by the DASC.
- (c) Implement EMCON plans set forth in reference (h) as directed by the VII MAF S/EWCC.

#### (4) 7th FSSG

- (a) Establish ESM/ECM support requirements and forward them to VII MAF via the S/EWCC.
- (b) Be prepared to implement EMCON plans set forth in reference (h) as required for reduction of target identification.

### (5) Radio Bn

TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT

- (a) Provide Special Intelligence Communication guard to VII MAF, 7th MARDIV, and 7th MAW (Forward) as directed.
- (b) Conduct ESM operations to satisfy EEI and develop the current Aggressor EOB.
- (c) Be prepared to conduct ECM missions in support of GOP and main defensive belt forces as Aggressor forces close on the MAF defensive security zone.

#### Coordinating Instructions

- (1) ECM ground-oriented targets of opportunity will not be engaged until attacks on MAF defensive positions are imminent or defensive units have been engaged by Aggressor tactical and/or REC elements.
- (2) Subordinate commands integrating EW and SIGINT operations into defensive and deceptive plans will ensure close coordination is maintained with the VII MAF S/EWCC and supporting arm control agencies to capitalize on assets available to unit commanders and to maximize mutual support.
- (3) MIJI reporting will be accomplished in accordance with provisions contained in reference (h).

- (4) Basic EMCON plans are provided for in reference (h). Subordinate commands may modify or develop EMCON plans to suit specific tactical requirements. Coordinate modifications with the VII MAF S/EWCC.
- 4. GUIDING PRINCIPLES. General policy is provided for in reference (h). Subordinate commands will utilize either passive or active ESM/ECM, organic fires, and/or supporting arms to subdue or destroy civil emissions emanating from within SYN City and posing a threat to friendly tactical communications and/or defensive operations provided that such measures have been coordinated with elements of 4th CAG and the VII MAF S/EWCC. Unit commanders should acknowledge that these emanations can be exploited for friendly use, however, the decision to degrade or destroy emitters will remain vested in commanders within their respective areas of influence.
- 5. <u>SPECIAL MEASURES</u>. Basic policy is provided for in reference (h) and the preceding paragraph. Modifications to basic policy will be distributed by frag order.
- 6. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
  - a. Administration
    - (1) MIJI report formats, Joint Tactical Electronic Warfare Request formats, and ECM Request formats are provided for in reference (h).
    - (2) See Annex P (Combat Service Support).
  - b. Logistics. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

てご

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

TABS: (All Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

of copies Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 7 (Deception) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

- (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
- (c) FM 90-2, Tactical Deception
- (d) FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)
- ECP 3-9, Deception in Amphibious Operations
  VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Deception (Constructive)
- 7th MARDIV OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. SITUATION

Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence).

#### b. Friendly

- (1) CATF 51 will provide for assault shipping and coordinate the arrival and debarkation of elements of the replacement draft with CG, 7th MARDIV and CG, 7th FSSG for the portrayal of reinforcing VII MAF with an additional infantry elements.
- (2) CATF 51 will provide elements of NCR-7 and coordinate the use of such personnel and equipment with CG, 7th MARDIV and CG, 7th FSSG for the portrayal of reinforcing units in accordance with provisions contained in this appendix.
- (3) See OPLAN 6-81 and Annex A (Task Organization).
- (4) See Tab A (Notional Order of Battle).
- Assumptions. None. С.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of VII MAF will conduct operations to simulate and portray a larger defensive force within SYN City to deceive Aggressor forces as to the true defensive OOB and location of combat, combat support, and combat service support (CSS) installations and activities.

#### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Simulations and portrayals will be employed to enhance VII MAF's defensive posture in the eyes of Aggressor forces closing on the MAF defensive security zone and partisans operating within SYN City. 7th MARDIV will conduct and coordinate all deception operations within the VII MAF area of influence. Such deception operations/measures will include but will not be limited to:
  - Simulation and portrayal of a fourth infantry regiment with elements of the replacement draft and an NMCB located in the port area. Elements of TF 51 will transport the replacement draft from TABs to VII MAFs area of influence via surface ship shuttles. An element of the replacement drain will be reinforced with NMCB personnel and equipment in the port area, will be transported to locations south of South River, and will establish false strongpoints simulating the reinforcement of defensive forces south of South River with a regimental sized force. NMCB personnel will assist in preparations, the establishment of strongpoints, preparation of artillery displays and actual sites, and preparation of CSS displays. Upon completion of tasks, NMCB personnel will be incrementally assigned exfiltrated from the area for backloading or redeployment as directed. A portion of the replacement draft will be used to reconstitute 3rd Marines after it has been determined that a reduction in false strongpoint manning levels is feasible.
  - (2) False strongpoints, artillery positions, minefields, and intermediate supply points will be utilized to the maximum extent feasible to simulate a shallow linear defense of the FEBA and conceal actual broken or echeloned defensive formations.

#### b. Tasks

## (1) 7th MARDIV (-)(Rein)

- (a) Develop supporting plans for deception operations listed in paragraph 3.a.(1-3) and coordinate requirements with CG, 7th FSSG, CG, 7th MAW, and CATF 51.
- (b) Conceal TFs A and B, once the GOPL becomes untenable and each assumes the mission of the MAF Reserve/Strike force, until their commitment.

(c) Conduct other deception operations within the VII MAF area of influence in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f), as directed, and subordinate command initiatives.

## (2) 7th MAW (Forward)

- (a) Submit deception requirements to CG, 7th MARDIV and assist in the development of deception measures in support of planned and spontaneous deception operations as directed.
- (b) Provide helicopter lift and flight crew support for planned deception operations and other measures as directed.

## (3) 7th FSSG

- (a) Submit deception requirements to CG, 7th MARDIV.
- (b) Provide motor transport equipment and operators and MHE and operators to support deception operations described in paragraph 3.(a).(1).
- (c) Portray increased support to defensive forces south of South River and as directed.

## (4) <u>S/EWCC</u>

- (a) Coordinate the portrayal of increased communicationelectronic (C-E) activity in support of deception operations south of South River.
- (b) Be prepared to overload C-E activity in support of division deployments/redeployments and as directed.
- (c) Develop C-E "leakage" plans in support of deception operations as directed.
- c. Objectives. Supporting plans for the deployment and employment of subordinate elements of VII MAF will satisfy the following objectives.
  - (1) Deceive Aggressor forces and partisans as to true OOB, location, and disposition of friendly forces in the VII MAF area of influence.
  - (2) Provide cover and deception for deployments and redeployments.

C - 7 - 3

- (3) Exploit Aggressor reconnaissance efforts by displaying or emitting false information to guide assault formations into areas offering maximum tactical advantage to VII MAF defensive forces.
- d. Phase Schedule. In accordance with provisions contained in reference (g).

## e. Coordinating Instructions

- CG, 7th MARDIV will act as the coordinating authority for all deception operations conducted within the VII MAF area of influence.
- (2) Subordinate commands may utilize deception initiatives provided that they are coordinated with appropriate MARDIV agencies and do not affect ongoing overt and covert defensive operations.
- (3) When not involved in deception operations, notional units will implement EMCON plans in accordance with provisions contained in Appendix 3 (Electronic Warfare) and reference (f); when committed, notional units will conform to provisions contained in current CEOIs, Annex K (Communications-Electronics), and reference (g).

## f. Security

- (1) Subordinate commands may include references and concepts regarding deception operations in succeeding OPORDs provided that they are located in separate Annexes, Appendixes, Tabs, etc. and issued in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).
- (2) No reference will be made to specific deception plans and ongoing operations in unclassified and/or unencrypted communications, publications, or briefings.
- (3) Other provisions are contained in reference (f).

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. <u>Administration</u>. See Annex E (Personnel) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- b. <u>Logistics</u>. See Annex D (Logistics) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).

#### COMMAND AND SIGNAL 5.

- Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT:

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### TABS:

- A Notional Order of Battle
- B Deception Implementation Schedule (Omitted)
- C Deception Operation Overlay
- D Electronic Deception Measures (Omitted)
- E Sonic-Olfacory-Visual Deception Measures (Omitted) F Notional Unit Call Sign and Frequency Plan (Omitted)
- G Notional Unit Emission Plan (Omitted)

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB A (Notional Order of Battle) to APPENDIX 7 (Deception) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) ECP 3-9, Deception in Amphibious Operations

(b) FM 90-2, Tactical Deception

Time Zone: P

1. The following true units will portray the NOTIONAL UNITS as indicated below:

True Unit Order of Battle	NOTIONAL UNIT ORDER OF BATTLE
Elms Replacement Det., 3rd Marines	7th MARINE REGT. (Rein)
NMCB 1/7 (-)	1/7
Det. MT Bn., 7th FSSG	2/7
Co. A, 1st Bn., 3rd Marines	3/7
Elms, H&S CO., 3rd Marines	3rd BN., 11th MARINES
Det. Btry. A. 3rd Bn., 10th Marines	•

2. True units, as indicated above, will conduct operations in support of 7th MARDIV in accordance with provisions contained in Appendix 7 (Deception).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT


BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City Map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no....of....copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

TAB C (Deception Operation Overlay) to APPENDIX 7 (Deception) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 8 (Rules of Engagement) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

- (b) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination
- (c) FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support
- (d) FMFM 11-1, Nuclear, Chemical, and Defensive Biological Operations in the FMF
- (e) FMFM 11-4, Staff Officers Field Manual Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures
- (f) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Civil Affairs (Constructive)
- (g) Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone:

## 1. SITUATION

VII MAF secured the FBHL and eliminated the immediate Aggressor threat to the FBH by D+10. Three Aggressor divisions have been identified moving on SYN City along multiple axes from the northwest and southwest. The unified commander has directed that VII MAF undertake the immediate deliberate defense of SYN City with priority to the port area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs. Approximately 34,000 of the 250,000 inhabitants of SYN City are in DPRE assembly areas, and many of them are becoming restive. Additional civilians may require evacuation/relocation from key defensive sectors or installations without delay. tions of two nearby villages (7 km north: pop. 450 and 5.5 km south: pop 1,350) have not caused any problems to date. residents of the agricultural/industrial town 30 km due west of SYN City have reflected a quarded but not overtly hostile atti-These three populated areas are not believed to house enemy military forces at present.

## b. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present in the city in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy attrition and by D+10 were destroyed or driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/

battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL. These remnants are capable, however, of delaying, harassing, or otherwise interferring with VII MAF forces that are screening the GOP; those Aggressor remnants can also furnish flank security, reconnaissance, and fire support to the three Aggressor divisions currently advancing on SYN City.

- c. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. See Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex C (Operations).
- d. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

## e. <u>Assumptions</u>

- (1) That Aggressor forces will employ persistent and nonpersistant chemical and biological weapons to maximize casualties during assault operations.
- (2) That Aggressor forces may employ tactical nuclear weapons to attack VII MAF concentrations with emphasis placed on such high value targets as CSS installations and areas where C-E concentrations are detected.
- (3) That elements of the civilian population will support Aggressor assault operations by conducting insurgent activity within the VII MAF area of influence.
- (4) Friendly use of chemical weapons will not be restricted by the theater commander.

l:..

(5) That VII MAF will be authorized to use tactical nuclear weapons if/when the Aggressors initiate their use.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force; with priority to the port area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; until follow-on forces are landed.

#### 3. EXECUTION

#### Concept of Operations

- (1) See Appendix 11 (Concept of Operations).
- (2) Except for SYN City and the two small villages and the agricultural/industrial town described in paragraph l.a., above, the VII MAF area of responsibility contains no urban areas. All enemy targets identified outside the FBHL/GOPL will be attacked by the best suited or most available

C-8-2

conventional or chemical weapon system. Standing procedures will be used through air, ground, or naval fire support control agencies (DASC, FSCC, SACC) as appropriate. The only restriction imposed with respect to conventional or chemical attacks against targets outside the GOPL is that only observed fire may be directed against military targets, positively identified as such, within the boundaries of the southern city located 90 km SSW of SYN City.

- (3) No restrictions are imposed on the use of conventional or chemical fires against targets located between the FEBA and the GOPL after the GOP, COP and local security forces have withdrawn.
- (4) The rules of engagement set fort in VII MAF OPLAN 1-81 will apply to all fire support within the metropolitan boundary of SYN City, with the objective of assuring a successful defense while minimizing destruction of facilities useful to the MAF and follow-on forces.
- b. <u>Tasks</u>. The following rules of engagement were set forth in reference (g). They will continue to be followed by all elements of VII MAF when requesting and adjusting fires in a given geographic area within SYN City during defensive operations.

## (1) Uninhabited Areas

- (a) Fire may be directed against enemy forces in contact.
- (b) Unobserved fires may be directed against targets, other than enemy forces in contact, provided that approval has been obtained from the appropriate fire control agency.
- (c) Observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity that have been clearly identified as hostile provided that MAF units in proximity to the target area and noncombatants are not endangered.

#### (2) Suburban and Urban Areas

- (a) Fire missions against enemy penetrations within urban and suburban areas must be under positive control by an FO, FAC, or NFG spotter and will be executed only upon approval by the appropriate fire control agency.
- (b) The utilization of nuclear, chemical, biological, and incendiary weapons will be avoided unless they are the only option left to accomplish the tactical mission and

have been approved for use by the appropriate fire control agency. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support).

- (3) Airfields and Port Area. Fire missions against targets within these areas will preclude unnecesary destruction and will require greater restrictions. Fire missions conducted in proximity to or at the airfields and port area will be controlled as follows:
  - (a) Fire missions will be under positive control and will be conducted only after approval of the appropriate fire control agency.
  - (b) Indirect and direct fire support missions will be employed only against postively identified targets to minimize the damage to buildings and to reduce the amount of rubble created by ordnance on target.
  - (c) The use of tactical nuclear and incendiary weapons will be avoided unless destruction of facilities within these areas is unavoidable or when final protective fires must be employed. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- (4) Shrines and Churches. Buildings and structures utilized for religious instruction or worship, or hallowed because of their significance to the population, will not be attacked by supporting arms and may only be included in defensive strongpoints upon approval of this headquarters. Unit commanders must make positive identification of enemy penetrations within or in proximity to such structures before permission to conduct fire support operations is granted.
- (5) Utility Installations. Installations that provide essential services (power generation, water and sewage treatment, etc.) to the population of SYN City will not be attacked by supporting arms or by other conventional means unless permission has been granted by the FSCC. Once permission to attack has been granted, unit commanders will ensure that only the minimum force required to destroy and/or neutralize enemy forces is used in an effort to preserve the operational capability of such installations. Utilities located in areas that have been taken by Aggressor forces will be turned off or destroyed to deny their use to the enemy.
- (6) Hostile Aircraft. See Appendix 1 (Air Defense/Antiair Warfare) to Annex M (Air Operations).
- (7) Non-Combatants. Civil disturbances will be handled in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).

## c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Tactical nuclear ifire support will be used only upon approval by NCA/CINC.
- (2) In cases where adherence to any of these ROE (except nuclear restrictions) conflicts with the immediate requirements for successful defense of a MAF unit or position, commanders should take appropriate action to assure the integrity of the defense and, thereafter, report the circumstances to this Headquarters through the chain of command at the earliest opportunity.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Reports. Any violations of ROE will be reported in accordance with provision contained in reference (f).
- b. See Annex E (Personnel), Annex D (Logistics), and Annex P (Combat Service Support).

## 5. <u>COMMAND AND SIGNAL</u>

- a. Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- b. <u>Signal</u>. See Annex C (Operations), Annex K (Communication-Electronics), and Annex M (Air Operations).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 10 (Operations Overlay) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

Time Zone: P

See Tab A (Operations Overlay, Security Forces) and Tab B (Operations Overlay, Forward Defensive Area and Reserve Area) for graphic illustrations of the concept of operations within the FBHL and in proximity to the FBHL.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### TABS:


A - Operations Overlay, Security Forces

B - Operations Overlay, Forward Defensive Area and Reserve Area

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB A (Operations Overlay, Security Forces) to APPENDIX 10 (Operations Overlay) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES


S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

NOTE Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB B (Operations Overlay, Forward Defensive Area and Reserve Area) to APPENDIX 10 (Operations Overlay) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Time Zone: P



**ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT** 

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES
S J THOMAS
Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 11 (Concept of Operations) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

Time Zone: F

#### MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force; with priority to the Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; until follow-on forces are landed.

#### 2. CONCEPT

THE STATE OF THE PRODUCTION OF

General Concept of Operations. VII MAF will defend in place. The GOPL will coincide with the trace of the FBHL. The FEBA will be established inside the SYN City metropolitan boundary to gain increased protection from the Aggressor's numerically superior air, artillery, and armor fires. Local civilians will be evacuated from selected areas within the FEBA to facilitate defensive operations and OPSEC. Only limited urban area is available for defensive deployments south of South River, which constitutes a major obstacle to north-south movement. highest defensive priority has been assigned to retention of the port area. For these reasons, five infantry battalions will be deployed north of the river and four battalions will defend south of the river. Preparations will be made for reinforcing across South River in either direction over bridges or by LVT or helicopter, selective redeployment/reinforcement Concerted efforts will be made by maneuver of GOP necessary. forces and fire power to delay the enemy for at least 48 hours and prevent both enemy columns from coverging on SYN City simultaneously. Every effort will be made to stop and destroy Aggressor forces before they are able to engage or penetrate the If the enemy succeeds in rupturing the FEBA, he will be canalized into relatively open terrain and destroyed or expelled by concentrated firepower, local counterattack, or mobile strike forces. In the event of major penetrations of the FEBA, and on order, affected units will conduct delaying actions to the next defensive phase line. Three such phase lines have been

delineated to provide effective control and coordination of the defense. Maximum efforts will be made, however, to prevent the Aggressor forces from entering the city, occupying urban structures, and using urban facilities. All units will make counterlanding preparations against airborne or heliborne assaults. Units in coastal areas will be prepared to destroy ACV-landed enemy forces.

## b. Security Forces

## (1) <u>GOP</u>

- (a) The South River fault has divided the FBH into two distinct defensive sectors, making it necessary to establish a northern and a southern GOP. Each of the two GOP task forces, ALFA and BRAVO, will be a MCATF comprised of a tank battalion, an infantry battalion (-), a reinforced AAV company, a composite artillery battalion of both self-propelled and towed artillery, a reinforced combat engineer company, a FAAD section, and a CSS detachment.
- (b) Each MCATF will provide observation, reconnaissance, long-range fires, and offensive and defensive operations to delay the enemy, mislead him as to the true location of the FEBA, inflict casualties, cause early deployment of enemy columns and, by use of natural and artificial obstacles, canalize the advancing enemy forces into avenues of approach favorable to the MAF.
- (c) The GOP MCATFs will operate in depth, and they are charged with delaying the enemy's advance by at least 48 hours.
- (d) MCATF security operations will be conventional in nature with no specific urban connotations.

#### (2) COP and Local Security

- (a) CG, 7th MARDIV will delineate the COPL and establish the COP outside the metropolitan boundary of SYN City. The COP will cover and support the withdrawal of the GOP and guide GOP forces through gaps in protective minefields. COP forces will withdraw on order of CG, 7th MARDIV.
- (b) Local security will be established by regimental and battalion commanders in or shortly beyond the outer fringe of suburban structures. Those forces will

C-11-2

provide warning of enemy approaches and will seek to delay and deceive the attackers. Local security forces will remain in position in each sector until after the COP in that sector has successfully withdrawn to the FEBA and the establishing authority authorizes withdrawal. It is anticipated that several COP and local security units will remain in position long after some such units have been forced to withdraw.

## c. Main Defensive Forces

- (1) Each of the infantry regiments will defend the FEBA from positions within their respective sectors. CG, 7th MARDIV will adjust and orient subordinate commands along the trace of the FEBA to enable infantry and supporting arms to apply maximum firepower well forward of the FEBA to stop and destroy Aggressor forces that have succeeded in penetrating the MAF defensive security zone. Subordinate commands along the trace of the FEBA will construct or install defensive barriers to stop enemy penetration attempts in-place and/or to canalize Aggressor forces into terrain more favorable to mechanized strike force counterattacks.
- (2) Maximum use will be made of buildings that offer good defensive positions. Structures that do not contribute to the defense will be razed, demolished, or booby trapped. Streets, roofs, backyards, parks, and other open areas will be covered by fire, mined, or prepared as explosive flame traps. Defenses will be prepared in depth, and all units will be prepared to conduct house-to-house, block-to-block fighting in either retrograde movements or counterattacks.
- (3) The 10th Marines will deploy subordinate commands to positions near the FEBA and will provide general support and reinforcing fires for preplanned and on-call missions in support of GOP forces. These units will be positioned to direct fires down likely avenues of approach and will be prepared to shift fires into potential enemy HLZs as directed. NGF stations will be established on D+11. NGF will be employed to interdict Aggressor LOCs along the coastline.

#### d. Reserves

(1) On order, TFs A and B will conduct a series of delaying actions and ultimately will withdraw behind the FEBA; TF A will be deployed to an area southeast of Airfield 1, TF B will be deployed to an area near the naval station. Each of the MCATFs will be dissolved and the tank battalions will be used as the nuclei for reserve/mobile strike forces. The

2nd Tank Battalion will retain an infantry and AAV company; will be chopped to the OPCON of CG, 7th MARDIV and comprise the division's reserve; and will be prepared to act as a mobile strike force for forces north of South River. The 1st Tank Battalion and 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines (1/2) will be retained as the MAF reserve. The 1st Tank Battalion will conduct mechanized operations in direct support of 3rd Marines and will initially comprise the mobile strike force for forces south of South River. 1/2 will be prepared to deploy by helicopter anywhere within the FEBA and may be attached with an AAV Company to the 1st Tank Battalion order.

- (2) Each of the mobile strike forces will establish tank and ATGM positions to support infantry strongpoints as directed near the FEBA. They will retain the capability to assemble quickly and conduct mechanized counterattacks on enemy forces canalized and stopped forward of the FEBA and to exploit successful defenses of northern or southern defensive sectors.
- (3) Regimental reserves will consist essentially of keeping a string on a reserve or supporting company of their least committed battalions.

## e. Air Operations

- (1) Theater and SYN City based 7th MAW aircraft will continue to conduct deep air strikes, CAS, CAP, and helicopter support missions in support of defensive operations. Close and deep air strike missions will be conducted by fixed-wing aircraft operating out of SYN City and the TAB to attack Aggressor force concentrations with emphasis on nuclear-capable and air defense units, artillery, motorized/mechanized columns, and supply LOCs. As Aggressor forces close on the GOPL, preplanned targets and targets of opportunity will be attacked in conjunction with MCATF ground operations northwest and southwest of SYN City in an effort to strip security forces from the Aggressor main bodies. security forcs will be reduced and/or destroyed by air and MCATF fires and the main body will be exposed to subsequent air attacks. CAS missions will continue to be flown out of SYN City and against the exposed main bodies of either Aggressor division for as long as each of the airfields is tenable.
- (2) Helicopter support requirements include the resupply of GOP forces, the transportation of notional units and equipment during deception operations, movement of barrier material forward to units tasked with barrier installation within the

C-11-4

MAF defensive security zone, SAR, and MEDEVAC operations. Helicopter support missions will be flown out of SYN City throughout the period of defensive operations.

(3) In the event that the airfields become untenable due to heavy enemy air, artillery, or missile and rocket bombardment, elements of the 7th MAW fixed- wing squadrons, except VMA(V) squadrons, will be deployed to locations outside SYN City and will conduct CAS operations from those locations as directed. VMA(V) and selected helicopter squadrons will continue to operate from within the FEBA for as long as sufficient areas for V/STOL basing and servicing are tenable. On order, elements of the helicpter MAGs and VMA(V) squadrons will be incrementally deployed from SYN City as phase lines are incrementally penetrated. An element of each of the squadrons will be retained in the VII MAF area of influence by conducting lift support or CAS operations from assault shipping.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

of copies Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) ŠYNTHETIČ (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b)
  - FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination
  - (d) FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support
  - (e) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support
  - FMFM 11-4. Staff Officers' Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures
  - (g) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Fire Support (Constructive)

Time Zone:

#### Ť. SITUATION

- Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- Friendly Forces b.
  - (1) TF 57 provides air cover and support to TF 51 and VII MAF.
  - (2) Naval gunfire support will be provided to elements of VII MAF by CATF 51; DDs will be in direct support of 1st and 3rd Marines and DDs will be in general support of 7th MARDIV and VII MAF.
- Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization). c.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF fire support elements will support defensive operations with conventional fires, and nuclear and chemical fire support if authorized, to facilitate the defense of SYN City; priority of fires will be accorded to GOP forces, COP forces, and in the defense of the FEBA in that order.

#### 3. **EXECUTION**

Concept of Operations. See Appendix 11 (Concept of Operations).

## b. Air Support

- General. Commencing on D+10, the sortie rate is based on an availability of 70%, and three sorties per day for Theater-Based, 7th MAW (Rear), attack aircraft and four sorties per day for SYN City based aircraft, 7th MAW (Forward). Thereafter availability will be based on the utility of each of the airfields, V/STOL facilities, and V/STOL and helicopter forward sites from bomb damage and enemy air supremacy operations. Commencing on D+10, fixed-wing aircraft from TF 57, 7th MAW (Forward), and 7th MAW (Rear) will conduct deep air support operations and attack preplanned targets and targets opportunity to destroy enemy NBC weapon delivery systems/units, armored/mechanized force concentrations, and interdict Aggressor division supply LOCs. Elements of the fixed-wing MAGs and attack helicopter squadrons will establish BARCAPs for the protection of GOP forces. FORCAPs will be maintained until air superiority has been reestablished within the VII MAF area of influence. Direct and/or CAS missions conducted within the trace of the GOPL will be executed only when under positive control.
- (2) Allocations. 7th MAW provides air support for all 7th MAF units from SYN City facilities and TABS; priority to GOP, COP, mobile strike forces, and general FEBA defense, in that order.

## c. Artillery Support

Commencing on D+10, the artillery envelope will begin at the maximum range of supporting weapons beyond the trace of the GOPL. Artillery in the GOP will engage Aggressor columns with long-range fires to delay, inflict casualties, and cause the marly deployment of advanced and main body assault forces. Concurrently, all subordinate commands of 10th Marines will be deployed as far forward in the forward defense area as possible. 10th Marines will initially support GOP forces by delivering long-range fires to delay enemy penetrations of the security zone. If the withdrawal of GOP forces behind the FEBA is required, 10th Marines will provide continuous artillery fire support of retrograde/delaying operations. In addition to fires in support of the GOP, preplanned withdrawal missions will be executed in conjunction with the use of barriers to stop and/or canalize enemy assault forces. Thereafter, priority of fires will be accorded to COP forces and forward area strongpoints. Elements of the 10th Marines in direct support of forward defense area forces will be prepared to direct fires on open areas with defensive

C-12-2

sectors identified as being potential enemy HLZs or drop zones.

## (2) Organization for Combat

10th Marines

Composite Arty Bn\* DS TF A 8" (SP)How Bn (-)

155mm (T) Btry

Composite Arty Bn\* DS TF B

155mm (SP) How BN (-)

155mm (T) Btry

1st Bn: DS 1st Marines

2nd Bn: DS 2nd Marines

3rd Bn: DS 3rd Marines 4th Bn: GS 7th MAR DIV

5th Bn: GS VII MAF

\*Units to be designated by CO, 10th Marines. Disbanded after GOP withdrawals and revert to parent unit control as directed.

(3) <u>Miscellaneous</u>. If GOP forces are withdrawn behind the FEBA, artillery assets in D/S of GOP will revert to parent unit control.

## d. Naval Gunfire Support

- (1) General. Commencing on D+10, naval gunfire support group TG 51.4 will support VII MAF by interdicting in potential coastal avenues of approach. NGF support stations will be established to provide direct support fires.
- (2) Allocations. See Tab C (Naval Gunfire Plan).
- (3) Miscellaneous. See Tab C (Naval Gunfire Plan).

#### e. Chemical Support

(1) General. Toxic chemical agent air and artillery fire missions will be executed, on order, as part of an integrated fire plan to maximize the number of enemy troop casualties and support the withdrawal of GOP forces in the security zone. Toxic agents will be employed, on-order, on the flanks and/or on key highground terrain north and south of the metropolitan boundary of SYN City to deny the enemy observation of and direct fire into MAF positions. Agents will also be used, in conjunction with conventional ammunition, to attack Aggressor assault forces that have been stopped and/or canalized by barriers well forward of the FEBA. Toxic agents will generally not be used within the

FEBA due to the presence of a large civilian population, however, nonpersistent agents may be used to temporarily deny the use of each of the airfields to advancing Aggressor forces and to cause a maximum number of troop casualties if the enemy succeeds in penetrating forward defenses proximate to the airfields.

- (2) Allocation. See Tab D (Chemical Fire Plan).
- (3) <u>Miscellaneous</u>. Provisions for logistics and resupply are contained in Tab K (Special Ammunition Logistics).
- f. Nuclear Support. See Appendix 1 (Nuclear Operations).
- g. <u>Fire Support Coordination</u>. See Tab F (Fire Support Coordination).
- h. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) Counterfire policy--active.
  - (2) The FSCL will be extended to the trace of terrain features beyond the GOPL; see Tab F (Fire Support Coordination Plan).
  - (3) Preclusion, troop safety requirements, and warnings are provided for in reference (g).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).
  - b. Command. The DASC will be collocated with the 7th MARDIV FSCC (FASC).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

C-12-4

UniCLASSIFIED

# TABS:

- A Air Fire Plan Encl 1 - Preplanned Close Air Support (Omitted - See Current 7th MAW FRAGO) Encl 2 - Air Target List Encl 3 - Air Fire Plan Target Overlay B - Artillery Fire Plan Encl 1 - Target Overlay Encl 2 - Fire Support Table (Preparation Fires) (Omitted) Encl 3 - Fire Support Table (Groups of Fires) (Omitted) C - Naval Gunfire Plan Encl 1 - Naval Gunfire Support Operations Overlay Encl 2 - Schedule of Fires Encl 3 - Naval Gunfire Reports (Omitted) Encl 4 - Radar Beacon Plan (Omitted) Encl 5 - Shore Fire Control Communications Encl 6 - Naval Gunfire Antimechanized Plan (Omitted) D - Chemical Fire Plan Encl 1 - Chemical Fire Support Table/Target List Encl 2 - Chemical Target Overlay E - Target List F - Fire Support Coordination G - Fire Support Communication Plan (Omitted) H - Countermechanized Fire Plan (Omitted) J - Nuclear Fire Plan Encl 1 - Nuclear Fire Support Table/Target List Encl 2 - Target Overlay Encl 3 - Weapon Readiness
- K Special Ammunition Logistics
- L Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Fire Plan (Omitted)

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB A (Air Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthethic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support
  - (c) FMFM, 7-1, Fire Suport Coordination
  - (d) ECP 7-11, Handbook on Fire Support Coordination and Fire Planning for Maneuver Element Commands
  - (e) 7th MAW OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. The purpose of this tab is to provide a list and necessary data for the conduct of preplanned airstrikes in support of defensive operations within the VII MAF area of influence.
- b. <u>Scope</u>. Enclosures 2 and 3 list data on preplanned air fire to be provided by elements of TF 57, 7th MAW (Forward), and 7th MAW (Rear) within the MAF area of influence commencing on D+10 and includes provisions for on-call and on-station aircraft.
- c. <u>Definitions</u>. Standard offensive air operation definitions will apply to defensive operations within the VII MAF area of influence. References (b) and (c) apply.
- 2. CONCEPT OF AIR FIRE SUPPORT. TF 57 will continue to provide air fire support to TF 51 and VII MAF. TF 57 functions as a TADC (afloat) responsive to VII MAF TACC. Subordinate commands will submit TARs to the TACC through TACP/FSCC (FASC) channels. Preplanned missions and alert/on-call missions will be scheduled routinely by the TACC in a daily basis in the air combat (frag) order in accordance with SOP. Immediate requests will be processed through TACPs as usual. Air fire support efforts will be planned initially to attack and destroy, divert, or delay enemy forces as they advance on the VII MAF. As the enemy closes within the MAF security zone, priority for air fire support is the GOP, mobile strike forces, COP, and forward defense forces, in that order. Air fire support within SYN City will be limited initially to helicopter gunships; if the Aggressor forces succeed in achieving a substantial penetration of the FEBA, major fixedwing attacks under positive-control will be launched against the incursion. In the event that Airfields 1 and 2 become untenable, V/STOL

C-12-A-1

aircraft will continue to provide air fire support from sites within the FEBA, and fixed-wing aircraft will redeploy to TABs from which they will continue to support VII MAF.

#### 3. CONDUCT OF AIR FIRE SUPPORT

- a. Air Fire Commencing on D+10. TF 57, 7th MAW (Forward), and 7th MAW (Rear) will conduct close and deep air support operations in accordance with Enclosures 1 through 3. Commencing on D+10, fixed-wing aircraft from CT 57, 7th MAW (Forward), and 7th MAW (Rear) will conduct air fire missions on preplanned targets and targets of opportunity outside of the trace of the GOPL in accordance with provisions contained in Enclosure 2 (Air Targets),
- b. Air Fire Subsequent to D+10. Direct and/or CAS will be provided for by frag order.

## c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>

- (1) All CAS outside of SYN City will be under positive control of the cognizant TAC(A)/FAC(A).
- (2) All CAS missions inside the metropolitan boundary of SYN City must be under positive control of a FAC or FAC (A).
- (3) Strikes against preplanned or targets of opportunity outside the GOP will be at the pilots discretion.
- (4) General safety procedures are provided for in Annex M (Air Operations).
- (5) Chemical Fires, see Tab D (Chemical Fire Plan).
- (6) Nuclear Fires, see Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan).

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- (1) BDAs received by the TAC(A)s and flight leaders will be submitted in accordance with paragraph 4, Annex M (Air Operations).
- (2) Changes to Enclosures 1 through 3 will be directed by frag order.
- b. <u>Logistics</u>. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

C-12-A-2

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

## 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. TAC(A) call sign: RED ROCK.
- b. FAC position marking: Red smoke and mirror signal on request or on order.
- c. Code words for mirror signal: WHITE LIGHT.
- d. Emergency signal to lift airstrikes: Green star cluster.
- e. Emergency code words to lift airstrike: SHUT DOWN, acknowledge.

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Preplanned Close Air Support (Omitted See Current 7th MAW FRAGO)
- 2 Air Target List
- 3 Air Fire Plan Target Overlay

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1961

ENCLOSURE 2 (Air Target List) to TAB A (Air Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEC (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-8)

Ref: (a) Map: 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map (b) EMEM 5-4, Offensive Air Support

Time Zone: P

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	3
LN#	TGT #	TGT DESCRIPTION	TGT COORD	SIZE (METERS)	DIRECTION/DISTANCE FRIENDLY UNITS	SOURCE	REMARKS
1	XZ 9001	ROAD JUNCTION	E42-N191	PT TGT	3300/-	PHOTINT	ON ORDER; TO PRODUCE IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES AND CONTAMINATE AREA
,	XZ 2118	BRIDGE	E22-N174	PT TGT	3150/-	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRINGE SECTIONS AND ARMORE: TARGETS
3	XZ 2119	ROAD JUNCTION	E21-N171	אז נפנ	3100/-	PHOTENT	UN OPDER; TO DESTROY ARMORED COLUMN CONCENTRATIONS AND PRODUCE IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES
4	XZ 9002	ROAD JUNCTION	E73-N143	PT TGT	3250/-	PHOTINT	ON ORDER; TO PRODUCE IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES AND CONTAMINATE AREA
5	XZ 2121	ROAD JUNCTION	111M-683	PT TGT	3050/8ს00ო	PHOTINT	TO PRODUCE IMMEDIATE ARMORED AND EXPOSED TROOP CASUALTIES
ò	XZ 2122	BRIDGE	E96-N112	PT TGT	340º/5000m	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRIDGE SECTIONS AND APMORED TARGETS
7	XZ 2123	ROAD JUNCTION	E94-N92	PT TGT	1950/4300m	PHOTINT	TO PRODUCE IMMEDIATE ARMORED AND EXPOSED TROOP CASUALTIES
3	XZ 2124	ROAD JUNCTION	E100-N85	PT TGT	175º/9000m	PHOTINT	TO PRODUCE IMMEDIATE ARMORED AND EXPOSED TROOP CASUALTIES
}	XZ 2125	ROAD JUNCTION	E90-N83	PT TGT	200º/15,000m	PHOTINT	TO PRODUCE IMMEDIATE ARMORED AND EXPOSED TROOP CASUALTIES
10	XZ 9003	ROAD JUNCTION	E80- <b>N</b> 80	PT TGT	225972U <b>,</b> 000m	PHOTIN*	ON OPCER: TO PROCUS: IMMEDIATE CASUALTIE AND CONTAMINATE AREA
11	x.Z 9004	ROAD JUNCTION	E53-N58 .	et igi	23007-	PHOTINT	ON ORGER, T. PRUGUE IMMEDIATE CASCALTIE AND CONTAMINATE AREA
12	XZ 9005	ROAD JUNCTION	E38-N50	eT ¶G†	23i)07-	PHCTIN'	N PROBRE TO PROPOSE PAREDIATE DAY ACTE AND TONTAMINATE AREA
3	v2 2127	ROAD JUNCTION	£63-N3*	शा हि	21007-	SHUTTA	ON PATER, TO SELTA ON LAMBOURS OF SOME AND CONTROL OF SOME OFFICE OF A TEST OF SOME OFFICE OF A TEST OF SOME OFFICE OFFI A TEST OF SOME OFFICE OF SOME OFFI OFFI OFFI OFFI OFFI OFFI OFFI OFF

C-12-A-2-1

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

14	XZ 2128	BRIDGE	E70-N11	PT TGT	.200 <del>o</del> 7-	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRIDGE SECTIONS AND ARMORED TARGETS
15	XZ 2129	BRIDGE	E56-N17	PT TGT	2100/-	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRIDGE SECTIONS AND ARMORED TARGETS
16	XZ 2130	BRIDGE	E43-N18	PT TGT	2170/-	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRIDGE SECTIONS AND ARMORED TARGETS
17	XZ 2131	ROAD JUNCTION	E30-N30	PT TGT	2270/-	PHOTINT	ON ORDER; TO DESTROY ARMORED COLUMN CONCENTRATIONS AND PRODUCE IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES
18	XZ 2132	BRIDGE	E30-N25	PT TGT	2250/-	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRIDGE SECTIONS AND ARMORED TARGETS
19	XZ 2133	BRIDGE	E29-N25	PT TGT	2260/-	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRIDGE SECTIONS AND ARMORED TARGETS
20	XZ 2134	BRIDGE	E25-N26	PT TGT	2280/-	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRIDGE SECTIONS AND ARMORED TARGETS
21	XZ 2135	BRIDGE	E23-N27	PT TGT	2300/-	PHOTINT	TO DAMAGE BRIDGE SECTIONS AND ARMORED TARGETS

<sup>\*</sup> NOT INTENDED TO REPRESENT A COMPLETE DOCUMENT.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81


C-12-A-2-2

**JNCLASSIFIED** 

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no.\_\_\_of\_\_\_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 3 (Air Fire Plan Target Overlay) to TAB A (Air Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB B (Artillery Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

- (b) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination
- (c) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support
- (d) 7th MARDIV OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

Elements of 10th Marines attached to TF A and TF B will integrate organic fires with fires of other MCATF elements to engage Aggressor columns advancing on the MAF defensive security zone with long-range fires. The intent of such fire support is to delay, inflict casualties, and cause the early deployment of the advanced force and main body units exposing them to subsequent localized counterattacks and air fires. Artillery units attached to or placed in D/S of each of the infantry regiments will remain with the regiments and will position organic weapons to enable them to direct fires on likely avenues of approach and into potential Aggressor drop zones and/or HLZs. The bulk of 10th Marines will be deployed within forward defensive sectors. They will be tasked with providing covering fires in support of delaying/retrograde operations of each MCATF and will conduct preplanned fire missions to stop enemy forces forward of the FEBA and/or to prepare canalized Aggressor forces prior to mechanized strike force counterattacks.

## 2. ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

- a. Organic Artillery. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- Reinforcing Artillery. None.

#### EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- b. GOP Forces (TFs A and B)
  - Conduct preplanned and on-call fire missions in the defense of the VII MAF security zone and in support of mechanized counterattacks conducted by each of the MCATFs.

C-12-B-1

- (2) Plan for conducting heliborne or terrestrial artillery raids, using mixed caliber ammunition when possible, to deceive the enemy as to the location of the GOP and main defensive positions. Submit requests for helicopter support, as required, soonest.
- (3) Provide covering fire should the MCATFs be forced to fight delaying actions within the security zone.

## c. 7th MARDIV

- (1) Support of GOP forces should they be forced to withdraw behind the FEBA.
- (2) Support of forward area defensive forces in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).
- (3) Upon withdrawal of the GOP, provide for DS, GS, and GS reinforcing fires to meet the changing threat.
- (4) Advise this Headquarters of the most optimum fire support measures to prevent the major enemy forces from converging simultaneously on SYN City.
- (5) Be prepared to redeploy substantial artillery assets between the northern and southern sectors of SYN City to meet the changing threat.

•

## d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Registrations: No restrictions beyond the FEBA. See Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex C (Operations) and reference (d).
- (2) Survey: See Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations) to reference (d).
- (3) Target numbers: See Enclosure I (Target Overlay) and Tab E (Target List).
- (4) Meteorology: See Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations) to reference (d).
- (5) Counterfire policy: active
  - a Counterbattery--confirmed targets only.
  - b Countermortar--confirmed and suspected targets.
- (6) Countermechanized: See Tab H (Countermechanized Fire Plan).

C-12-B-2

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

- (7) CFLs, FSCL: See Tab F (Fire Support Coordination Plan).
- (8) Chemical Fires: See Tab D (Chemical Fire Plan).
- (9) Nuclear Fires: See Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
  - Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Target Overlay
- 2 Fire Support Table (Preparation Fires) (Omitted)
- 3 Fire Support Table (Groups of Fires) (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81


C-12-B-3

Copy no.\_\_\_of\_\_\_copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

ENCLOSURE 1 (Target Overlay) to TAB 8 (Artillery Gunfire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Time Zone: P



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB C (Naval Gunfire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

(c) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination

(d) FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support

- (e) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Fire Support (Constructive)
- (f) ATF OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive)

(q) VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

## Task Organization:

TG 51.4 (-), Fire Support Group

(DD-963) (DD-942) (DD-964) (DD-944) (DD-931) (DD-945)

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support).

#### 2. MISSION.

Commencing on D+10, TG 51.4 will be prepared to support VII MAF in accordance with capabilities.

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. TG 51.4 deploys gunfire support ships to stations north and south of the metropolitan boundary of SYN City to interdict potential Aggressor coastal avenues of approach and conduct destruction and/or neutralization fires in accordance with provisions contained in Enclosure 2 (Schedule of Fires).

- Ship assignments (effective 250380P):
  - DD-963 General Support, VII MAF
  - (2) DD-964 General Support, 7th MARDIV
  - DD-931 General Support, 1st Marines
  - DD-942 Direct Support, 1/1 (4)

  - DD-944 General Support, 3rd Marines
    DD-945 Direct Support, TF B. Revert to D/S 1/3 on order.

## Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Targeting information is contained in Enclosures 1 and 2.
- (2) Ships execute on-call fires using air or ship spot to the maximum degree possible.
- (3) Target priorities established in accordance with reference (c).
- (4) Countermechanized fires executed in accordance with Enclosure 6 (Naval Gunfire Antimechanized Plan) to reference (g). Reports of mechanized movements will be directed to the FSCC vice the SACC.
- Coordination of naval gunfire with air and artillery support in Tab F (Fire Support Coordination Plan).
  - Smoke and illumination fires will be employed only upon request of the supported unit commander.
  - (b) Clearance to attack targets of opportunity outside of the assigned zones of fire will be requested from the agency controlling fires within that sector of the VII MAF security zone. Each NGF support unit commander will coordinate, with the FSCC, fires outside of the FSCL to ensure safety of friendly aircraft.
- (6) Unless otherwise adjusted, standard fire-for-effect salvos will be conducted for call fires. Such fires will consist of the following:
  - 5": 16 rds (4 guns 4 salvos; 2 guns 8 salvos; 1 gun - 16 salvos)
- (7) Massing of fires by D/S and G/S ships will be accomplished in accordance with reference (e).
- (8) Alterations to the schedule of fires will be directed by the 7th MARDIV FSCC.

C-12-C-2

(9) NGF support ship relief will be directed by the CATF, in coordination with the FSCC. Ship requests, aircraft allocations for spotting, and communication net changes will be made by 1400 hours daily.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- (1) Reports submitted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).
- (2) See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

## b. Logistics

- (1) Initial bombardment allocations contained in Enclosure 2 (Schedule of Fires).
- (2) Replenishment data contained in reference (f).

## 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

#### a. Command

- (1) See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- (2) Radar Beacon Plan. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations) to reference (g).
- b. <u>Signal</u>. Communication circuits in accordance with provisions contained in Enclosure 5 (Shore Fire Control Communications) and procedures contained in Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Naval Gunfire Support Operations Overlay
- 2 Schedule of Fires
- 3 Naval Gunfire Reports (Omitted)
- 4 Radar Beacon Plan (Omitted)

C-12-C-3

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

- 5 Shore Fire Control Communications6 Naval Gunfire Antimechanized Plan (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81


C-12-C-4

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no.\_\_\_of\_\_\_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 1 (Naval Gunfire Support Operations Overlay) to TAB C (Naval Gunfire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Time Zone: P



TGT #	DESCRIPTION	COORDINATES	ALT. (M)	BEARING (MILS)	AMMUNI 5"	TION 6"	REMARKS
XZ2136	COASTAL ROAD SECTION	E104-N120 TO E104-N110	0	4900	200	!	ON CALL
XZ2137	COASTAL ROAD SECTION	E104/N84 TO E98-N72	5	5500	200	<b>†</b>	ON CALL
XZ2138	MOUTH OF HILL PASS	E95-N62 TO E95-N54	60	4500	200		ON CALL
XZ2139	COASTAL HILL SLOPE (FORWARD)	E92 N34 TO E99 N31	80-MSL	4300	200	1	ON CALL

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 2 (Schedule of Fires) to TAB C (Naval Gunfire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City; 1:20,000

(b) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination

(c) FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support

Time Zone: P

### INSTRUCTIONS

Consideration acceptable between the considerations of the consideration of the consideration

- 1. Ship Column--# indicates air spot assigned.
- A&F Column--Numerator represents support mission while the denominator represents frequency of GROUND SPOT NET for DS ships or CONTROL NET for GS ships.
- Ammunition Column--Numerator represents the bombardment allowance at the commencement of fires while the denominator represents the number of rounds planned for expenditure.
  - 4. Body of Schedule:
    - a. Spaces between operation hours indicate an increment of time during which fire missions are accomplished.
    - Numerator represents ZF--Arabic Numerals and targets to be attacked.
    - c. Denominator represents assigned FSA--Roman Numerals. The number of rounds to be expended on each target is located below the target number.
    - All ammunition in this schedule is HC or AAC unless otherwise designated.
    - e. All projectiles will be set for impact burst unless otherwise designated.
  - Maximum use of air spot and offshore spot will be made for adjusting pre-arranged neutralization fires.
  - 6. Call fires will be executed upon request.

C-12-C-2-1

7. Target missions that must be repeated will be executed with one-half the ammunition expediture listed for each target in this schedule.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

EY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### ATTACHMENT:

A - Schedule of Fires Table

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

C-12-C-2-2

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ATTACHMENT A (Schedule of Fires Table) ENCLOSURE 2 (Schedule of Fires) to TAB C (Naval Gunfire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: None

Time Zone: P

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	PERIODS	SUBSEQUENT TO D+10	(e)				
	SHIP	A&F	BTRY	AMMO	D+10 -	0+15			D+16-D+20		
1	DD-963	GS VII MAF	5" 54	2000	ZF-6	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM
2		5120		1500	FSA-IV	<b>*15</b> 0	400	100	*150	400	100
3	DD-964	GS 7th MARDIV	5" 54	2000	ZF-6	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM
4		5120		1500	FSA-IV	<b>*</b> 150	400	100	*150	400	100
5	DD-931	GS 1st MARINES	5" 54	2000	ZF - 7	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM
6		5120		1500	FSA-V	*155	400	100	*155	400	100
7	DD-942	DS 1/1	5" 54	2000	ZF - 7	**XZ 2136	RES	ILLUM	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM
8		5110		1500	FSA-V	<b>*</b> 205	400	50	*105	400	50
9	DD-944	GS 3rd MARINES	5" 54	2000	ZF -6	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM
10		5120		1500	FSA-IV	<b>*</b> 155	400	50	*155	400	50
11	DD-945	DS 1/3	5" 54	2000	ZF-6	** XZ 2137/38/39	RES	ILLUM	AS REQUESTED	RES	ILLUM
12		5190		1500	FSA-IV	*136/34/34	400	50	*105	400	50
		L	L	·	.l						

- \* ALLOCATION/DAY
- \*\* INDICATES TARGET IS ON CALL

NOT INTENDED TO REPRESENT A COMPLETE DOCUMENT

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

C-12-C-2-A-1

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 5 (Shore Fire Control Communications) to TAB C (Naval Gunfire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City; 1:20,000

(b) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination

(c) FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support

Time Zone: P

LEGEND:	EMISSION				L		I				
C - NET CONTROL	FREQUENCY										
x - GUARD	PRI	L		1						1	1
Y - COPY	SEC		-	Τ-					_	<u> </u>	$\Box$
O - WHEN DIRECTED	DESIGNATOR FREQUENCY PRI SEC										
	TIME OF ACTIVATION										
UNIT	CALE SIGN NET	NGF CONTROL	NGF OVERLOAD	DIV NGF SUPPORT	SP01 b	NGF GROUND SPOT 7	MGF A18 SPUT 1	NGF AIR	MGF A1P SPOT 1	NGF ATR	PIV RADAR
CATE		x	×								
TG 51.4	<u> </u>	X	X	$\vdash$	-	<del>                                     </del>	<del>                                     </del>	-	_		<del>                                     </del>
FSCC	1	С		c			_		$\vdash$	_	⇈
DD-963	1	X	X	X							
DD-964	1	X	X	0							Т
00-931		x	X		0					$\vdash$	
00-942		X	X	1	0					Η-	
DD-944		X	X			0		$\vdash$	_	$\vdash$	
00-945	1	×	X	<b></b>		0				┖	$\vdash$
1st MARINES	<u> </u>			<del>                                     </del>		<b>†</b>		<b></b> -	†		
1/1	1			T ~	C	$\vdash$		<u> </u>			Г
3rd MARINES	1									_	_
TF B (INITIALLY)						С					Г
1/3 (ON ORDER)	<del> </del>				$\vdash$	0	$\vdash$	$\vdash$	<del>                                     </del>		$\vdash$

NOT INTENDED TO REPRESENT A COMPLETE DOCUMENT.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

C-12-C-5-1

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB D (Chemical Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination

(c) FMFM 11-3, Employment of Chemical Agents

(d) VII Standing Operating Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Employment (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. SITUATION

a. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. See Annex B (Intelligence).

#### b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 7th MAW will, on order, conduct chemical attack missions to harass and canalize Aggressor assault formations within the VII MAF area of influence.
- (2) 7th MARDIV will, on order, augment and/or supplant air chemical attacks as Aggressor forces close on forward defensive area positions.

### 2. MISSION

MAF will conduct chemical attacks within the MAF area of influence to deny the enemy the use of key terrain for the establishment of supply LOCs, to harass and/or neutralize assault units, and to canalize assault formations into terrain more favorable for localized counterattacks and attacks by supporting arms.

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Commencing on D+10, fixed-wing elements of both 7th MAW (Forward) and 7th MAW (Rear) will be prepared to execute preplanned chemical attack missions and attacks on targets of opportunity within the VII MAF area of influence. Targets north of South River will be attacked with persistent chemical agents to deny Aggressor forces the use of key terrain for the establishment of supply installations and/or supply LOCs. Targets south of South River will be attacked with persistent agents to canalize Aggressor assault formations into terrain more

C-12-D-1

favorable for the execution of localized counterattacks and conventional reduction fires. Elements of the artillery regiment, both placed in direct support of GOP forces and proximate to the forward defense area, will be prepared to deliver chemical ordnance in support of each MCATF if required and the forward defense area forces to delay, canalize, and cause casualties to assault formations that are successful in penetrating the defensive security zone. Riot control agents will be employed by elements of the artillery regiment and/or infantry regiment organic fire support weapons to harass assault force penetrations of the FEBA should that occur, to control disorderly civilian gatherings, and to attack areas identified as being occupied by active partisans in an attempt to create confusion as a diversion for subsequent building assault operations.

### b. GOP Forces (TFs A and B)

- (1) In the event that preplanned chemical airstrikes cannot be conducted due to hostile action or weather conditions, be prepared to conduct each preplanned fire mission within organic capabilities.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct on call chemical fire missions as directed.

#### c. 7th MARDIV

- Be prepared to conduct on call chemical fire missions outside of the FEBA to neutralize, canalize, and/or to disrupt and harass assault formations that approach or threaten to penetrate the defensive security zone.
- (2) Be prepared to conduct riot control agent fires in support of organic and attached units as required.
- d. 7th MAW. Commencing on D+10 and/or upon receipt of authorization, be prepared to conduct preplanned chemical attacks in accordanced with provisions contained in Enclosure 1 (Chemical Fire Support Table/Target List) and Enclosure 2 (Chemical Target Overlay).

#### e. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>

- (1) Troop safety measures will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).
- (2) Warning procedures will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).

C-12-D-2

(3) All chemical fire missions, with the exception of the employment of riot control agents, will be coordinated by the 7th MARDIV FSCC.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administration
  - (1) Reports will be submitted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).
  - (2) See Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- b. <u>Logistics</u>. See Tab K (Special Ammunition Logistics) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Command. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
  - b. Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Chemical Fire Support Table/Target List
- 2 Chemical Target Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 1 (Chemical Fire Support Table/Target List) to TAB D (Chemical Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 11-3, Employment of Chemical Agents

Time Zone: P

	(a)	(b)	(c)	. d )	(e)	d)	191	(h)	(k)	(j.	(k)
LN. NO.	TGT. NO.	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION	AL TITUDE	S1ZE	ALTITUDE (MILS)	WEAPON/ AMMUNITION	TOT	UN17	нов	REMARKS AND/OR RESULTS DESIRED
1	xZ 9001	ROAD JUNCTION	E42-N191	55m	POINT TGT.	5800	2 SORTIES SPRAY VX. ! TANK/SORTIE	ON CALL	7th MAW		ON CALL TO CONTAMINATE AREA.
2	x2 9002	ROAD JUNCTION	E73-N143	50m	POINT TGT.	580	2 SORTIES SPRAY VI. : TANK/SORTIE	ON CALL	7th MAW		ON CALL TO CONTAMINATE AREA.
3	x2 9003	ROAD JUNCTION	E80-N80	l 5m	POINT TGT.	HEA	2 SORTIFS SPRAY VX, 1 TANK/SORTIF	ON CALL	"th MAW	-	ON CALL TO CONTAMINATE AREA.
4	xZ 9004	RUAD JUNCTION	£53-N58	15m	POINT TGT,	34.1-1	2 SORTIES SPRAY VK, 1 TANK/SORTIE	ON CALL	Zen MAW	-	ON CALL TO CONTAMINATE AREA.
5	xZ 9005	R AD JUNCTION	E38-N50	20m	POINT IGT.	400	2 SORTIES SPRAY VX, 1 TANK/SORTIE	ON CALL	7th MAN	-	ON SALL TO CONTAMINATE AREA.
6	x7 9006	ROAD JUNCTION	F/H-444	e) Jm	PENNT TOT.	41918	2 SORTIES SPRAY VX. 1 TANK/SORTIE	ON CALL	7th MAW	-	ON TALE TO CONTAMINATE AREA.

<sup>.</sup> NOT INTENDED TO REPRESENT A IMPLETE TABLE

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81


C-12-D-1-1

Copy no.\_\_\_of.\_\_\_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

ENCLOSURE 2 (Chemical Target Overlay) to TAB D (Chemical Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Time Zone: P



**ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT** 

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB E (Target List) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
(b) FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support
(c) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination
(d) FMFM 7-2, Naval Gunfire Support
(e) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support

Time Zone: P

#### VII MAF TARGET LIST PART 1 (Targets to be Destroyed by VII MAF)

TARGET NUMBER	COORDINATES	DESCRIPTION OF TARGET	ELEVATION (METERS)	TARGET CLASSIFICATION	TARGET PRIORITY
XZ 2048	E7.6-N15.3	ROAD JUNCTION	4	С	III
XZ 2049	E7.5-N15.7	BRIDGE	4	C	III
XZ 2050	E5.7-N14.8	PT ON AIRFIELD SERVICE ROAD	<b>4</b> 8	C	III
XZ 2051	E6.4-N14.3	AIRFIELD SERVICE BUILDING	10	С	III
XZ 2052	E6.5-N14.2	AIRFIELD SERVICE BUILDING	10	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	III
XZ 2053	E6.6-N14	AIRFIELD SERVICE BUILDING	10	С	111
XZ 2054	E6.7-N13.9	AIRFIELD SERVICE BUILDING	10	C	III
XZ 2055	E6.8-N13.8	AIRFIELD SERVICE BUILDING	10	С	III
XZ 2056	E3.3-N13.9	ROAD JUNCTION	12	С	III
XZ 2057	E5.1-N13.4	AIRFIELD MAINTENANCE BUILDING	12	С	III
XZ 2058	E5.2-N13.3	AIRFIELD MAINTENANCE BUILDING	12	C	III
XZ 2059	E5.3-N13.2	AIRFIELD MAINTENANCE BUILDING	12	C	III
XZ 2060	E5.6-N13.4	AIRFIELD TERMINAL BUILDING	12	C	III
XZ 2061	E5.7-N13.3	AIRFIELD TERMINAL BUILDING	12	С	III
XZ 2062	E5.3-N13.2	AIRFIELD TERMINAL BUILDING	12	C	III
XZ 2063	E5.9-N13.1	AIRFIELD FREIGHT BUILDING	12	C	III
XZ 2064	E6.1-N13	AIRFIELD FREIGHT BUILDING	12	C	III
XZ 2065	E6.2-N12.9	AIRFIELD FREIGHT BUILDING	12	С	III
XZ 2066	E5.4-N13.5				
	TO				
	E6.3-N14	AIRFIELD TAXIWAY	12	С	111
XZ 2067	E5.7-N12.4	INDUSTRIAL BUILDING	12	С	III
XZ 2068	E5.5-N12.3	INDUSTRIAL BUILDING	12	С	III
XZ 2069	E5.6-N12.3	INDUSTRIAL BUILDING	12	С	111

TARGET NUMBER	COORDINATES	DESCRIPTION OF TARGET	ELEVATION (METERS)	TARGET CLASSIFICATION	TARGET PRIORITY
	COORDINATES  E5.8-N12.3 E5.5-N12 E5.6-N11.8 E5.4-N11.7 E4.1-N11.5 E4.3-N10.8 E2.4-N9.4 E3.6-N9.8 E3.9-N9.8 E4.1-N9.8 E3.5-N9.7 E3.6-N9.7 E3.6-N9.7 E3.6-N9.7 E3.6-N9.7 E3.6-N9.5 E3.7-N9.5 E3.6-N9.5 E3.6-N9.5 E3.7-N9.5 E3.6-N9.5 E3.7-N9.5 E3.8-N9.5 E3.7-N9.5 E3.8-N9.5 E3.8-N9.5 E3.9-N9.5 E3.9-N9.6 E3.7-N9.7	INDUSTRIAL BUILDING INDUSTRIAL BUILDING INDUSTRIAL BUILDING INDUSTRIAL BUILDING INDUSTRIAL BUILDING ROAD JUNCTION BRIDGE FOOD PROCESSING BUILDING		CLASSIFICATION CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC	
XZ 2105 XZ 2106 XZ 2107	E3.6-N4.5 E3.2-N3.6 E5.8-N4.2	ROAD JUNCTION BRIDGE ROAD JUNCTION	10 12 6	C C C	III III III
XZ 2108 XZ 2109 XZ 2110 XZ 2111 XZ 2112	E7.3-N2.7 E8.6-N2.9 E8.9-N1.7 E10.2-N0.9 E9.9-N2	ROAD JUNCTION BRIDGE ROAD JUNCTION ROAD JUNCTION	4 2 4 4	000000000	
	E11-N1.5	RIGHT BANK OF CHANNEL INLET	2		111

C-12-E-2

The second of th

TARGET NUMBER	COORDINATES	DESCRIPTION OF TARGET	ELEVATION (METERS)	TARGET CLASSIFICATION	TARGET PRIORITY
XZ 2113 XZ 2114 XZ 2115 XZ 2116	E10.6-N1.8 E11-N1.6 E11.4-N1.5 E10.1-N2.4 TO	BRIDGE BRIDGE BRIDGE	2 2 2	С С С	III III
XZ 2117	E10.8-N1.8 E10.2-N2.5 TO	LEFT BANK OF CHANNEL INLET	2	С	III
XZ 2118 XZ 2121 XZ 2122 XZ 2123 XZ 2124 XZ 2125 XZ 2128 XZ 2129 XZ 2130 XZ 2132 XZ 2133 XZ 2134 XZ 2135 XZ 2136	E10.8-N2.4 E22-N174 E89-N111 E96-N112 E94-N92 E100-N85 E90-N83 E70-N11 E56-N17 E43-N18 E30-N25 E29-N25 E29-N26 E23-N27 E104-N120	ROAD SECTION BRIDGE ROAD JUNCTION BRIDGE ROAD JUNCTION ROAD JUNCTION ROAD JUNCTION BRIDGE	4 35 10 10 10 10 5 10 20 30 35 35 35		
XZ 2137	TO E104-N110 E104-N84 TO	COASTAL ROAD SECTION	0	С	III
XZ 2138	E98-N72 E95-N62 TO	COASTAL ROAD SECTION	5	С	111
XZ 2139	E95-N54 E92-N34 TO	MOUTH OF HILL PASS	60	С	III
	E99-N31	COASTAL HILL	80-MSL	С	III

TARGET NUMBER	COORDINATES	DESCRIPTION OF TARGET	ELEVATION	TARGET CLASSIFICATION	TARGET PRIORITY
XZ 2119 XZ 2120 XZ 2126 XZ 2127	E21-N171 E77-N117 E83-N70 E63-N35	ROAD JUNCTION ROAD JUNCTION HILL ROAD JUNCTION	40 10 20 10	C C C	III III III

TARGET NUMBER	COORDINATES	DESCRIPTION OF TARGET	ELEVATION (METERS)	TARGET CLASSIFICATION	TARGET PRIORITY
XZ 2131	E30-N30	ROAD JUNCTION	30	С	III
XZ 9001	E42-N191	ROAD JUNCTION	55	С	III
XZ 9002	E73-N173	ROAD JUNCTION	50	С	III
XZ 9003	E80-N80	ROAD JUNCTION	15	С	III
XZ 9004	E53-N58	ROAD JUNCTION	15	С	III
XZ 9005	E38-N50	ROAD JUNCTION	20	Ċ	III
XZ 9006	E28-N44	ROAD JUNCTION	60	C	III

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

C-12-E-4

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB F (Fire Support Coordination) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) NWP 22-2, Supporting Arms Cochdination in Amphibious Operations

(c) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action (d) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination

(e) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Fire Support Coordination (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization)

#### SITUATION

- Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUMS.
- b. Friendly Forces. See Tab A (Air Fire Plan), Tab B (Artillery Fire Plan), and Tab C (Naval Gunfire Plan).

#### 2. MISSION


The 7th MARDIV FSCC will conduct the initial planning for and coordination of conventional and nonconventional fires within the VII MAF area of influence. The VII MAF primary command post will be prepared to coordinate all fire support in the event that the division FSCC becomes inoperative.


#### 3. EXECUTION

a. General. Fire support coordination will be accomplished in accordance with existing doctrine contained in references (b, d, and e).

### b. CG, 7th MARDIV

(1) Coordinate with the SACC concerning no-fire areas within the metropolitan boundary of SYN City and outside of the FEBA.





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

- (2) Submit any recommendations to change the existing coordination measures to this headquarters in the event that the GOPL becomes untenable and forces are withdrawn behind the FEBA.
- (3) See Tabs A-J to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- c. CG, 7th MAW. See Annex M (Air Operations).
- d. <u>CG</u>, 7th FSSG. Submit requests for fire support to the FSCC in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).

#### 4. TARGET INFORMATION

- a. <u>Target List</u>. CG, 7th MARDIV will be responsible for the maintenance and coordination of the VII MAF Target List. See Appendix 4 (Target Intelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) and Tab E (Target List) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- b. Restricted Targets. All religious, historical, and cultural structures, medical facilities, and civilian utilities within the FEBA will continue to be classified as restricted targets. Unit commanders will only fire on restricted targets when it has been determined that such fire is necessary for the protection of forward defensive area and rear area forces or is absolutely required in the defense of assigned sectors. Requests for such fire must be approved by the FSCC. Units operating within or outside the VII MAF defensive security zone will apply the same restraint when required to direct fires near or within outlying communities surrounding SYN City. See Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement).
- 5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY. See Annex M (Air Operations) and Appendix 1 (Nuclear Operations) to Annex C (Operations).

#### SAFETY OF GROUND FORCES

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

- a. <u>Boundaries</u>. The 7th MARDIV FSCC will establish, publish, and coordinate with subordinate commands the location of boundary lines and no-fire and/or restricted-fire areas within the VII MAF area of influence.
- b. <u>Coordinated Fire Line (CFL)</u>. Subordinate commands will forward recommended and/or modified CFLs for approval and consolidation to the FSCC.
- c. Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). The FSCL has been established along the general trace of a line from the hill NW of SYN City to the finger west of SYN City to the escarpment south of SYN City. All fire missions within the trace of the FSCL will be

C-12-F-2

conducted under the positive control of a terminal control agency such as the FAC, FAC(A), AO, FO or similar observation agency. Fire missions beyond the FSCL will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in Tabs A-C to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).

- d. Restricted Fire Line (RFL). RFLs will be established by the FSCC, upon recommendation from subordinate commands, in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).
- e. Free Fire Area (FFA)/No Fire Area (NFA). Same as subparagraph 6.d..
- f. NBC Munitions. See Appendix 1 (Nuclear Operations), Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan), and Tab D (Chemical Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- g. <u>Smoke and Illumination Missions</u>. Conducted in accordance with procedures established in reference (e) with the following restrictions:
  - (1) Smoke and illum fires will not be conducted near defensive sector boundaries without being coordinated between adjacent commands.
  - (2) Caution will be used when employing any incendiary in circumstances that may cause fires endangering adjacent units.

#### 7. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. <u>Command</u>. See Annex J (Command Relationships). The FSCC will be collocated with headquarters, 7th MARDIV.
- b. Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

TAB J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination

- (c) FMFM 11-4, Staff Officers' Field Manual Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures
- (d) FMFM 11-4B, Staff Officers' Field Manual Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data
- (e) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons Employment (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. <u>Enemy Forces</u>. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support).

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of VII MAF, on order, will conduct nuclear fire missions to destroy or neutralize Aggressor assault formations forward of the GOPL and forces successful in penetrating the MAF security zone; emphasis will be placed on the destruction of Aggressor NBC delivery systems and fully deployed attack formations of first and second echelon forces.

#### 3. EXECUTION

#### a. Concept of Operations

(1) If authority to employ nuclear weapons has been granted by the NCA, nuclear fire missions will be conducted, on order, to destroy elements of each division's column advancing on the GOPL. An attempt will be made to combine nuclear fires with conventional fires to disorganize each column, isolate security and main body forces for subsequent massed fire attacks, and to assist all applicable supporting arms in causing the early deployment of assault formations for subsequent conventional airstrikes. Should any assault formation succeed in eluding initial nuclear and conventional

C-12-J-1

attacks, then nuclear fire missions will be conducted to stop further penetration of the VII MAF security zone.

(2) Assignment (250830P--as directed); see Figure J-1.

UNIT	TOTAL	0.5KT	1KT	2KT	5KT	10KT	20KT	50KT
VII MAF	4	4						
DIV TGTs								
1st MARINES	11	*3	*4	*4				
2nd MARINES	11	*3	*4	*4				
3rd MARINES	11	*3	*4	*4				
7th MAW	12				*4	6	<b>*</b> ]	*1
TOTAL	49	13	12	12	4	6	1	1

\* ON CALL AND/OR TGTS OF OPPORTUNITY

Figure J-1

### (3) GOP Forces (TFs A and B)

- (a) On order, conduct preplanned nuclear fire missions in accordance with Enclosures 1-3.
- (b) Coordinate unit deployments with respect to nuclear fires.

#### (4) 7th MARDIV

The contraction of the contract of the contrac

- (a) Conduct nuclear fires, employing air and artillery support, on targets of opportunity in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e) and Tabs A (Air Fire Plan) and B (Artillery Fire Plan).
- (b) Control nuclear fire support missions of organic artillery units.
- (c) Be prepared to receive, emplace, and detonate ADMs on order.

#### (5) 7th MAW

(a) On order, conduct preplanned nuclear fire missions in accordance with provisions contained in this plan, Tab A (Air Fire Plan), and Annex M (Air Operations).

C-12-J-2

(b) Be prepared to conduct on call nuclear fire missions against targets of opportunity within the MAF security zone.

#### b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Nuclear target numbers assigned to VII MAF; XZ 2119-2120, XZ 2126-2127, XZ 2131; others to be issued.
- (2) Notification of intent to fire nuclear weapons will be given to the FSCC in all cases.
- (3) Nuclear weapons will not be employed if effects will be of a greater degree of risk than is equal to moderate risks for warned exposed civilians.
- (4) Nuclear weapons will not be detonated within the metropolitan boundary of SYN City.
- (5) The FSCC and TACC will be notified 15 minutes prior to Time On Target (TOT) of a cancelled nuclear strike mission. The code words for a cancellation are CHECK OFF followed by the nuclear target number.
- (6) Troop safety will be provided for in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).
- (7) Reports will be submitted in accordance with reference (e).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex P (Combat Service Support) and Tab K (Special Ammunition Logistics) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).

### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).
- b. Command

- (1) See Annex J (Command Relationships)
- (2) DASC will be collocated with 7th MARDIV CP.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Nuclear Fire Support Table/Target List2 Target Overlay3 Weapon Readiness

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

C-12-J-4

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 1 (Nuclear Fire Support Table/Target List) to TAB J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
(b) FMFM 11-4B, Staff Officers' Field Manual Nuclear Weapons
Employment Effects Data

Time Zone: P

CONTROL OF STREET AND STREET STREET STREET STREET STREET

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g \	(h)	(1)	(31	
LINE NO.	TARGET NO.	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION DGZ	ALT	STZE	ALT (MILS)	MPN/ AMMO	•101	UNIT	нов	REMARKS AND/OR RESULTS DESTRED
1	XZ 2119	ROAD JUNCTION	E21-N171	40m	PT TARGET		AIR 10KT	TB1	Jtn MAW	LΑ	NEUTRALIZATION OF MECHANIZED UNITS.
2	XZ 2120	ROAD JUNCTION	E77-N117	10m	PT_ TARGET	-	155mm 0.5KT	TB1	5/10	LA	Same as line 1.
3	XZ 2126	HILL MASS	CENTERED AT E83-N70	20m	PT, TARGET	-	155mm 0.5KT	TBI	4/10	LA	Same as line 1.
4	XZ 2127	ROAD JUNCTION	E63-N35	10m	PT. TARGET	-	AIR 10KT	181	7th MAN	LA	Same as line t.
5	XZ 2131	ROAD JUNCTION	E30-N30	30m	PT. TARGET	-	AIR 10KT	TBI	7th MAW	LA	Same as line 1.

<sup>\*</sup>TOT TO BE ISSUED (TBI) CONTINGENT UPON AUTHORIZATION TO CONDUCT MISSION

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

C-12-J-1-1


<sup>\*</sup>NOT INTENDED TO REPRESENT A COMPLETE DOCUMENT

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 2 (Target Overlay) to TAB J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Time Zone: P



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 3 (Weapon Readiness) to TAB J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

STATE	OF	READINESS	
JIMIL	vı	レアレウエはにつつ	

Unit	Yield	I	11
10th MARINES			
4/10	0.5KT		13
5/10	1KT		12
	2KT		12
7th MAW (AIR)	5KT		4
, ,	10KT		6
	20KT		1
	50KT		i

<sup>\*</sup> Not intended to represent a complete document.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB K (Special Ammunition Logistics) to APPENDIX 12 (Fire Support) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

- (b) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)
- (c) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Special Ammunition Logistics (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

- 1. ALLOCATION. The following allocations of special ammunition apply:
  - a. Special Ammunition Load
    - (1) 7th MAW

VX (SPRAY TK)	5KT	10KT	20KT	50KT
12	4	6		

(2) 10th Marines

- b. <u>Special Ammunition Stockage</u>. The remaining allocations will be stocked in Special Ammunition Stockage Posts near each intermediate supply point and at each airfield.
- Distribution. Supply point distribution of special ammunition stocks throughout the period of operations or as directed.
- d. Replenishment. Stockage and distribution of additional special ammunition will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c). Replenishment will tentatively be at a rate of one round per two expended or as directed.
- 2. STORAGE. Each firing unit will establish forward field storage sites: quantity/distance and minimum spacing requirements are set forth in reference (c).

#### 3. SECURITY

- (a) Each nuclear/chemical-capable firing unit will provide for its own firing position security.
- (b) Emergency destruction procedures are contained in reference (c). Materials for destruction will accompany nuclear weapons wherever deployed.

#### 4. TRANSPORTATION

- a. The primary method for the displacement of nuclear munitions will be by helicopter. Secondary means include truck convoys.
- b. Chemical munitions will be displaced by truck convoy.
- c. Accountability procedures for nuclear and chemical munitions are contained in reference (c).

#### 5. MAINTENANCE

- a. Required and scheduled maintenance of nuclear and chemical munitions will be conducted by contact teams from 7th FSSG and MWWU-7.
- b. Nuclear and chemical weapon firing units will be responsible for the conduct of storage monitoring at forward stockage points.
- 6. REPORTS. Reporting procedures are contained in reference (c).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

C-12-K-2

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 13 (Countermechanized Operations) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
     (c) FMFM 7-1, Fire Support Coordination
     (d) FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Antimechanized Operations

Time Zone: P

Task Organization:

### Task Force A 2nd Tank Bn (Rein) 2/1 (-) Co B (Rein), 1st AAV Bn Co A (-), 7th Cbt. Engr. Bn. Composite Artillery Bn Btrys Q and R, 5th Bn. 10th Marines Btry D, 2nd Bn, 10th Marines 1st Sect., 1st Plt, FAAD Btry (D/S) Det FSSG

Lieutenant Colonel BLUE

Lieutenant Colonel WHITE

#### Task Force B

1st Tank Bn (Rein) 1/2 (-) Co A (Rein), 1st AAV Bn Co B (-)(Rein), 7th Cbt Engr Bn Composite Artillery Bn Btrys N and P, 4th Bn, 10th Marines Btry B, 1st Bn, 10th Marines
1st Sect, 3rd Plt, FAAD Btry (D/S) Det FSSG

#### SITUATION

- Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- Friendly Forces. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support).

C-13-1

c. <u>Attachments and Detachments</u>. See Annex A (Task Organization) and the task organization above.

#### d. Assumptions

- (1) That enemy mechanized forces will not be able to traverse the northern swamps or the wooded mountainous terrain that parallels the two major avenues of approach to SYN City.
- (2) That enemy mechanized forces will not be able to advance along or cross over the South River fault.

### 2. MISSION

7th MAF establishes a barrier system to delay and canalize the attacking enemy mechanized forces and destroys or ejects them by a combination of air. artillery, and armor attacks.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. Commencing on D+10, air fires will be directed at targets of opportunity beyond the GOPL to attack and destroy security and main body elements of the approaching MRD columns. Elements of each column that have successfully eluded air attacks beyond the GOPL and are able to close on the GOPL will be engaged by long-range fires of the combined firepower of each MCATF and CAS aircraft to delay the assault while causing the maximum number of casualties feasible with massed fires, to disorganize assault forces and cause the early deployment of security and main body units, and to counterattack penetrating and fully deployed assault forces without becoming decisively engaged. Each MCATF will continue to conduct delaying actions with emphasis placed on utilizing natural and artificial barriers to enhance efforts in an attempt to canalize assault formations into terrain restricting freedom of action and favorable to massed attacks of conventional and, when authorized, nonconventional long-range fires in the security zone from supporting arms within SYN City. On order, each MCATF will be withdrawn behind the FEBA and will be prepared to counterattack Aggressor mechanized units as they approach or penetrate the FEBA.

.

#### b. Tasks

## (1) GOP Forces (TFs A and B)

- (a) Establish actual and dummy minefields forward of and within the security zone.
- (b) Make contact with advancing enemy forces as far forward of the GOPL as possible.

C-13-2

- (c) Using barriers and maneuver, canalize the enemy into ambush routes or killing zones and attack him with supporting fires and armor.
- (d) Avoid becoming decisively engaged in the security zone.
- (e) Be prepared to request nuclear fire support in accordance with provisions in Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- (f) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA using ambush and counterattack tactics to the maximum degree possible.

#### (2) 7th MARDIV

- (a) Establish obstacles to canalize assault formations into terrain more favorable for subsequent air and artillery attacks in accordance with provisions contained in Appendix 14 (Obstacle Plan).
- (b) Establish blocking positions within assigned defensive sectors.
- (c) Conduct on call artillery fires in accordance with provisions contained in Tab B (Artillery Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support).
- (d) Be prepared to commit reserve/mechanized strike forces to conduct counterattacks anywhere within or near the FEBA.

#### (3) 7th MAW

- (a) Conduct conventional and chemical strikes in accordance with Tab A (Air Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support); conduct nuclear strikes if authorized.
- (b) Be prepared to deliver scatterable mines in support of countermechanized operations and other missions as directed.
- (c) Support GOP operations and delaying actions with conventional and guided weapons.

### c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>

(1) Effective for planning upon receipt; execution on order.

C-13-3

- (2) See Appendix 10 (Operations Overlay) and Appendix 12 (Fire Support) for illustrations and/or detailed information regarding schemes of maneuver and location of preplanned fire support missions.
- (3) The antimechanized readiness posture of applicable forces will be Condition III and will be effective upon receipt.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- (a) See Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- (b) Damaged but repreble armor and tracked vehicles will be retrieved and evacuated expeditiously to the nearest appropriate maintenance facility.
- (c) The highest priority is assigned to restoring tanks and SP guns to operable condition.
- 5. <u>COMMAND AND SIGNAL</u>. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics) and report CP location changes.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

TAB: (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

C - 13 - 4

of copies Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 14 (Obstacle Plan) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic City, 1:20,000

- (b) FMFM 4-4, Engineer Operations (c) ECP 4-4, Engineer Operations
- (d) FM 31-10, Denial Operations and Barriers

Time Zone: P

#### SITUATION

- Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence)
- Friendly Forces b.
  - (1) See Basic OPLAN 6-81.
  - (2) CTF 51 will provide NMCB detachments, as required, to assist in obstacle development in accordance with provisions contained in this appendix and Appendix 7 (Deception).
- c. Assumptions. None.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of VII MAF will prepare barrier systems to impede the Aggressor force advance in the security zone, to inflict casualties, and to canalize assault formations closing on the FEBA into terrain more favorable for massed artillery and air fires and mechanized strike force counterattacks.

#### 3. **EXECUTION**

#### Concept of Operations

Elements of 7th MARDIV, augmented by detachments from 7th FSSG and NMCBs, will establish barrier systems within the VII MAF defensive security zone. Obstacles will be designed to delay Aggressor assault formations closing on forward defensive areas and canalize units into terrain more favorable for massed organic fires and mechanized strike force Barriers will be installed making maximum use of natural obstacles and locally available materials.

Efforts will be made to minimize destruction of civilian public and private properties consistent with assigned missions and/or the tactical situation.

- (2) Tab A (Overlay, Barrier Location Concept) indicates the general trace of covering and forward barriers. Unless otherwise specified, barriers will be constructed in the following order of priority:
  - (a) Covering barrier
  - (b) Forward barrier
  - (c) Intermediate barriers

#### b. 7th MARDIV:

AA-BB-CC-DD  TGT VII-XX(MAF)-1(R)  TGT VII-XX(MAF)-2(U)  TGT VII-XX(MAF)-3(U)  E8.1-NO.7  1  Elms of 7th MARDIV(+  site, mark, and reco  obstacles.	
TGT VII-XX(MAF)-4(R) E3.6-N.4 1 A-B-C-D-E Covering Barrier	
TGT VII-XX(MAF)-5(R) E10.2-N1 1 Same as above. TGT VII-XX(MAF)-6(U) E8.8-N2.2 1 TGT VII-XX(MAF)-7(U) E5.1-N6.9 1	
TGT VII-XX(MAF)-8(U) E5.4-N8 1 TGT VII-XX(MAF)-9(U) E4.8-N9.3 1 TGT VII-XX(MAF)-10(U) E4.4-N10.9 1	
TGT VII-XX(MAF)-11(U) E5.2-N13.8 to 1 E5.8-N14.5	
TGT VII-XX(MAF)-12(U) E6.2-N14.8 1 TGT VII-XX(MAF)-13(U) E11.2-N16.2 1 E-F-G-H-I Forward Barrier	
TGT VII-XX(MAF)-14(R) E7.6-N15.7 2 Same as above. TGT VII-XX(MAF)-15(U) E5.4-N6.9 2 TGT VII-XX(MAF)-16(U) E9.6-N2.5 2	

- c. 7th FSSG. Conduct obstacle preparation operations with elements of the Engineer Support Bn placed in D/S of 7th MARDIV in accordance with provisions contained in this appendix and Appendix 7 (Engineer Support Plan) to Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- d. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) Toxic chemical contaminants will not be employed within the metropolitan boundary of SYN City.

C-14-2

- (2) Bridge demolition and road cratering will be conducted on order from this headquarters or if capture is imminent.
- (3) Report change of status of targets to this headquarters immediately.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. See Annex J (Command Relationships) and Annex K (Communications-Electronics).
  - b. Reports. Minefields: report intent, progress, and/or completion status by the most rapid secure means available; follow with standard minefield reports.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### TABS:

- A Overlay, Barrier Location Concept
- B Demolitions (Omitted)


DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB A (Overlay, Barrier Location Concept) to APPENDIX 14 (Obstacle Plan) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Time Zone: P




ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81



Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ANNEX D (Logistics) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

- (b) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)
- (c) MCO 8010.1C, Class V Available Supply Rates for Fleet Marine Force Combat Operations (U)
- (d) MCO 4400.39, War Reserve Policy Manual (U)
- (e) NAVMAT P4000-2, Logistic Reference Data
- (f) NAVMC 1017, Table of Authorized Material
- (g) FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers Field Manual Organizational Technical and Logistic Data
- (h) ForO 4000.3, SOP for Combat Service Support
- (i) Annex D (Logistics) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

#### 1. GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To provide guidance and direction for logistic support of VII MAF forces conducting defensive operations in southern Aggressorland.
- b. <u>Concept of Logistic Support</u>
  - (1) Logistic planning will be based on the support of continuing operations in southern Aggressorland. The 7th FSSG will provide internal logistic support for elements of VII MAF conducting defensive operations within the MAF area of influence. Logistic support within SYN City will be conducted from intermediate support areas near forward defensive sectors to satisfy the more urgent Combat Service Support (CSS) requirements and from facilities in CSSAs established during the previous assault operations. See Annex P (Combat Service Support) for details concerning internal logistic support requirements.
  - (2) The primary method for the transportation and introduction of elements of the replacement draft and bulk supplies and equipment to points of debarkation within the MAF area of influence will be accomplished by sealift support from TF 51. MSC will provide resupply sealift support to augment the fleet as required.

- (3) CTF 51 will continue to provide for port operations until the arrival of follow-on forces. Such support will include furnishing port operations personnel, harbor craft, and continuing harbor clearance operations.
- (4) MAC will continue to provide intertheater airlift support for the transportation of emergency Class I and V supplies to the Theater Airbase (TAB) and aerial medical evacuation operations from the TAB to other theater air terminals or to CONUS as requested by CG, VII MAF. The USAF will provide for the required logistic support of MAC units operating out of the TAB.
- (5) DLA will provide for the operation of property disposal facilities within the MAF area of influence and in support of MAF units operating out of the TAB.
- (6) The Defense Fuel Supply Center will arrange for the delivery of bulk fuel to meet VII MAF requirements within the MAF area of influence and the TAB.

### c. Assumptions

- (1) Navy forces will be able to maintain adequate levels of resupply to sustain VII MAF operations through at least D+45.
- (2) That ISPs and forward supply points will be established and stocked prior to the time that enemy forces can close on the FEBA.

### d. Resource Availability

(1) Elements of VII MAF will plan and execute the debarkation storage, and maintenance of supply and equipment stocks in sufficient quantity to enable defensive forces to continue operations within the MAF area of influence until follow-on forces arrive; a period estimated to be on or about D+30. MAF Forces will initially require the equivalent of 20 DOS stored in CSS facilities dispersed throughout SYN City and in forward supply dumps for the MCATFs operating within the defensive security zone. To meet the demand for additional storage sites and support facilities, elements of 4th CAG will direct the evacuation of selected civilians; designated private dwellings and commercial buildings will be requisitioned for use as CSS support facilities. When combined with evacuations required for the occupation of defensive positions in the forward defense area, the demands imposed upon the 4th CAG and elements of 7th MARDIV in terms of personnel to perform this function outstrip resources within the MAF area of influence. Augmentation will be required

from the least committed defensive forces and from USA CA units and/or uncommitted elements within the FMF. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).

- Indigenous water purifications system are currently operating at slightly less than normal capacity and currently provide an adequate amount of potable water for both VII MAF Should any major component and the civilian population. become a casualty of combat action, VII MAF can rely entirely on organic capabilities for potable water, but repercussions would occur in the MAF's capability to assure water supplies for the civilian population. As an interim measure, subordinate commands will store the maximum amount of potable water on position and units tasked with the production of potable water will take all measures to increase the volume of purified water currently being produced and stored. Provisions have been implemented for rationing throughout subordinate commands instructions pertaining to rationing will be issued to the population. To meet minimum consumption requirements, augmentation of purification equipment will be required from the theater command. See Annex G (Civil Affairs) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- (3) Calculations for antipated casualty rates during defensive operations indicate a significant shortfall in the number of beds and surgical facilities organic to elements of VII MAF. The requirement for an on-station hospital ship continues during the entire period of defensive operations. In addition to the anticipated increased medical requirement of subordinate commands, it is estimated that during heavy conventional and nonconventional attacks on SYN City by Aggressor forces, civilian medical requirements will outstrip indigenous resources. The 4th CAG, in coordination with CG, 7th FSSG, will be prepared to provide an emergency medical kit to the local hospitals and Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees (DPRE) assembly area clinics. A second kit has been located at the TAB for emergency airlift to SYN City if required.
- e. <u>Planning Factors</u>. Logistic planning factors used in this annex and attached appendixes are contained in references (c) through (f).

### f. Responsibilities

A CONTRACT TO SECURITY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE

(1) See Appendixes 1-6 for external logistic support requirements and Annex P (Conbat Service Support) for internal requirements.

- (2) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate external logistic support requirements as directed by CG, VII MAF.
- 2. Supply and Distribution. US Marine Corps war reserve policy is promulgated in reference (d). Policies pertaining to support of VII MAF are summarized in each succeeding subparagraph and in accordance with references (c) and (e-g). Aviation units operating from within the MAF area of influence and at the TAB will be supported by organic assets and through Navy supply channels and in accordance with references (c) and (e-g). For the period D+10 through D+30, VII MAF will be self-sustaining. In the event that heavy defensive action outstrips available resources and/or orders are received to extend operations in southern Aggressorland for a period to exceed D+45, resupply augmentation will be required from both Marine Corps and Naval supply systems.

### a. <u>Distribution and Allocation</u>

- Prior to and during assault operations, elements of VII MAF embarked and deployed 60 DOS which included initial issue allowances, operating stocks considered useful in the objective area, and mount-out stocks divided between the AE and During assault operations, MAF forces conducting operations within SYN City consumed 10 days of selected classes of supply. The balance has been landed and is stored in dispersed supply, maintenance, and/or transportations activities. Elements of the AFOE arrived in the AOA on D+5 and general unloading began on D+6 to increase the level of supply within the FBH and land those items left behind by the AE and deemed necessary for continuing operations within the MAF area of influence. The current level of supply available for MAF consumption is an averaged total of 50 DOS with additional emergency resupply packages of Classes I and V at the TAB?
- (2) Supply support will be provided by the 7th FSSG from CSSAs established during assault operations in the port area and BLUE Beach, from detachments of 7th FSSG deployed forward to establish intermediate supply points in an effort to disperse supply stocks, from authorized supply stocks on position in the forward defense area, and from supply dumps with selected classes of supply deployed forward within the security zone to accommodate requirements for support of GOP forces.

# b. Level of Supply

(1) Effective D+10, preplanned resupply packages of Class I and V will arrive by MAC air at the TAB. These will be broken down into three 5-day increments to arrive 5 days apart and

can be transported as emergency supplies to defensive forces within SYN City by elements of VII MAW (Rear) and/or by ship shuttle service.

- (2) In the event that SLOCs and ALOCs are temporarily interdicted by Aggressor actions, a sufficient level of supply must be achieved and maintained to sustain defensive forces until the arrival of follow-on forces. Elements of VII MAF will incrementally establish and maintain a level of 20 DOS (less Class III(A) and (W)) to meet this requirement.
- (3) Commencing on D+10, the following constitutes a DOS required to sustain forces defending the VII MAF area of influence:

Class III (A&W) 673,811 Gal. All other classes 1419.6 ST

- Salvage. Salvage operations will be conducted in accordance with references (b) and (h). Nonreparable major end items may be used to assist subordinate commands in portraying and displaying notional units and associated equipment. CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate with and respond to requirements of 7th MARDIV to support deception operations which may include the recovery and relocation of major end items of equipment.
- d. <u>Captured Enemy Material</u>. Logistic procedures for the handling of captured enemy material are contained in reference (h).
- e. Local Procurement. Local procurement will be limited to consumable items, such as materials useful for the construction of obstacles and other barrier materials, and will be coordinated by elements of 4th CAG and the 7th FSSG.
- f. POL. See Appendix 1 (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply).
- g. <u>Inter-Service Logistic Support</u>. Provisions for common supply and service are contained in reference (h).
- h. Mortuary Services. See Appendix 2 (Mortuary Services).

#### MAINTENANCE AND MODIFICATION

- a. CG, 7th FSSG will provide 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance support for all organic items of equipment within capabilities and will coordinate maintenance support of Navy-furnished items with CG, 7th MAW, CTF 51, and the theater command.
- Maintenance activities will be dispersed throughout the MAF area of influence. Third and fourth echelon maintenance on major end items will continue to be conducted at each CSSA, however,

detachments from 7th FSSG will be deployed forward to intermediate supply points to perform limited intermediate level maintenance on end items that need not be evacuated to the rear. Contact teams will also be deloyed forward to conduct limited intermediate level maintenance on end items which need not be or cannot be evacuated from the forward defense areas and within the MAF security zone.

- 4. MEDICAL SERVICES. See Appendix 3 (Medical Services).
- 5. MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION. See Appendix 4 (Mobility/Transportation).
- construction operations will nearly be curtailed in an attempt to provide engineering support to forces occupying forward defense area positions and in support of planned deception operations. Projects undertaken during assault operations will be completed if absolutely essential; e.g., the completion of the EAF at Airfield 2 and rehabilitative efforts on Airfield 1. A detachment of wing engineers and NMCB units will continue to perform immediate airfield repairs and NMCB units in the port area will continue to maintain equipment and facilities required for throughput services. Should GOP and 7th MARDIV forces fail to halt Aggressor penetrations of the security zone, barrier-obstacle installation units will withdraw to the FEBA to augment internal barrier-construction units or perform other tasks as directed.
- 7. <u>SECURITY ASSISTANCE</u>. There are no current requirements for security assistance imposed upon VII MAF by allied forces.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### APPENDIXES:

- 1 Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply
- 2 Mortuary Services
- 3 Medical Services
- 4 Mobility/Transportation
- 5 Civil Engineering Support Plan (Omitted)
- 6 Nonnuclear Ammunition

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.

D-6

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY. AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply) to ANNEX D (Logistics) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) ForO P4600. 33 w/ch., SOP for Embarkation

(b) FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data

(c) FM 101-10-2, Staff Officers Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data; Extracts of Nondivisional Tables of Organization and Equipment

(d) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

(e) LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

(f) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)

NAVMAT 1017. United States Marine Corps Table of Authorized Material

VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Logistics (Constructive)

(i) VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

#### 1. **GENERAL**

- Purpose. To outline procedures for Class III (bulk and package) POL support for VII MAF defensive operations in southern Aggressorland.
- Concept of POL Supply Support
  - (1) 7th FSSG will provide internal POL supply support for VII MAF.
  - Defense Fuel Supply Center will allocate POL supplies to support requirements of VII MAF.
  - (3) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate arrangements for the transportations of POL supplies to the VII MAF area of influence.
  - (4) A 20 DOS stock objective, less Class III(A), will be maintained to the maximum extent feasible. Class III(A) stocks will be built up to a level of 20 DOS for units anticipated to be operating out of SYN City during the period of defensive operations.

- c. Assumptions. None.
- d. Resource Availability. POL requirements can be met with assigned resources.
- e. <u>Planning Factors</u>. Planning factors utilized for POL supply support in this appendix are contained in references (a-c) and (g).

### f. Responsibilities

- (1) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate internal distribution of fuel supplies ashore for both MAF and naval forces operating within the VII MAF area of influence.
- (2) CG, 7th MAW (Rear), in coordination with CG, 7th FSSG, will arrange for the provision of POL support for all Naval and MAF units at theater airbase facilities (7th MAW Rear).
- (3) In the event that Airfield 1 and/or 2 become untenable, designated 7th MAW (Forward) fixed-wing units and their aircraft will redeploy to and conduct operations from TABs. TF 51 will provide POL support to any 7th MAW units that may be redeployed to TF 51 ships.

### 2. SUPPLY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

- a. General Guidance. POL supply support for VII MAF units will be provided in accordance with references (a), (b), (c), (g), and provisions contained in this plan. Preplanned push shipments of class III (a) (w) products, both bulk and packaged, will continue through D+60. CG, VII FSSG will notify the Defense Fuel Supply Center 30 days in advance of any changes to these requirements.
- b. Specific Guidance. POL supply support for VII MAF units will be provided by the Bulk Fuel Co., Supply Bn., 7th FSSG.
  - (1) Distribution and Allocation
    - (a) The Bulk Fuel Co will initially stock fuel supplies within each CSSA, in accordance with provisions contained in reference (i). With the assistance of other elements of the FSSG and units near or operating out of intermediate supply points, the Bulk Fuel Co. will relocate and install AAFS and HERs assemblies within the intermediate supply points as required to support forward defensive area forces. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

- (b) CG, 7th FSSG will provide fuel truck convoys to support GOP forces operating within the MAF security zone. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- (c) Normal requisitioning procedure will begin with the first shipment arriving after D+60.
- (2) <u>Local Procurement</u>. Local procurement of POL supplies is not authorized except in emergency situations and will not be required; sufficient resources are available to meet anticipated requirements.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 2 (Mortuary Services) to ANNEX D (Logistics) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFPACO 4000 (Logistic SOP)

- (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
- (c) ECP 4-1, Combat Service Support (d) FM 54-9, Corps Support Command
- (e) FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistic Data
- (f) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Logistics (Construc-

Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

a. To publish external logistic support requirements for mortuary service plans of VII MAF.

### Concept of Mortuary Service Support

- (1) 7th FSSG and other MAF units will provide internal graves registration and mortuary service in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).
- (2) Contingent upon the availability of MAC aircraft, MSC shipping will augment amphibious shipping as required, to provide transportation of the deceased to CONUS, or to a collection point at the TAB (7th MAW Rear) until such time as MAC aircraft can satisfy lift requirements.
- (3) CTF 51 will be prepared to provide assault shipping and coordinate transporting the deceased from the VII MAF area of influence to the TAB.
- (4) CG, 7th FSSG will provide contracted morticians, under the cognizance of the Navy Current Care of the Dead Program, to prepare the deceased for caskets which will be evacuated to CONUS from the TAB.
- (5) NSC will provide sufficient quantities of caskets at the TAB to meet evacuation requirements of the deceased.

- (6) Military Airlift Command aircraft will provide airlift assets to transport the deceased from the TABs to Travis AFB.
- (7) The Naval Regional Medical Center, Oakland, under the direction of authorities from the Navy Current Care of the Dead Program, will assume responsibility for the remains of the deceased at Travis AFB.
- (8) Upon request from the NRMC (Oakland), CG, FMFPAC will provide escort of at least equivalent rank in movement of the deceased to final destinations.
- c. Assumptions. None.

### d. Resource Availability

- (1) Mortuary services can be provided with available resources of the 7th FSSG.
- (2) Priority of civilian funeral and interment facilities will be for the use of the local populace. If, however, civilian requirements would not be impaired by the use of facilities for forces in the vicinity, then temporary interment areas will be utilized for the remains of the deceased until subsequent evacuation to unit collection points can be accomplished.
- (3) Contingent upon authorization by higher authority, in such instances as death resulting from contamination from NBC weapons, local crematoriums or other expeditious cremation measures can be taken to eliminate the contamination hazard and prepare the remains (ashes) for evacuation.
- e. <u>Planning Factors</u>. Planning factors used in this appendix are contained in reference (e).

### f. Responsibilities

- (1) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate the extraction of the deceased from FDA, CSSAs, and/or intermediate collection points to assault shipping as directed by CG, VII MAF, or to Airfield 1 for extraction by 7th MAW transport aircraft for as long as that airfield is tenable.
- (2) CG, 7th MAW will provide airlift support for the evacuation of the deceased from the VII MAF area of influence to the TAB and the extraction of remains from the security zone to Airfield 1 and/or to each CSSA for evacuation by elements of TF 51 as appropriate.

D-2-2

- (3) CG,7th FSSG will coordinate with CTF 51 the evacuation of the deceased aboard assault shipping to the TAB.
- (4) NRMC, Oakland, will coordinate the final disposition of the deceased upon arrival at Travis AFB or ports to be designated.

### 2. SUPPLY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

- a. <u>General Guidance</u>. Mortuary service supply support for VII MAF units will be provided in accordance with references (a), (e), and (f).
- b. <u>Specific Guidance</u>. Mortuary supply support of VII MAF units will be provided by the 7th FSSG from organic resources.
  - (1) Allocation. CG, 7th FSSG will arrange for supply stocks to include sufficient supplies to support the registration and evacuation of the following anticipated casualty figures within the MAF area of influence:

PERIOD	CASUALTIES	LOSSES (DEATHS)
D+10 to D+16 Battle/NB	1882/619	356
D+16 to D+40 Battle/NB	7873/2471	1493

- (2) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate with Marine and NSC systems, provisions for the supply of caskets to transport the deceased from the TAB to Travis AFB.
- (3) The central collection points will continue to be each CSSA and CG, 7th FSSG will be responsible for collecting and preparing the deceased for further evacuations from these facilities.
- (4) Local procurement of items associated with the preservation of the remains is not authorized; adequate amounts of applicable supplies will be made available by 7th FSSG.

#### 3. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- a. General Guidance. In accordance with references (a) and (f).
- b. Specific Guidance
  - (1) Elements of the 7th FSSG will provide security detachments at initial collection or temporary interment points and at each CSSA.

(2) Elements of the 7th MAW (Rear) will provide security detachments at the TAB facility for the deceased while awaiting transportation to CONUS.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

THE REPORT OF THE PARTY OF THE

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

**E** ...

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

D-2-4

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 3 (Medical Services) to ANNEX D (Logistics) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFPACO 4000, Logistics SOP

(b) FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers Field Manual Organization, Technical,

and Logistical Data

- (c) FM 101-10-2, Staff Officers Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistic Data; Extracts of Nondivisional Tables of Organization and Equipment
- (d) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

e) ECP 4-1, Combat Service Support

(f) LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

- (g) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Logistics (Constructive)
- (h) VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To publish external logistic support requirements for medical service plans of VII MAF.
- b. Concpet of Medical Service Support
  - (1) Each unit with a medical detachment and the 7th FSSG will provide internal medical service support for VII MAF.
  - (2) CTF 51 will provide medical facilities for the hospitalization of MAF battle and nonbattle casualties aboard assault shipping and a hospital ship during defensive operations.
  - (3) CTF 51 will provide sealift to evacuate casualties from the MAF area of influence to the TAB.
  - (4) CTF 51 will provide for a veterinary support throughout the period of defensive operations.
  - (5) MAC aeromedical evacuation aircraft will provide airlift and medical treatment aboard aircraft for the evacuation of casualties from the TAB to designated NRMC facilities or other theater general hospital facilities as required.
- c. Assumptions. None.

- d. Resource Availability. As stated in Annex D (Logistics), the anticipated number of casualties suffered during defensive operations will outstrip organic medical support capabilities and resources. Bed and operating room shortfalls combined with a greater vulnerability to enemy airstrikes near medical facilities impose a number of restrictions on the capability of existing medical facilities and units to handle anticipated workloads and supporting units to provide security for expansion efforts. The following measures will be taken in an attempt to reduce the impact of anticipated casualty rate increases and to protect evacuation hospital facilities:
  - (1) A continuing requirement will be placed on the utilization of medical facilities aboard all assault shipping capable of receiving helicopter MEDEVAC flights; a hospital ship is required on station to provide both additional bed and operating room facilities.
  - (2) The evacuation policy within the MAF area of influence will be reduced from 7 days to 5 days in an attempt to reduce the number of casualties requiring hospital beds in SYN City.
  - (3) A significant increase in the number of civilian casualties is anticipated during defensive operations. While every effort will be made to assist civilians in caring for their own casualties, the priority of effort for MAF medical personnel will be placed on the treatment of combat, combat support, and CSS personnel and their evacuation if required. Medical evacuations will be limited to MAF and naval support personnel. Elements of 7th FSSG will, however, assist in relocating hospital and clinic facilities located within the trace of the forward defensive area. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).
  - (4) The theater command will provide additional medical facilities at the TAB to accommodate an increased number of casualties evacuated from the MAF area of influence.

### e. <u>Planning Factors</u>

- (1) Planning factors used for medical support requirements in this appendix are contained in references (c) and (d).
- (2) The evacuation policy for operations within the MAF area of influence is 5 days. The theater evacuation policy is 15 days.
- (3) The locations and capabilities of civilian medical facilities are contained in Appendix 3 (Medical Services) to Annex D (Logistics) to reference (h).

### f. Responsibilities

- (1) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate medical and veterinary services provided to defensive and CSS units operating within the MAF area of influence and at the TAB.
- (2) CG, 7th FSSG, in coordination with CTF 51, will make provisions for the evacuation of casualties in the AOA to the TAB as directed by CG, VII MAF.
- (3) CTF 51 will provide medical services for MAF personnel still embarked aboard assault shipping, casualties evacuated to assault shipping, and units backloaded if required.
- (4) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate with USAF units in the evacuation of casualties by MAC air medical evacuation services operating out of the TAB.
- (5) CG, 7th FSSG, in coordination with CG, 7th MAW, will provide for air transport of emergency medical supplies and equipment stocks from the TAB to SYN City.

#### 2. SUPPLY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

- a. General Guidance. Medical supply support for units within VII MAF and those naval units supporting defensive operations within the VII MAF area of influence will be provided in accordance with provisions contained in reference (a-c) and (g) and provisions contained in this appendix.
- b. <u>Specific Guidance</u>. Medical supply support will be provided by the Medical Logistics Co., Supply Bn., 7th FSSG.

#### (1) Allocation

- (a) Elements of 7th FSSG will take all measures to meet the initial stockage objective of 20 DOS within the MAF area of influence; this stockage objective will include 20 DOS of Class VIII consumables and equipment.
- (b) Elements of 7th FSSG will be prepared to receive, store, and, if required, to assist in the distribution of supplies contained in the emergency medical kit for the civilian population.
- (c) Initial emergency medical support within SYN City will be provided from each CSSA where medical facilities have been established to collect, provide emergency treatment, and evacuate casualties to assault shipping and/or direct air evacuation to the TAB. In addition

to hospital facilities at each CSSA, medical companies will be deployed to the intermediate supply points and establish 60-bed facilities to accommodate the more immediate emergency medical needs of units occupying the forward defense area. In the event mass casualties are taken as a result of the Aggressor's use of NBC weapons, orders will be issued to expand evacuation facilities to include the former BSAs and HLZs used during assault operations and other measures required to safeguard, treat, and evacuate casualties from the MAF area of influence.

(2) Local Procurement. Local procurement of items associated with the care and evacuation of casualties is prohibited; adequate stocks and/or treatment will be made available to defensive forces by the 7th FSSG. Emergency procurement, when justified, may be authorized on a case-by-case basis by this headquarters.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 4 (Mobility/Transportation) to ANNEX D (Logistics) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

- (b) LFM 02, Doctrine for Landing Forces
- FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)
- FMFM 4-2, Amphibious Embarkation (e)
- For 0P4000.4 w/chs, Standing Operating Procedures for Logistics
- NAVMC 2500, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs (g)
- NAVMC 1017, United States Marine Corps Table of Authorized Mate-

Time Zone: P

#### 1. GENERAL

1. 日本 かんかん かんかん 単いない いっこうに 量っ

- Purpose. To publish external mobility and transportation support requirement plans of VII MAF.
- b. Concept of Mobility/Transportation Support
  - 7th FSSG will provide internal transportation support for the movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment within the VII MAF area of influence.
  - MTMC will provide rail, highway, and commercial carrier support for the movement of supplies and equipment to points of embarkation within CONUS.
  - (3) MTMC will schedule MSC shipping, cargo arrival, and loading operations for supplies and equipment within CONUS.
  - (4) CTF 51 will provide for assault shipping intratheater transportation to include shuttle services between the MAF area of influence and the TAB.
  - (5) MAC will provide aircraft for the evacuation of casualties from the TAB to other theater air terminals and/or to CONUS as requested by CG, 7th FSSG.
  - (6) MAC will provide aircraft for intra/intertheater transportation of personnel, equipment, and supplies once an air

terminal capable of handling MAC transport aircraft has been established within the MAF area of influence.

c. Assumptions. None.

### d. Resource Availability

- (1) Mobility and transportation requirements can be met by assigned resources with MTMC, MAC, and MSC augmentation allocated by the JTB.
- (2) Civilian transportation resources will be controlled in accordance with provisions contained in reference (g).
- e. <u>Planning Factors</u>. Planning factors utilized for mobility and transportation planning in this appendix are contained in references (a), (c), (f), and (h).

### f. Responsibilities

THE PETERSON BEFORE AND PROPERTY OF STREET OF STREET, THE PETERSON OF STREET OF STREET, AND STREET OF STREET,

- (1) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate the movement of units, supplies, and equipment within the VII MAF area of influence.
- (2) CTF 51 will coordinate the use of assault shipping and naval landing craft for intratheater transportation.
- (3) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate external transportation support to include MAC air and MSC augmentation.
- (4) CTF 51 will provide the necessary harbor craft to support port operations until the arrival of follow-on forces.
- (5) MTMC will assume responsibility for technical port operations once follow-on forces have landed and established appropriate facilities within SYN City.
- (6) MAC will be responsible for the evacuation of casualties from the TAB to designated terminals.

#### 2. SUPPLY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

a. <u>General Guidance</u>. Transportation supply support for VII MAF will be provided in accordance with reference (f) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).

### b. Specific Guidance

(1) Distribution and Allocation


- (a) Elements of 7th FSSG will land and stock 20 DOS which will include Class IX items and Class III (W) bulk fuel package supplies.
- (b) Initial supply support and the deployment of maintenance contact teams will occur from each CSSA. Once established, ISPs near the forward defense area will provide adequate facilities for the more immediate supply and maintenance requirements of units manning assigned defensive sectors.
- (2) <u>Local Procurement</u>. Local procurement of items relating to the supply and maintenance of transportation means will be approved and coordinated by this headquarters.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES.

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.



Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 6 (Nonnuclear Ammunition) to ANNEX D (Logistics) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) MCO 8010.1C, Class V (W) Available Supply Rates for Fleet Marine Force Combat Operations
  - (b) ForO P4600.33 w/ch., Standing Operating Procedures for Embarkation
  - (c) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)
  - (d) FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation
  - (e) FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers Field Manual Organization, Technical and Logistical Data
  - (f) FM 101-10-2, Staff Officers Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data; Extracts of Nondivisional Tables of Organization and Equipment
  - (g) Final Report, Army Science Board Ad Hoc Group on Military Operations in Built-up Areas (MOBA)
  - (h) TM 9-1300-206 w/ch., Ammunition and Explosives Standards

#### Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To publish external logistics support requirements for nonnuclear ammunition supply of VII MAF.
- b. Concept of Nonnuclear Ammunition Supply Support
  - (1) 7th FSSG will provide internal nonnuclear ammunition supply support for VII MAF.
  - (2) The DOD Single Manager for Ammunition (USA Armaments Readiness Command) will provide nonnuclear Class V (A)(W) supplies to support requirements of VII MAF.
  - (3) CTF 51 will provide assault shipping for the intratheater transportation of nonnuclear ammunition supplies.
- c. Assumptions. None.
- d. Resource Availability. Anticipated nonnuclear ammunition requirements can be met by use of stocks available in the MAF area of influence and emergency stocks being established at the TAB.

e. <u>Planning Factors</u>. Planning factors utilized for nonnuclear ammunition supply and storage in this appendix are contained in references (a), (e), (f), and (h) as modified by factors calculated for defensive operations in SYN City.

### f. Responsibilities

- (1) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate internal nonnuclear ammunition supply distribution and distribution for naval units operating ashore.
- (2) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate with CG, 7th MAW and CTF 51, the supply and distribution of nonnuclear ammunition for MAF units operating out of the TAB and the deployment of emergency stocks from the TAB to the MAF area of influence.
- (3) CTF 51 will provide assault shipping for the transportation of emergency Class V supplies from the TAB if required.

#### 2. SUPPLY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

- a. General Guidance. Nonnuclear ammunition supply support for VII MAF will be provided in accordance with references (a), (b), and storage in accordance with reference (h).
- b. Specific Guidance. Nonnuclear supply support will be provided by the Ammunition Co., Supply Bn., 7th FSSG.
  - (1) Distribution and Allocation
    - (a) Elements of VII MAF will incrementally land and store up to 20 DOS of Class V (A and W).
    - (b) Additional emergency stocks of major subclasses are available for fly-in or transported by elements of TF 51 as directed.
    - (c) Initial ammunition support will be provided at each of the CSSAs. Once established, forward defensive units will draw ammunition from intermediate supply points near assigned defensive sectors within the forward defense area.
  - (2) Local Procurement. Local procurement of nonnuclear ammunition supplies will not be authorized. Any ammunition stocks, other than organic stocks, will be confiscated and evacuated through normal channels to the Ammunition Co., Supply Bn., 7th FSSG.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.

D-6-3

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250230P May 1981

ANNEX E (Personnel) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)

(b) ECP 1-1, G-1 Manual

- (c) Annex G (Civil Affairs) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81
- (d) Appendix 4 (Reports) to Annex P (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81
- (e) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Personnel (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

CONTRACTOR OF STREET, CONTRACTOR

#### GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To set forth administrative and personnel policy necessary to support Operation BREAKER SIX.
- b. Concept of Personnel Support. The overall objective of personnel support and CSS within the MAF area of influence and at the TAB will be to provide the desired units, at authorized strengths, and give them the capability to carry out the concept of operations stated in Annex C (Operations). The original replacement draft at the TAB has been used to reconstitute the MAF and additional replacements are being phased into the TAB for future deployments within the MAF area of influence. Provisions for organic and external logistic support for the MAF are contained in Annexes D (Logistics) and P (Combat Service Support).
- c. Assumptions. None.
- d. Supporting Annex. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).

#### 2. PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDUPES

- a. General Guidance. See Chapter III, JCS Pub 2.
- Specific Guidance
  - (1) Reporting Procedures
    - (a) Reports will be based upon total authorized allowances.

- (b) Periodic personnel reports will be submitted in the format contained in reference (a) and as specified in reference (d).
- (c) Personnel status reports will be submitted in the format contained in reference (a) and as specified in reference (d).

### (2) Replacement Policies

- (a) As stated in paragraph 1.b., subordinate commands have been reconstituted and the replacement draft from Okinawa is being incrementally phased into the TAB for future deployments into the MAF area of influence. There is currently a 6,000 man replacement draft available for individual and/or unit replacements.
- (b) Units reporting less than 50 percent effective strength will be replaced as a unit, as the tactical situation permits, and remaining personnel will be utilized as individual replacements.
- (c) Submit replacement requirements in accordance with provisions contained in references (d) and (e). Identify requirements by immediate projections, 30 day projections, and 90 day projections.
- (d) Casualties will be returned to parent commands via the medical liaison chain established by CG, 7th FSSG.

### (3) Personnel Center Operations

- (a) The incoming personnel reception center will be relocated from Airfield 1 to the port area due to the fact that the bulk of replacements have been arriving in the port area and each of the existing airfields are vulnerable to enemy aircraft and missile fires.
- (b) Reference (e) applies.
- (4) Rotation Policies. Individual and unit replacements will be controlled by higher headquarters.
- (5) <u>Use of Female Military Personnel, Personnel with Critical Skills, and Specialists</u>
  - (a) Deployment of female military personnel within the MAF area of influence is prohibited.

- (b) Female military personnel will fill line billets at the TAB.
- (c) Personnel categorized as having critical skills and Naval MOTU specialists will perform functions only in their MOSs within the MAF area of influence; reference (e) applies.
- (6) <u>US Citizen Civilian Personnel</u>. Civilian specialist support will only be required at the TAB. See Appendix 2 (Mortuary Services) to Annex D (Logistics).
- (7) Non-US Citizen Labor. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).
- (8) Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Internees/Detainees. See Appendix 1 (Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detailed Persons).
- (9) <u>Captured, Missing, and Detained US Military Personnel</u>. See Appendix 2 (Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detailed US Personnel).
- (10) Morale, Recreation, and Welfare
  - (a) Due to the anticipated and ongoing workload, there will be no provisions made for recreational pursuits within the MAF area of influence until the threat to the MAF has been neutralized.
  - (b) Rest and rehabilitative areas will be established after D+30 or as the tactical situation permits.
  - (c) Emergency leave will be authorized by the MAF ACofS, G-1 and his designated representatives.
  - (d) Liberty programs to be issued.
  - (e) Exchange services will not be established until such time as the threat to the MAF has been neutralized; ration sundries packs will be issued and will adequately provide for personal comfort.
- (11) <u>Casualty Reporting</u>. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).
- (12) Decorations and Awards. Awards will be conveyed in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e) and Appendix 9 (Personnel) to Annex P (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81.

- (13) Hostile Fire Pay. Will be authorized in accordance with existing DOD directives.
- (14) <u>Travel Procedures</u>. Applicable travel procedures are contained in Joint Travel Regulations and provisions contained in reference (e).
- (15) Military Law, Discipline, and Order
  - (a) Unit commanders will impose high standards for the control and accountability of personnel, arms, and ammunition.
  - (b) Unit commanders will impose curfews within their defensive sectors that are commensurate with the tactical situation and as directed.
  - (c) Provisions for straggler control are contained in Appendix 1 (Concept of Combat Service Support) to Annex P (Combat Service Support).
  - (d) Serious incident reports will be forwarded to this headquarters and will be drafted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).
  - (e) Provisions for confinement and the administration of justice under the UCMJ and manual for Courts-Martial are contained in Appendix 9 (Personnel) to Annex P (Combat Service Support), Appendix 2 (Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel), and reference (e).

#### 3. FINANCE AND DISBURSING

THE PROPERTY SECTIONS OF THE PROPERTY OF THE P

a. <u>General Guidance</u>. See Navy Controller Manual, DOD Pay Entitlement Manual, Military Pay Procedures, and provisions contained in reference (e).

# b. Specific Guidance

- (1) <u>Currency and Credit Controls</u>. Controlled and coordinated by <u>CINCPAC</u>.
- (2) Pay Functions. Conducted in accordance with procedures contained in the Joint Uniform Military Pay Systems (JUMPS) Manual.
- (3) Control of Financial Institutions. See Force 07200.1.

(4) <u>Inspection and Audit</u>. Conducted in accordance with procedures contained in reference (e).

#### 4. LEGAL

a. General Guidance. The manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) will apply as appropriate.

### b. Specific Guidance

- (1) Claims. Claims against the US arising out of activities of VII MAF personnel will be settled under Provisions of Foreign Claims Act (10 USC 2734) and by the JAG.
- (2) <u>International Legal Considerations</u>. See Annex G (Civil Affairs) and provisions contained in reference (c).
- (3) <u>Legal Assistance</u>. Provided for in accordance with reference (e).
- (4) <u>Military Justice</u>. Conducted in accordance with the UCMJ and Manual for Courts-Martial and reference (e).
- (5) Reporting Violations of the Law of War. See Annex G (Civil Affairs) and references (c) and (e).

### 5. POSTAL AND COURIER SERVICES

a. General Guidance. Conducted in accordance with reference (e) and OPNAVINST 2260.6.

### b. Specific Guidance

- (1) CG, 7th FSSG in coordination with CG, 7th MAW will provide for courier services between the MAF area of influence, the TAB, and CONUS.
- (2) See Appendix 1 (Concept of Combat Service Support) to Annex P (Combat Service Support).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

ţ....

#### APPENDIXES:

- 1 Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons
- 2 Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons) to ANNEX E (Personnel) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedure for Intelligence (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To set forth administrative and security procedures for handling enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, and other detained persons.
- b. Concept. All detained persons will be considered hostile and kept under guard and close observation until their exact status has been determined. Military officers will be segregated and processed separately from enlisted personnel. Civilians, detainees, POW's, and incarcerated MAF personnel will be segregated at all times. All detainees will be interrogated for intelligence information as soon after capture or detention as possible.
- c. Assumptions. None.

#### POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

- a. General Guidance. See Annex G (Civil Affairs) and reference (a).
- b. Specific Guidance
  - (1) Enemy POWs. POWs will be delivered by the capturing unit to the parent battalion/unit POW collection point as soon as the tactical situation permits. First aid will be provided if required. Preliminary interrogation will take place at battalion level, or higher level if no interrogation capability exists at battalion, to determine whether or not the individual POW merits immediate high-priority attention. Military police or designated elements within individual units will provide guards and escort from battalion or unit collection points to the POW stockade or to overflow stockades being maintained at RED Beach and CSSA II. POWs requiring emergency life saving medical treatment will be evacuated by the most expeditious means possible to hospital

faciliites at the ISPs and/or CSSAs, and if warranted, designated casualty receiving shipping.

- (2) Civilian Internees. Normally, civilians will not detained but will be guided to safe areas where they will not interfere with MAF operations and will be comparatively safe from small arms and indirect fires. In the event that detaining or apprehending civilians is warranted by the tactical situation, or hostile or other acts, civilians will be evacuated to the nearest CSSA where they will be administratively processed, medically treated, and interrogated for information of interest to the production of useable intelligence by Civil Affairs detachments. Military police will assume responsibility at the CA detachment CP for guard and escort to the civilian detainee stockade. In the event that families are detained, it will be advisable to keep family members together unless the senior MAF officer/NCO present determines that separation is advisable. determination may be based on obstreperous or militant behavior, non-cooperation, inciting to riot or misbehavior, or other good and sufficient cause. Civilian internees having special intelligence value will be delivered under escort/guard to the VII MAF CP.
- (3) SYN City Prison Detainees. Inmates at the SYN City Prison will be kept in detention. Prison guards, administrators, food service personnel, and other supporting personnel will be retained subject to the authority of VII MAF Provost Marshal. Records search and interrogation will continue for the identification of political prisoners and others who might cooperate with MAF authorities or provide useful information. Careful screening will be accomplished by interrogator teams to protect against planted agents.
- (4) Other Detained Persons. Foreign nationals and other persons not covered by the foregoing categories will be kept separate from all other detainees. Their presence, location, and status of custody will be reported through administrative channels to VII MAF G-2 with information to 4th CAG. Preliminary inquiry concerning identity, citizenship, current business, and reasons for presence in the area will be made in all cases. Any determination to undertake a detailed intelligence interrogation will be made by VII MAF G-2, with due consideration for diplomatic or allied status.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 2 (Processing of Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained US Personnel) to ANNEX E (Personnel) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedure for Intelligence (Constructive)

(b) Code of Conduct

Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To set forth administrative, intelligence, and counterintelligence procedures for handling and processing formerly captured, missing, or detained US personnel.
- b. <u>Concept.</u> All US personnel who have been captured, detained, or were otherwise missing from their units during Operation BREAKER SIX and who are subsequently recovered by reason of scope or release will be processed by intelligence and counterintelligence interrogators at the earliest opportunity.

### 2. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

a. General Guidance. Reference (a) applies.

#### Specific Guidance

Intelligence. Priority of interrogation efforts will be directed toward counterintelligence data, asualty data concerning other US POW's or MIA's, and general intelligence information of interest to the MAF. Unit commanders will provide to VII MAF G-1 the name, grade, SSN, and circumstances of loss for each individual in VII MAF who becomes lost, missing, or captured or who deserts or is believed to have deserted. The VII MAF G-1 will be the central repository for such information and all casualty information that is developed subsequent to the incident in which an individual becomes separated from his unit. All of the information compiled on a specific missing, detained, or captured person will be provided to the I/CI interrogators when that individual returns to VII MAF custody. processing, all returnees will be treated with proper military courtesy unless the circumstances extant make it advisable to place the individual under guard or arrest and to warn him of his rights under Art. 31 of the UCMJ.

- Information Processing. Information concerning US POWs that alleges cooperation or collaboration with the enemy will be handled in CI and legal channels using the appropriate security classification. Priority intelligence data concerning Aggressor NBC capabilities and intentions or impending mechanized attack will be provided by secure means, FLASH precedence, to CG, VII MAF and to higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands as directed. Casualty intelligence that suggests an opportunity for rescuing captured US personnel from Aggressor POW camps or holding areas will be provided immediately by secure means, FLASH precedence, to VII MAF TOC, to facilitate the initiation of possible rescue operations. Other information of interest will be provided to the cognizant command or staff agency by appropriate means and precedence.
- (3) <u>Duty Status</u>. Personnel who are in MIA status or otherwise separated from their units for less than 10 days before returning to VII MAF custody will normally be restored to duty with their parent units as soon as intelligence, administrative, and medical processing are completed. In cases where the circumstances of loss, or other related circumstances, militate in favor of further processing or detention, that individual will be remanded to the custody of VII MAF Provost Marshal for further action. The duty status of persons missing for more than 10 days or who were known to be captured and in POW status will be determined by VII MAF G-1 after processing, with the advice of VII MAF G-2 and Legal Officer in appropriate cases.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

### ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) JCS Pub; Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Annex L (Civil Affairs) (Notal)

(c) JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Notal)

(d) JCS Pub 3, Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance (Notal)

(e) DOD Directive 5100.77 of July 1979, Law of War Program

(f) DA PAM 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare

(g) FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons

(h) FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare

(i) FM 41-5/OPNAV 09B2P1/AFM 110-7/NAVMC 2500, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs

(j) FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations

(k) USAF AFP 110-20, Selected International Agreements

(1) DOD Military Assistance Manual

- (m) MCP P12910.1, Use and Administration of Local Civilians in Foreign Areas During Hostilities
- (n) Judge Advocate General JAG INST 5800.7 (Series) Manual of the Judge Advocate General

(o) Force Order P5080.2, SOP for Civil Affairs (Constructive)

- (p) SECNAVINST 3300.1A, Law of Armed Conflict (Law of War) Program to Insure Compliance by the Naval Establishment
- (q) SECNAVINST 5710.22, Procedures for Handling Requests for Political Asylum

(r) MCO 3300.2, Law of War Training in the Marine Corps

(s) National Intelligence Survey, AGGRESSORLAND (Constructive)

- (t) A Guide to Food and Health Relief Operations for Disasters, Protein-Calorie Advisory Group of the United Nations System, (1977) UN, New York
- (u) World Health Organization, Technical Report Series 641, The Selection of Essential Drugs
- (v) World Health Organization, Measurement of Nutritional Impact, WHO/FAP/79.1
- (w) League of Red Cross Societies, Food and Feeding in Relief Actions: Notes for Red Cross Delegates; LRCS, Geneva, 1981
- (x) 4th CAG Civil Affairs Estimate of the Situation, dated 15Mar81, (Notal)
- (y) ANNEX B (Intelligence) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81
- (z) ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81
- (aa) ANNEX B (Intelligence) to VII MAF OPLAN 6-81

G-1

Time Zone: P

TASK ORGANIZATION: Appendix 1 (Task Organization)

#### 1. SITUATION

#### a. General

- (1) The purpose of this Annex is to provide instructions and guidance for planning and conducting civil affairs operations in the SYN City area of AGGRESSORLAND. References (b) through (m) provide background concerning civil affairs policies and responsibilities. Reference (o) contains specific civil affairs guidance for elements of VII MAF, and references (p) through (s) provide specific civil affairs guidance concerning relationships between military forces and civilian authorities and inhabitants of the area of References (t) through (w) contain data and operations. techniques useful in civilian management describe operations. References (x) through (aa) describe the SYN City area and its inhabitants.
- (2) Civil affairs operations in support of this plan will be conducted to accomplish the following:
  - (a) Prevent civilian interference with the accomplishment of the tactical mission.
  - (b) Fulfill obligations imposed by international law and such agreements as may be in effect.
  - (c) Further the policies of the United States.
  - (d) Assist, when necessary, in the evacuation of US and third-country nationals.

#### b. Enemy

- (1) ANNEX B (Intelligence).
- (2) National Intelligence Survey, AGGRESSORLAND, reference (s) (Constructive).
- (3) The people of AGGRESSORLAND are generally hostile to the US and entirely in sympathy with the Aggressor cause. Overt hostility from the general populace has been minimal, but numerous sniper/sapper attacks have occurred, particularly in CSS areas. Continuing attacks by snipers and sappers at the current level will constitute an annoyance but will not seriously inhibit VII MAF operations. A significant

increase in the number or severity of such attacks will impede defensive preparations, routine resupply activities, and defensive operations.

- (4) Evacuees and refugees now in assembly areas number about 34,000. Adults and teenagers are becoming less cooperative, and many are becoming seriously unruly. An increase in their restiveness could make it necessary to increase the size of security detachments assigned to the assembly areas.
- (5) The suburban area paralleling the western municipal boundary of SYN City houses approximately 2,800 people per square kilometer. If the Aggressor forces penetrate the GOP and advance on the FEBA, that suburban area will be involved in intense combat that will pose a serious hazard to the residents. Further, the presence of approximately 15,000 civilians in that portion of the forward defense area during combat operations would hinder friendly maneuver and pose a security threat. They would also constitute a lucrative source of intelligence information for the Aggressor forces if taken into custody by them. A similar situation exists in the forward defense area of the southern sector where nearly 15,500 civilians are located.
- (6) Civil affairs estimates will be updated as additional information becomes available and will include consideration of civilian supply, labor, local resources, attitudes of government officials, refugee matters, public health, public safety, and other actual or potential CA-related problem areas

#### c. Friendly

- (1) Department of State (DOS)
  - (a) Coordinates the civil affairs activities of US military forces with the support activities of other US governmental agencies present in AGGRESSORLAND.
  - (b) Maintains cognizance of civil affairs policies which may affect the AGGRESSORLAND government. Interests include matters having an impact on third countries, the general economic level to be attained, and the amount of civil relief supplies to be provided.
  - (c) Provides advice and guidance on the laws and customs of AGGRESSORLAND.
  - (d) In the event of evacuation of any US citizens or third-country nationals from AGGRESSORLAND, DOS makes the

ultimate decision as to who is evacuated and establishes any priorities that may be required in the evacuation.

- (e) In the event that evacuation of SYN City inhabitants from AGGRESSORLAND to offshore locations becomes advisable, DOS makes the ultimate decision as to whether or not an evacuation will be accomplished, establishes priorities and number of civilians that may be removed from SYN City, and provides instructions and guidance for VII MAF and other participating commands through the Unified Commander concerning means of transportation, enroute measures, and destination.
- (2) Department of Defense (DOD)/Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
  Promulgates, in conjunction with DOS, basic civil-military operations (CMO) policies and guidance.
- (3) <u>Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)</u>. Through the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC), purchases and ships civil relief supplies to the AOA as requested by CG, VII MAF through the unified command's predominant user, and as approved by DOS.
- (4) <u>US Readiness Command (USREDCOM)</u>. Provides civil affairs personnel and units as directed by the JCS.
- (5) Department of the Army (DA). Provides CA personnel not provided by USREDCOM, as requested by CG, VII MAF.
- (6) Department of the Air Force (DAF). Provides temporary emergency billeting and medical care at theater air bases (TABs) for any US citizens, third-country nationals (TCN), and AGGRESSORLAND citizens that are evacuated from SYN City to those locations.
- (7) Department of the Navy (DON). Provides support in the form of logistics and transportation for CMOs when requested.
- (8) Commander, Amphibious Task Force 51 (CATF 51). Provides back-up support and emergency delivery of relief supplies from TABs if required to support CA and CMO operations.
- (9) Other US Government Agencies. Furnish advice and assistance in their functional areas, and, as requested, provide civil relief supplies and support.

#### d. Assumptions

(1) That VII MAF units will not participate in military government operations administered by occupying forces.

- (2) That VII MAF CA operations will be required only until follow-on forces arrive, estimated to be between D+30 and D+45, after which time all CMO will become the responsibility of the follow-on forces.
- (3) That the landing of relief food supplies and their distribution by indigenous authorities will be possible throughout the period of VII MAF defensive operations in SYN City.
- (4) That indigenous public service personnel will cooperate with VII MAF by repairing and operating essential equipment and maintaining electric power, potable water supplies, sewerage, and garbage and waste removal within the limitations imposed by damage to or loss of equipment and facilities and in consonance with the tactical situation.
- (5) That no mass exodus or ingress of civilians will take place and approximately the entire current population of SYN City, estimated to number 250,000, will require food supply support from VII MAF from D+11 through D+40, and that thereafter follow-on forces will provide whatever civil affairs support is required.

### 2. MISSION

VII MAF will plan for and conduct civil affairs operations to prevent indigenous civilian interference with tactical and logistical operations, fulfill obligations imposed by international law and such agreements as may be in effect, further policies of the United States, support military operations, and promote an environment favorable for long-term civil affairs operations by follow-on forces.

#### 3. EXECUTION

#### a. Concept of Operations

- (1) VII MAF civil affairs activities will be limited to those minimum essential civil-military operations (CMO) necessary for the accomplishment of the primary mission or required by international law, treaties, and US policy. CA operations will consist primarily of monitoring existing or reestablished civilian institutions and providing appropriate liaison and instructions.
- (2) Commanders should plan for and conduct the reconnaissance and liaison necessary for monitoring the civil populace, identifying civilian resources and labor potential, and locating suitable areas and structures for sheltering evacuees and refugees.

- (3) Staff support will be provided from the Fourth Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG) to subordinate commanders to assist in accomplishing assigned tasks.
- (4) Maximum attention will be given during all phases of the operation to alleviate suffering of the civilian population, utilizing local resources whenever possible. Civil affairs activities and resources used will be in accordance with policy guidelines published by higher authority and this annex.
- (5) Economic activities will be limited essentially to the function of civilian supply.
- (6) Government affairs functions will generally not be accomplished by VII MAF except for essential liaison with public administration officials and labor organizations and direct supervision of public safety and health activities. As a matter of urgent priority, commanders will take steps to assure the continued cooperation of government officials and their subordinates in providing an effective public health and safety environment. Legal problems and claims will be recorded for adjudication by VII MAF legal representatives, follow-on forces and/or the unified commander.
- (7) Public facilities functions will be the responsibility of local agencies under the supervision of CA or FSSG personnel. Priority will be given to repairing and operating public works, utilities, and communications. Sufficient public and commercial wheeled transportation is available for use by indigenous agencies to distribute relief supplies throughout SYN City when the tactical situation permits. VII MAF assets will not be used for this purpose without specific permission from this headquarters (CO, 4th CAG).
- (8) Special areas of interest will require thorough indoctrination of all VII MAF personnel and continuing attention by all commanders. Arts, monuments, archives, and religious facilities will not be molested or needlessly damaged. Refugees will be directed to areas of comparative safety in shelters that are or can readily be supplied with food and water. Refugees may involuntarily be billeted in occupied private homes. All civilians in certain designated areas will be evacuated in accordance with this annex, but not before adequate provisions have been made for selecting and identifying routes (using secondary roads), control points, and facilities and assuring that adequate food and potable water supplies are stocked. Indigenous agencies will be used to implement deliberate evacuations, when possible, to

minimize interpreterconserve military manpower and translator requirements. Except for nonambulatory persons, evacuations will be on foot. Only those evacuations that are directed by this annex or deemed vital to mission by on-the-scene commanders accomplishment will implemented. Unscheduled evacuation should be avoided whenever possible, primarily because of the burden it places on If the GOP is forced to withdraw because of Aggressor pressure, all relocation of civilians will cease, and a "standfast" policy will be in effect. remaining in areas that are threatened by enemy action will be directed to take cover in basements or other suitable places. The VII MAF civil information program will continue in effect as a priority function to keep the populace informed, provide for their safety, and prevent their interference with MAF operations.

## b. Tasks and Responsibilities

のような。 これのことが、 100mmの 100mm 100mm

- (1) 4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG)
  - (a) Administer the VII MAF civil affairs program.
  - (b) Submit requests for any additional functional CA support that may be required to support the defense of SYN City.
  - (c) Provide CA Detachment to 7th FSSG.
  - (d) Coordinate evacuation of civilians from designated areas, to include route selection and marking, site selection, and supervision of supply stockage in evacuee billeting areas.
  - (e) Provide CA liaison, as requested, with VII MAF units that do not have CA detachment support assigned.
  - (f) Maintain contact with SYN City government officials, in coordination with VII MAF ACofS G-2 and CI Group, to assure their continued cooperation in public safety and public health matters.
  - (g) Coordinate all legal matters relating to civil affairs operations.
  - (h) Evaluate the status and potential use of local livestock, agriculture, and industry and recommend means for capitalizing on these assets in accomplishing the mission prior to the Aggressor force's main offensive action.

(2) VII MAF ACofS G-4. In coordination with the unified commander, arrange for standby emergency provisions, to include disalinization equipment or water tankers, for providing potable water for VII MAF and the populace of SYN City in the event of chemical, biological, or nuclear contamination of SYN City's water sources.

## (3) 7th Communication Battalion (7th Comm Bn)

- (a) Support 4th CAG and CA operations as required.
- (b) Continue to supervise the repair, operation, and maintenance of public communications in SYN City in connection with the VII MAF CA program.
- (c) Continue to monitor and/or control police and fire department communications in support of CA operations.
- (d) Continue to make use of the SYN City and Naval Station telephone system in support of VII MAF operations.

## (4) 7th Mar Div (-) (Rein)

- (a) Prevent or reduce civilian interference with military operations.
- (b) Support evacuation of civilians from designated areas in accordance with Appendix 5 to this annex.
- (e) Conduct CA activities to support defensive operations in accordance with reference (o) and this annex.

**1**, ...

- (f) Establish priorities and coordinate or control indigenous public safety operations in 7th MarDiv TAORs as necessary to eliminate or minimize major threats, such as fire, to VII MAF operations or the populace.
- (g) Continue to conduct CA operations to create a favorable attitude among the populace to foster collaboration in intelligence matters and support long-range CA activities.
- (h) Be prepared to support a nonpermissive evacuation of noncombatants from SYN City to offshore locations to be designated.

# (5) 7th MAW (Forward)

(a) Report all sightings of refugee group movements within, into or from SYN City to the appropriate agency of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS).

- (b) Conduct CA activities in assigned areas in accordance with reference (o) and this annex.
- (c) Request CA support from this headquarters as it is required.
- (d) Be prepared to provide helicopter support for emergency delivery of relief supplies, if required.
- (e) Be prepared to support evacuation of selected individuals or general nonpermissive evacuation, if required.

## (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Continue to billet and provide basic relief supplies for 28,000 evacuees and 6,250 refugees (34,250 total) already relocated.
- (b) Establish sufficient evacuee assembly areas to accommodate 30,000 additional evacuees; provide potable water and adequate supplies of food stocks in accordance with this annex. See Appendix 5 (Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees) to this annex.
- (c) On order, evacuate an estimated 30,000 civilians from designated areas to collection points; provide requisite military police security and escort. See Tab C (Public Safety Overlay) to Appendix 2 (Public Safety) to this Annex.
- (d) Be prepared to assume OPCON of up to 3,000 replacements for DPRE security missions.
- (e) Locate, safeguard, and utilize the civilian population, labor resources, and facilities to help accomplish VII MAF's mission.
- (f) Continue to evaluate the civilian health and medical status and make provisions to overcome any significant shortfalls in personnel, medical supplies, equipment, or facilities that might otherwise result in epidemics that could threaten MAF units.
- (g) Be prepared to provide an estimated 62,500 gallons per day of potable water to the civilian populace.
- (h) Control the stockage and operations of the five food storage and distribution points in support of the civilian populace. Appendix 6 (Civil Affairs Logistics).

- (i) Offload and transport a minimum of 52 containers and additional breakbulk per week of relief food supplies in support of the civilian population.
- (j) In coordination with 4th CAG, implement and supervise the indigenous food supply/distribution system.
- (k) Continue to evaluate the indigenous firefighting capability and potential threat from fires, and report dangerous shortfalls and recommended solutions to this headquarters ASAP.
- (1) Determine the availability of local civilian labor to support civil-oriented operations. Use skilled labor to restore utilities, railroads, lighterage, etc.
- (7) <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>. All subordinate units will be prepared to augment MP Companies, as directed, in DPRE security and traffic control.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. <u>Military Resource Requirements</u>
  - (1) Annex D (Logistics)
  - (2) Annex P (Combat Service Support)
  - (3) Supplies required for relief of civilian distress will be given a logistical priority second only to the military supplies essential for combat. Distribution of supplies will be accomplished by SYN City representatives and resources whenever possible.
  - (4) MHE and transportation will be required to offload and deliver to central storage/distribution points a minimum of 52 containers per week for civilian food support. Civilian resources will be used whenever possible to accomplish this task.

#### b. Civilian Personnel

- (1) Annex E (Personnel)
- (2) Combat units are not expected to require any significant labor support, and the presence of civilians near combat units should be discouraged. Civilian laborers will not be used to accomplish work that is in direct support of combat operations.

(3) Maximum possible use will be made of civilian labor in rear areas performing tasks of a noncombat nature.

### c. Economic Affairs

(1) Food and Agriculture. Farm crop, livestock, and poultry supplies are not expected to be available within SYN City after the advancing enemy forces engage the GOP. Indigenous foodstuffs and agricultural products will not be consumed by VII MAF personnel except in cases of emergency.

### (2) Property Control

- (a) When effective control is restored to the proper SYN City authorities, local government will be responsible for control of property except for that which is in combat areas or in other areas designated for exclusive use of VII MAF.
- (b) Military use of private property will be in accordance with international law or legal agreements. Identification and control of private property will remain the responsibility of local government authorities except for that directly controlled by VII MAF.
- (c) Return of expropriated property will not be accomplished by VII MAF. Property placed under VII MAF control will be turned over to officials of the follow-on forces, together with appropriate records to facilitate CA operations by the follow-on forces.

# (3) Civilian Supply

- (a) The provision of US relief supplies will be limited to the amount necessary to augment local resources to the level required to prevent widespread disease and starvation and such unrest as might interfere with military operations. Requests for civil relief supplies will be addressed to this headquarters.
- (b) In the distribution of US relief supplies, the local populace will be given factual information as to the source. When possible, distribution will be accomplished by SYN City government agencies or local civilian relief organizations. Distribution will be monitored to prevent diversion into unauthorized channels.
- (c) Combat-type rations will not be issued to civilians except when immediate relief is necessary and no other provisions are available.

(d) Supplemental rations will not exceed approximately 1,500 calories per person per day initially. A maintenance level of about 3200 calories will be provided on or after D+30 if possible.

### d. Governmental Affairs

### (1) Public Administration

- (a) Most duly appointed officials of SYN City government agencies have been identified and screened. Those who appeared willing to cooperate with VII MAF in support of the common welfare were restored to office. Disposition of uncooperative officials will be determined by VII MAF ACofS G-2 in coordination with the Provost Marshal.
- (b) VII MAF decrees, ordinances, and other official communications will be promulgated through SYN City officials whenever possible, and they will be enforced by cognizant VII MAF units.
- (c) No promises, expressed or implied, will be made to any individuals, agencies, or organizations relating to US recognition, economic or financial support, US liabilities, or the US position on any matters whatsoever, without prior approval of this headquarters.
- (2) Public Safety. Appendix 2 (Public Safety).
- (3) Public Health. Appendix 3 (Public Health).

# (4) Public Welfare

- (a) Requirements for humanitarian necessities in excess of local and military capabilities will be made known to this headquarters as the need arises.
- (b) Maximum use will be made of indigenous relief and welfare agencies, US governmental and international agencies, and such volunteer agencies as may be available.

## (5) Legal/Claims

(a) Civil affairs international law specialists assigned to the 4th CAG are responsible for all legal aspects of civil affairs matters, including whatever translations may be required. All legal problems or incidents that may possibly involve civil affairs will be referred to this headquarters without delay.

G-12

- (b) All claims will be handled in accordance with Annex E (Personnel) through VII MAF Staff Judge Advocate. (reference (n))
- (c) Requests for asylum will be processed in accordance with reference (q).
- (6) <u>Labor</u>. Civil affairs personnel will assist in determining the availability of indigenous manpower for essential civilian requirements, economic rehabilitation, and military support functions. Advise this headquarters of anticipated requirements.

### e. <u>Public Facilities</u>

### (1) Public Works and Utilities

- (a) Public utilities and public service and safety facilities are currently operating at sufficient levels to meet urgent needs of the populace. These services must be expected to suffer severe interruptions and possible total loss during defensive operations.
- (b) All units will report the status of public works and utilities in their respective TAORs, using administrative nets and priority precedence.
- (c) Construction or repair of facilities by US personnel will be undertaken only when required in support of military operations.
- (2) Public Communications. CO, 4th CAG has cognizance over all public communication facilities except the telephone system. These facilities will be controlled and used to support the VII MAF public information program.

### (3) Public Transportation

- (a) VII MAF personnel will not commandeer or convert to their own use any public transportation unless specifically authorized to do so by this headquarters.
- (b) Significant changes in the location, condition, and operability of public transportation assets will be reported to this headquarters, ACofS G-4.
- (c) Public transportation will be used, as authorized by ACofS G-4, to support VII MAF operations as required, with second priority to CA support of the populace.

## f. Special Functions

- (1) <u>Displaced Persons</u>, <u>Refugees</u>, and <u>Evacuees</u>
  - (a) No displaced persons, i.e., civilians who are involuntarily outside the boundaries of their own countries, have been identified to date in or near SYN City. Existence of any such individuals or groups will be reported to this headquarters immediately.
  - (b) Currently, approximately 34,000 evacuees and refugees require support from VII MAF. Care and treatment of these civilians will be accomplished in accordance with reference (o) and this annex.
  - (c) In addition to those already relocated, an estimated 15,000 persons will have to be evacuated form their homes on the western edge of SYN City. Another 10,380 south of South River will require evacuation from the forward defense area in that sector. Approximately 3950 evacuees currently billeted in three schools on or outside of the FEBA in the southern sector will also have to be moved to a safe area where they won't interfere with VII MAF operations.
  - (d) Suitable facilities for evacuees are available in eight unused schools on Old City peninsula for about 14,000 persons. The naval station can accommodate about 5,000 people. High-rise buildings in New City have sufficient capacity to house several thousand people.
- (2) <u>Civil Information</u>. Civil affairs and psychological operations will be coordinated to ensure maximum effectiveness in obtaining the support of the SYN City population to facilitate accomplishment of the tactical missions.
- (3) Arts (Cultural Objects), Monuments, and Archives. Maximum protection will be afforded to these historic works, and they will not be used by VII MAF units for military purposes. Needless destruction of these invites increased resistance from the populace. Military record centers and those of civil government agencies have been confiscated, and, except where posted by VII MAF decree, these structures may be used for defensive purposes by local commanders if necessary.
- (4) Religious Affairs. Destruction or defacing of religious buildings or artifacts will be avoided. Churches or other religious-type structures may be taken under fire or attack

only in cases where they are occupied and defended by Aggressor troops.

- g. Reports. This headquarters will be informed of significant civil affairs matters daily as part of the SITREP submitted by subordinate commands. Attention should be given to the following:
  - (1) Those civil affairs matters directly or potentially affecting the accomplishment of the tactical mission.
  - (2) Any matter having actual or potential international repercussions, which may result in the creation of tension or undesirable relations between the US and other countries.
  - (3) Civilians who are or were in leadership positions or who appear to be disaffected or otherwise constitute potential intelligence targeting.
  - (4) Hoarding of food supplies or other critical resources.
  - (5) Serious incidents warranting prompt command attention, which will be reported to this headquarters without delay.
  - (6) Evidence of serious unrest among the civilian populace or in the evacuee assembly areas.

## 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. <u>Command</u>. Annex J (Command Relationships)
- b. <u>Signal</u>. Annex K (Communications-Electronics).
- c. Civilian Agency Locations
  - (1) Report locations of SYN City governmental, police, fire department, and other official agencies and significant volunteer and other private agencies.
  - (2) The list of the locations of principal civilian agencies of direct interest to units of VII MAF compiled by this head-quarters will be modified as required and promulgated weekly.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### APPENDIXES:

- 1 Task Organization
- 2 Public Safety

- 3 Public Health and Welfare
  4 Information and Education (Omitted)
  5 Displaced Persons, Refugees and Evacuees
- 6 Civil Affairs Logistics

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.

G-16

**L.NCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Task Organization) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFLANT Force Order P5080.2, SOP for Civil Affairs

(b) Civil Affairs Group, FMF, Planning T/O 4998, 10Sep81

(c) FM 101-10-2 Staff Officer's Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistic Data; Extracts of Nondivisional Tables of Organization and Equipment

Time Zone:

(All attachments effective 261000P May)

#### 4th Civil Affairs Group (Rein)

General Support VII MAF

Command Section
S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4 Sections
Motor Transport Section
Communications Section
Public Health Section
International Law/Claims Team, Det 4-1
Displaced Persons/Refugee Team, Det 4-1
Food & Agriculture Team (USA Team LB)
Public Works & Utilities Team (USA Team WB)
Public Transportation Team (USA Team WB)
Public Communications Team (USA Team PB)
Public Safety Team (Police) (USA Team TB)
Civil Defense Team (USA Team GB)\*
Public Welfare Team (USA Team VB)\*

# <u>Civil Affairs Detachment 4-1 (-)(Rein)</u> Direct Support 7th MARDIV

Detachment Headquarters

Liaison Team

Civil Affairs Team 411

Civil Affairs Team 412

Civil Affairs Team 413

Property Control Element (from USA Team NB)

\* Requested from Department of the Army on urgent basis. Attachment tentatively 1 June.

## Civil Affairs Detachment 4-2 (Rein) Direct Support 7th FSSG

Detachment Headquarters International Law/Claims Team Displaced Persons/Refugee Team Liaison Team Civil Affairs Team 421 CSSA 1 Property Control Team (-)(USA Team NB) Civilian Supply Team (-)(USA Team IB) Public Safety Team (Fire) (-) (USA Team TB) Civil Affairs Team 422 CSSA 2 Property Control Elm Civilian Supply Elm Public Safety Element (Fire) (From USA Team TB) Civil Affairs Team 423 Location to be designated

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 2 (Public Safety) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) FM 41-5/OPNAV 09B2P1/AFM 110-7/NAVMC 2500, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs
  - (b) FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations
  - (c) Force Order P50802, SOP for Civil Affairs
  - (d) FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances
  - (e) VII MAF OPLAN 1-81
  - (f) Annex G (Civil Affairs) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone:

### 1. SITUATION

a. General. The existing police and fire departments appear to be adequate now to provide for day-to-day control and bodily protection of the local population, but increased public safety problems will undoubtedly result from combat actions in SYN City to a level beyond the effective control of local agencies on occasion.

#### b. Enemy Forces

- (1) AGGRESSOR forces located outside SYN City are expected to direct long-range artillery fires and air attacks against positions within the city. Collateral damage to civilians and civilian facilities is inevitable.
- (2) Large-scale AGGRESSOR attacks inside the metropolitan limits of the city will create serious public safety problems. Such actions could exacerbate the refugee problem and threaten the security or maneuver of friendly units.
- Friendly Forces. CG, FMFPAC provides military police augmentation.

#### d. Assumptions

(1) That the current 34,000 evacuees and refugees and the anticipated 30,000 additional evacuees will not create public safety problems of a magnitude greater than can be controlled by VII MAF.

- (2) That, in the interest of self-preservation, the civilian population of SYN City will submit to VII MAF controls and, except for individuals or small groups, will not deliberately act against the public safety.
- (3) That SYN City officials will strive to maintain public order to protect their citizens.
- (4) That the SYN City fire department and volunteer firefighters will continue to fight fires that threaten civilian-occupied areas not involved with direct combat actions.

### 2. MISSION

VII MAF controls and supervises local civilian officials in the creation, maintenance, or reestablishment of public order and safety in the SYN City area to prevent civilian interference with accomplishment of the tactical mission, fulfill obligations imposed by international law, and to further policies of the United States by obtaining essential civilian support.

#### 3. EXECUTION

### a. <u>Concept of Operations</u>

- (1) Combat and combat support commanders will direct their CA activities towards keeping civilians and their movable property out of the way of VII MAF units. Circulation of civilians will be restricted except when it is necessary for them to move out of life-threatening areas or situations; under those circumstances local police, government officials, or citizen leaders will be used to organize and implement such movements to the maximum degree possible.
- (2) Military police, in conjunction with SYN City police, will be responsible for preventing civilian movement into and from bypassed areas that have been cordoned off and for evacuating civilians from areas designated for exclusive use of VII MAF.
- (3) Military police will continue to staff police and penal institutions as directed by VII MAF Provost Marshal.
- (4) Security requirements for guarding PWs, internees, refugees and evacuees that exceed the capabilities of MP units will be met by other units as directed.
- (5) If AGGRESSOR forces succeed in driving back the GOP, VII MAF forces will be very constricted within SYN City, and all public and private civilian movement will be stopped for

security reasons. Civilians will be ordered to standfast and remain indoors. If circumstances require that major fires be fought, local police and firefighters will be authorized by this headquarters to perform their tasks at specific locations. Requisite VII MAF units will be advised of the time and circumstances for this type action.

### b. Tasks and Responsibilities

The Control of the Co

### (1) 4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG)

- (a) Administer the VII MAF public safety program.
- (b) Maintain liaison with CG 7th FSSG and VII MAF Provost Marshal.
- (c) Supervise and coordinate public safety operations of the SYN City police department.
- (d) In conjunction with ACofS G-2, continue to screen officials and other public safety personnel for suitability, and remove or replace them as required.
- (e) Prepare plans and procedures to maintain or restore law and order during all civil emergencies.

# (2) 7th MarDiv(-)(Rein)

- (a) Be prepared to provide forces to maintain or restore public order in the case of civil emergencies.
- (b) Be prepared to provide security at evacuee assembly areas.
- (c) Be prepared to provide working parties to help contain fires that may seriously threaten VII MAF positions, installations, or personnel.
- (d) Enforce all VII MAF proclamations, ordinances, and other directives in 7th MarDiv defensive sectors.
- (3) 7th MAW (Forward). Provide fire protection and firefighting support at Airfields 1 and 2, to include protection of Class III (A) and V (A) stocks.

#### (4) 7th Force Service Support Group

(a) Staff main police and fire stations and SYN City prison with MPs as directed. Report augmentation requirements to this headquarters.

- (b) Provide guards at evacuee collection points and assembly areas, as required.
- (c) Supervise and coordinate public safety operations of the SYN City regular and volunteer fire departments.
- (d) Be prepared to control major fires by cutting fire breaks and/or demolishing flammable structures.
- (e) Enforce all VII MAF proclamations, ordinances, and other directives in assigned areas.
- (f) Prepare selected warehouses on the peninsula west of Old City for housing additional POWs.

## c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Commands that do not have CA specialists assigned will discharge CA responsibilities with the resources available or request specific support needed.
- (2) Keep this headquarters informed of the level of hostility within the local populace.
- (3) Collect and take into custody all arms and ammunition and implements of war.
- (4) Control circulation of civilians, enforce the 1800-0800 curfew, and verify the identity of civilians bearing VII MAF photo identification passes.

: 3

- (5) See Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence) to Annex B (Intelligence) for Civil Security.
- (6) Command attention will be paid to prevent fires with the second priority to control those fires that threaten VII MAF personnel, units, or maneuvers.
- (7) Commanders will not reduce the level of fire protection at VII MAF installations to fight fires in civilian-occupied areas without authority from this headquarters.
- (8) See Tab C (Minor Radio) to Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to reference (e) for public safety and other minor radio systems.
- (9) See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence) to this OPLAN and to reference (e) for data on commercial telephone network.

G-2-4

UNC LASSIFIED

(10) Indigenous communication systems should be used when feasible to report public safety information, emergencies, etc. except in cases where classified security information would be divulged.

### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Annex D (Logistics)
- Annex P (Combat Service Support)
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Annex J (Command Relations)
  - b. Annex K (Communications-Electronics)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT


BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### TABS:

- A Police and Penal Functions and Operations
- B Firefighting Operations
- C Public Safety Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81



Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

TAB A (Police and Penal Functions and Operations) to APPENDIX 2 (Public Safety) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: None

Time Zone: F

#### GENERAL

#### a. Police Department

- Currently, approximately 75% of the indigenous police officials and uniformed personnel appear to be cooperating with VII MAF in matters relating to public order and safety of civilians.
- (2) The members of the police force not actively functioning in a public safety role have been identified by name using current police rosters, but their whereabouts and current activities are not known.
- (3) Police Headquarters (Police Central Station Number 1), located in New City, is functioning under the supervision of VII MAF Provost Marshal. Police communications between Police Central and the other seven stations are monitored.
- (4) During the assault phase of Operation BREAKER, individual police assisted in moving and escorting evacuees for their protection. Subsequent liaison with police officials indicates that the police will cooperate with VII MAF MPs in any immediate, deliberate evacuation that may be ordered to protect civilians from life-threatening situations that are likely to result from intense combat in or near the FEBA. Police officials will not support evacuations or any other operations during combat except for isolated, critical situations.
- (5) Police Station 5 is the only police station in or near the area of the western municipal boundary of SYN City from which a significant number of civilians may be evacuated. Station 5 personnel will be relocated to public facilities located about 3 km east northeast of the present location. See Tab C (Public Safety Overlay) to this appendix.

G-2-A-1

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

## b. SYN City Prison and Penal Functions

- (1) Currently, VII MAF Provost Marshal controls the SYN City prison. Sufficient prison administrators, guards, and service personnel remained in the prison area to continue normal prison functions with respect to the local inmates.
- (2) After seizure of the prison by VII MAF, civilian inmates were screened and relocated within the prison to make room for the 800 POWs and 1850 civilian internees (CI) that are currently being held in separate sections of the prison.
- (3) Prison facilities are overcrowded, and no additional POWs, civilian internees, or local civilians can be accommodated in the prison.
- (4) Selected warehouses on the small peninsula immediately west of the old city will be prepared for housing POWs and any additional civilian internees.

### 2. POLICE DEPARTMENT FUNCTIONS DURING THE DEFENSE

### a. Public Safety

CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACT OF THE CONTRACTOR OF

- (1) Local police authorities will be held responsible for maintaining law and order among the civilian populace throughout SYN City.
- (2) Force is authorized to prevent looting and/or to apprehend looters or other criminals.
- (3) During active defensive combat operations, all civilians will be ordered to remain indoors.
- (4) Evacuee assembly areas will be guarded by local police under the supervision of VII MAF personnel tasked to provide security assistance.
- (5) In the event that any groups among the 64,000 evacuees create public safety problems of a significant nature, indigenous police will be directed to take whatever actions are necessary to restore order. Units of VII MAF that are near the sites of disorder will take action only if the security and integrity of their operations or positions are threatened or on orders from this headquarters.

### b. Penal Functions

- (1) Current inmates in SYN City prison will continue to be incarcerated in that facility.
- (2) Criminals/law breakers in SYN City who are apprehended by local police remain the responsibility of local authorities, and their place and nature of confinement will be determined by local authorities.
- (3) Criminals/law breakers apprehended by VII MAF units or personnel will be remanded to the custody of the nearest indigenous policy activity.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

TAB B (Firefighting Operations) to APPENDIX 2 (Public Safety) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Annex G (Civil Affairs) to VII MAF OPLAN 6-81

Time Zone:

### 1. GENERAL

の場合は、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、「日本のでは、」」
「日本のでは、「日本の

#### a. Situation to Date

- (1) Currently, approximately 75% of the indigenous firefighters appear to be cooperating with VII MAF in matters relating to public order and safety of civilians.
- (2) No major fires are now burning in SYN City.
- (3) The firefighting equipment and personnel at one station located forward of the FEBA will have to be relocated.
- (4) During the assault phase of Operation BREAKER, fire department personnel and equipment functioned with reasonable success in business and residential areas, but they were unable to combat the major fire that destroyed the POL tank farm in the port area.

## b. Firefighting Equipment

- (1) By US Standards, SYN City should have 22 fire trucks, but only 12 of the 16 fire trucks in the department are operable.
- (2) The incidence of fire during forthcoming operations must be expected to exceed the capability of available indigenous equipment.
- (3) See Tab A (Classification of Fires) to Appendix 2 (Public Safety) to reference (a) for a description of the classes of fires and approved methods for fighting them.

### 2. PREPARATIONS FOR FIGHTING FIRES DURING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

#### a. Fire Department

- (1) The SYN City fire department is not expected to fight fires in sectors where active combat operations are taking place or which are subject to regular indirect artillery fire.
- (2) Fire department officials will coordinate directly with appropriate public service agencies to arrange for repairs or restoration of service to water mains and fire hydrants when the tactical situation permits.
- (3) Police and fire department personnel and equipment may be authorized access to areas threatened by fire during standfast periods in the case of major fires; such authorization will be made by this headquarters and appropriate VII MAF units will be duly notified.
- (4) The SYN City fire department will be solely responsible for firefighting activities in all areas not specifically under the cognizance of VII MAF firefighters, i.e., ASPs, supply dumps, airfields, etc.
- (5) Fire department officials will coordinate the stockpiling of local POL and other supplies needed to support departmental activities.

## b. Civilian Preparations

- (1) Through the VII MAF civil information program, the residents of SYN City will be directed to take the following steps to aid in firefighting for their own protection:
  - (a) Fill all bath tubs, sinks, and other large containers with water and use water sparingly.

- (b) Locate and keep available shovels, picks, buckets, and garden hoses.
- (c) Locate sources of sand, dirt or gravel that might be useful in helping to contain fires.
- (d) Locate any available fire extinguishers and check them for serviceability.
- (e) In industrial areas, locate stocks of sodium chloride or graphite for fighting fires fueled by reactive metals.

G-2-B-2

- (2) To the extent of their ability to do so within the constraints of time available and the tactical situation, SYN City police and fire department officials will be tasked to help establish and orient/indoctrinate the following volunteer agencies:
  - (a) Volunteer firefighting teams in each block of residential structures.
  - (b) Volunteer firefighting teams in business and industrial areas not occupied by VII MAF units.
  - (c) Volunteer firefighting teams in each school building or other facility which is serving as a DPRE assembly area.
- (3) The VII MAF civil information program will broadcast the requirement for volunteers and will provide instructions for establishing and operating these teams.

#### c. Evacuation

- (1) During defensive operations, evacuation of large structures or areas not directly threatened by fire will be discouraged because of the hazards of combat and danger from weapons fire. In the event of a serious fire that threatens civilians and cannot be contained, the individuals concerned will be permitted to escape the danger. They may be assisted in their evacuation to the extent that such assistance aids in their safe and rapid movement and minimizes interference with MAF operations.
- (2) All unit commanders will familiarize themselves with the location of suitable shelters in reasonably safe areas to their rear to which they may direct civilians fleeing a fire danger.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

G-2-B-3

**UNCLASSIFIED** 


NOTE: Overprinted SYN City Map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling,

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

TAB C (Public Safety Overlay) to APPENDIX 2 (Public Safety) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: None

Time Zone: P



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L.R. DAVID Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 3 (Public Health and Welfare) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) Synthetic (SYN) City Information Book, August 1980
  - (c) FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations
  - (d) Annex G (Civil Affairs) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: F

### 1. SITUATION

a. General. Except for occasional maldistribution of medical personnel and assets, SYN City's public health services were adequate to meet recent needs. During combat operations, initial civilian casualties may exceed surviving treatment capabilities. Attacks by mass destruction or mass casualty weapons will undoubtedly create serious public health problems well beyond the capability of indigenous medical support.

#### b. Enemy Forces

- (1) The numerically superior Aggressor forces now advancing on SYN City are equipped with large numbers of tanks and artillery. They are capable of inflicting severe damage on the public works and service facilities that are essential for providing potable water, electric power, sewage and garbage removal. Prolonged interruption of these services would threaten the health and welfare of the city's inhabitants and expose them and VII MAF personnel to the danger of epidemics.
- (2) Aggressor forces have the capability of using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons against Landing Force units with collateral impact on nearby civilians. NBC attacks in SYN City would be catastrophic, and indigenous public health services would probably be unable to treat, hospitalize, or bury the resulting casualties.
- (3) Aggressor forces have the capability of contaminating all open sources of water within SYN City.

G-3-1

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

### c. Friendly Forces

- (1) <u>CG</u>, <u>FMFPAC</u>. Provides limited augmentation of VII MAF medical personnel upon request.
- (2) Commander, Theater Air Bases. Provides temporary emergency billeting and medical care at theater air bases (TABs) for any US citizens, third-country nationals, or AGGRESSORLAND citizens that are evacuated offshore from SYN City.
- d. Assumptions. None.

#### 2. MISSION

THE COURT OF THE PROPERTY OF T

VII MAF controls and supervises public health organizations and facilities in SYN City to preserve or restore the state of public health and to protect the health of VII MAF personnel, to fulfill obligations imposed by international law, and to further policies of the United States by obtaining essential civilian support.

#### 3. EXECUTION

### a. Concept of Operations

- (1) In preparing for defensive operations within SYN City, the patients, staff, and all movable supplies and equipment in the general hospital at E5.4-N10 on the SYN City base map will be relocated to temporary emergency locations. That hospital has a capacity of 350 beds, 12.5% of the total hospital beds in the city, but it is on the FEBA and its location is untenable.
- (2) Indigenous health and welfare agencies will be required to provide health services for the populace. VII MAF augmentation of local agencies will be restricted to cases where local capabilities are severely overloaded causing lifethreatening situations to exist for large numbers of civilian sick or injured.
- (3) Continuing efforts will be made on a priority basis to assure that local personnel provide adequate medical support for civilians and proper functioning of sanitation facilities.
- (4) Health service for internees, refugees, and evacuees will be provided by indigenous personnel insofar as possible.
- (5) During periods of active combat, all civilian movement outdoors will cease, and civilian casualty evacuation will be terminated until the tactical situation permits resumption of that service.

G-3-2

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

- (6) Indigenous medical personnel will be responsible for establishing field-expedient emergency medical facilities to accommodate the large overflow of civilian casualties that is expected. Local doctors, nurses, and corpsmen will accomplish all triage functions for civilian casualties and make appropriate determination of casualties for treatment, hospitalization, or interment by local services.
- (7) In the event, mass civilian casualties result from use of conventional weapons, civilian authorities will be responsible for preparing mass graves and interring the dead. VII MAF assets will be used to augment indigenous labor and equipment only if failure to do so will result in a serious threat to MAF operations or the health of MAF personnel and the general populace.
- (8) In the event mass civilian casualties result from the employment of NBC weapons, an immediate assessment will be made by CO, 4th CAG of the extent of the problem and the desired level of and requirement for VII MAF support of local authorities.
- (9) In the interest of maintaining a satisfactory state of health among the populace, continuing assessments will be made by VII MAF medical personnel to identify any significant shortfalls in civilian medical supplies that should be procured and provided in the MAF's self-interest.

## b. <u>Tasks and Responsibilities</u>

たいかいこと コンマススのは 単いないなったな 国のことにののなる 単なないない

- (1) 4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG)
  - (a) Administer VII MAF public health and welfare program.
  - (b) Coordinate the evacuation and relocation of the staff, patients, and equipment at General Hospital No. 5 (E5.4-N10 on the SYN City base map) within 24 hours.
  - (c) Estimate possible need for medical support and supplies for civilian agencies from VII MAF or higher authority assets.
  - (d) Plan for direction and control of public health administration.
  - (e) Direct implementation by local officials of water purification and other health and sanitary measures.
  - (f) Without delay, in coordination with local authorities and using VII MAF civil information assets, require the

local populace to store potable water in containers that can be sealed. Two gallons per person is considered to be the minimum quantity necessary to provide drinking and cooking water to cover the period required for emergency decontamination or delivery of fresh water supplies from offshore sources, such as desalinization equipment or water tankers.

- (g) Coordinate emergency medical treatment for civilians as required.
- (h) Screen officials and other personnel of public health agencies for suitability and remove or replace them as required.
- (i) On order, provide special emergency drug kits and basic medical equipment packages to meet immediate needs if local sources are inadequate. See Tab B (Health Support) to Appendix 3 (Public Health and Welfare) to reference (d).
- (j) Advise and assist indigenous health agencies in organizing and operating public health services to include conservation and employment of all resources.
- (k) Direct local hospital authorities to paint red crosses on the roof tops of all hospitals, clinics and other medical buildings and to display red cross flags at conspicuous places at ground level.
- (1) Estimate the impact of nuclear or chemical weapons casualties on indigenous public health resources and requirements for military supplement of resources.
- (m) Prepare plans for operating public health services under conditions of mass casualties, to include analysis of food and water supplies for contamination.

# (2) 7th Force Service Support Group

TOTAL PROPERTY CONTRACTOR CONTRAC

- (a) Be prepared to provide potable water, food, and medical support for an estimated 64,000 refugees and evacuees, and 1850 internees.
- (b) Be prepared to direct or support indigenous efforts to repair, maintain and operate medical and sanitation facilities and services.
- (c) Prepare plans for establishing emergency, field-expedient sanitation programs to include human waste

G-3-4

**UNC\_ASSIFIED** 

and garbage removal and interment of deceased civilians and animals.

- (d) Be prepared to direct civilian labor in establishing hasty shelters to serve as emergency public health facilities.
- (e) Be prepared to support the evacuation of General Hospital No. 5.

### c. Coordinating Instructions

CONTRACTOR INSCREDE INSCREDE TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

- (1) Keep this headquarters informed of the state of public health and health services and facilities. Report significant communicable diseases without delay.
- (2) Provide medical treatment to civilians only on an emergency basis within capabilities.
- (3) VII MAF medical units will <u>not</u> provide mass immunizations for civilians.
- (4) In the event of medical emergency, such as an epidemic, isolate and contain the affected group and request an immediate, on-the-spot, expert assessment from this headquarters (4th CAG).
- (5) Existing indigenous public health facilities and supplies will be used to the maximum extent feasible; other suitable local structures will be substituted when dedicated medical facilities are not available; hasty construction of temporary facilities may be undertaken, preferably using local labor, in emergency situations only.
- (6) Permanent records will be kept of all emergency medical treatment given to civilians and of any medical supplies provided to local public health service agencies.
- (7) If Aggressor forces penetrate the FEBA and threaten to overrun any of the indigenous clinics, hospitals, or temporary medical treatment facilities, no effort will be made to evacuate patients, staff, or equipment. All such facilities must be conspicuously identified as medical installations. Ground defenses will be oriented and conducted in such a way as not to endanger or induce an Aggressor attack against these installations.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Annex D (Logistics)
- b. Annex P (Combat Service Support)
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Annex J (Command Relations)
  - b. Annex K (Communications-Electronics)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

TAB:

A - SYN City Public Health Facilities

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.

Copy no.\_\_of\_\_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

TAB A (SYN City Public Health Facilities) to APPENDIX 3 (Public Health and Welfare) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

(b) Synthetic (SYN) City Information Book, August 1980 (c) Annex G (Civil Affairs) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone:

1. GENERAL. The following data are the most current available for public health facilities in SYN City.

<u>NO</u>	LOCATION	TYPE	CAPABILITIES
1	E11.3-N14.2	General hospital	300 beds; up to major surgery
2	E12.1-N12.8	Clinic	25 beds; primary outpatient; emergency treatment and temporary holding or overflow
3	E11.6-N11.4	Geriatric hospital	325 beds; up to major surgery
4	E11.3-N10.5	Psychiatric clinic	50 beds; primary outpatient; temporary holding
5	E5.4-N10	General hospital	350 beds; up to major surgery TO BE EVACUATED
6	E6.8-N8	Clinic	50 beds; primary outpatient; emergency treatment and temporary holding or overflow
7	E10.5-N7.6	Geriatric hospital	35 beds; outpatient and temporary care
8	E10-N7.2	General hospital	340 beds; up to major surgery; has a blood bank
9	E8.8-N7.3	Pediatric hospital	400 beds; up to major .urgery

G-3-A-1

10	E8.9-N6.6	Clinic	20 beds; outpatient; emergency treatment and temporary holding
11	E9.6-N6.5	General hospital	250 beds; up to major surgery
12	E8.5-N5.7	Naval hospital	500 beds; up to major surgery; has a blood bank
13	E7.8-N4.5	Psychiatric hospital	200 beds
14	E7.3-N3.5	Clinic	25 beds; outpatient; emergency treatment and temporary holding
15	E11.2-N3	Clinic	20 beds; outpatient; emergency treatment and temporary holding
16	E9.5-N7.4	Red Cross	Blood bank

#### 2. HOSPITAL SUPPORT

- a. The general hospitals have a full range of equipment and require no additional medical support in peacetime.
- b. Approximately 500 doctors and 1,200 nurses are affiliated with the hospitals and clinics, and most of them are currently performing their duties.
- c. 4th CAG is prepared to provide an emergency medical kit to local hospitals or DPRE assembly area clinics. A second kit is available for emergency airlift to VII MAF. Each kit is generally adequate to support 30,000 refugees for one month. These kits contain the following:
  - (1) Basic drug requirements to meet initial medical requirements of DPRE.
  - (2) Drug kit for hospital augmentation to be used in conjunction with basic drug requirements, above, by doctors and senior nurses.
  - (3) Refugee clinic equipment to be used in establishing a clinic or augmenting an existing facility.
- d. The medical supplies and equipment contained in these kits are described in Tab B (Health Support) to Appendix 3 (Public Health and Welfare) to reference (c).
- e. Vaccines and drugs for the control of certain communicable diseases have not been included in these kits. These diseases are either not present in SYN City or the national disease

G-3-A-2

control program in AGGRESSORLAND has conducted an effective program to eradicate or control them.

- f. When VII MAF medical personnel provide treatment or drugs to civilians, careful attention must be paid to adverse reactions, irritant factors, and special considerations for pregnant women, children, elderly persons, the undernourished, and those with renal or hepatic diseases. For drug usage, patients must be given clear instructions in their own language on how and when to use the drugs.
- 3. <u>REPORTS</u>. Units will report the following data through medical channels to this headquarters (4th CAG):
  - a. Any changes in status for the hostifials and olifies described above.
  - b. All cases in which VII MAF personnel are treated in civilian facilities.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.

G-3-A-3

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no.\_\_of \_\_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 5 (Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

(b) FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations

(c) MCP P12910.1, Use and Administration of Local Civilians in Foreign Areas During Hostilities

(d) VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

(e) FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons

(f) FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare

(g) FMFLANT Force Order P5080.2, SOP for Civil Affairs

Time Zone: F

Task Organization: Appendix 1 (Task Organization)


#### SITUATION

a. General. There are no indications that any displaced persons (DP), i.e., civilians who are involuntarily outside the national boundaries of their own countries, are present in or near SYN City. Deliberate evacuation (relocation) of several thousand additional civilians will be necessary in designated areas near the FEBA to prevent interference with VII MAF defensive operations.

#### b. Enemy

- (1) Civilian refugees and evacuees could refuse to cooperate with VII MAF units, thus requiring greater effort and commitment of personnel and equipment to administer an effective Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees (DPRE) program.
- (2) Local government officials and agencies are capable of resisting or failing to cooperate with VII MAF efforts to relocate and provide billeting subsistence, and other emergency support for refugees and evacuees.

GENERAL URBAN WARFARE AMPHIBIOUS LOGISTICS APPLICATIONS VOLUME 4 OPERATIO. (U) MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND QUANTICO VA DE. R J VEDHAN 23 JUN 83 BDM/M-82-306-TR F/G 15/7 AD-8133 165 4/6 UNCLASSIFIED NL



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

- (3) A small number of Aggressor military personnel continue to operate as snipers/sappers, and some have disguised themselves as civilians and infiltrated refugee/evacuee groups to incite dissension, disorder, and sabotage.
- (4) Aggressor military or civilian public utilities personnel who are currently cooperating with VII MAF are capable of interrupting, damaging, or destroying public utilities, potable water sources, and other features that are needed to provide support at refugee/evacuee collection points and assembly areas; these actions would result in increased demands for use of the limited VII MAF assets to comply with practical and humanitarian requirements.
- (5) If Aggressor forces penetrate the GOP and bring heavy firepower to bear on SYN City, the number of refugees within the city will increase markedly, possibly to the extent that VII MAF operations will be interferred with.
- (6) Use by Aggressor forces of NBC (CBR) weapons in or near SYN City can result in a level of military and civilian casualties that will exceed friendly capabilities to administer an effective CA/DPRE program.

### c. Friendly

- (1) There is no host-nation support available to VII MAF.
- (2) Local Red Cross and other relief agencies in SYN City may be expected to continue rendering emergency support to the populace within their limited capabilities.
- (3) CATF 51 supports out-of-country evacuation of DPRE if ordered by higher authority.
- (4) Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) provides relief supplies that are requested by CG VII MAF via unified command predominent user.
- (5) Commander, Theater Air Bases, provides temporary billeting and emergency medical support for US citizens, third-country nationals, and DPRE that are evacuated from SYN City.

### d. Assumptions

(1) That sufficient usable space will be available in local schools, churches, municipal buildings, hotels, apartment buildings, high-rise structures and other facilities to shelter the additional 30,500 civilians estimated to require evacuation.

- (2) That the entire population of SYN City, estimated to be about 250,000, will require food and emergency medical support from VII MAF through D+40.
- (3) That, except for individuals or small groups of agitators, the civilian population in SYN City will submit to VII MAF control measures in the interest of self-preservation and assured food supplies.
- (4) That approximately 128 short tons per day of food will be sufficient to provide a 1,500 calorie per day subsistence diet for the 250,000 civilians in SYN City through D+30 and an additional 270 short tons per day will be required thereafter.
- (5) That public and private wheeled transportation assets in SYN City will continue to be adequate to provide internal civilian transportation (freight hauling) to support the VII MAF-sponsored civilian-operated emergency food support program.
- (6) That civilian medical personnel, facilities, and supplies are sufficient to meet the basic medical requirements of refugees and evacuees through D+40, except in the event of NBC attacks.
- (7) That landing and unloading relief supplies will continue to be feasible despite 'me intensity of combat action.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF plans for and conducts DPRE operations to control the movement and activity of such persons to reduce or prevent civilian interference with VII MAF operations, evacuate specified areas pursuant to security requirements and military necessity, and fulfill obligations imposed by international law.

#### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Operations. Tab A (DPRE Plan).
  - (1) Any displaced persons (DP) that may be identified will be segregated from other civilians and their status determined to assure that appropriate steps are taken in handling, treating, or exploiting them for intelligence and PSYWAR purposes.
  - (2) Evacuation or relocation of civilians will be avoided whenever possible because it removes them from areas where they can best maintain themselves. It places the burden of

movement control and support on VII MAF, causes resentment, provides material for Aggressor propaganda, and increases the possibility of epidemics.

- (3) Evacuation/relocation of additional civilians required from designated areas along the FEBA, notably in the western suburbs and southern sector. All evacuations/ relocations, control of refugee/evacuee and other civilian movements will normally be accomplished by local police or other recognized government officials under VII MAF super-Civilians will be moved on foot in small, manageable groups to previously selected and prepared assembly areas that will serve as temporary camps. Nonambulatory persons and those for whom walking would be hazardous will be transported by locally awailable vehicles, using military vehicles only as a last resort. The maximum number of DPRE authorized at any one location or assembly area is 5,000, with actual numbers depending on the practical capacity and support capability of the structures(s) selected at each assembly area. DPRE will not be moved over routes needed for tactical maneuver or MSRs, nor will they be taken through or near sensitive military or command post areas. Secondary or trinary routes will be used.
- (4) Facilities selected as assembly areas include eight schools and selected public buildings on Old City peninsula, barracks in the naval station and high-rise buildings in New City. These will be prestocked with basic essential supplies immediately.
- (5) The populace will be informed to stay in place (standfast) or evacuate, as required, by loudspeaker, leaflet, posters, radio, and/or whatever is the best available means for disseminating that information to each neighborhood. Close coordination will be maintained between public affairs and civil affairs units in this conjunction.
- (6) During fluid situations, refugees will be billeted with the local population rather than moving them to collection points or assembly areas.
- (7) No civilian groups will be returned to previously evacuated areas without direct approval from this headquarters.
- (8) Construction of civilian billeting will <u>not</u> be undertaken by VII MAF. Existing structures will be used. Repairs or additions to those structures may be accomplished only by civilian labor using locally available materials.

### b. Tasks and Responsibilities

- (1) 4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG)
  - (a) Administer the VII MAF DPRE program.
  - (b) Maintain contact with SYN City government officials, in coordination with VII MAF ACofS, G-4, and plan and coordinate the establishment of food storage and distribution points and delivery of relief food supplies to the distribution points in SYN City. See Appendix 6 (Civil Affairs Logistics) to this annex. Note the changes in location required from those specified in Tab A (Storage/Distribution Overlay) to Appendix 6 (Food Storage/Distribution Points) to Annex G (Civil Affairs) to reference (d).
  - (c) Organize, direct, and supervise the establishment of civilian medical clinic support at or near all refugee/evacuee assembly areas.
  - (d) Organize, direct, and supervise a civilian-operated food distribution system.
  - (e) Prepare appropriate information bulletins, announcements, broadcasts, etc., to inform civilians to remain in place or to prepare for evacuation, as appropriate.
  - (f) Plan for the establishment of and select suitable additional refugee/evacuee assembly areas; select and train local civilians from the government and/or private or public welfare organizations as cadre for maximum self-administration of those areas.
  - (g) Plan for and supervise a program using selected SYN City officials and agencies, to collect food, blankets, and other survival supplies from evacuated areas, to be used for stocking new evacuee assembly areas.
  - (h) Supervise the establishment and stockage of refugee/ evacuee assembly areas with food, clothing, blankets, fuel, and medical supplies, as appropriate, using civilian and captured stock to the maximum.
  - (i) Provide military supervisory personnel at assembly areas as required.
  - (j) Coordinate with VII MAF ACofS, G-2, regarding intelligence-related activities of civil affairs personnel.

- (k) Coordinate and supervise the evacuation of civilians in accordance with Tab A (DPRE Plan).
- (2) Counterintelligence Group (CI Grp). Be prepared to screen DPRE at assembly areas to identify and exploit PWs, internees, disaffected civilians, and other potential intelligence targets.
- (3) 7th Mar Div (-) (Rein). Support evacuation of civilians from designated areas in accordance with Tab A (DPRE Plan).

### (4) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Prepare plans to support the evacuation and billeting of an estimated 30,500 evacuees in addition to the 34,000 already relocated.
- (b) In coordination with CO 4th CAG, establish and stock evacuee assembly areas in suitable structures in safe areas, using civilian supplies and captured stocks to the maximum degree.
- (c) In coordination with 4th CAG, maintain liaison with the local police and fire departments.
- (d) Be prepared to provide MP and limited motor transport support for evacuation operations, as required.

۵. ٦

- (e) Provide security for DPRE program.
- (f) Be prepared to provide potable water for refugee/ evacuee groups at a minimum of one quart per person per day, if required.
- (g) Plan for and establish check points to control refugee/evacuee movements.
- (h) Be prepared to provide limited medical support or augmentation to civilian medical institutions.
- (i) Screen DPRE and use appropriate persons for labor.

### c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) The fundamental rights of civilians, described in reference (e), will be protected.

- (2) Control of DPRE is a command problem in each TAOR and all other areas. Local police should be used to the maximum degree possible to exercise that control.
- (3) Unit commanders are obliged by the rules of international law to provide a minimum standard of humane care and treatment for civilians.
- (4) Refugees and evacuees will be prevented from blocking LOCs or otherwise interfering with VII MAF tactical or logistical operations, using discretionary force if necessary.
- (5) Refugees will be billeted, involuntarily if necessary, with other civilians, in public facilities that have basic accommodations, or at evacuee assembly areas if feasible.
- (6) Report CA emergencies to this headquarters by the most rapid means available.
- (7) Report all planned DPRE movements, to include date, time, route, number of civilians, security precautions, check points, and destination.
- (8) Report establishment and specific location of all DPRE checkpoints, collection points, and assembly areas.
- (9) Coordinate all DPRE movements on Traffic Control Net.
- (10) Civil affairs authority is delegated to commands having CA teams attached or in DS. Report unusual problems to this headquarters immediately.
- (11) DPREs will not be used for labor except as authorized herein. Requests for labor support to CG 7th FSSG.
- (12) DPRE will be encouraged to take with them a change of clothing blankets and whatever concentrated food supplies they may be able to carry on foot. No transportation will be allocated for moving baggage or other personal items.
- (13) Government officials or other community leaders or officials of voluntary agencies found among DPREs will be segregated and their identity, status, and location reported to this headquarters (4th CAG).

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Annex D (Logistics)
- b. Annex P (Combat Service Support)

### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. <u>Command</u>. Annex J (Command Relationships)
- b. <u>Signal</u>. Annex K (Communications-Electronics)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS

2.3

Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

TAB:

A - DPRE Plan

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City Map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981


TAB A (DPRE Plan) to APPENDIX 5 (Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000 (b) 4th CAG Civil Affaira Estimate of the Situation, dated 15 March 81 (Notal)

Time Zone: P

CHARLE WENDERS CARAGOS. BUREDES, GORGOS

1. EVACUATION REQUIRED. Evacuation/Relocation of the following civilians will be accomplished by 271800P May 81 for their protection and to clear the FEBA area for VII MAF forward defense area units:




ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

L.R. DAVID Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81



Copy no. of \_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 6 (Civil Affairs Logistics) to ANNEX G (Civil Affairs) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

Time Zone: P

#### 1. GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. The purpose of this appendix is to provide guidance for logistic support of the civilian population of SYN City. That support is necessary to prevent civilian interference with military operations, to meet humanitarian obligations, and to comply with international law.
- Situation. Major Aggressor forces are at a distance of about 150 km from SYN City and are converging on the city from the northwest and southeast. They are capable of reaching the area of the GOP within 48 hours, after which they will be able to interdict VII MAF logistic operations within the city and port area to an increasing degree. During the offensive phase of Operation BREAKER, approximately 34,000 evacuees and refugees were relocated from their homes to DPRE assembly areas that are An additional 30,500 (estimated) serving as temporary camps. civilians will have to be evacuated from the FEBA area The acute shortage of suitable storage space for Class V stocks may require even further evacuation from selected urban/suburban areas to provide sufficient ammunition storage space that will not endanger civilians. Because local food supplies are now virtually exhausted, the 64,500 evacuees that are or will be in assembly areas and the remaining 185,500 civilians in their residences will require food support and emergency medical assistance from VII MAF sources. SYN City governmental authorities and relief and welfare agencies have agreed to distribute food supplies to the population using available indigenous transportation.

### c. Concept of Logistic Support

(1) 'II MAF will provide food support, within capabilities, for an one remainder of the SYN City residents, a total of sree 250,000 persons, through D+40.

- (2) Local stocks, captured supplies, and suitable food stuffs remaining in homes and stores in evacuated areas will be used to the maximum degree possible.
- (3) Containerized and break bulk food provided for civilian consumption by DLA, and currently being unloaded, will be delivered to five storage and distribution sites by 7th FSSG. (Eight-five percent in northern sector, 15 percent in southern sector.)
- (4) The Chairmen of the SYN City Agriculture Commission and Health and Social Welfare Commission, assisted by the Division Chief of Transport and Municipal Works, will be responsible for providing the indigenous labor and transportation needed to unstuff and distribute to the populace the appropriate types and quantities of food. Local vehicles can carry loads from 1 to 15 tens; they cannot transport fully loaded standard containers. The Chairman of the District Council (Mayor) will coordinate these activities, and he is responsible to CG VII MAF for unstuffing containers, spotting supplies, and equitably distributing food and the emergency relief support to the populace.
- (5) The basis for issue will be rations for one week for each family unit. The first week's supply to be distributed by 271800 P May 82; organization and management of area and neighborhood sub-delivery systems will be the responsibility of the Chairman of the District Council.
- (6) Subsequent unloading and distribution of weekly ration supplies will be accomplished in a similar manner.
- (7) In the event that Aggressor artillery interdiction renders the main post area untenable for offloading civil affairs stocks, landing craft will be used during darkness or inclement weather to land the supplies in North River and over RED Beach in the North and South River in the southern sector.

## d. Resource Availability

- (1) An undetermined but minimal quantity of food, livestock and poultry is available among the civilian populace.
- (2) Approximately 2900 S/T of food in 170 containers, provided by DLA, are being offloaded and moved to CA storage/distribution sites. This amount constitutes a 1,500-calorie diet for 250,000 people for 21 days and allows 10 percent for loss or maldistribution.

- (3) Approximately 2,900 additional S/T of food are scheduled by DLA to arrive at SYN City on or about D+28. This amount constitutes a 3,200-calorie diet for 250,000 people for 10 days and allows for 10 percent loss or maldistribution.
- (4) Requirements for civilian food support beyond D+40 have been established by follow-on forces, and these supplies may be made available to VII MAF distribution if follow-on forces have not assumed responsibility for CA by D+40.
- (5) Sufficient potable water is available to meet projected needs except in the event of major contamination of water sources. See paragraph 3b.(2) of this annex and Appendix 3 (Public Health and Welfare) to this annex.
- (6) Medical supplies in civilian hospitals and clinics are believed to be adequate for 30 days in most categories.
- (7) Two emergency kits, each sufficient to provide for 30,000 refugees for one month, are available to augment indigenous supplies.

### e. <u>Planning Factors</u>

- (1) The basic daily subsistence diet for civilians for the period D+10 to D+30 was computed at 6.3 megajoules (MJ), which is equivalent to 1,500 kilocalories, commonly referred to as calories.
- (2) The maintenance diet for civilians for the period D+31 to D+40 was computed at 13.4 MJ or 3,200 calories.
- (3) The standard container has an inside volume of 1,063 cubic feet. The average density of day Class I stock is 33 lbs./ft.<sup>3</sup>. The average container will hold 17.5 S/T of food. (CH-53E helicopters will not lift a container that holds more than 13 S/T of any supply commodity.)
- (4) Emergency water rations were computed at one quart per person per day.
- f. Responsibilities. All CA support responsibilities for staff agencies and commands of VII MF are assigned in Annex G (Civil Affairs) to this OPLAN and Appendices 2 (Public Safety), 3 (Public Health and Welfare), and 5 (Displace Persons, Refugees and Evacuees) to Annex G.

### 2. SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. <u>Supply</u>. 7th FSSG will deliver food relief supplies to the five storage/distribution sites described below:

### (1) North of South River

Number	Location	Population* Served
1	Old City - Quadrangle (Ell.5-N10.5)	47,000
2	N. Central Peninsula - Soccer Field (E9.8-N15.1)	34,000
3	Central Suburbs** (E7.3-N.98)	78,000
4	New City Pier (E9-N6)	52,380

### (2) South of South River

Number	Location	Population* Served
5	Naval Station Warehouse** (E8.5-N5.2)	38,620

- \* Reflects relocation of 64,500 DPRE.
- \*\* Location changed from OPLAN 1-81. \*
  - b. <u>Distribution</u>. The Chairman of the District Council will arrange for subordinate breakdown and distribution points on an area or neighborhood basis and will direct and control distribution to the populace using indigenous labor and transportation.
  - c. Level of Supply. The level of supply is constrained by the resource availability described in paragraph l.d. above; i.e., 1,500 calories per person per day through D+30 and 3,200 calories per person per day from D+31 through D+40.
  - d. <u>Local Procurement</u>. No significant quantities of processed food are available for local purchase. The Food and Agriculture Augmentation team with 4th CAG is arranging to purchase and move into SYN City as much healthy livestock, poultry, and marketable farm produce as can be procured before defensive combat begins. The foodstuffs are intended for civilian consumption only.

- e. <u>POL</u>. Local POL stocks are sufficient to meet the near-term needs of public health and safety agencies and the civilian-managed food distribution program.
- f. Mortuary Services. See Appendix 3 (Public Health and Welfare) to this annex.
- 3. MEDICAL SERVICES. See Appendix 3 (Public Health and Welfare) to this annex.

#### 4. MOBILITY AND TRANSPORTATION

### a. <u>General</u>

A TORREST CONTRACT FOR THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO

- (1) VII MAF mobility assets are adequate to support the CA program.
- (2) Indigenous mobility assets consist of 25 buses and 200 trucks ranging from 1 to 15-ton capacity. Twenty-six 5-ton truck equivalents will be required to lift one day's civilian 1,500-calorie ration. Delivering a week's ration per family for all inhabitants in a single day, as is planned, will require nearly three trips by each vehicle if one half of the civilian trucks available are used for this purpose.

### b. Movement Feasibility

- (1) Vehicles used in the civilian food relief program will use tertiary and secondary roads whenever possbile.
- (2) Movement within the city is currently feasible in all sectors, although several secondary and tertiary roads are blocked by craters or rubble in some areas.
- (3) During periods of heavy fighting along the FEBA, and when Aggressor artillery directs heavy H&I fires into the city, movement will be restricted and hazardous in areas that reunder fire. Local police have been tasked to provide information to the Chairman of the District Council and his sbordinates, via Police Central, concerning hazardous travel conditions and any rerouting that might be required.
- (4) Storage/Distribution Sites 2, 4, and 5 are accessible by river, and S/D Site 1 is accessible over RED Beach. S/D Site 3 requires overland support from NEW City, S/D Site 4 or from an alternate site (to be selected) on the right (west) bank of North River.
- (5) Movement of civilian food relief vehicles will not be conducted when the tactical situation makes such movement

unacceptably dangerous. A determination of "unacceptable danger" can be made by the Chairman of the District Council or, in specific areas, by local VII MAF unit commanders.

### c. VII MAF Support

- (1) CO, 4th CAG will provide overall guidance and supervision of the food and emergency supply distribution program.
- (2) Requirements for MHE or transportation support of civil agencies will be determined by CG, 7th FSSG.
- (3) All convoy movements will be coordinated with the Traffic Control Center.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

تستا

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_ of \_\_ of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

ANNEX J (Command Relationships) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

(b) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Operations (Constructive)

(c) Annex J (Command Relationships) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

### GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To describe the command relationships between Commander, US Seventh Fleet and Commanding General, VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force.
- b. <u>Scope</u>. This annex establishes the command relationships pertaining to VII MAF operations in AGGRESSORLAND.
- c. <u>Effective Date</u>. The command relationships described herein are effective 250830P.

#### 2. COMMAND LINES

#### a. External Command Relationships

- (1) Under the direction of Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) through Commander in Chief, Pacific-Fleet, COM7THFLT exercises operational control of VII MAF until the defensive operations in SYN City have been completed and responsibility for operations and OPCON of forces in Southern AGGRESSORLAND are passed to the Commanding General of Follow-On Forces.
- (2) CG, Follow-On Forces will exercise OPCON of all US forces in southern AGGRESSORLAND commencing on or about D+45.
- (3) CINCPAC will direct the transfer of OPCON of designated augmentation forces from PACOM component commanders to COM7THFLT or CG, VII MAF as required.
- (4) CG, FMFPAC will direct the transfer of OPCON of designed FMF units to CG, VII MAF as requested, within capabilities.

### b. Command Relationships Within VII MAF

- (1) Ground Combat Element. CG, 7th MARDIV commands the Ground Combat Element, which is comprised of the composite 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein). The 1st Tank Battalion and the 1st BN 2nd Marines (-) (Rein) are VII MAF Reserve initially. All other units assigned to 7th MARDIV and the 2nd Tank Bn remain under the command of CG, 7th MARDIV.
- Aviation Combat Element. CG, 7th Marine Aircraft Wing commands the Aviation Combat Element, which is comprised of the composite 7th MAW. All units and personnel assigned to 7th MAW are under command of the CG, 7th MAW from the activation of VII MAF until detached by order of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Selected helicopter, fixed-wing, and support squadrons were withdrawn from VII MAF after SYN City was consolidated. The ACE consists of 7th MAW (Forward) in or near SYN City and 7th MAW (Rear) at Theater Air Bases (TABs). The Assistant Wing Commander, 7th MAW, has command authority over units assigned to 7th MAW (Rear) in accordance with the specific delegation made by CG, 7th MAW.
- (3) Combat Service Support Flement. CG, 7th Force Service Support Group commands the Combat Service Support Element, which is comprised of the composite 7th FSSG. All units and personnel assigned to the 7th FSSG are under command of the CG, 7th FSSG until detached by order of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Additional MP units and personnel will be transferred to the OPCON of 7th FSSG by CG, FMFPAC.

### 3. SUPPORT AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS

- a. <u>Supporting Military Forces</u>
  - (1) Amphibious Task Force 51. TF 51 will support VII MAF with assets as available. NGF support ships will report to SFCPs in accordance with established procedures and will provide direct and general support until such time as the ships are withdrawn by the Fleet Commander for other missions. VII MAF commands will be notified when any changes in support relationships occur.
  - (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57). TF 57 provides air support to ATF 51 and VII MAF during Operation BREAKER SIX. Deep support air operations will be coordinated through VII MAF DASC. TF 57 aircraft providing close support will report to the DASC upon entering and leaving the designated air spaces in accordance with ANNEX M (Air Operations). TF 51 TADC directs the seaward extension of air defense operations.

### b. <u>Coordinating Authorities</u>

- (1) CG 7th MAW is responsible for coordinating base support arrangements to accommodate 7th MAW (Rear). This responsibility includes arrangement for Military Airlift Command support for deploying personnel and cargo to theater airbases (TABs) for forwarding to VII MAF. Arrangements for logistic support will be made by CG, 7th FSSG in accordance with requirements established by CG, 7th MAW.
- (2) CO 1st Tank Battalion is responsible for preparing plans for mobile defensive operations using a mechanized combined arms task force (MCATF) as the Strike Force. For this purpose, during the planning phase, CO, 1st Tank Battalion has coordinating authority over 1st Bn 2nd Mar and an AAV Company, to be designed by CO, 1st AAV Bn. Upon activation of the MCATF, the artillery battery normally in DS of 1/2 will be directed to provide DS to the TF. Regularly assigned FO teams with 1/2 will call fires.

### c. Supporting Agencies

- (1) Military Aircraft Command (MAC) will provide airlift for designated personnel, supplies and equipment from present bases to theater airbases (TABs). In addition, MAC will provide aero medevac services to theater/CONUS hospitals from TABs. Direct liaison is authorized between CG, 7th MAW, CG, 7th FSSG and CG, 315th Air Division, MAC, for planning and executing these deployments and services.
- (2) Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) will arrange for delivery of VII MAF bulk fuel requirements to the AOA and theater airbases. CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate fuel requirements with COM DFSC.
- (3) USAF Base Commanders at TABs will support MAC operations on behalf of VII MAF, and will provide host-base support, including billeting, for 7th MAW Rear. CG, 7th MAW/AWC, 7th MAW are authorized direct liaision with host-base commanders for purposes of arranging for and implementing formal support agreements.
- d. <u>Interservice Support Agreements</u>. The PACOM Planning Directive specifies the areas and degrees of interservice cooperation and support that will be required. The Chief of Staff, US Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with the concurrence of CINCPAC, have agreed on the nature and extent of USAF host-unit support to be provided to 7th MAW units.

e. Coordination with Diplomatic Agencies. A senior official from the Office of the Political Advisor (POLAD) of PACOM has been reassigned from the staff of CATF 51 to VII MAF staff as political advisor for the duration of Operation BREAKER SIX. The POLAD will function as a member of the VII MAF special staff and, subject to the approval of CG, VII MAF, will represent VII MAF in communications that may be necessary with diplomatic agencies.

## 4. RELATIONSHIPS WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMANDS AND ORGANIZATIONS

- a. VII MAF will not establish any direct relationships with any international commands or organizations. All such relationships are the province of the unified command. No commands or organizations other than those of the Aggressor Republic are expected to be encountered in the battle area.
- b. Under the direction of CG, VII MAF, the political advisor (POLAD) will prepare any politico-diplomatic communications or liaison that may be required between the VII MAF, COM7THFLT, the unified command, and international commands and organizations.
- c. Proclamations that may be required to set forth to the populace within the area the basis for authority of CG, VII MAF and the obligations, liabilities, rights and duties of the population affected will be prepared by CO, 4th CAG, with the advice and assistance of the POLAD, for promulgation by CG, VII MAF.

d. Subordinate commands of VII MAF will not engage in any relationships with international commands and organizations unless specifically authorized to do so by CG, VII MAF.

### 5. PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS

- a. Supporting plans to VII MAF Operation Plan 6-81 (Operation BREAKER SIX) will be prepared by CG, 7th MARDIV, CG, 7th FSSG (-) (Rein), and CO, 1st Tank Bn.
- b. Direct liaison is authorized between the foregoing commands for planning purposes.
- c. Coordinating authority is specified in paragraphs 3.b, above.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff


### APPENDIX:

1 - Command Relationships Diagram

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Command Relationships Diagram) to ANNEX J (Command Relationships) to Operation Plan 6-81



BY COMMAND LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_of \_\_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ANNEX K (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 10-1, Communications

(c) 7th Communication Bn OPLAN 1-81 (Constructive)

(d) 7th Communication Bn OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive)

(e) Annex K (Communications-Electronics) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

(f) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Communications-Electronics

Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

A STATE OF STATE STATE OF STAT

a. <u>Purpose</u>. To provide instructions and detailed tasking to VII MAF communication elements for the relocation, installation, operation, and maintenance of communications and electronic systems to support Operation BREAKER SIX.

## b. Situation

## (1) Enemy Forces

- (a) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (b) Aggressor Forces have the capability to:
  - Conduct signal intelligence and electronic warfare. Capabilities include jamming or interfering with radar, navigational aids, and a broad range of tactical and non-tactical communications circuits.
  - Degrade, deny, or use indigenous telecommunication systems and terminals to their advantage.
  - Develop EOB information from plain language traffic and/or extended duration traffic.

## (2) Friendly Forces

(a) See Annex A (Task Organization).

- (b) The 7th Communication and Radio Battalions will provide for communication and special intelligence communication guard within the MAF area of influence. Special intelligence communication guard requirements for MAF liaison elements embarked aboard remaining TF 51 shipping will be provided by CATF 51.
- (c) The Defense Communication Agency (DCA) will provide or arrange for DCS entry facilities at the TAB for elements of VII MAF and heavy tropospheric connectivity, SHF tropospheric connectivity, and satellite connectivity for follow-on forces arriving in southern Aggressorland as directed. Each of the major subordinate elements of VII MAF will maintain DCS circuitry with assistance provided by 7th Comm. Bn. as required; i.e., 7th MARDIV, 7th MAW, 7th FSSG, MAF Hgs.
- (3) Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).
- Assumptions. None.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of the 7th Comm Bn and Communications-Electronics (CE) units within subordinate commands will install, operate, and maintain C-E circuits and equipment to facilitate  ${\sf C}^3$  operations in support of forces defending the MAF area of influence.

**C** 

#### 3. EXECUTION

Geed Golden Wilder 2004 D. Wilderstand A. 1888

a. <u>Guiding Principles</u>. Communications security procedures and assets will be employed to the maximum extent feasible and in accordance with provisions contained in references (d and f) and this annex.

#### b. Operational Concept

- (1) C-E systems established during the assault phase of MAF operations in southern Aggressorland remain intact and will be maintained in accordance with unit SOPs and provisions contained in reference (e).
- (2) A number of subordinate commands will be redeployed to locations within the forward defense area. Organic communications circuits within these commands will be established with emphasis placed on parallel, redundant paths and

diverse routing to counter the hostile ECM threat. Air and vehicular messenger services will be rerouted to accommodate the requirements of units that have been redeployed.

### c. Tasks and Responsibilities

### (1) 7th Communication Battalion

- (a) Operate and maintain circuitry for the MAF headquarters element and maintain communication systems established during assault operations in accordance with provisions contained in references (c, e, and f) and this annex.
- (b) Be prepared to replace or augment subordinate communication facilities that have become casualties and provide special communication support to 7th MARDIV as required.
- (c) Be prepared to provide equipment and operators to elements of the Radio Bn to facilitate the implementation of the deception plan.

### (2) 7th MARDIV

- (a) Install, operate, and maintain communication facilities in accordance with provisions contained in references (c-f) and this annex.
- (b) Be prepared to assume communication control and provide communication support to subordinate elements of VII MAF in the event the MAF CP becomes a casualty.

## (3) 7th MAW (Forward)

CONTRACTOR DESCRIPTION (DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PRO

- (a) Maintain established communications facilities at each of the airfields for as long as they are tenable and in accordance with reference (d) and this annex.
- (b) Be prepared to establish communication circuitry within each of the V/STOL forward operating sites in the event that each of the airfields become untenable.
- (c) Be prepared to provide airborne retransmission platforms to support GOP forces and coordinate flights with 1st Force Recon Co for the retransmission of traffic from distant RAOs to this Headquarters.

- (d) Be prepared to provide air messenger service as required in accordance with this annex and Annex M (Air Operations).
- (4) 7th FSSG. Maintain existing communications circuitry in accordance with organizational directives, references (c-f), and this annex.
- (5) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company
  - (a) Utilize organic equipment and establish required nets within RAOs in accordance with unit SOP, instructions promulgated in current COIs, and this annex.
  - (b) Coordinate with elements of 7th MAW, scheduled retrans overflights of the major approach corridors.
- (6) GOP Forces (TFs A and B). Utilize organic equipment and establish required nets within the security zone in accordance with unit SOP, current COIs, and this annex.
- (7) 7th Radio Battalion
  - (a) Continue to provide special security communications center operations support to all subordinate commands within the MAF area of influence.
  - (b) Be prepared to coordinate with elements of the 7th Comm Bn, the transmission of traffic in support of deception operations and in accordance with unit SOP and this annex.
- (8) Naval Gunfire Communications. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations) and Appendix 2 (Radio Circuit Plan) to reference (d).
- (9) <u>Air Operations Communications</u>. See Appendix 8 (Air Communications) to Annex M (Air Operations) to 7th MAW OPLAN 6-81 and Appendix 2 (Radio Circuit Plan) to reference (d).
- (10) Artillery Communications. See Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations) and Appendix 2 (Radio Circuit Plan) to reference (d).

## d. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>

(1) <u>Communications Security</u>. See Appendix 1 (Communications Security).

- (2) Radio. See Appendix 1 (Communications Security and Appendix 2 (Radio Circuit Plan) to reference (d).
- (3) <u>Call Signs and Routing Indicators</u>. See Appendix 3 (Radio Call Signs and Routing Indicators) to reference (d).
- (4) <u>TECCON/SYSCON</u>. See Appendix 5 (System Management and Control) to reference (d).
- (5) Wire/Multichannel.
  - (a) MUX displacements will be coordinated by this headquarters.
  - (b) Additional MUX frequency pairs will be provided by this headquarters upon request.
  - (c) Switching central service will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in references (d and f).
  - (d) See Appendix 4 (Wire and Multichannel Radio Plan) to reference (d).
- (6) Messenger Service.
  - (a) Liaison officers or other visitors to the MAF CP will coordinate message delivery or pick-up with the Comm. Center, 7th Comm. Bn.
  - (b) See Appendix 6 (Messenger Service) to reference (d).
- (7) <u>Visual and Sound</u>. See Appendix 7 (Visual and Sound) to reference (d).
- (8) Communications Center

のである。これは、これのではないできない。これでは、これのないのでは、これには、これにはないでは、これではないできない。

- (a) Conduct operations in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f) and Appendix 1 (Communications Security).
- (b) Communication shift messages will be provided for in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).
- (9) <u>Safety</u>. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).
- (10) Subordinate commands will submit restoration priorities to this headquarters in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).

(11) ZULU time will be used on all DCA messages and PAPA time will be used on all internal MAF messages.

### 4. SPECIAL MEASURES

- a. Daily changes in call signs and frequencies on all circuits will be used to enhance operational security and will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).
- b. Burst transmission techniques will be employed to the maximum degree possible within the MAF area of influence to degrade the enemy's capability to conduct ECM operations.
- c. Use of indigenous telecommunication systems is authorized within each assigned defensive sector as a backup to wire and multichannel radio assets, however, these systems will be vulnerable to interception and interdiction. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).

### 5. LOGISTICS

- a. See Annex D (Logistics) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- b. Intermediate level maintenance will be provided at each CSSA in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e) and from the ISPs once established.

#### 6. ADMINISTRATION

- a. Reports. Submitted in accordance with reference (f) and Annex of (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81.
- b. Command Posts. See Operation Plan 6-81.
- c. All subordinate commands that have been redeployed will report the location of their CP once established in the forward defense area.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

£ ...

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### APPENDIX:

THE REPORT OF THE PROPERTY OF

1 - Communications Security

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Communications Security) to ANNEX K (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FM 24-1, Combat Communications

(b) FMFM 10-1, Communications

(c) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Communications Security (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To set forth general policy and procedures for physical, cryptographic, transmission, and emissions security measures.
- b. <u>Concept</u>. Communication security is both a command responsibility and an individual responsibility. Unit commanders will ensure that subordinates adhere to proper radio-telephone procedures as set forth in unit SOP and current COI. All national correspondents and other members of the news media will be referred to the MAF Public Affairs Officer and his designated representatives while covering the events occurring within the MAF area of influence. Special intelligence and conventional communications guard will be provided for by elements of the Radic Bn and 7th Comm Bn respectively.

#### POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

a. General Guidance. Unit commanders will enforce communications security (COMSEC) measures in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c), operational directives, an: adhere to regulations and guidelines as set forth in the current edition of CMS-4 and KAG-1.

#### b. Specific Guidance

- (1) Physical Security
  - (a) Mobile/Tactical Communications Centers, Automatic Switches, TECH-CONFACs, and CMCCs
    - Mobile/tactical communication centers, automatic switches, technical control facilities and

classified material control centers must be guarded until the termination of the operation and subsequent return of units to parent organizations in CONUS.

- Commanders will ensure that when a facility is in operation and keying material, classified documents, and other cryptographic material is stored within a facility, guards are cleared with the commensurate level of security clearance. Security guards may not be authorized access to the information unless controlled emergency destruction or safeguarding procedures are implemented.
- When classified documents and cryptographic material are secured in approved containers, armed guards need not be cleared provided that cleared personnel are readily accessible to implement emergency destruction or safeguarding procedures as established in unit SOP's.
- All communications emmitters and receivers will be afforded protection to eliminate the possibility of damage or sabotage.

#### (b) Aircraft

- Elements of cryptographic keys, codes, authenticators, and one-time pads and tapes will be required to complete designated airborne missions. Aircraft, squadron, and group commanders will ensure that the amount of classified/crypto-sensitive material aboard each aircraft or afforded to each unit does not exceed that which is specified in current letters of promulgation.
- Aircraft missions requiring quantities of classified/crypto-sensitive material in excess of amounts as specified in letters of promulgation will require special procedures, as set forth in reference (c), to be implemented by appropriate commanders and upon authorization of CG, 7th MAW.

#### (c) <u>Safeguards</u>

- COMSEC material, unless otherwise directed, will be destroyed after use or supercession.
- All operational communications security material will be covered and/or concealed to the maxi-

extent feasible to eliminate the possibility of compromise by the occasional or accidental viewing by personnel without a commensurate level of security clearance.

Theater-based air operations will require the use of COMSEC material in the presence of allied host nation personnel. Necessity may dictate the external viewing of COMSEC equipment by allied personnel; however, they will not be afforded the opportunity for detailed examinations of keys, supporting documents, or internal components of classified equipment.

#### (2) Cryptosecurity

- (a) All cryptographic codes, ciphering devices, and equipment designed to encrypt or decrypt messages will be marked CRYPTO and afforded physical security measures in accordance with provisions contained in this appendix and reference (c).
- (b) In addition to the CRYPTO marking, all one-time pads, rotors, key lists, key cards, and punches will bear an orange stripe.
- (c) Unit commanders will limit the holdings of keys and associated equipment and material within the objective area making maximum use of authorized extracts as specified in applicable letters of promulgation.
- (d) The handling of cryptosecurity material will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in current editions of KAG-1, CSPM-1, CMS-4, and reference (c).

### (3) <u>Transmission Security</u>

- (a) Strict circuit disipline and adherence to doctrinal procedures will be enforced to the maximum extent by all CEOs and unit commanders.
- (b) The following control measures will be utilized over radio circuits:
  - Prohibition of unauthorized transmissions and excessive testing.

- Strict employment of authentication systems to determine or verify authenticity of transmitting stations or traffic.
- Employment of jam-breaking doctrinal procedure to work through electronic attacks and reduce the vulnerability of other frequencies and channels.
- 4 Use of changing call signs and frequencies at scheduled times and as authorized by unit commanders.
- (c) Doctrinal communication procedure must be adhered to in the use of wire, telephone, and telegraph communication circuits. While unit commanders ensure wire multichannel radio equipment and stations are afforded protection, circuits remain vulnerable to line degradation or exploitation by enemy committed forces. Circuits are most vulnerable when augmenting channels by utilizing indigenous telecommunication means with compatible parameters. Reference (c) applies.

### (4) Emission Security

- (a) While in operation, communication and other information handling equipment will emit unintentional and possibly compromising information. Emission propagation will vary from limited in very heavily congested urban centers to extensive propagation in the more open suburban areas within SYN City. Committed Aggressor forces will be able to intercept and analyze information obtained from emanations of MAF communications equipment in proximity to all defending unit concentrations.
- (b) Unit commanders will ensure that strict transmission discipline and adherence to doctrinal procedure is maintained in accordance with provisions contained in current editions of KAG-1 and OPNAVINST's 05510.93 and 05510.82.
- (c) COMSEC monitoring and assistance will be afforded to unit commanders by elements of the Radio Battalion, upon request and as directed by this headquarters, to aid in securing transmissions and emanations from communication equipment and manipulative deception operations in support of tactical and/or logistical operations.

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### TABS:

- A BEADWINDOW Procedures (Omitted)
- B GINGERBREAD Procedures (Omitted)
- C COMSEC Keying Materials and Systems (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ANNEX M (Air Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation

(c) FMFM 5-3, Assault Support

(d) FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support

(e) FMFM 5-5, Antiair Warfare

(f) Annex M (Air Operations) to 7th MAW OPLAN 6-81

Time Zone: P

#### SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence) and current INTSUMS.
- b. <u>Friendly Forces</u>. Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) will continue to provide deep airstrike, CAP, and fleet air defense support to VII MAF until the termination of defensive operations in southern Aggressorland.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

#### 2. MISSION

7th Marine Aircraft Wing will conduct air defense and anti-air warfare operations and CAS and deep air support missions in support of defensive operations being conducted by VII MAF in southern Aggressorland.

#### 3. EXECUTION

The 7th MAW will continue to be Concept of Air Operations. divided between units operating out of the MAF area of influence, 7th MAW (Forward), and units operating from the TAB, 7th MAW 7th MAW (Forward) is comprised of essential command and (Rear). control agencies, helicopter MAGs/squadrons, two of the three VTOL (Harrier) squadrons, one fixed wing attack MAG, the 2nd LAAM Bn., and the 1st FAAD Btry. These units will support defensive operations in southern Aggressorland until such time as the airfields become untenable. In the event that Aggressor forces are able to damage the airfields and disrupt existing ALOCs, all of the fixed-wing MAG, less VTOL squadrons, and the majority of medium and heavy-lift helicopter squadrons will be redeployed to the TAB. remaining in SYN City Units will

defensive operations from dispersed forward operating sites within the urban and suburban areas of the city. Theater-Based Aviation includes the remainder of 7th MAW operating from the TAB which is located 170 NM from SYN City. Elements of 7th MAW will initially concentrate on conducting deep air strikes to destroy Aggressor NBC weapon delivery systems, attack mechanized force concentrations, attack Aggressor air defense installations and units and defend the vital area with all available aircraft and If Aggressor forces are successful in penetrating SAM support. the GOPL, emphasis will shift to conducting on-call air strike missions and missions against targets of opportunity within the security zone to facilitate delaying actions by the MCATFs and to cover the MCATF retrograde to positions within the forward defense area. Thereafter, and until the termination of defensive operations, all available attack aircraft will assist in the defense of the FEBA by conduct air strikes against Aggressor force concentrations and penetrations of the FEBA.

- b. <u>Air Defense/Antiair Warfare</u>. See Appendix 1 (Air Defense/Antiair Warfare).
- c. <u>Air Support</u>. See Appendix 2 (Air Support) and Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations).
- d. <u>Air Reconnaissance</u>. See Appendix 11 (Surveillance and Reconnaissance Plan) to Annex B (Intelligence).
- e. <u>Assault Support</u>. See Appendix 3 (Assault Support) to reference (f).
- f. <u>Air Control</u>. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).
- g. <u>Search and Rescue</u>. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).
- h. <u>Electronic Warfare</u>. See Appendix 3 (Electronic Warfare) to Annex C (Operations).
- i. Armament. Reference (f) applies.
- j. <u>Aircraft Schedules</u>. Reference (f) applies.
- k. Coordinating Instruction

THE REPORT OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF

(1) Requests for preplanned direct air support will continue to be submitted to the TACC/DACSs by 2000 daily; emergency requests through TACPs as required.

- (2) The FSCL has been established by CG, 7th MARDIV and is shown in TAB A (Air Fire Plan) to Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations).
- (3) Aircraft operating out of the TAB report in and out to TACC/TAOC upon entering and departing controlled airspace within the MAF area of influence.
- (4) See Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations).
- (5) Procedures for the employment of nuclear weapons are contained in Appendix 1 (Nuclear Operations) and Tab J (Nuclear Fire Plan) to Annex C (Operations).
- (6) Direct authority for CAS remains vested in the DASC.
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex D (Logistics), Annex E (Personnel), and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Command
    - (1) See Annex J (Command Relationships).
    - (2) Control Agencies will be located in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).
  - b. Signal. See Appendix 8 (Air Communications) to reference (f).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### APPENDIXES:

- 1 Air Defense/Antiair Warfare
- 2 Air Support
- 3 Assault Support (Omitted)
- 4 Air Control (Omitted)
- 5 Search and Rescue (Omitted)
- 6 Armament (Omitted)
- 7 Aircraft Schedules (Omitted)
- 8 Air Communications (Omitted)
- 9 Air Operations Overlay (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Air Defense/Antiair Warfare) to ANNEX M (Air Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation

- (b) FMFM 5-5, Antiair Warfare
- (c) CTF 57 OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive)
- (d) Annex M (Air Operations) to 7th MAW OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive) (e) Annex M (Air Operations) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81
- VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Air Defense/AAW (Con-

Time Zone: P

#### ١. SITUATION

- Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. Attack Carrier Striking Force (CTF 57) conducts anti-air and fleet air defense operations until the termination of Operation BREAKER SIX.
- Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization). С.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of 7th MAW will conduct both active and passive air defense and antiair warfare to achieve and maintain air superiority within the MAF area of influence.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. Elements of 7th MAW, operating from both installations within SYN City and from the TAB, will continue to conduct deep airstrikes againt Aggressor force concentrations, NBC weapon delivery systems, and air defense systems throughout the period of defensive operations. Attack Carrier Striking Force (CTF 57) will conduct anti-air and fleet air defense operations in support of ATF units remaining near southern Aggressorland and VII MAF. The landward extension of the MAF AAW destruction area will continue to be in trace of the FBHL/GOPL while the vital area has been extended to the FEBA to provide a degree of protection to the forward defense area strongpoints and the ISPs.

### b. Tasks and Responsibilities

#### (1) All\_Units

- (a) Unit commanders will disperse tactical and CSS units and equipment and will make maximum use of building spaces to provide a degree of protection, cover, and concealment from hostile observation and fires.
- (b) Units will deploy additional air guards to provide early warning and identification of enemy aircraft as required.

### (2) 7th MAW (Forward)

- (a) Be prepared to relocate ASRT and LAAM Bn units as required to provide medium altitude air defense protection to MCATF forces operating within and beyond the security zone.
- (b) Be prepared to relocate ASRT and LAAM Bn units as required to protect the vital area in the event that Aggressor ACEs are successful in penetrating the MAF AAW envelopes near the FBHL/GOPL and are successful in interdicting SLOCs.

t: :

(3) 7th MAW (Rear). Conduct Air Defense/AAW operations in coordination with and in addition to missions conducted by elements of 7th MAW Forward and CTF 57 as directed by CG, 7th MAW.

### c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) AAW procedures. See Appendix 1 (Antiair Warfare) to Annex M (Air Operations) to references (c) and (d).
- (2) Air raid warnings. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in (f).
- (3) Aircraft conditions of readiness. In accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).
- (4) Antiaircraft missile control conditions. In accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).
- (5) Air traffic control procedures. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in references (d) and (f).
- (6) Antiair warfare operations sketch. See Appendix 1 (Antiair Warfare) to reference (d).

- (7) Sectors of responsibility and locations of AAW means overlay. See Appendix 1 (Antiair Warfare) to reference (d).
- (8) Antiaircraft missile and aircraft coordinating procedures. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in references (c) and (d).
- (9) Electronic emission control, countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures. Conducted in accordance with provisions contained in references (c) and (d) and Appendix 3 (Electronic Warfare) to Annex C (Operations).
- 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. See Annex D (Logistics), Annex E (Personnel), and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
  - a. Command. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
  - b. Signal. See Appendix 8 (Air Communications) to reference (d).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 2 (Air Support) to ANNEX M (Air Operations) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation

(b) FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support

(c) Annex M (Air Operations) to VII MAW OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive)

(d) CTF 57 OPLAN 6-81 (Constructive)

(e) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Tactical Air Control (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

- 1. GENERAL. The purpose of this appendix is to set forth procedures to be employed by elements of VII MAF in requesting and controlling aircraft in the conduct of airstrike missions and on call air fires.
- 2. CONCEPT. Close Air Support (CAS) during the period of defensive operations in southern Aggressorland will be provided by elements of 7th MAW (Forward), 7th MAW (Rear), and CTF 57. Initially, CAS missions will be controlled by the TACC from command and control facilities established ashore during assault operations. In the event that the TACC becomes a casualty and control within the MAF area of influence cannot be maintained as a result of heavy combat action within the city, the TADC aboard LCC 19 will become the TACC and overall control of air support will revert to the TACC afloat. The TACC will determine the exact number of sorties that will be flown within the MAF area of influence and specific details concerning preplanned defensive air support are contained Appendix 12 (Fire Support) to Annex C (Operations).

#### 3. CONDUCT

a. <u>Priorities</u>. All targets will continue to be classified in accordance with provisions contained in NWP 22. The following list of classifications and priorities will be used to publish Target Bulletins (TARBULs) and update the MAF target list.

### (1) <u>Target Classification</u>

- (a) Class A. Targets which jeopardize the amphibious task force through their threat to shipping, aircraft, minesweeping, and underwater demolitions operations.
- (b) Class B. Targets which affect the ATF by threatening the landing force in the ship-to-shore movement and/or the beach assault.

M - 2 - 1

- (c) Class C. Targets which affect landing force operations ashore and facilitate continued enemy resistance.
- (d) Class D. Targets not to be attacked prior to D-day.
- (e) Class E. Targets restricted by the CATF which will not be destroyed, except upon direct order.
- (2) <u>Targeting Priorities</u>. Within each target classification, the following priorities are assigned:
  - (a) Priority I. Targets capable of preventing the execution of the plan of action.
  - (b) <u>Priority II</u>. Targets capable of immediate serious interference with the plan of action.
  - (c) <u>Priority III</u>. Targets capable of ultimate serious interference with the execution of the plan of action.
  - (d) Priority IV. Targets capable of limited interference with the execution of the plan of action.

#### b. Air Requests

- (1) Preplanned TAR's. Preplanned TAR's will be forwarded to the TACC via the TAR net by 1700 daily or as soon as a specific target or target area has been identified.
- (2) Immediate TAR's. Immediate TAR's will be processed in the TACC as soon as they are received and in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).

#### c. <u>Tactical Air Control Procedures</u>

- (1) <u>Sequencing</u>. Normal control sequencing will be employed from the point of origin (carrier/theater airbase/SYN City Airfields and forward operating sites); to the Air Traffic Control Section of the TACC; to the Terminal Controller (FAC/FAC(A)); and back.
- (2) Briefing. Pilots will be briefed on CAS missions by the Air Support Section of the TACC while inbound to the target area utilizing mandatory items listed on the Tactical Air Request Form. Modification, diverts, and other items of information will be briefed by the terminal controller.
- (3) Orbit Points. See Appendix 9 (Air Overlay) to reference (c).

- (4) <u>Contact Points</u>. See Appendix 9 (Air Overlay) to reference (c).
- (5) Delivery
  - (a) Low level approach and retirement techniques will be utilized, to the maximum extent feasible, with assigned initial points (IPs).
  - (b) IPs and run-in headings will be chosen to allow for NGF and artillery fire support.
  - (c) Airspace Coordination Areas (ACA), helicopter entry and exit points, fixed wing IP's, and holding points. See Appendix 9 (Air Overlay) to reference (c).
- (6) Abort Procedures. CAS missions will be terminated by using coded signals provided the following conditions exist:
  - (a) Target cannot be marked or positively identified by the aircraft.
  - (b) Loss of communications between the terminal controller and the aircraft.
  - (c) Aircraft appears to be approaching and/or running on friendly positions.
  - (d) Multiple marking rounds.
  - (e) Weather precludes positive target identification.
- d. AFAC Procedures. See Appendix 2 (Air Support) to reference (c).
- e. BDA Reporting Procedures
  - (1) BDA Reports. BDAs will be provided by the FAC/FAC(A) to the DASC directly or via the FSCC.
  - (2) <u>Items Reported</u>
    - (a) Target (number, coordinates, and type).
    - (b) Time (on and off target).
    - (c) Ordnance expended which impacted on target over the percentage of target destroyed; i.e., expressed as 75/100.
    - (d) Specific results.

- (e) Enemy action.
- (f) Remarks.

#### f. Target Marking for Air Attack

- (1) FACs/FAC(A)'s will control strikes on all observable targets. Targets will be designated by one or more of the following methods:
  - (a) Map coordinates.
  - (b) Geographic location (direction and distance from known location).
  - (c) Observation and direction by FAC/AFAC.
- (2) Targets will be marked by one or more of the following methods:

Smoke	Flare	
WP	Laser	
HE	Radar Beacon	i

g. <u>Air Support Radar Team Procedures</u>. See Appendix 2 (Air Support) to reference (c).

#### h. Aircraft Alert Status

(1) Aircraft alert conditions are as follows:

Alert Condition	" <u>Time to Launch</u>
1	Airborne
2	5 Minutes
3	15 Minutes
4	30 Minutes
5	1 hour

- (2) Time On Target (TOT). Until the Aggressor long range SAM systems have been neutralized and air superiority can be maintained, TOT will be the time for aircraft to have ord-nance or target plus or minus (1) minute. Once air superiority has been achieved within the MAF area of influence, TOT will be the time for aircraft to arrive over target or, in the absence of an assigned target, the time to arrive at a predesignated holding point.
- (3) <u>Time to Target (TTT)</u>. TTT will supercede TOT and will be the exact time ordnance will be placed on target.

- (4) Time On Station (TOS). TOS for strike, CAP, and CAS flights will be the time available to remain on station until BINGO at designated holding points.
- i. Aircraft Armament. See Appendix 6 (Armament Codes) to reference (c).
- j. Attack Limitations. Aggressor AAA and SAM systems are located within range of the MAF area of influence and can attack theater-based, carrier based, and SYN City based aircraft conducting CAS missions. In addition to the Aggressor longer range SAM systems, pockets of enemy forces within SYN City are capable of attacking CAS aircraft with low altitude missiles. Until these weapon systems have been neutralized, low level approach and exit techniques will be employed to the maximum extent feasible. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Administration. All preplanned TARs will be forwarded to FACs or FAC(A)'s who will, in turn, submit TARs to the DASCs. BDAs will be submitted either by FACs, FAC(A)'s, or flight leaders to the DASCs. The DASCs will receive the requests and reports and will direct aircraft or submit reports to the TACC accordingly.
- b. <u>Logistics</u>. CG, 7th MAW will provide for the necessary control and marking items needed to conduct CAS operations in support of VII MAF. See Annex D (Logistics) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- b. <u>Signal</u>. CAS signals will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in Appendix 2 (Air Support) to reference (c).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

TABS: (All omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

M - 2 - 5

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1;20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

(c) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)

(d) FMFM 4-2, Amphibious Embarkation

(e) FMFM 4-3, Landing Support Operations

(f) FMFM 4-4, Engineer Operations

(g) NAVMC 2500, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs

- (h) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Combat Service Support (Constructive)
- (i) Annex P (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces
  - (1) See Annexes D (Logistics) and E (Personnel).
  - (2) MAC will transport the replacement draft in Okinawa to the TAB and will provide aero-medical evacuation services from the TAB.
  - (3) CTF 51:
    - (a) Provides elements of the Cargo Handling/Port Terminal Unit and the Mobile Construction Regiment to maintain equipment and facilities and operate port facilities in the harbor.
    - (b) Provides assault shipping for casualty treatment to supplement field medical facilities established during assault operations. MAF casualty treatment will be provided aboard the following ships:

LHA-1 LPH-2 AH-1X LKA-113 LSD-28 LPD-4 LST-1179 LPD-5 LST-1195

- (c) Provides supply support for elements of VII MAF still embarked and emergency rearming and refueling for elements of V/STOL and helicopter squadrons operating out of SYN City.
- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

#### 2. MISSION

7th FSSG will provide CSS to VII MAF units operating within SYN City and the security zone from each CSSA established during assault operations, from intermediate support points (ISPs) near the forward defense area, and from supply dumps located within the MAF security zone.

#### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of Combat Service Support.
  - (1) See Appendix 1 (Concept of Combat Service Support)

#### (2) Personnel

(a) Elements of the replacement draft located at the TAB will be phased into the VII MAF area of influence to reconstitute forces defending the forward defensive area. This element will be used to provide individual combat replacements based on current personnel status reports. An additional replacement draft element of 4,535 Marines will be deployed from Okinawa to the TAB to provide additional augmentaion as required.

t. 🗈

- (b) The Status of Forces Agreements will apply at TABs.
- (c) See Annex E (Personnel).

### (3) Supply

- (a) Within the MAF area of influence:
  - All elements of VII MAF manning positions within the forward defense area will be replenished by unit distribution. CSS units at ISPs and within each CSSA will be replenished by supply point distribution. GOP forces conducting operations within the security zone will be replenished by supply point distribution from dumps established by HSTs, and long-haul transport interfacing with the GOP force trains.

- CSS units within SYN City will make maximum use of local facilities for the storage and protection of deployed supply stocks. Local gasoline stations and dwellings or commercial structures with suitable basements will be requisitioned and used to store Class III bulk stocks. Buildings of substantial construction will be used to store the bulk of supply stocks and house a variety of maintenance activities near the ISPs within the forward defense area.
- 3 CSS units will make maximum use of local construction materials in the implementation of the obstacle plan. Construction materials from local construction yards, borrow pits, and in the port area will be requisitioned and transported to the forward defense area for barrier installation and strongpoint fortification.
- (b) Aviation units operating out of SYN City will receive CSS from organic MAW elements and the FSSG. If Aggressor forces succeed in penetrating the MAF defensive security zone in force, the preponderance of fixed-wing squadrons (less VMA V), medium-lift helicopter squadrons, and a number of heavy-lift helicopter squadrons will be redeployed to the TABs. The remainder of VII MAW (Forward) operating out of SYN City will be reconfigured enabling composite squadrons to operate out of dispersed support sites.
- (c) Theater-based aviation units (7th MAW Rear) will continue to be supported through supply dumps and maintenance facilities established at the TABs by organic resources within the MAW and with assistance provided by the supporting fleet and other theater forces.

### (4) Maintenance

- (a) Elements of 7th MAW (Forward) and 7th MAW (Rear) will continue to accomplish organic and intermediate-level maintenance on aircraft and ground support equipment within organic maintenance capabilities.
- (b) Initially, intermediate-level maintenance support for units within the FEBA will continue to be provided by elements of the FSSG operating out of each CSSA. End items and/or assemblies which can be effectively repaired at forward locations will be serviced by maintenance contact teams. Maintenance teams will also be deployed to support detachments from the FSSG attached

to each MCATF. Once established, 3rd echelon maintenance will be performed at ISPs and each CSSA where applicable.

#### (5) Transportation

- (a) Initially, all available organic transportation and heavy equipment within the FSSG will be employed to continue offloading the AFOE in the port area, to deploy essential equipment and relocate units to forward defense area sectors and to GOP forces, and to deploy elements of the replacement draft arriving in the port area to designated units defending the FEBA.
- (b) Once unit relocation has been completed and essential supply stocks and equipment have been deployed to forward area defense forces, all available organic transportation and heavy equipment will be used to relocate and build up supply stocks and equipment echeloned on position within the forward defense area, at ISPs near the forward defense area, and in each CSSA. Concurrently, engineer construction material will be moved to the forward defense area for implementation of the obstacle plan.
- (c) Upon achieving the desired stockage level within all dispersed supply activities, CG, 7th FSSG, in coordination with 7th MARDIV and 7th MAW, will designate units to distribute supplies forward to consumers and replenish ISPs and HLZ supply dumps from each CSSA.

### (6) Engineer Support

- (a) Priority of engineer support will be devoted to combat support of units operating in assigned defensive sectors. Repair of facilities and equipment in the port area and runway repair will continue by elements of the NCR and WES but the majority of engineer assets within the division and the FSSG will be concentrated on implementing the obstacle plan, fortifying strongpoints, and establishing ISPs.
- (b) See Appendix 7 (Engineer Support Plan).

# (7) Landing Support

(a) Elements of 7th FSSG completed the establishment of each CSSA and assumed control of port and beach operations during the period D+4 to D+6. General offloading of AFOE supplies and equipment began on D+6 and will

continue in the current time frame from ELCAS offloading facilities established at RED and BLUE Beaches and from container and equipment handling facilities in the port area.

- (b) When the ISPs become operational, general unloading for replenishment purposes will be more selective; i.e., offloading will concentrate the buildup of supply stocks and equipment tailored to satisfy the requirements of units near RED and BLUE Beaches and the port area.
- (8) Medical/Dental. See Appendix 3 (Medical Services) to Annex D (Logistics), Appendix 3 (Public Health and Welfare) to Annex G (Civil Affairs), and Appendix 6 (Medical/Dental) to this annex.

#### (9) Military Police

- Competing demands on MP assets will increase during the defensive operations. The number of civilian internees and enemy POWs will increase as combat action intensifies near the forward defense area. The relocation of defensive units and the establishment of strongpoints within the forward defense area will require the evacuation and relocation of additional civilians. To initially satisfy additional requirements imposed upon security and control elements within the MAF, MP units performing the functions of law enforcement, traffic control, POW evacuation and control, DPRE management, and CSS site security will be augmented by the leastcommitted elements of 7th MARDIV and 7th FSSG. arrival within the port area, elements of the replacement draft will replace combat and CSS units augmenting the MPs. MP resources currently within the MAF area of influence will still require augmentation by trained personnel to supervise the activities of the replacement draft; CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate with the theater command provisions for obtaining MP augmentation from additional resources within the FMF and/or USA units.
- (b) POW and CI will be confined at the SYN City prison. POW compounds established at RED Beach and CSSA II will be used to accommodate additional prisoners until more suitable facilities can be found. A number of new DPRE assembly areas will be required to accommodate the additional DPREs. Site locations, capabilities, and support requirement are delineated in Annex G (Civil Affairs).

- (10) <u>Civil Affairs Support.</u> See Annex G (Civil Affairs) and Appendix 1 (Concept of Combat Service Support) to this annex.
- (11) Automated Data Processing Systems. See Appendix 8 (Automated Data Processing Systems Support) to reference (i).
- (12) Miscellaneous. Functions of food service and financial management will be handled in accordance with provisions contained in Annex E (Personnel) and Appendix 1 (Concept of Combat Service Support) to this annex. Requirements imposed upon the utilization of MHE are stated in Appendix 1 (Concept of Combat Service Support) to this annex.

### b. Tasks: Combat Service Support Units; 7th FSSG

- (1) Provide transportation and supply support for elements of the replacement draft arriving at each airfield and within the port area.
- (2) Develop CSS facilities at sites to be used as ISPs near the forward defense area and provide for unit distribution of supplies to major subordinate commands manning defensive sectors within the forward defense area.
- (3) Support air operations at the TABs and within the MAF area of influence in accordance with provisions contained in this annex, Appendix 2 (Mortuary Services) to Annex D (Logistics), and Annex M (Air Operations).

- (4) Establish intermediate-level-maintenance facilities at each ISP in the forward defense area and provide contact teams to support GOP and main defensive forces as required.
- (5) Provide for the defense and security of each CSSA and ISP in accordance with provisions contained in Appendix 3 (CSS Installations Defense Plan).
- (6) Provide transportation and MHE augmentation to satisfy the relocation requirements of combat units and combat support units being redeployed to the forward defense area; the buildup of supply stocks and equipment at the ISPs; and provide construction materials for implementation of the obstacle plan.
- (7) Provide engineer assistance to forces manning the forward defense area for the implementation of the obstacle plan.

- (8) Provide medical support and assistance in accordance with Appendix 3 (Medical Services) to Annex D (Logistics) and Appendix 6 (Medical/Dental) to this annex.
- (9) Expand POW compounds, establish new DPRE assembly areas, and provide for additional security force requirements in accordance with this annex, Appendix 2 (CSS Overlay) to this annex, and support CSS requirements stated in Annex G (Civil Affairs).

#### c. Tasks: Combat and Combat Support Units

#### (1) 7th MARDIV

- (a) Maintain on-position supply stocks and submit replenishment requests by 1630 daily.
- (b) Adhere to organizational maintenance procedures provided for in unit SOPs. Submit 3rd echelon maintenance support requests to the appropriate element of the FSSG initially at each CSSA; later at ISPs nearest the combat unit requiring assistance.
- (c) Provide MP and least-committed-combat-unit support for the operation of POW collection points, traffic control, and CSS site security. Units will be released to assume their positions in the forward defense area on order from this headquarters.
- (d) Provide organic transportation assets to the FSSG, as required, to facilitate the movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment to forward defense area strong points.

#### (2) 7th MAW

- (a) Provide helicopter support for evacuation of casualties to aid stations, hospital facilities within ISPs, hospital facilities within each CSSA, and assault shipping as directed.
- (b) Provide helicopter lift support for the movement of supply stocks within SYN City and from CSSAs to HLZ dumps within the security zone.
- (c) Coordinate with MAC, the deployment of the replacement draft in Okinawa to the TAB and the evacuation of casualties and the deceased with MAC aero-medical evacuation units.

(d) Coordinate air courier services with 7th MAW (Forward).

#### (4) VII MAF Headquarters

- (a) Coordinate Civil Affairs support and population control measures in accordance with provisions contained in Annex G (Civil Affairs).
- (b) Coordinate unit personnel replacements with subordinate commands in accordance with provisions contained in Annex E (Personnel) and Appendix 9 (Personnel) to this annex.

#### d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Personnel. See Appendix 9 (Personnel).
- (2) Reports and Records. Reference (h) applies.
- (3) Traffic Control Measures. Reference (h) applies.
- (4) Preventive Medicine. See Appendix 6 (Medical/Dental).
- (5) ADPS. See Appendix 8 (Automated Data Processing Systems Support) to reference (i).

t ... ‡

(6) <u>Disbursing</u>. Reference (h) applies.

#### 4. SUPPORT

In accordance with reference (h) and Annexes D (Logistics) and E (Personnel).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).
- b. See Appendix 2 (CSS Overlay).
- c. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- d. Report changes in CP locations as they occur.

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### **APPENDIXES:**

- 1 Concept of Combat Service Support
- 2 CSS Overlay
- 3 CSS Installations Defense
- 4 Reports (Omitted; See OPLAN 1-81)
- 5 Bulk Fuel
- 6 Medical/Dental
- 7 Engineer Support Plan
- 8 Automated Data Processing Systems Support (Omitted; See OPLAN 1-81)
- 9 Personnel
- 10 Support Agreements (Omitted)
  11 Landing Force Support Party (Omitted)
- 12 Plan for Landing Supplies (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

APPENDIX 1 (Concept of Combat Service Support) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

- (c) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Suport for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)
- (d) FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers Field Manual, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data

(e) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 82 (Tab D to Annex B)

(f) NAVMC 1017, United States Marine Corps Table of Authorized Material

(g) Annex P (Combat Service Support) to OPLAN 1-81

(h) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Combat Service Support (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force; with priority to the Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; until follow-on forces are landed.

2. <u>CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS</u>. The defensive operations will be conducted in two periods as a continuation of the periods set forth in VII MAF OPLAN 1-81 for the Amphibious Assault. Period VI commences on D+11 and continues through D+15, when it is anticipated that GOP and other security zone opeations will be drawing to a close. Period VII covers the span from D+16 to D+40, when heavy urban defensive operations are expected to occur.

CSSAs 1 and 2, established during the offensive phase of the SYN City operation, will serve as the primary focal points for the offloading and marshalling of containerized supplies as well as the remainder of the AFOE. Elevated causeways (ELCAS) at Beaches RED and BLUE will augment the throughput capability within the main port area. Large containers ( $\geq 20'$ ) will be offloaded from containerships or lighterage and transported to the container marshalling areas by container-compatible semi-trailer combinations. Once at the marshalling area, supplies may be stored within the large container or reconfigured into smaller-sized loads and transported to more forward stockage points.

Four Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established in the suburban areas with one ISP in support of each regiment (three infantry regiments plus one artillery regiment). A full range of CSS will be available at each ISP to include maintenance, medical, engineer, supply, and motor transport services. The ISPs will serve as intermediate container handling areas where MILVAN or QUADCON-sized loads are reconfigured as QUADCON or PALCON-sized loads ready for transport to forward units. FSSG slices (roughly equivalent to a MAU slice) will provide the CSS nucleus at each ISP supplemented by divisional and MAW CSS elements as required.

For supply dispersion purposes there will be two additional echelons of supply stockages. Selected supplies will be stockpiled at approximately nine battalion-level locations as well as twenty-seven forward points. These forward support and forward sites will be used primarily for supply stockage while the remainder of CSS is provided by activities located at ISPs and CSSAs. Supplies will be sited within structures whenever possible to protect them from pilferage and indirect fires.

#### a. Period VI (D+11 - D+15)

(1) Enemy Forces and Capabilities. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).

#### (2) Friendly Forces

- (a) TF 51 will provide landing craft for tactical redeployment and logistic operations in the port areas of the city.
- (b) TF 57, in conjunction with 7th MAW, will provide air support for resupply operations to the FEBA.
- (3) <u>Characteristics of the Area</u>. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).

#### (4) Major CSS Tasks

(a) Continue buildup and expansion of facilities within each CSSA to accommodate an increased level of supply.

- (b) Complete expedient rehabilitation of runways at Airfield 1, the installation of main base facilities at Airfield 2, and throughput equipment and facilities within the harbor port area to facilitate offloading and the deployment of supply stocks within each CSSA and to facilities being established within and near the forward defense area.
- (c) Establish ISPs and forward defense area V/STOL and helicopter operating sites within each assigned defensive sector and stock with the designated level of supply and equipment to support forces operating within the forward defense area.
- (d) Establish AAFs and TAFDS tank farm assemblies within each ISP.
- (e) Establish rafting system (M4T6 bridge sections) at GREEN Beach to transport logistic and/or combat and combat support vehicles, personnel, and equipment to and from the port area in the event bridges spanning South River are damaged by Aggressor long-range artillery, missile, aircraft fires, and/or zapper action.
- (f) Establish HLZ supply dumps at locations shown in Tab B (Helicopter Landing Zones--Distant) to Appendix 10 (Helicopter Landing Zone Study) to Annex B (Intelligence).
- (g) Provide supervision, transportation, and supply support for the implementation of the obstacle plan and the development of strongpoints within the forward defense area and the security zone.
- (h) Provide ground and air transportation of supply stocks to expedient resupply points and/or HLZs supporting the GOP sectors.
- (i) Evacuate approximately 30,000 civilians from the vicinity of the FEBA and establish additional DPRE assembly areas to accommodate them.
- (j) Establish additional water points throughout forward area defensive sectors, at the ISPs, and utilize all available means to produce and store potable water for subordinate commands within SYN City.

- b. <u>Period VII</u> (D+16 D+40)
  - (1) Enemy Forces and Capabilities. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).
  - (2) Friendly Forces. See paragraph 2.a.(2) above.
  - (3) Characteristics of the Area. See Appendix 7 (Intelligence Estimate) to Annex B (Intelligence).
  - (4) Major CSS Tasks
    - (a) Continue upgrading facilities and support for units manning the ISPs.
    - (b) Provide transportation and supply support for the evacuation and relocation of threatened ISP stocks and units.
    - (c) Provide material and equipment to establish hasty obstacles in support of changing tactical situations.
    - (d) Evacuate non-essential personnel and equipment and conduct such backloading operations as deemed necessary.

t .:

#### 3. CSS REQUIREMENTS

- a. Period VI (D+11 to D+15)
  - (1) Personnel
    - (a) Strengths
      - 1 Unit Strength
        - a MAF Area of Influence

<u>Unit</u>	Strength
MAF Division	2,040 19,044
Wing (Forward)	11,156
FSSG	12,979

#### b Other

Theater-based Aviation 7,070 Replacements (Okinawa) 6,000

#### 2 Casualties

#### a MAF Area of Influence

Unit	<u>Battle</u>	N	<u>Nonbattle</u>	
MAF	30		10	
Division	642		282	
Wing (Forward)	253		99	
FSSG	296		117	
<u>b</u> <u>Other</u>				
Theater-based Avi		160	63	
Replacements (Oki		0	30	

#### (b) Replacements

- During this period, the initial replacement draft at the TABs will be transported to the SYN City port area and attached to units manning the forward defense area.
- The replacement draft in Okinawa has been augmented to accommodate the replacement requirements anticipated for elements of VII MAF during the defense of SYN City. Units will be incrementally phased into the TAB in preparation for future deployment to the MAF area of influence.
- VII MAF will not require augmentation from the replacement draft in Okinawa during this period.

### (c) Morale

- $\underline{1}$  Religious services for 45,219 personnel within the MAF area of influence.
- 2 Religious services for 7,070 personnel operating from the TAB.

### (d) <u>Personal Services Support</u>

- Postal support for 45,219 personnel within the MAF area of influence.
- Postal and recreation support for 7,070 personnel operating from the TAB.

#### (e) Military Justice

- The central collection and holding point for all POWs and civilian internees will continue to be located within the SYN City prison complex. Temporary and overflow compounds at RED Beach and at CSSA II will be utilized until such time as evacuation to the central compound occurs or if the security of each compound cannot be assured and relocation is required.
- A central MAF internee collection point will be established at a warehouse facility on the peninsula near Old City to accommodate, temporarily, MAF personnel charged with crimes and awaiting evacuation for longer-term confinement or further adjudication.
- (f) <u>Personnel Procedures</u>. Specific personnel reporting procedures and general guidance are contained in reference (h) and Annex E (Personnel).

#### (2) Supply

(a) Average daily troop strength of Theater-Based units is 7,070 and a DOS requirement is:

Class	I	22	S/T
Class	II	1.64	S/T
Class	III(A)	284,282	gal
	III(W)	44,399	.6 ga1
Class	V(A)	47	.16 S/T
Class		108.	.14 S/T
Class	IX	6	.72 S/T

(b) Average daily MAF troop strength to be supported within the MAF area of influence is 45,219. DOS requirements during this period are:

Class	I	141.08	S/T
Class	II	10.47	S/T
Class	III(A)	394,426	
Class	III(W)	283,975.32	gal
Class	IV	48.66	S/T
Class	V(A)	301.61	S/T
Class	V(W)	691.62	S/T
Class	VΪ	72.58	S/T
Class	VII	175.9	S/T
Class	VIII	26	S/T
Class	IX	42.96	S/T

#### (3) Maintenance

- (a) Ground equipment intermediate level maintenance will be provided for by detachments from the FSSG attached to GOP forces and contact teams deployed forward to support GOP forces. In the event that equipment cannot be evacuated to the ISPs and/or CSSAs, maintenance contact teams will be deployed forward to perform 3rd and limited 4th echelon repairs.
- (b) Each of the MAGs will continue to perform intermediate level aircraft maintenance at each airfield. In the event that the airfields become untenable emergency intermediate level aircraft maintenance for applicable V/STOL and helicopter units will be provided at the designated forward operating sites near the ISPs.
- (c) Maintenance operations conducted at the TAB will be in accordance with provisions contained in reference (g).

#### (4) <u>Transportation</u>

- (a) To achieve the level of supply objective within the MAF area of influence, an average of 4 DOS must be offloaded and moved to appropriate storage facilities each day within this period. The following represents the transportation requirements of the MAF for moving 4 DOS in an 18-hour working day:
  - Number of trucks required:
    - (183) 5-ton trucks
    - ( 32) Container-capable semi-trailer combinations
  - The number of MHE required to support the offloading and distribution of 4 DOS in an 18-hour period is as follows:
    - (109) 6000 lb. cap. RTFLs
    - (50) 30-ton RT Cranes
  - Approximately 1360 ST of mines, demolitions, and barbed wire will have to be delivered to the security zone in three days, requiring 20 fire ton cargo vehicles and a minimum of 6 RTFLs.

- (b) The transportation requirements for a DOS of Classes I, III(W), and V(W) within the security zone for GOP forces is as follows:
- Primary (19) CH-53D planeloads at existing operating conditions
  Fuel, in sufficient quantity, must still be transported by 5000 gal refuelers
- Alternate (14) 10 ton trucks w/trailers (8) 5000 gal refuelers
- (c) To support the food distribution site operations for providing a weeks worth of subsistance rations to the civilian population, the transportation requirements are as follows:
  - (1) RT Crane, DROH 2500, or suitable civilian substitute
  - (11) Container capable semi-trailer combinations

#### (5) Engineer Support

THE TANKS OF THE CONTROL OF THE PARTY OF

- (a) Availability of at least 700,000 gallons of potable water per day is the desired goal to provide 10 gal per man per day for VII MAF and 1 gal per person per day for civilians. Under emergency conditions, if the SYN City water system is inoperable or unusable, a minimum of 192,000 gal per day will have to be produced by MAF engineers.
- (b) Expedient repairs of Airfield I and essential construction at Airfield 2 will continue on a priority basis until either one or both airfields become untenable, at which time four V/STOL facilities and their associated landing sites will require priority repairs and upkeep.
- (c) Expedient repairs on equipment and facilities within the harbor port area will be required of the NCR on a continuing basis.
- (d) Approximately 33,000 AT mines and 185,000 AP mines will be installed in the security zone in addition to explosives and barbed wire; four combat engineer platoons will be required to supervise and assist the infantry battalions that implement the obstacle plan.
- (e) Four class 60 rafts will be constructed on South River near GREEN Beach.

- (f) Four HLZs will be established in support of the GOP.
- (g) Bulk fuel storage at Airfields 1 and 2 will have to be relocated to less vulnerable sites.
- (h) Four ISPs and 36 company and battalion forward supply sites will require engineer support for reinforcing building structures and berming outside sites.

#### (6) Landing Support

- (a) Continue increasing the level of supply initially in each CSSA, ISP, and forward sites.
- (b) Establish HLZ supply dumps within the security zone; stock each with 3 DOS of Class I and V(W) supplies as a minimum to support MCATF operations.

#### (7) Medical/Dental

- (a) Elements of the FSSG will establish field hospital facilities and temporary collection sites for the deceased at each ISP.
- (b) Elements of the FSSG will evacuate casualties and the remains of the deceased in accordance with provisions contained in Appendixes 2 (Mortuary Services) and 3 (Medical Services) to Annex D (Logistics) and Appendix 6 (Medical/Dental) to Annex P (Combat Service Support).

### (8) Military Police

- (a) Straggler control is a command responsibility, however, roving MP patrols will be tasked with collecting and relocating stragglers within each defensive sector.
- (b) Implement traffic control measures to ensure that only essential civilian vehicular traffic is permitted over designated routes for the distribution of food supplies, that major road arteries near each of the CSSAs and ISPs are used only by tactical and logistic support vehicles, establish checkpoints along MSRs for civilian traffic to control the transportation of unauthorized material and on MAF MSRs to assist in rerouting traffic when required.
- (c) POW evacuation procedures are contained in Annex E (Personnel).

(d) Provide security for DPRE evacuation and at DPRE assembly areas.

### (9) Civilian Employees

- (a) Contracted civilian morticians will prepare the deceased for further evacuation to CONUS from facilities at the TAB.
- (b) There will be no further requirement for civilian support within the MAF area of influence or at the TAB.
- (10) <u>Civil Affairs Support</u>. See paragraph 3.b.(6) to Annex G (Civil Affairs).
- (11) <u>Automated Data Processing Systems</u>. Management, operation, and support requirements and provisions for such requirements are contained in Appendix 8 (Automated Data Processing Systems Support) to reference (g).
- (12) Miscellaneous. Organic MHE will provide sufficient means to offload and distribute the requisite supply stocks. The functions of food service and financial management will be handled in accordance with provisions contained in Annex E (Personnel) and reference (h).

#### b. Period VII (D+16 to D+40)

#### (1) Personnel

### (a) Strengths

### 1 Unit Strength

# a MAF Area of Influence

<u>Unit</u> <u>Str</u>	Strength		
Division 18. Wing (Forward) 8.	,005 ,017 ,506 ,591		

#### b Other

Theater-Based	Aviation	12,421
Replacements (	(Okinawa/TAB)	

#### 2 Casualties

#### MAF Area of Influence

Unit	<u>Battle</u>	<u>Nonbattle</u>
MAF Division Wing (Forward) FSSG	317 5,421 944 1,852	135 1,245 407 795
h Other		

Theater-Based	Aviation	1,974	848
Replacements (	Okinawa/TAB)	0	105

#### (b) Replacements

- 1 Commencing on D+19 and continuing thereafter, elements of the replacment draft, transported from Okinawa to the staging area at the TAB, will be incrementally phased into the MAF area of influence to reconstitute forces defending the forward defense area and to fill requirements for combat support and CSS personnel.
- The total requirment for replacemnts during this period is 5,750.

#### (c) Morale

- 1 Religious services for 37,583 personnel within the MAF area of influence.
- 2 Religious services for 12,421 personnel operating from the TAB.

#### (d) Personal Services Support

- Postal support for 37,583 personnel within the MAF area of influence.
- Postal and recreation support for 12,421 personnel operating from the TAB.
- (e) Military Justice. Same as in Period VI.
- (f) Personnel Procedures. Same as in Period VI.

#### (2) Supply

(a) Average daily troop strength of Theater-Based units is 12,421 and a DOS requirement is:

Class	I	38.75	S/T
Class	II	2.88	S/T
Class	III(A)	555,069	gal
Class	III(W)	78,003.88	gal
Class	V(A)	82.85	Š/T
Class	V(W)	189.98	S/T
Class	IX	11.8	S/T

(b) Average daily MAF troop strength to be supported within the MAF area of influence is 37,583. A DOS requirements during this period is:

Class	I	117.26	S/T
Class	II	8.7	S/T
	III(A)	123,639	gal
Class	III(W)	236,021.24	gal
Class	IV	40.44	S/T
Class	V(A)	111.64	S/T
Class	V(W)	574.83	S/T
Class	VI	60.32	S/T
Class	VII	146.2	S/T
Class	VIII	21.61	S/T
Class	IX	35.7	S/T

2.3

(3) <u>Maintenance</u>. Same as in Period VI. Tanks will have the highest priority for repairs.

### (4) Transportation

- (a) To maintain the level-of-supply objective within the MAF area of influence, an average of 1 DOS per day must be offloaded and distributed during this period. The following represents the transportation requirements of VII MAF for moving 1 DOS in a 10-hour working day:
  - Number of trucks required:
    - (94) 5-ton trucks
    - (13) Container-capable semi-trailer combinations
  - Number of MHE required:
    - (69) 6000 lb. cap. RTFLs
    - (50) 30-ton RT Cranes

(b) The MHE and transportation requirements to support civilian food distribution operations are the same as in Period VI.

### (5) Engineer Support

- (a) In the event that Aggresor forces successfully penetrate the FEBA, engineer units will augment other combat and combat support units in establishing hasty obstacles and blocking positions.
- (b) Field-expedient wet gap crossing points in support of defensive force retrograde or relocation operations.
- (c) Battle damage to fuel pipelines, bridges, and port facilities will require expeditious repairs; repairing sewerage and water will be accomplished by indigenous personnel.
- (6) <u>Landing Support</u>. Maintain the current level of supply on position in the forward defense area, in the ISPs, and in each CSSA.
- (7) Medical/Dental. Same as in Period VI.
- (8) Military Police. Same as in Period VI.
- (9) Civilian Employees. Same as in Period VI.
- (10) Civil Affairs Support. Same as in Period VI.
- (11) Automated Data Processing Systems. Same as in Period VI.

### (12) Miscellaneous

- (a) It will be necessary to keep open the LOCs from the FEBA and the designated phase lines to the port area and to maintain requisite supply levels at all dumps.
- (b) Firefighting is expected to increase during this period necessitating field expedient CSS measures to provide sand, water, and other materials on an emergency basis.

### 4. PROVISION OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

#### a. Period VI

- (1) CSS Organizations and Task Organizations. CSS for theater-based units will be provided by detachments from 7th MAW as augmented by MAC and TF 51 assets. All functions incident to CSS within the MAF area of influence will be provided for by the 7th FSSG as augmented by naval support forces from the fleet and organized civilian labor.
  - (a) <u>Locations</u>. See Appendix 2 (CSS Overlay) to Annex P (Combat Service Support).
  - (b) Missions/Tasks. The FSSG will provide the full range of CSS to VII MAF units operating within the MAF area of influence. Priority of efforts will be given to completing expedient repairs and/or construction on each airfield and port operation facilities, to the establishing defensive strongpoints, implementing the obstacle plan, establishing ISPs, and building up supplies to meet the stockage objective.
  - (c) <u>Task Organization and Command Relationships</u>. See Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex J (Command Relationships).
  - (d) General Capabilities and Status. Initially, the full range of CSS will be provided from the CSSAs established during the offensive phase. Work will commence on ISPs located within each defensive sector in SYN City. As soon as the ISPs are operational, the majority of CSS functions will be performed at these sites. Equipment, personnel, and supply support of Naval Support Forces will require provisioning augmentation from CTF 51.
  - (e) <u>Tactical Responsibilities</u>. Provide sufficient assets to perform local security of CSS installations.
  - (f) Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems
    Support Arrangements. See Appendix 7 (Automated Data
    Processing Systems Support) to reference (g).

#### (2) Personnel

PANASSAN MARKATER LIBERTOR (DEPOSE RESERVED RESERVED RECECCES RESERVED TO SERVE SERVED PROPERTY

(a) Strengths. By utilizing the replacement draft at the TAB, an effort will be made to bring all combat, combat support, and CSS units to T/O strength during this

period. Units will submit daily personnel status reports in accordance with reference (h).

- (b) Replacements. All replacements reporting into the port area during this period will be used to support strong-point preparations, help implement the obstacle plan, and augment MPs in performing police actions and control functions. Submit requirements for emergency replacements to ACoS, G-1.
- (c) Morale. See Annex E (Personnel) and Appendix 9 (Personnel) to Annex P (Combat Service Support).

### (d) Personnel Services Support

- Exchange, postal, and recreation support for theater-based units and the replacement draft will be provided by Naval and Air Force activities. Detachment, HQ Sqdn, 7th MAW (Rear) will coordinate support with Naval and MAC authorities.
- Exchange and recreation functions cannot be accommodated and will not be performed in the MAF area of infleunce during this period due to operational and logistic support requirements that will consume the majority of time and labor of all subordinate commands. Postal services will be provided by elements of the 7th FSSG.
- (e) Military Justice. See paragraph 3.a.(1)(e).

### (f) Personnel Procedures

- Personnel reporting procedures will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (h).
- $\frac{2}{2}$  Unit diaries will be transmitted via message traffic or delivered by courier services from all subordinate commands to the MAF Headquarters.
- See Annex E (Personnel) and Appendix 9 (Personnel) to Annex P (Combat Service Support).

### (3) Supply

(a) Supply support of theater-based aviation and replacement draft units will be provided by organic H&S and H&MS units as augmented by Naval base support units and

the Naval supply system for aviation-unique supply support.

- (b) Supply support within the MAF area of influence will be provided by elements of 7th FSSG initially from CSSAs established during assault operations and later from forward area stocks on position with defensive forces, from ISPs, and from each of the CSSAs. Distribution of supplies will be accomplished by unit distribution to forward area defensive forces from positional, ISP, and/or CSSA stocks. All others will be resupplied by supply point distribution.
- (4) Maintenance. See paragraph 3.a.(3).

### (5) Transportation

- (a) Organic transportation assets will adequately provide for the deployment of defending forces, supplies, and equipment within the MAF area of influence.
- (b) Combat and combat support units will be relocated by organic transport vehicles, helicopters, or ground transport vehicles provided by the 7th FSSG. Elements of 7th FSSG will transport supplies and equipment to the ISPs. Combat and combat support units will transport supplies and equipment from the ISPs to assigned defensive positions using organic support vehicles and will be augmented by elements of the FSSG and helicopter support as required.
- (c) 7th MAW will provide helicopter-lift for the movement of break-bulk supplies and equipment to forward area defense forces, MEDEVAC lift support, and will relocate ground combat elements as required. 7th MAW will also provide lift support for the movement of supplies and equipment to designated HLZs within the MAF security zone.
- (d) See Appendix 4 (Mobility/Transportation) to Annex D (Logistics).
- (6) <u>Engineer Support</u>. See paragraph 3.a.(5) and Appendix 7 (Engineer Support Plan).
- (7) Landing Support. See paragraph 3.a.(6).
- (8) Medical/Dental. See paragraph 3.a.(7), Appendix 3 (Medical Services) to Annex D (Logistics), and Appendix 6 (Medical/Dental) to Annex P (Combat Service Support)

### (9) Military Police

- (a) MP companies from 7th MARDIV, 7th FSSG, and elements of the replacement draft wil' perform the functions of law enforcement, traffic control, and straggler control and implement the POW collection and evacuation policy for VII MAF.
- (b) Law enforcement subtasks, including pass and ID monitoring, police protection, criminal investigation, and confinement of military personnel will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (h). Key civilian police, fireman, utility workers, and government officials will require access to designated areas within the city. A special identification badge/card system will be established by elements of the 4th CAG as augmented by a special USA processing team and their organic consumables (badges, fingerprint materials, etc.).
- (c) Straggler control is a command function; however, ACofS G-2, in coordination with the OICs of each major MP element will implement measures to provide in-country orientation briefings, disseminate city maps to major subordinate commands, utilize fixed checkpoints and roving patrols on MSRs to redirect personnel separated from their parent unit.
- (d) Traffic control measures will be implemented by MP assets of both 7th MARDIV and 7th FSSG. To reduce civilian traffic and decongest MSRs, the 4th CAG issued proclamations warning civilians that are not to be evacuated to remain indoors and out of harm's way. A circulation plan will be implemented to ensure that a one-way traffic system has been established on primary roads connecting the CSSAs with the ISPs and a two-way system has been established between the ISPs and forward defensive strongpoints.
- (e) VII MAF policy pertaining to the collection and evacuation of POWs is contained in Annex E (Personnel).
- (10) <u>Civilian Employees</u>. See paragraph 3.a.(9).

- (11) <u>Civial Affairs Support</u>. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).
- (12) <u>Automated Data Processing Systems Support</u>. See Appendix 8 (Automated Data Processing Systems Support) to reference (g).

(13) <u>Miscellaneous</u>. See paragraph 3.a.(12).

#### b. Period VII

- (1) CSS Organizations and Task Organizations. CSS operations will be conducted in the same manner as in Period VI. In the event that the airfields become untenable, all but the V/STOL fixed-wing squadrons and the majority of medium and heavy helicopter squadrons will be redeployed to the TAB. The remainder will be logistically supported by their own organic support element with augmentation from the MWSG and FSSG at forward operating sites near each ISP. If GOP forces are withdrawn behind the FEBA, attached elements of 7th FSSG will revert to parent unit control.
  - (a) Locations. Same as in Period VI.
  - (b) Mission/Tasks. With the logistic support system in place, CSS units will concentrate on reacting to requirements of combat and combat support units who will be maneuvering to blunt or gain advantage over enemy forces that have succeeded in penetrating security and forward area defensive positions. CSS units will be prepared to relocate threatened ISPs; assist in the implementation of revised or frag obstacle plans; and evacuate, through the port and/or over the landing beaches, nonessential personnel and equipment.
  - (c) <u>Task Organization and Command Relationships</u>. Same as in Period VI.
  - (d) General Capabilities and Status. Same as in Period VI.
  - (e) <u>Tactical Responsibilities</u>. Same as in Period VI.
  - (f) <u>Communications and Automated Data Processing Systems</u> Support Arrangements. Same as in Period VI.

#### (2) Personnel

(a) Strengths. Just prior to and during Period VI the initial replacement draft at the TAB will be transported to the MAF area of influence by surface ship shuttles. Elements of the second draft, located in Okinawa, will be incrementally phased into TAB for staging and possible deployment into SYN City to bring T/O strengths up to acceptable levels and provide replacements in response to immediate support requests.

Personnel status reports will continue to be submitted in accordance with reference (h).

- (b) Morale. Same as in Period VI.
- (c) Personal Services Support. Same as in Period VI.
- (d) Military Justice. Same as in Period VI.
- (e) Personnel Procedures. Same as in Period VI.
- (3) Supply. Same as in Period VI.
- (4) Maintenance. Same as in Period VI.
- (5) Transportation. Same as in Period VI.
- (6) Engineer Support. See paragraph 3.b.(5) and Appendix 7 (Engineer Support Plan).
- (7) Landing Support. See paragraph 3.b.(6).
- (8) Medical/Dental). Same as in Period VI.
- (9) Military Police. Same as in Period VI.
- (10) Civilian Employees. Same as in Period VI.
- (11) Civil Affairs Support. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).
- (12) <u>Automated Data Processing Systems Support</u>. Same as in Period VI.
- (13) Miscellaneous. Same as in Period VI.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81.

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. — of — copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830 May, 1981

APPENDIX 2 (CSS Overlay) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Time Zone: P



- ★ TENTATIVE LOCATION OF ISPs
- TENTATIVE LOCATION OF FORWARD SUPPORT POINTS

NOTE: FORWARD POSITIONAL STOCKAGE POINTS NOT SHOWN

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex 2 (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

\_ copies Copy no.\_\_ of\_ VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 3 (CSS Installation Defense Plan) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1;20,000 (b) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)

(c) FMFM 11-5, Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense

- (d) FMFM 11-6, Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical Warfare and Biological Defense
- (e) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Combat Service Support (Constructive)

Time Zone: P

#### SITUATION 1.

### **Enemy Forces**

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) The remnants of the original committed MRB, partisans, and elements of each of the advancing divisions will have the capability to infiltrate, disrupt, and sabotage operations and facilities within each of the CSSAs and ISPs.

#### Friendly Forces **b**.

- 7th MAW and Theater-Based units and aviation elements of TF 57 will be able to achieve air superiority only on a surge basis but will provide protection to vital areas which include CSS installations.
- (2) TF 57 will provide the seaward extention of VII MAF BARCAP, HICAP, and LOWCAP support.

#### 2. MISSION

FSSG defense forces defend against enemy attack and provide local security to CSS installations and other facilities as required.

### 3. EXECUTION

- a. <u>Concept</u>. The following provisions will be made to defend each of the CSSAs and ISPs:
  - (1) To achieve maximum security against enemy air attack and to minimize the amount of tentage, camouflage netting, and overhead construction required of elements of the FSSG and NCR, maximum use will be made of existing structures within each CSSA and suburban areas within or near the forward defense area. Priority will be accorded to the use of substantial structures, like municipal buildings, which contain sufficient floor space, have faces which can be cut without severely damaging structural integrity, and can accommodate a large quantity of supplies. A number of substantial structures will also be required which have basements capable of being sealed for the storage of bulk fuel. Second priority will be to garages, schools, business buildindustrial production and warehouse facilities. Private homes and multi-family dwellings will generally not be employed for the storage of supplies, but will be used for troop billeting, messing, and head/latrine facilities. Supplies stored in open spaces will be camouflaged against enemy air and ground observation and provided appropriate security.
  - (2) Ammunition will be stored within and/or between the same substantial structures described above, in cul de sacs, and other suitable locations which provide separate entry and exit. Fuzing material will be stored separately from the ammunition stacks to reduce the potential for sympathetic detonations.
  - (3) Aggressor forces are capable of delivering NBC munitionry within the MAF area of influence. To reduce the potential for catastrophic supply stock losses, an effort will be made to disperse supply stocks by building up quantities of supply echeloned on unit positions, at ISPs, and within each CSSA. Each depot will be kept at a minimum level to support the requirements, stocks will be mobile loaded to the maximum extent feasible, and concentration of stocks will be avoided when possible.
  - (4) Elements of the FSSG operating out of each CSS facility will establish a perimeter defense and will be responsible for their own security. A provisional platoon, under the command of the CO, LS Bn, will provide a ready reaction force for CSSA 2. A provisional company, under the command of CO, H&S Bn, 7th FSSG will be formed as a ready reaction force for CSSA 1. Elements of the least committed units of 7th

MARDIV, within the appropriate defensive sectors, will provide details to be utilized as ready reaction forces for the ISPs.

### b. 7th FSSG

- (1) Coordinate and control the defense of each CSSA and the ISPs and provide for internal security at each facility.
- (2) Coordinate with CG, 7th MARDIV the defense of each ISP.
- (3) Provide the equipment and personnel necessary for the construction and/or improvement of defensive positions within each CSSA and at the ISPs.

### c. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Defensive conditions will be established in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).
- (2) Defensive conditions to be employed at any given time will be determined by CG, 7th FSSG.
- (3) Counterintelligence/counterinsurgent measures. See Annex B (Intelligence).

#### 4. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. <u>Command</u>. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- b. <u>Signal</u>. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 5 (Bulk Fuel) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

- (b) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)
- (c) Landing Force Organization Systems Study, CG, MCDEC, Quantico, VA 1979
- (d) FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support

(e) ECP 4-4, Engineer Operations

(f) Appendix 4 (Reports) to Annex P (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-8]

Time Zone:

Ρ

#### 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. See Annex A (Task Organization).
- c. Assumptions. None.

### 2. MISSION

Elements of the 7th FSSG will provide bulk fuel support to organic and attached units of VII MAF as required.

#### EXECUTION

院院の特別の**間**のなかながら、**間**なるものできる。

#### a. Concept of Operations

- (1) Initially, the concept for storing bulk fuel will not change from the systems established during the offensive phase. Bulk fuel elements will maintain systems capable of storing a 3 DOS level of Class III (A) and (W) within the metropolitan limits of SYN City. GOP forces will be resupplied by 5000 gal. refuelers deployed from CSSAs to designated HLZ support areas and/or to locations designated by the MCATF commanders.
- (2) In the event that Aggressor naval and air combat elements are successful in temporarily interdicting SLOCs and/or the airfields become untenable, causing the redeployment of MAW

assets to the TAB, bulk fuel supplies will have to be relocated and the level of supply must be increased. AAFS and TAFDS assemblies will be established at each of the ISPs and additional systems will be established in each of the CSSAs to accommodate the increased level of supply; the level of supply will be built up to meet the overall stockage objective of 20 DOS. AAFS and TAFDSs at each of the airfields and at Industrial Area I will be drained of fuel supplies and recovered.

(3) Follow-on forces are expected within the MAF area of influence on or about D+30 and will be responsible for augmenting the throughput capacity and/or establishing their own forward deployed bulk fuel systems if they are to conduct a passage of lines and continue the attack; if not, then fuel storage system augmentation will still be necessary to accommodate both MAF and follow-on force requirements.

### b. 7th FSSG

- (1) Provide 5000 gal refuelers to accommodate the fuel requirements of GOP forces on a daily basis until such time as the MCATFs are ordered to withdraw behind the FEBA.
- (2) With technical assistance provided by elements of the WES, be prepared to establish the following AAFS and TAFDS assemblies at each of the ISPs:
  - (a) ISP 1 (1) Tank Farm Assembly (TFA) (DF-2) (4) TAFDSs (JP 4/5)
  - (b) ISP 2 (1) TFA (MOGAS)
    - (3) TFAs (DF-2) (4) TAFDSs (JP 4/5)
  - (c) ISP 3 (1) TFA (MOĜAS)
    - (3) TFAs (DF-2)
    - (4) TAFDSs (JP 4/5)
  - (d) ISP 4 (1) TFA (MOGAS)
    - (3) TFA (DF-2)
    - (4) TAFDS (JP 4/5)
- (3) Be prepared to establish the following additional AAFS assemblies within each of the CSSAs:
  - (a) CSSA 1 (2) TFAs (MOGAS)
    - (2) AAFS and (1) TFA (DF-2)
    - (1) AAFS (JP 4/5)
  - (b) CSSA 2 (1) TFA (MOGAS)
    - (1) AAFS (DF-2)
    - (1) TFA (JP 4/5)

- (4) Be prepared to establish the following temporary pipelines and pumping assemblies to drain fuel supply stocks at outlying facilities and pump the fuel to the ISPs; excess quantities will be pumped to the CSSAs:
  - (a) Airfield (AF) 1 to ISP 2
  - (b) AF 2 to ISP 4
  - (c) Industrial Area (IA) 1 to ISP 3
  - (d) ISA 1 to CSSA 1
- (5) Be prepared to establish the following pipelines for subsequent stock replenishment:
  - (a) Move existing pipelines between CSSA 1 and AF 1 to connect CSSA 1 to ISP 2.
  - (b) Move existing pipelines between CSSA 2 and AF 2 to connect CSSA 2 to ISP 4.
  - (c) Establish a pipeline from CSSA 1 to ISP 3.
- (6) With technical assistance provided by the WES, be prepared to drain the AAFS and TAFDSs located at each of the airfields and at IA I and pump the fuel to the following locations:
  - (a) AF 1 Drain (1) TFA (MOGAS) and pump to TFA at ISP 2.
    - Drain (1) AAFS (DF-2) and pump to (3) TFAs at ISP 2; pump excess to CSSA 1.
    - Drain (2) TAFDSs (JP 4/5) and pump to (2) TAFDSs at ISP 2, the remainder of the requirement will be met from CSSA 1.
  - (b) IA 1 Drain 1 AAFS (DF-2) and pump to (3) TFAs at ISP 3; pump excess to CSSA 1.
  - (c) AF 2 Drain (1) TFA (MOGAS) and pump to TFA at ISP 4.
    - Drain (1) AAFS (DF-2) and pump to (3) TFAs at ISP 4; pump excess to CSSA 2.
    - Drain (2) TAFDSs (JP 4/5) and pump to (2) TAFDS at ISP 4; the remainder of the requirement will be met from CSSA 2.
- (7) With technical assistance provided by the WES, be prepared to recover the following AAFS and TAFDS assemblies:
  - (a) Recover (1) AAFS, (1) TFA, and (2) TAFDS from AF 1.

- (b) Recover (1) AAFS, (1) TFA, and (2) TAFDs from AF 2.
- (c) Recover (1) AAFS from IA 1.
- (8) Establish MSR refueling points as required.

### c. 7th MAW (Forward)

- (1) Be prepared to provide technical assistance for the installation and operation of 4 TAFDSs at each of the ISPs.
- (2) Be prepared to provide technical assistance for the draining and recovery of 2 TAFDSs at each of the airfields.
- (3) Provide helicopter-lift support for the relocation and/or deployment of bulk fuel system assemblies as required.

### d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) All fuel tank farms will be installed in accordance with safety procedures established in unit SOPs.
- (2) Fuel tank farm assemblies will be dispersed to the maximum extent possible and will be located within or between substantial structures to provide protection and concealment from hostile observation and fire.
- (3) Fuel pipelines will be buried or camouflaged to the extent practicable to reduce the threat of sabotage or destruction as a result of hostile action.

**\*** ...

(4) Tanker/fuel pumping schedules will be coordinated by the MAF G-4.

### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- b. Reports. In accordance with reference (f).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- b. Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

P-5-5

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 6 (Medical/Dental) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 4-5, Medical and Dental Support

(c) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Medical and Dental Support (Constructive)

(d) Appendix 6 (Medical/Dental) to Annex P (Combat Service Support)
to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization).

### 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. See Annex A (Task Organization) and Appendix 3 (Medical Services) to Annex D (Logistics).
- c. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization) and the Task Organization above.
- d. Assumptions. None.

#### 2. MISSION

Elements of the Medical and Dental Bns, 7th FSSG will provide medical support and hospital facilities within each CSSA, the ISPs, and BAS facilities within the forward defensive area; emergency maxillofacial surgical support will be provided for at each of the CSSAs.

#### 3. EXECUTION

- a. Sanitation and Preventive Medicine
  - (1) Commanders of subordinate and attached units will require maximum sanitary discipline under all combat conditions.
  - (2) Current INTSUMS will contain intelligence gained on pestulance, disease, and Aggressor force use of contaminants within the MAF area of influence.

- (3) CG, 7th FSSG will ensure that sufficient quantities of insecticide and DDT and associated dispersing equipment are maintained to support operations within the MAF area of influence.
- (4) CG, 7th FSSG will coordinate the deployment and use of veterinary augmentation teams with CTF 51 in the inspection of Class I stocks within CSSAs and ISPs.
- (5) As a minimum, elements of each subordinate command's medical support unit will inspect the following on a daily basis:
  - (a) Potable Water
  - (b) Sewerage
  - (c) Vector Control
  - (d) Food Service
- (6) Sanitation and preventive medical measures to support the civilian population are contained in Annex G (Civil Affairs).

#### b. Evacuation

- (1) GOP forces operating within the MAF security zone will utilize organic transportation to the maximum extent feasible to evacuate casualties to their trains element and from the trains element to hospital facilities in the port area. Emergency helicopter MEDEVAC services will be provided for by elements of 7th MAW (Forward).
- (2) Subordinate commands operating within the confines of SYN City will utilize organic transportation to evacuate casualties from forward strongpoints to evacuation hospital facilities at ISPs within the appropriate defensive sector. CG, 7th FSSG in coordination with CG, 7th MAW (Forward), will provide for the ground and air MEDEVAC transportation of casualties from medical facilities in the ISPs and/or CSSAs to designated casualty receiving ships as required.
- (3) Casualties requiring longer-term or intensive care beyond the capability of local and/or ships medical units will be evacuated to the TAB. Provisions for such evacuation operations are contained in Appendix 3 (Medical Services) to Annex D (Logistics).

### (4) Casualty Overload

- (a) Designated elements of the Medical and Dental Bns will be prepared to furnish medical and dental officers and corpsmen with medical supplies and equipment to units experiencing casualty overload.
- (b) Priority of casualties in accordance with Medical Emergency Code Plan. See provisions contained in reference (c).
- (c) Emergency casualty evacuation will not be delayed for lack of complete medical records or other administrative procedures.
- (d) Evacuation destinations will be determined by CG, 7th FSSG, upon recommendation of the MAF medical officer; noneffectives will be evacuated as soon as beds become available and as directed while emergency lifesaving surgical casualties will be immediately evacuated via evacuation channels to casualty receiving ships.
- (e) In the event of nuclear attack, evacuation procedures will be implemented in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d).
- (5) Air Evacuation. See paragraphs 3.b.(1) and (2) and provisions for external support contained in Annex D (Logistics).

### (6) Evacuation Policy

- (a) The evacuation policy within the MAF area of influence is 5 days while the theater evacuation policy is 15 days.
- (b) POW casualties will be transported under guard through normal medical channels; provisions for POW evacuation are contained in reference (c).
- (c) Civilian casualty evacuation assistance will be provided by subordinate commands within capabilities, and augmentation of transportation will be provided by elements of 7th FSSG. Civilian casualties will be evacuated to the nearest civilian hospital, clinic, or aid station at DPRE centers. Details concerning evacuation and care of civilian casualties are contained in Annex G (Civil Affairs).

### c. Hospitalization

(1) Ship's Medical and Dental Facilities. See Annex P (Combat Service Support) and Appendix 3 (Medical Services) to Annex D (Logistics).

### (2) Medical Bn. 7th FSSG

- (a) Units will continue to provide care to MAF personnel at field hospital facilities within each CSSA.
- (b) Once established, detachments will provide emergency lifesaving and stabilization care at each of the ISPs shown in Appendix 2 (CSS Overlay).
- (3) Dental Bn, 7th FSSG. Units will continue to provide emergency dental and/or maxillofacial surgery support initially from each CSSA and later from the CSSAs and with detachments at the ISPs.
- (4) <u>Civilian</u>. Medical assistance will be provided in accordance with provisions contained in Annex G (Civil Affairs).

### (5) Prisoners of War

- (a) All POWs will receive preventive medical innoculations at the central collection compound and at overflow collection compounds at CSSA II and at RED Beach.
- (b) POWs will be hospitalized in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c).
- (c) Maximum use will be made of captured medical personnel, supplies, and equipment in the treatment of POWs.

### d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Establish provisional medical and dental emergency detachments in accordance with reference (c).
- (2) Collect medical intelligence in accordance with provisions contained in reference (c).
- (3) Provide markers on evacuation routes to designated BAS, ISP, and CSSA medical facilities.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

a. Administration. See Annex E (Personnel) and Appendix 4 (Reports) to Annex P (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81.

### b. Logistics

- (1) See Annex D (Logistics) and Annex P (Combat Service Support).
- (2) Elements of 7th FSSG will equip, supply, and provide transportation augmentation to medical detachments at the ISPs once established.
- (3) Whole blood distribution operations will continue out of each CSSA and stocks may be transported to the ISPs as directed by CG, 7th FSSG.

### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command Relationships. See Annex J (Command Relationships).
- Signal. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 7 (Engineer Support Plan) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)
  - (c) FMFM 4-4, Engineer Operations(d) ECP 4-4, Engineer Operations
  - (e) FM 20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations at the Company Level
  - (f) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Engineer Support (Constructive)
  - (g) Appendix 7 (Engineer Support Plan) to Annex P (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN 1-81

Time Zone: P

Task Organization: See Annex A (Task Organization).

### 1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Friendly Forces. See OPLAN 6-81, Appendix 10 (Operations Overlay) to Annex C (Operations) and Appendix 14 (Obstacle Plan) to Annex C (Operations).

#### 2. MISSION

Engineer elements of the 7th FSSG, 7th MAW (Forward), and 7th MARDIV will support VII MAF in implementing the obstacle plan and establishing strongpoints in the forward defense area; in completing expedient repairs and maintaining airfield and port facilities; and in performing essential engineer tasks within the MAF area of influence as required.

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. <u>Concept of Engineer Operations</u>. See Tab A (Concept of Engineer Operations).

#### b. Tasks

### (1) GOP Forces (TFs A and B)

- (a) Develop expedient obstacles in likely Aggressor avenues of approach.
- (b) Conduct such close engineering support as deemed necessary by each of the MCATF commanders; tasks may include:
  - Engineer reconnaissance within security zone.
  - Rigging bridges in the security zone for damage and/or demolition within capabilities.
  - 3 HLZs within security zone for MEDEVAC/resupply purposes.

### (2) 7th MARDIV

- (a) All remaining Combat Engineer assets will be deployed forward within assigned defensive sectors to provide supervision for the implementation of the obstacle plan and perform essential close engineering as required.
- (b) See Tab A (Concept of Engineer Operations) and Tab B (Major Tasks, Unit Assignments, and Priorities).

### (3) 7th MAW (Forward)

(a) WES elements will establish helicopter and V/STOL aircraft forward operating sites near the four ISPs. **C**...3

(b) See Tab A (Concept of Engineer Operations) and Tab B (Major Tasks, Unit Assignments, and Priorities).

### (4) 7th FSSG

- (a) Engineer assets will be deployed to conduct or to assist in the following tasks:
  - 1 Implementation of the obstacle plan.
  - Maintenance of MSRs between the CSSAs and CSS installations near or within the forward defense area.
  - 3 Engineering support in establishing ISPs.

- A Relocation of bulk fuel systems and establishment of new bulk fuel systems at the ISPs and within the CSSAs respectively.
- <u>5</u> Establishment of ferry/rafting system at GREEN Beach.
- Complete the expedient repair of and/or construction of airfield facilities at each of the airfields.
- 7 Maintaining port equipment and facilities.
- (b) See Tab A (Concept of Engineer Operations) and Tab B (Major Tasks, Unit Assignments, and Priorities).

### c. <u>Coordinating Instructions</u>

(1) Maintenance and improvements of roads and bridges will be based on priorities established in Tab B (Major Tasks, Unit Assignments, and Priorities).

### (2) Mines and Unexploded Ordnance

- (a) Records and required reports of mine emplacements will be in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e) and VII MAF SOP for Mine/Countermine Operations (Constructive).
- (b) Scatterable minefields will be reported ASAP.

#### (3) Demolitions

- (a) On order, major installations and facilities will be prepared for demolition. Demolitions will be prepared on southern sector LOCs to include each bridge spanning South River and the following sites:
  - $\underline{1}$  Cut and fill sections on roads within key avenues of approach.
  - 2 Railroad bridges.
  - Power plant and dam on South River reservoir.
  - 4 Airfield 2.
  - Sites and stocks within naval station and CSSA II that must be left behind.

(b) Other targets are included in the obstacle plan.

### (4) Water Supply

- (a) All available well digging and water purification equipment will be utilized to produce and store the maximum amount of potable water within the forward defense area and CSS installations.
- (b) Equipment augmentation will be required and requests have been provided for in Annex D (Logistics).
- (5) Maintenance and repair of indigenous airfield runways and construction of the main base at Airfield 2 will continue, however, repairs and/or construction operations will be limited to those absolutely necessary to keep runways functional until such time as the airfields become untenable and/or the threat to defensive forces has been neutralized.
- (6) Port rehabilitation and major construction will cease and only those maintenance and repair activities required to facilitate general offloading will continue in order that engineer assets within the CSSAs can be redeployed to assist in implementing the obstacle plan and in strongpoint development.
- (7) Railroad rolling stock will remain under MAF control and may be overturned and utilized as obstacles in the trace of major avenues of approach leading into key defended terrain and/or facilities.

- (8) Camouflage, deception, and dispersion of required defensive strongpoints, equipment, and CSS installations will be conducted by all subordinate commands with assistance provided by engineers within 7th MARDIV and 7th FSSG.
- (9) Utilization of indigenous labor will be authorized but will be controlled by elements of 4th CAG.
- (10) All uncovered indigenous construction materials and equipment will be requisitioned and used in the development of obstacles and the fortification of strongpoints.
- (11) Reports will be submitted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).

### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Class IV engineer construction materials will be stored in each CSSA, deployed forward as soon as feasible, and will be controlled in accordance with provisions contained in reference (f).
- b. See Appendix 1 (Concept of Combat Service Support).

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command
  - (1) See Annex J (Command Relationships).
  - (2) Command Posts. See Annex C (Operations).
- <u>Signal</u>. See Annex K (Communications-Electronics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### TABS:

STATES TO STATE STATES AND STATES STATES AND STATES AND

- A Concept of Engineer Operations
- B Major Tasks, Unit Assignments, and Priorities
- C Road and Bridge Plan
- D Airfield Development
- E Controlled Class IV Engineer Items (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

copies of Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

TAB A (Concept of Engineer Operations) to APPENDIX 7 (Engineer Support Plan) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthethic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

FMFM 4-4, Engineer Operations (b)

(c) ECP 4-4, Engineer Operations

(d) VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Engineer Support (Constructive)

#### Time Zone: P

#### 1. SUPPORT FOR GOP FORCES (TFs A and B)

- Elements of the 7th Cbt. Engr. Bn. will be attached to each MCATF a. to initially provide close combat engineering support in the deployment of the MCATFs to the GOPL.
- Once deployed, the MCATF's combat engineers will reconnoiter Aggressor likely avenues of approach and will be tasked with b. conducting countermobility operations within their capabilities. Such tasks will include the following:
  - (1) Install well placed standard pattern minefields.
  - Dig AT ditches and improve such obstacles or create new obstacles with wire entanglements and abatis.
  - Be prepared to contaminate open areas, within capabilities, with chemical minefields rigged for and detonated on command.
  - (4) Rig bridges within the security zone for demolition or damage by reducing structural integrity.
- HLZs within the security zone will require a minimum amount of С. preparation to accommodate selected classes of supply and helicopter landing sites. Such preparation will be accomplished by the LZ platoons within the HSTs that have been temporarily reinforced with least committed combat engineer squads from combat engineer elements remaining in the city.

#### 2. SUPPORT FOR 7th MARDIV

- a. Subordinate commands defending from the forward defense area will require heavy equipment support for the removal and/or displacement of rubble from assault actions within SYN City. Elements of 7th Cbt Engr Bn will be tasked with either removing the rubble within each regimental defensive sector or relocating the rubble to designated intersections to enhance or create obstacles intended to impede the advance of Aggressor forces successful in penetrating the FEBA.
- b. Subordinate commands operating south of South River must use each of the existing bridges spanning South River for administrative and logistic traffic as well as providing the primary means to cross the river in the event that orders are received to conduct retrograde operations or displace to locations in the northern part of the city. The bridges are prime targets for Aggressor air, artillery, and missile fires. Spanning the river with floating bridges is infeasible due to the width which is nearly constant to the dam. As an alternate means of crossing South River, the Bridge Co, 7th FSSG will utilize all available M4T6 bridge sections to establish Class 60 rafts near Bridge 1 to facilitate the movement of troops, supplies, and equipment across South River when required.
- c. Units defending the FEBA will require engineering assistance to deny Aggressors the utility of primary, secondary, and tertiary avenues of approach leading into designated defensive sectors. Elements of the 7th Cbt Engr Bn, reinforced with personnel from the NCR and engineers from 7th FSSG, will provide technical assistance to frontline combat units in implementing the obstacle plan within SYN City.
- d. Units defending the FEBA will require engineering support to fortify defensive strongpoints. The fortification of each building strongpoint will require the removal of flammables, cutting firing embrasures, installing wire mesh in windows and embrasures, creation of firing cells with sandbags, and creating internal ingress/egress routes. Elements of the 7th Cbt Engr Bn will develop each strongpoint; frontline combat units will assist by providing a labor force for the engineers to draw upon as required and truckloads of sand will be provided by elements of 7th FSSG from the beaches.
- e. Essential indigenous utility sources lay astride likely Aggressor avenues of approach. The utility of these facilities will be questionable if the Aggressors are successful in penetrating the FEBA. All subordinate commands will proceed on the assumption that indigenous electrical utility services will be damaged during the initial stages of defensive operations. Units should

P-7-A-2

make maximum use of organic power generators and additional Mobile Electric Power (MEP) resources within the Cbt Engr Bn will be used to fill gaps in requirements. Similarly, sewerage and water treatment plants may be rendered inoperable. Combat engineers will use all organic frame-mounted erdalators for the production of potable water which will be stored on position and at the ISPs. In addition, combat engineers will provide technical assistance and equipment to combat units within the forward defense area for the construction of expedient field latrines.

f. The well developed road network within the forward defense area will preclude extensive road development and maintenance operations; however, mechanized and artillery units will require larger turnaround areas and a number of dead end secondary roads will have to be linked to one another. The 7th Cbt Engr Bn will be capable of meeting anticipated LOC development requirements within the forward defense area. See Tab B (Major Tasks, Unit Assignments, and Priorities).

### 3. SUPPORT FOR 7th MAW (FORWARD)

- Each airfield will continue to be maintained by elements of the NCR and the WES until such time as the runways and operational facilities become untenable as a result of Aggressor supporting arms attacks.
- b. In the event that the airfields are damaged and orders have been issued for the redeployment of 7th MAW (Forward) to the TAB, the WES and elements of the NCR will establish V/STOL operating sites near the ISPs and expand HLZ capabilities in each of the CSSAs to accommodate the remaining forward based ACE.

### SUPPORT FOR 7th FSSG

**a**)

- a. Requirements for the establishment of ferrying services in subparagraph 2.b. apply equally for the continuous flow of logistic vehicular traffic between the two CSSAs and other locations north and south of South River.
- b. To disperse and provide a degree of security for supply stocks, ISPs will be developed near the forward defense area. Supplies will be stocked within or between buildings. The Engr. Spt. Bn, 7th FSSG will prepare these buildings to accommodate supplies by fortifying and reinforcing interior spaces and structural members, sealing a limited number of basements to accommodate bulk fuel, cutting large embrasures on the easternment face of the buildings enabling MHE to enter and exit interior spaces, and removing interior walls.

- c. Many of the same general engineering requirements for combat elements will be required to support CSS elements. Electrical source requirements will be met with organic MEP equipment. The same is true for the production and storage of potable water at CSS installations; organic equipment will meet the requirement.
- d. Bulk fuel engineer support requirements are contained in Appendix 5 (Bulk Fuel).
- e. LOC maintenance tasks are assigned in Tab B (Major Tasks, Unit Assignments, and Priorities).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

**f**... :

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

P-7-A-4

**VCLASSIFIED** 

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

TAB B (Major Tasks, Unit Assignments, and Priorities) to APPENDIX 7 (Engineer Support Plan) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

- (b) FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers' Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data
- (c) FMFM 4-4, Engineer Operations
- (d) ECP 4-4, Engineer Operations
- (e) FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support

Time Zone: P


### 1. RECAPITULATION OF TASKS WITHIN THE MAF AREA OF INFLUENCE


- a. Roads (Repair and Maintenance)
  - (1) See Tab C (Road Repair and Bridge Plan).
  - (2) Extensive LOC development will not be required within SYN City or in the security zone due to the existence of a well defined all-weather road net in the city and major highways that can be utilized outside of the city. Primary and secondary tactical and logistical traffic routes have been designated and numerous bypasses are available in the event that the designated routes become impassable. Modifications or improvements to the existing road nets will be minimal; tasks will be limited to expanding turnaround areas, continuing secondary roads through dead end areas, and clearing rubble/debris as a result of combat actions within the city. The magnitude of such efforts will be small and reinforced platoon sized units will be committed for this work upon approval of the MAF engineer.
  - (3) The following road modification, maintenance, and repair assignment are made and are ranked in order of priority:

<u>Priority</u>	Road(s)	<u>Unit Assigned</u>
1	5, 22, 21 6, HIGHWAY 4 9, 10, 11, 12 9, 27	7th Cbt Engr Bn 7th Cbt Eng Bn 7th Engr Spt Bn 7th Cbt Engr Bn
2	4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14	7th Engr Spt Bn
3	4, 3, 2, 1 12, 13 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 27, 25	7th Engr Spt Bn 7th Cbt Engr Bn 7th Cbt Engr Bn 7th Cbt Engr Bn

- b. Railroads. The MAF engineer has determined that repair and maintenance of the railroad system within SYN City will conflict with on-going strongpoint and CSS installation development and implementation of the obstacle plan. MAF engineer assets will not be committed to railroad repair unless it has been determined that certain types of rolling stock would be useful in establishing obstacles in the forward defense area; cars overturned and boobytrapped in street intersections. Repairs, in such a case, will be limited to those required to move rolling stock near its intended destination within capabilities; augmentation will be provided by cooperating civilian railroad workers.
- c. Bridges. Major bridges spanning North and South River will be subject to heavy bombardment at the outset of renewed hostilities within MAF area of influence. An effort will be made to keep the bridges operational as long as it is feasible to ensure the safety of units tasked with repair and maintenance of the bridges and until Class 60 ferrying rafts sections and naval landing craft are capable of transporting troops, equipment, and supplies across both North and South Rivers. The following prioritized repair and maintenance assignments are made; bridge locations are contained in Tab C (Road and Bridge Plan):

<u>Priority</u>	Bridge	Estimated Task Size	Unit Assigned
1	1, 3, 5	Co. (-)	7th Engr Spt Bn
2	6, 7, 8, 10	Plt. (+)	7th Engr Spt Bn
3	4, 9	Plt.	7th Engr Spt Bn
4	2	Plt. (+)	7th Engr Spt Bn





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

d. Airfield and Helicopter Operating Areas. Helicopter operating areas within SYN City will be restricted to designated HLZs. In the event that the airfields become untenable, V/STOL sites will be established or expanded near the ISPs and within the CSSAs. Each site will be located within shallow sloped, open terrain areas thereby reducing preparation requirements. V/STOL site preparation will require a minimum number of engineers and equipment from the WES and tasks can be completed within one day's time of the issuance of orders. See Tab D (Airfield Development).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981


Note: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

TAB C (Road and Bridge Plan) to APPENDIX 7 (Engineer Support Plan) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 4-4, Engineer Operations
(b) Enclosure 1 (Bridge Criteria) to TAB C (Road and Bridge Plan) to Appendix 7
(Engineer Support Plan) to Annex P (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN

Time Zone: P

- 1. Roads. All primary roads have 4 lanes with a minimum width of 3.5m per lane and are composed of asphaltic and macadam blacktop material. All secondary and trinary roads have 2 lanes, minimum width 3.5m per lane. Secondary roads in the vicinity of Old City (peninsula) are limited to 3 and 2.5m per lane. All secondary and trinary roads are composed of tar and imported gravel, macadam, and in certain areas of Old City cobblestone material.
- Bridges. Bridges in the FBH generally have a load capacity of 20T plus; see reference (b). Local materials will be used to the maximum extent in repair and reinforcement of bridges.



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOMES

5. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Enlef of Staff

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May 1981

TAB D (Airfield Development) to APPENDIX 7 (Engineer Support Plan) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) Map: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000

(b) FMFM 4-4, Engineer Operations (c) FMFM 5-4, Offensive Air Support

- (d) FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers' Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data
- (e) NWP 11-23, Civil Engineer Support Planning

Time Zone: P

# 1. REPAIR OF EXISTING FIELDS (Airfield 1)

- a. Emergency repairs to Airfield 1 have been completed and the airfield is currently fully operational. The arrival of sustaining repair material will be delayed until the threat to the MAF area of influence has been neutralized.
- b. Elements of the WES and NCR will continue to exploit construction material at coordinates E6-N7 to make expedient repairs to the airfield to ensure air operations continue uninterrupted now and to facilitate aircraft evacuation operations as directed if air operations out of Airfield 1 must be curtailed.
- c. Construction of aircraft revetments will continue until orders are received redirecting efforts to the construction of forward V/STOL operating sites.
- 2. <u>CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FIELDS</u>. New airfield construction, if required and ordered, will be conducted within the criteria for advanced base airfields and in accordance with provisions contained in reference (e).

#### 3. EAF

- a. Construction of a main base from the expanded V/STOL facility at Airfield 2 will continue until orders are received redirecting efforts to the construction of V/STOL forward operating sites.
- b. The corresponding expansion of support facilities and the development of aircraft revetments will continue and will only cease on order of CG, 7th FSSG and/or CG, VII MAF.

c. Inhabitants due west of the main base will be evacuated with the intent to provide room for the extension of the runway to 5,184 ft. and additional space provided for end zones.

#### 4. HELICOPTER FACILITIES

- a. A number of new HLZs have been selected and will be prepared inside the city and within the MAF security zone. A complete description of each is provided for in Appendix 10 (Helicopter Landing Zone Study) to Annex B (Intelligence).
- b. Only minimum site preparation will be required at each new HLZ to include the clearing of debris and vegetation. Clearing operations will be the task of the LZ platoons, with combat engineers attached, within each HST for HLZs outside of SYN City. Elements of the Eng. Spt. Bn. and/or combat engineers will clear new HLZs within SYN City.
- c. In the event that the airfields become untenable, elements of the WES, NCR, an Engr Spt Bn will establish V/STOL forward operating sites in open areas and/or parking lots near the ISPs and expand the HLZs within each CSSA to accommodate the Harrier and helicopter squadrons that will continue air operations from within SYN City. Sites will be selected with priority to areas where there is little overhead interference and ground preparations are minimal. The time available for V/STOL forward operating site preparation will be very short, therefore, only the minimum and essential facilities will be established at each site; forward arming and refueling points. Any surface preparations will be made using locally available construction materials as required.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

1 - EAF Diagram (Omitted)

2 - Minimum Short Airfield Configuration (Omitted)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

copies of Copy no. VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1981

APPENDIX 9 (Personnel) to ANNEX P (Combat Service Support) to Operation Plan 6-81

Ref: (a) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

(b) FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Draft)

(c)

- ECP 1-1, G-1 Manual
  VII MAF Standing Operating Procedures for Personnel (Construc-
- Appendix 9 (Personnel) to Annex P (Combat Service Support) to VII MAF OPLAN 6-81

Time Zone: P

A MANAGEM - BEDEVICES - MANAGEM - MANAGEM - BOTTONGS

## STRENGTHS

- The initial replacement draft at the TAB began phasing into the MAF area of influence on D+6 and has been used to reconstitute the MAF and to augment MP units in the performance of guard, escort, and traffic control functions.
- b. Personnel status reports will be submitted to this headquarters ACofS G-1) in accordance with provisions contained in references (d) and (e).
- Submit casualty reports on occurrence in accordance with reference (d).
- d. Submit routine, periodic personnel reports in accordance with provisions contained in references (d) and (e).

#### 2. REPLACEMENTS

- The replacement draft in Okinawa has been augmented to accommodate the anticipated replacement requirements in the MAF area of influence and will be incrementally transported to the TAB. There are currently 6,000 replacements staged either at the TAB or in Okinawa.
- Replacements will be available for individual assignment as the tactical situation permits based on status reports and air or sea-lift availability.

c. Submit emergency requisitions for key personnel as required by the tactical situation.

# 3. DISCIPLINE, LAW, ORDER

### a. <u>Discipline</u>

- (1) Special instructions regarding troop conduct within the MAF area of influence will be in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d) and unit SOP.
- (2) Offenses committed by personnel operating out of the TAB will be referred to CG, 7th MAW (Rear) or his designated representative. Base confinement facilities will be available for use as required.
- (3) Claims against the US arising out of activities of VII MAF personnel will be settled under the provisions of Foreign Claims Act (10 USC 2734) and the Judge Advocate General Manual.
- (4) Military justice will be in accordance with the UCMJ and manual for Courts-Martial.

## b. <u>Stragglers</u>

- (1) Straggler control is a command function, however, collection points will be maintained in the CSSAs and MPs operating out of roving patrols and/or checkpoints will redirect disoriented personnel to their parent units.
- (2) Sole survivors and Return To Duty (RTD) personnel that have been permanently separated their units will form provisional units and will be redeployed as directed by CG, 7th MARDIV.
- 4. PRISONERS OF WAR. See Appendix 1 (Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Other Detained Persons) to Annex E (Personnel).

#### 5. GRAVES REGISTRATION

- a. Collection points for the deceased will be maintained in each of the CSSAs and new collection points will be established at each of the ISPs.
- b. Commanders are responsible for the collection, identification, and evacuation, within capabilities, of the deceased to the ISPs and/or CSSAs as applicable. Elements of 7th FSSG will provide transportation augmentation as required to evacuate the remains of the deceased to the designated collection points. CG, 7th

FSSG will provide for or coordinate with CG, 7th MAW, transportation of the deceased from the collection points to designated assault shipping for further evacuation to the TAB.

- c. Subordinate units report location of temporary internment sites and/or holding facilities.
- d. See Appendix 2 (Mortuary Services) to Annex D (Logistics).

#### 6. MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES

#### a. Mail

- (1) CG, 7th FSSG in coordination with CG, 7th MAW will arrange for the transportation and delivery of mail within the MAF area of influence by the most expeditious means available.
- (2) Mail delivery at the TAB will be coordinated by CG, 7th MAW. The U.S. Postal Service will be utilized.
- (3) Ships' post offices will be available for casualties and other embarked MAF personnel.
- (4) Money orders service will be made available on paydays and free mailing privileges will be effective throughout the period of defensive operations.

#### b. Pay

- (1) Paydays will continue as scheduled by the MAF ACofS G-1.
- (2) Normal pay periods will continue for units operating out of the TAB.
- (3) Military Payment Certificates (MPC) will be issued in lieu of currency within the MAF area of influence.

#### c. Leave

- (1) Emergency leave will be authorized only by the MAF ACofS G-1.
- (2) Submit requests to this headquarters.

#### d. Exchange

(1) Ships' stores will be available for casualties and other embarked MAF personnel.

- (2) Select items will be provided as ration supplements throughout the period of defensive operations.
- (3) Naval and Air Force exchange facilities at the TAB will be available for the theater-based ACE and replacement draft personnel.

#### e. <u>Information</u>

- (1) Ships non-tactical communications will be available for casualties and other embarked MAF personnel.
- (2) A maximum effort will be made to keep all personnel informed about the progress of operations being conducted in southern Aggressorland as well as in other parts of the region. MAF newsheets will be distributed and posted near all CPs as the tactical situation permits.
- f. Awards. Awards will be recommended and bestowed in accordance with provisions contained in references (d) and (e).
- g. <u>Recreation</u>. Provisions for recreational services will be left to the discretion of each subordinate command.
- 7. <u>PERSONNEL PROCEDURES</u>. In accordance with provisions contained in references (d) and (e).
- 8. <u>INTERIOR MANAGEMENT</u>. CP operations will be conducted in accordance with provisions contained in reference (d) and unit SOPs.

# 9. CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

- a. The only requirement for civilian employees will be contracted civilian morticians operating out of the TAB under the direction of NRMC, Oakland.
- b. See Appendix 2 (Mortuary Services) to Annex D (Logistics).

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

**C**...

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, US Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Plan 6-81

P-9-4

# OUTLINE PLAN 7-81 OPERATION BREAKER SEVEN

#### MISSION SEVEN - DEFEND KEY SECTORS

THIS CONCEPT MAY BE EMPLOYED WHEN THE MARINE CORPS LF MISSION REQUIRES THAT ONLY A PORTION OF AN URBAN AREA BE HELD OR WHEN MARINE CORPS LF STRENGTH IS INSUFFICIENT TO ATTEMPT TO DEFEND THE ENTIRE AREA. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

## VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends SYN City with priority to Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; be prepared to support the landing and deployment of follow-on forces on or after D+30.

Note: Much of the data contained herein are identical to that in Operation Plan 6-81. Substantive changes are indicated by a line in the margin.

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981 HEI-80

Outline Plan 7-81 (Operation BREAKER SEVEN)

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation
  - (d) FMFM 6-1, Marine Division
  - (e) FMFM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operation
  - (f) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support
  - (g) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense
  - (h) FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Antimechanized Operations
  - (i) FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations
  - (j) JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas

Time Zone: P

<u>Task Organization</u>: No change to Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Plan 6-81.

#### 1. SITUATION

a. General. This outline plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by subordinate commands. This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. The unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.

#### b. Enemy Forces

(1) Enemy Situation. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present in the cit in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that

battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy casualties in personnel and equipment, and by D+10 they were destroyed or driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL. Those units range from 10 percent to 50 percent in combat efficiency. The principal threat to VII MAF stems from the advance of one MRD from the northwest and an airborne division and a second MRD advancing from the southwest. Those three divisions have advance elements about 150 km from SYN City at present.

(2) Enemy Capabilities. Aggressor remnants within SYN City are capable of conducting sniper and sapper attacks against VII MAF units and installations. The CSS areas are particularly vulnerable to those kinds of attacks. Aggressor personnel within the city are also capable of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information to the major units now advancing on the city. The scattered elements inside SYN City are believed to have at least seven operable, man-portable, surface-to-air missiles of the SA-7 type which can inhibit helicopter and low-level fixed-wing air operations over several sectors of the city. The civilian population in SYN City is growing increasingly restive, and civilians in large numbers are able to augment the MRB remnants and create situations that may require greater MAF involvement in security operations or adoption of stringent measures that can result in substantial civilian casualties. The elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH are believed to constitute one MRB and two half-strength MRRs. Tank, artillery, and AD units of that MRD are reported to be at from 10 percent to 50 percent of their initial strengths. These units are capable of harassing, delaying, or otherwise interferring with VII MAF GOP forces. In addition, they are capable of providing a reconnaissance screen or flank security for the march columns and significantly reinforcing the tank, artillery, and air defense fires of the three divisions now entering the region. The three divisions have the capability of closing the FBHL in about 48 hours and the FEBA in an additional 24 hours. They are well-protected by mobile antiaircraft weapon systems and have strong air The TAA providing their air support is able to establish air superiority over the battle zone when it launches a surge effort. The Aggressor forces are also able to launch an air assault by up to one airborne division, a heliborne assault by approximately one reinforced battalion, and a surface assault from ACVs by up to one light armored vehicle battalion. These types of assault could be conducted separately or simultaneously. The Aggressor forces have already demonstrated their capability for operating in a chemical warfare environment. They also have the

capability to initiate nuclear warfare and are well-trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

Indications. The physical deployment and movement of the three divisions toward SYN City strongly indicates that this is their objective. Low-level communication intercepts and interrogation of Aggressor POWs tend to confirm that evalua-The posture of the elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH area appears to support the deployment of the advancing divisions. Efforts to establish and maintain communications between the civilians and military remnants within the city and the major forces outside the city also suggest that expulsion of VII MAF from the SYN City beachhead is their objective. Deployment of ACVs in coastal areas north of SYN City gives the enemy the capability to launch surfaceborne assaults against VII MAF's seaward flanks. There are no immediate indications of a buildup for airborne assault, but the enemy is capable of deploying transport and supporting aircraft extremely fast; therefore, an airborne assault must be anticipated despite the lack of indications at present.

# c. Friendly Forces

- (1) TF 51 provides NGF support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphibious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.
- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.
- d. Attachments and Detachments. To be published separately.

#### e. <u>Assumptions</u>

- (1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforced.
- (2) That the three Aggressor divisions will be delayed sufficiently by friendly action so that they will require at least 48 hours to reach the FBHL/GOPL.

- (3) That MAF security forces will be capable of delaying the attackers for at least 24 hours between the GOPL and the FEBA.
- (4) That, aside from occasional isolated acts of sabotage, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, the population of SYN City will not rise en masse against elements of VII MAF.
- (5) That Aggressor forces and dissident civilian elements will not be able to prevent, completely, friendly resupply efforts.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends SYN City with priority to Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; we prepared to support the landing and deployment of follow-on forces on or after D+30.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. VII MAF will establish the GOP along the trace of the FBHL; the FEBA will be generally parallel to but just outside of the SYN City metropolitan boundary. The defense envisioned incorporates key elements of both the area and active The GOP forces will operate well-forward of the GOPL to detect, ambush, attack, and deceive the attacking forces as to the location and strength of the GOP and FEBA. All retrograde movements of the GOP will be accomplished by delaying actions designed to gain time for the FEBA forces to prepare the Forward Defense Area (FDA). The FDA will consist of infantry entrenchments in open terrain overlooking major avenues of approach, supported by overwatch positions manned by tank, antitank, and direct-fire artillery units. This area will include the first line of suburban structures which will provide supporting positions for the forward entrenchments. The main barrier system will be established forward of the FEBA, using buried mines and other obstacles. Key sectors are designated as (A) CSSA 1, (B) RED Beach area, (C) BLUE Beach area, and (D) Airfield 2. If the FEBA is driven back, a series of phase lines will be established to coordinate the delaying actions that will be necessary to gain time for FEBA forces to prepare the deliberate defense. Key sectors A (Port Area) and B (RED Beach and BSA) are vital and will be retained at all cost to assure that follow-on forces can be landed and deployed in accordance with the assigned mission. Key sectors C and D will be denied to the enemy in any event, since their occupation by Aggressor forces could make VII MAF's position untenable in the SYN City area.

**C** ...

 Planning Considerations. Combat actions in the security zone during the period D+11 to D+16 can be characterized as

a series of raid and delaying actions conducted from hastily prepared positions. The intent of such actions is not only to delay the advancing Aggressor columns but to canalize force concentrations into prepared killing zones. port such actions, combat engineers attached to each of the MCATFs will be required to install well placed standard pattern minefields, dig anti-tank ditches and improve these obstacles with wire entanglements and abatis, install chemical minefields with the intent to deny Aggressor use of tactically important terrain, and rig bridges within the security zone for demolition. Within the city, the outer fringe of structures includes buildings and homes that lend themselves to defensive operations and others that are either too fragile or too flammable to be used in the defense. Buildings that are useful to VII MAF in the defense will be used as strongpoints; other structures will be razed or rigged for demolition or booby traps in the event the enemy succeeds in occupying them. The phase lines and associated defensive positions inside the city will be selected to deny the Aggressor forces access to good LOCs or positions that give them an advantage in urban warfare, while simultaneously denying them key facilities that are important to VII MAF's accomplishment of the mission. Fallback to the phase lines will uncover Airfields 1 and 2, making them untenable to VII MAF for fixed-wing operations. In that event, all aircraft except V/STOL will have to be deployed to TABs. Counterbattery and air defense fires will have to be coordinated to support logistic resupply operations as the enemy forces close on SYN City and are able to bring indirect fires and increased air attacks against naval surface movements and logistic support areas. The continuing threat of NBC warfare will require that the greatest possible dispersion be maintained between all units of the

Plan of Supporting Fires. The details of supporting fires will be worked out during concurrent planning. Essentially, the MCATFs comprising the GOP will include self-propelled and towed artillery to provide long-range fires forward of the GOPL; these artillery units will revert to parent unit control after withdrawal of the GOP. The 10th Marines will occupy firing positions near the FEBA, initially, to support the withdrawal of the GOP and engage the Aggressor as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Artillery units will be prepared to engage Aggressor airborne or heliborne landing inside SYN City as well as ACV-landed forces in coastal areas. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) will prevail for the employment of all conventional and chemical air, ground, and naval fire support. Plans will be prepared for the use of tactical nuclear weapons outside of SYN City in the event their use is authorized.

#### b. Tasks

- (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A
  - (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1981.
  - (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the north and northwest.
  - (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
  - (d) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF CCC) timing for withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
  - (e) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA and delay the enemy for at least 24 hours.
  - (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of 7th MARDIV Reserve in accordance with Annex A (Task Organization) to OPLAN 6-81.

# (2) GOP Southern Sector, Task Force B

- (a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1981.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the VII MAF area of responsibility from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOPL as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Plan for and request, if necessary, the employment of reinforcements to assure that the enemy forces converging on SYN City from the NW and SW do not arrive within supporting arms range of the city simultaneously.

- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw in a series of delaying actions on order; delay the enemy forward of the FEBA for at least 24 hours.
- (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Southern Sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of VII MAF Reserve in accordance with Annex A (Task Organization) to OPLAN 6-81.

# (3) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

- (a) Provide units to GOP and MAF Reserve as directed.
- (b) Prepare blocking positions to protect Airfields 1 and 2, CSSAs, and Port Area.
- (c) Support withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not coverage simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (d) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.
- (e) Defend Phase Lines CUTLASS, SABER, and DAGGER on order.
- (f) Defend the Port Area in depth.
- (g) Notify this Headquarters of the deployment of division units to assigned blocking positions or the commitment of division reserves; contain major enemy penetrations for counterattacking force.
- (h) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (i) Prepare plans to deploy tanks, artillery, amphibious vehicles, and infantry between the northern and southern sectors, priority to the southern sector.
- (j) Prepare counterlanding plans to detect and destroy enemy airborne, heliborne, or ACV attacks in assigned TAORs.
- (k) Be prepared to deploy company to battalion-sized units with supporting fires to establish secure enclaves for the landing of supplies by landing craft or helicopter.

- (1) Be prepared to deploy reconnaissance teams inside SYN City to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.
- (m) Be prepared to support the evacuation/relocation of civilians from the immediate vicinity of the FEBA; these operations to be controlled and coordinated by CO, 4th CAG.

# (4) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 110001P May 1981; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Designate TADC as TACC at 110001P May 1981. Implement coordination of air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon Teams as requested.
- (d) Be prepared to redeploy fixed-wing squadrons to TABs and continue air operations therefrom in support of VII MAF, while continuing to operate V/STOL aircraft from sites within SYN City.

# (5) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

(a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed. 

- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of influence.
- (c) Be prepared to implant electronic intrusion devices as directed.
- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACVborne raiding forces.
- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, or other means of entry.
- (f) Submit recommendations for additional recon missions.

# (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.
- (b) On order, in coordination with 4th CAG, evacuate and relocate civilians from areas on or near the FEBA to locations to be designated.

### c. MAF Reserve

# (1) <u>1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein)</u>

- (a) Be prepared to assume operational control of the 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines, and conduct mobile strike force operations south of South River to destroy Aggressor forces forward of the FEBA.
- (b) Be prepared to attack Aggressor forces forward of the FEBA.
- (c) Prepare plans to deploy across South River to the Northern Sector; submit bridging, rafting, or other requirements to this Headquarters soonest. Be prepared to execute these plans on order.

# (2) 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines

- (a) Prepare supporting and blocking positions in coordination with 3rd Marines; be prepared to revert to OPCON of CO, 3rd Marines.
- (b) Be prepared to deploy by LVT to reinforce ground combat forces anywhere inside the FEBA.
- (c) Be prepared to counterattack enemy penetrations into urban/suburban areas.
- (d) Be prepared to relinquish OPCON of Co B (Rein), 1st AAV Bn, and deploy by helicopter to reinforce ground combat forces anywhere inside the FEBA.
- (e) Be prepared to chop to OPCON of 1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein) and conduct mobile strike force operations south of South River.

# d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Contact left to right.
- (2) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.
- (3) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern and southern sectors in such a manner as to deny the enemy the capability of converging his NW and SW forces simultaneously on SYN City.
- (4) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Aggressor airborne or heliborne attacks.
- (5) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (6) The code name for this defensive phase is BREAKER SEVEN.
- (7) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.
- (8) This plan is effective on order.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

(1) Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.

**(**"

(2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

#### b. Logistics

- Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability as well as to provide forward logistic sites near alternate defensive phase lines.
- (2) Conceptually, units in the forward defense area will maintain on position sufficient quantities of Class I and V to support intense combat expenditures for at least three days. An additional three days of all classes of supplies will be positioned to support three days of operations at ISPs on each succeeding phase line to the rear, so that FEBA forces can fall back onto prestocked supplies or use those stockpiles to support forward defense forces with a minimum of resupply effort.

- (3) CSSAs will be drawn down to provide stocks for the ISPs while simultaneously reducing the vulnerability of the CSSAs. Roughly 3 DOS will be maintained at each of the forward positions, ISPs and the balance of supplies (14 DOS) will be maintained at the CSSA.
- (4) A sea-based logistic system will be required to replenish the CSSAs and intermediate supply points.
- (5) Modifications in VII MAF logistic posture may be required to accommodate to the changing tactical situation.
- (6) Indigenous structures will be used whenever possible for storing supplies to deny the enemy observation and indirect fires and to protect supplies from pilferage and sabotage.
- (7) 7th MAW will recommend supply and maintenance levels at V/STOL operating sites.
- (8) Priority support will be accorded to 4th CAG in repairing and operating essential public works, utilities, and communications that contribute to the health and welfare of the populace and safe guard VII MAF from health hazards and civil uprisings.
- (9) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.
- (10) The 34,250 civilians currently in DPRE assembly areas plus possibly an additional 30,000 evacuees will require billeting and other logistic support.
- (11) Maximum support will be accorded to indigenous firefighting units.
- (12) Supplies required for relief of civilian distress will be accorded a high priority; local SYN City representatives will distribute civilian emergency supplies.
- (13) Maximum possible use will be made of civilian labor in rear areas.

### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Charles and the Control of the Contr

#### a. <u>Command Relationships</u>

(1) Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.

- (2) CG, 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.
- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of influence will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.
- (4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow-on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

#### b. <u>Signal</u>

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Commanding


#### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Operations Overlay
- 2 Logistics Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling Copy no \_ \_\_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 1 (Operations Overlay) to Outline Plan 7-81 (Outline BREAKER SEVEN)



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to II MAF SQP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830 May, 1981

#### ENCLOSURE 2 (Logistics Overlay) to Outline Plan 7-81 (Operation BREAKER SEVEN)

Time Zone: P



★ TENTATIVE LOCATION OF ISPs

NOTE FORWARD POSITIONAL STOCKAGE POINTS NOT SHOWN

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION. Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

#### **OUTLINE PLAN 8-81**

#### **OPERATION BREAKER EIGHT**

#### MISSION EIGHT - ENTRAP AND AMBUSH

THIS CONCEPT REQUIRES THE PREPARATION OF A SERIES OF BLOCKING AND AMBUSH POSITIONS ALONG MAJOR ARTERIES LEADING THROUGH THE URBAN AREA (AND)... WOULD BE PREFERRED WHEN THE DEFENDER LACKS REQUISITE STRENGTH TO MAN ORGANIZED DEFENSE IN-DEPTH POSITIONS. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

#### VII MAF MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed: a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

Note: Much of the data contained herein are identical to that in Operation Plan 6-81 and Outline Plan 7-81. Substantive changes are indicated in the margin.

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981 **ZUT-62** 

Outline Plan 8-81 (Operation BREAKER EIGHT)

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action (c) FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation

(d) FMFM 6-1, Marine Division

(e) FMFM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations

(f) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support (g) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense

(h) FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Antimechanized Operations

(i) FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations

(j) JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas

Time Zone: P

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization) to VII MAF OPLAN 6-81 as modified herein.

#### 1. SITUATION

General. This outline plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by subordinate commands. This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. The unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.

#### Enemy Forces ь.

(1) Enemy Situation. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present

ながんなななななが、一般のではないできません。

in the city in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy casualties in personnel and equipment, and by D+10 they were destroyed or driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL. Those units range from 10% to 50% in combat efficiency. The principal threat to VII MAF stems from the advance of one MRD from the northwest and an airborne division and a second MRD advancing from the southwest. Those three divisions have advance elements about 150 km from SYN City at present.

(2) Enemy Capabilities. Aggressor remnants within SYN City are capable of conducting sniper and sapper attacks against VII MAF units and installations. The CSS areas are particularly vulnerable to those kinds of attacks. Aggressor personnel within the city are also capable of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information to the major units now advancing on the city. The scattered elements inside SYN City are believed to have at least seven operable, manportable, surface-to-air missiles of the SA-7 type which can inhibit helicopter and low-level fixed-wing air operations over several sectors of the city. The civilian population in SYN City is growing increasingly restive, and civilians in large numbers are able to augment the MRB remnants and create situations that may require greater MAF involvement in internal security operations or adoption of stringent measures that can result in substantial civilian casualties. The elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH are believed to constitute one MRB and two half-strength MRRs. Tank, artillery, and AD units of that MRD are reported to be at from 10% to 50% of their initial strengths. These units are capable of harassing, delaying, or otherwise interfering with VII MAF GOP forces. In addition, they are capable of providing a reconnaissance screen or flank security for the march columns and significantly reinforcing the tank, artillery, and air defense fires of the three divisions now entering the region. The three divisions have the capability of closing the FBHL in about 48 hours and the FEBA in an additional 24 hours. They are well-protected by mobile antiaircraft weapons sytems and have strong air cover.

The TAA providing their air support is able to establish air superiority over the battle zone when it launches a surge effort. The Aggressor forces are also able to launch an air assault by up to one airborne division, a heliborne assault by approximately one reinforced battalion, and a surface assault from ACVs by up to one light armored vehicle battalion. These types of assault could be conducted

separately or simultaneously. The Aggressor forces have already demonstrated their capability for operating in a chemical warfare environment. They also have the capability to initiate nuclear warfare and are well-trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

Indications. The physical deployment and movement of the three divisions toward SYN City strongly indicates that this is their objective. Low-level communication intercepts and interrogation of Aggressor POWs tend to confirm that The posture of the elements of the MRD that evaluation. were driven out of the FBH area appears to support the deployment of the advancing divisions. Efforts to establish and maintain communications between the civilians and military remnants within the city and the major forces outside the city also suggest that expulsion of VII MAF from the SYN City beachhead is their objective. Deployment of ACVs in coastal areas north of SYN City gives the enemy the capability to launch surfaceborne assaults against VII MAFs seaward flanks. There are no immediate indications of a buildup for airborne assault, but the enemy is capable of deploying transport and supporting aircraft extremely fast; therefore, an airborne assault must be anticipated despite the lack of indications at present.

# c. Friendly Forces

COURT DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPE

- TF 51 provides NGF support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphibious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.
- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.
- d. Attachments and Detachments. On order, 2nd Tank BN will be attached to 7th MARDIV.

#### e. <u>Assumptions</u>

(1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforced.

- (2) That the three Aggressor divisions will be delayed sufficiently by friendly action so that they will require at least 48 hours to reach the FBHL/GOPL.
- (3) That MAF security forces will be capable of delaying the attackers for at least 24 hours between the GOPL and the FEBA.
- (4) That forces in the FDA will be able to stop enemy attackers forward of the FEBA except in those areas designated as ambush routes herein, or by subordinate commands.
- (5) That, aside from occasional isolated acts of sabotage, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, the population of SYN City will not rise en masse against elements of VII MAF.
- (6) That Aggressor forces and dissident civilian elements will not be able to prevent, completely, friendly resupply efforts.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed; a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

f. ...

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. <u>Concept of Operations</u>. VII MAF will establish the GOPL along the trace of the FBHL, with GOP forces operating as far forward of that line as possible. GOP forces will be charged with delaying the enemy by at least 48 hours forward of the GOPL and, in conjunction with GOP forces, an additional 24 hours between the GOPL and FEBA. The FEBA will be established generally along the metropolitan boundary of SYN City in the outer fringe of structures.

Extensive minefields, antitank ditches, roadblocks, and other obstacles will be installed to help protect the FDA and canalize hostile elements along designated ambush routes. VII MAF will establish a major ambush route in each of the two defensive sectors. CG, 7th MARDIV and his subordinate commanders will designate such additional ambush routes and killing zones as they deem appropriate and within their capabilities to initiate effectively. Houses, buildings, and other structures on the FEBA or within killing zones not required by 7th MARDIV will be barricaded to prevent entry, thereby assuring that the Aggressor personnel cannot take cover inside those structures. Structures that are particularly vulnerable to machinegun or other direct or

indirect fires will not be barricaded but will be booby trapped and covered by observation and fire. Mortar and artillery fires will be planned for and used extensively to stop penetrations and seal off the enemy forces. Heavy use of close air support is contemplated for attacking and destroying the enemy along the two major ambush routes. Smaller-scale penetrations will require greater reliance on the use of mortars, direct-fire supporting weapons and infantry counterattack. VII MAF will not retain a MAF Reserve but will keep a string on an infantry battalion in each of the two defensive sectors in the event that MAF intercession in the ground action becomes advisable.

- Planning Considerations. Delaying the enemy well-forward of the FEBA for a substantial period of time is essential to the success of the mission. At ditches enhanced with wire entanglements and abatis, bridges rigged for demolition, and selected implantation of deliberate minefields, both actual and dummy, will be required in the GOP to help gain that essential time. Conversely, the barrier system forward of the FEBA will require virtually all of the standard mines available to canalize the enemy along ambush routes and to impede their progress at the designated points. Allocation of these limited resources must be carefully balanced to meet competing needs. Any major penetration in the southern sector will threaten Airfield 2. A defense in depth with strong mobile reserves will be required in the vicinity of that airfield to provide adequate defense. Airfield 1 is exposed and can easily be interdicted by the enemy as soon as the GOP is penetrated. Although continued operation of the field can be rendered untenable, thereby forcing VII MAF to evacuate all fixed-wing aircraft to TABs, the field can be denied to the enemy by direct and indirect fires. area in the northern sector that best lends itself to a major ambush route/killing zone is the northern industrial which, if penetrated successfully by Aggressor forces, provides ready access to the vital port area. Strong blocking positions will be required in-depth east of that area to stop any penetration or to support friendly forces defending Airfield 1. Counterbattery and air defense fires will have to be coordinated to support logistic resupply operations as the enemy forces close on SYN City and are able to bring indirect fires and increased air attacks against naval surface movements and logistic support areas. The continuing threat of NBC warfare will require that the greatest possible dispersion be maintained between all units of the MAF.
- (2) Plan of Supporting Fires. The details of supporting fires will be worked out during concurrent planning. Essentially, the MCATFs comprising the GOP will include self-propelled

and towed artillery to provide long-range fires forward of the GOPL; these artillery units will revert to parent unit control after withdrawal of the GOP. The 10th Marines will occupy firing positions near the FEBA, initially, to support the withdrawal of the GOP and engage the Aggressor as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Artillery units will be prepared to engage Aggressor airborne or heliborne landing inside SYN City as well as ACV-landed forces in coastal areas. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) will prevail for the employment of all conventional and chemical air, ground and naval fire support. Plans will be prepared for the use of tactical nuclear weapons outside of SYN City in the event their use is authorized. As a matter of priority, all units will prepare fire plans in support of ambush and entrapment operations that are envisioned in their defensive sectors.

#### b. Tasks

- (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A
  - (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1981.
  - (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the north and northwest.
  - (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
  - (d) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
  - (e) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA and delay the enemy for at least 24 hours.
  - (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission chop to OPCON of CG, 7th MARDIV.
- (2) GOP Southern Sector: Task Force B
  - (a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1981.

- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the VII MAF area of influence from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOPL as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Plan for and request, if necessary, the employment of reinforcements to assure that the enemy forces converging on SYN City form the NW and SW do not arrive within supporting arms range of the city simultaneously.
- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw in a series of delaying actions on order; delay the enemy forward of the FEBA for at least 24 hours.
- (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Southern Sector mission, revert to OPCON of CG, 7th MARDIV.

# (3) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

- (a) Provide units to GOP as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to chop to VII MAF OPCON a battalion in each defensive sector for employment as MAF Reserve.
- (c) Prepare blocking positions to protect Airfields 1 and 2, CSSAs, and Port Area.
- (d) Support withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not converge simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (e) Plan for ambush and entrapment operations in each battalion sector; submit concepts for support plans and additional requirements soonest.
- (f) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.
- (q) Defend the Port Area in depth.

- (h) Notify this Headquarters of the deployment of division units to assigned blocking positions or the commitment of division reserves.
- (i) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (j) Prepare plans to deploy tanks, artillery, amphibious vehicles, and infantry between the northern and southern sectors, priority to the southern sector.
- (k) Prepare counterlanding plans to detect and destroy enemy airborne, heliborne, or ACV attacks in assigned TAORs.
- Be prepared to deploy company to battalion-sized units with supporting fires to establish secure enclaves for the landing of supplies by landing craft, or helicopter.
- (m) Be prepared to deploy reconnaissance teams inside SYN City to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.
- (n) Be prepared to support the evacuation/relocation of civilians from the immediate vicinity of the FEBA; these operations to be controlled and coordinated by CO, 4th CAG.

#### (4) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 110001P May 1981; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Designate TADC as TACC at 110001P May 1981. Implement coordination of air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon Teams as requested.
- (d) Be prepared to redeploy fixed-wing squadrons to TABs and continue air operations therefore in support of VII MAF, while continuing to operate V/STOL aircraft from sites within SYN City.
- (e) Be prepared to attack enemy forces along major ambush routes and in ambush killing zones using attack helicopters, AV-8Bs, and fixed-wing aircraft from TABs.

# (5) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

- (a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of interest.
- (c) Be prepared to implant electronic intrusion devices as directed.
- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACV-borne raiding forces.
- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, or other means of entry.
- (f) Submit recommendations for additional recon missions.

# (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.
- (b) On order, in coordination with 4th CAG, evacuate and relocate civilians from areas on or near the FEBA to locations to be designated.
- c. MAF Reserve. 7th MARDIV will designate one battalion in each defensive sector for possible assignment to VII MAF as a reserve force, if required. Tasks will be assigned to designated units by frag order.

# d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Contact left to right.
- (2) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.
- (3) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern and southern sectors in such a manner as to deny the enemy the capability of converging his NW and SW forces simultaneously on SYN City.

- (4) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Aggressor airborne or heliborne attacks.
- (5) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (6) Preparations for ambush/entrapment will commence immediately and the concepts and fire support plans will be consolidated at each level of command above battalion and forwarded to this Headquarters by 7th MARDIV.
- (7) Every effort will be made to stop the Aggressor forces forward of the FDA without permitting penetration of the FEBA; failure to do so will necessitate defending key positions in the subsector under attack in order that the enemy will be guided into ambush routes and ambush killing zones.
- (8) The code name for this defensive phase is BREAKER EIGHT.
- (9) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.
- (10) This plan is effective on order.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- (1) Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.
- (2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

#### b. Logistics

- (1) Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability as well as to provide forward logistic sites near alternate defensive phase lines.
- (2) Conceptually, units in the forward defense area will maintain on position sufficient quantities of Class I and V to support intense combat expenditures for at least three days. An additional three days of all classes of supplies will be positioned to support three days of operations at ISPs on each succeeding phase line to the rear, so that FEBA forces can fall back onto prestocked supplies or use those

- stockpiles to support forward defense forces with a minimum of resupply effort.
- (3) CSSAs will be drawn down to provide stocks for the ISPs while simultaneously reducing the vulnerability of the CSSAs. Roughly 3 DOS will be maintained at each of the forward positions, ISPs and the balance of supplies (14 DOS) will be maintained at the CSSA.
- (4) Supply stocks will not be established in or near assumed penetrations or ambush routes. Stocks and CSS activities that are currently near assumed penetration areas south of South River will be incrementally relocated to ISP 4.
- (5) A sea-based logistic system will be required to replenish the CSSAs and intermediate supply points.
- (6) Modifications in VII MAF logistic posture may be required to accommodate to the changing tactical situation.
- (7) Indigenous structures will be used whenever possible for storing supplies to deny the enemy observation and indirect fires and to protect supplies from pilferage and sabotage.
- (8) 7th MAW will recommend supply and maintenance levels at V/STOL operating sites.
- (9) Priority support will be accorded to 4th CAG in repairing and operating essential public works, utilities, and communications that contribute to the health and welfare of the populace and safeguard VII MAF from health hazards and civil uprisings.
- (10) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.
- (11) The 34,250 civilians currently in DPRE assembly areas plus possibly an additional 30,000 evacuees will require billeting and other logistic support.
- (12) Maximum support will be accorded to indigenous firefighting units.
- (13) Supplies required for relief of civilian distress will be accorded a high priority; local SYN City representatives will distribute civilian emergency supplies.
- (14) Maximum possible use will be made of civilian labor in rear areas.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

# a. Command Relationships

- (1) Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.
- (2) CG 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.
- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of influence will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.
- (4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow-on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

#### b. <u>Signal</u>

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Commanding 

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Operations Overlay
- 2 Logistics Overlay


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

Copy no. \_\_\_of\_\_\_copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

ENCLOSURE 1 (Operations Overlay) to Outline Plan 8-81 (Operation BREAKER EIGHT)

Time Zone: P



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830 May, 1981

#### ENCLOSURE 2 (Logistics Overlay) to Outline Plan 8-81 (Operation BREAKER EIGHT)

Time Zone: P



\* TENTATIVE LOCATION OF ISPs

NOTE: FORWARD POSITIONAL STOCKAGE POINTS NOT SHOWN

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

# OUTLINE PLAN 9-81 OPERATION BREAKER NINE

#### MISSION NINE - DEFENSE IN DEPTH

DEFENSE IN DEPTH WILL GENERALLY BE CONSIDERED WHEN THE ENEMY POSSESSES ARMOR AND THERE ARE ADEQUATE ARMOR AVENUES OF APPROACH AVAILABLE. THIS CONCEPT REQUIRES THE LOCATING OF STRONGPOINTS IN DEPTH ALONG ARTERIES LEADING INTO THE CITY. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

#### VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed; a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter be prepared to attack to the northwest.

Copy no. \_\_of \_\_copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981 CXZ-38

Outline Plan 9-81 (Operation BREAKER NINE)

See VII MAF OPLAN 6-81 (Operation BREAKER SIX). At MAF level these two plans are virtually identical.

See following page for General Considerations.

General Considerations. Outline Plan 9-81 (Operation BREAKER NINE) is based on defense inside the city and it is virtually identical at MAF level to VII MAF OPLAN 6-81 (Operation BREAKER SIX), which calls for a defense in depth. The two missions are similar in that they require VII MAF to defend in place until follow-on forces are landed. The principal differences between the two plans are these: Operation Plan 6-81 specifies defensive priorities for the Port Area, CSSAs, and Airfield 2 whereas Outline Plan 9-81 does not list any priority areas but does state that the MAF is to be prepared to continue the attack to the northwest after follow-on forces have landed and deployed. The configuration of SYN City influences the defensive posture and limits the tactical and logistical options that can seriously be considered at MAF level. The Aggressor's substantial superiority in armor, artillery, and air defense weapon systems militates in favor of establishing the main defense inside the metropolitan boundaries of the city to take advantage of the cover, concealment, and defensive compartmentalization of the urban area. The requirement that VII MAF defend the port city to permit the landing and deployment of follow-on forces makes it necessary to provide for the defense of key areas, which, from the MAF viewpoint, are the same for a defense inside the city (See OH 8-7, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)) and for defense in depth (See USMC Study SCN 30-77-01). It should be noted that a defense in depth can be employed in any defensive concept if sufficient forces are available to achieve the desired depth.

Planning and preparing for the defensive battle against numerically superior forces will require the full attention of all VII MAF planners. The nature and duration of the urban combat cannot be predicted with any confidence at this time; therefore, specific planning for continuing the attack to the northwest will be undertaken later. In this context, the MAF plan requires no elaboration except to alert subordinate units to the need for being prepared to continue the attack (some 30-or-more days in the future). Stating this alert in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of paragraph 3 (EXECUTION) is considered to be sufficient at this time.

Tactical Considerations. The GOPL will be established along the trace of the FBHL because that line has already been secured and it constitutes the most defensible terrain in the immediate area. Although key defensive areas are not specified by higher authority in this mission, defense of the Port Area, CSSAs, and Airfield 2 is a deduced mission; their retention is essential for accomplishment of the stated mission. In all respects the tactical and logistical concepts are the same at MAF level for these specific missions (6-81 and 9-81) in the SYN City FBH.

# OUTLINE PLAN 10-81 OPERATION BREAKER TEN

#### MISSION 10 - MOBILE DEFENSE

MOBILE DEFENSE WOULD BE CONSIDERED IF . . . THE MARINE CORPS LF IS CHARGED WITH DEFENDING AND RETAINING AN URBAN AREA AGAINST A SUPERIOR FORCE OR THE SIZE OF THE URBAN AREA EXCEEDS THE LF CAPABILITY TO ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE ALONG THE FEBA. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

## VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed, a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

NOTE: Much of the data contained herein are identical to that in Outline Plan 8-81 (Entrapment and Ambush). Substantive changes are indicated in the margin.

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force VII MAF SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981 INE-75

Outline Plan 10-81 (Operation BREAKER TEN)

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense
  - (d) JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas
  - (e) LFM 04/NWP 17, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

Time Zone: P

<u>Task Organization</u>: Annex A (Task Organization) to VII MAF OPLAN 6-81 as modified herein.

#### 1. SITUATION

General. This outline plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by subordinate commands. This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10, the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN The unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.

## b. **Enemy Forces**

(1) Enemy Situation. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present in the city in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy casualties in personnel and equipment, and by D+10 they were destroyed or

driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL. Those units range from 10% to 50% in combat efficiency. The principal threat to VII MAF stems from the advance of one MRD from the northwest and an airborne division on a second MRD advancing from the southwest. Those three divisions have advance elements about 150 km from SYN City at present.

Enemy Capabilities. Aggressor remnants within SYN City are capable of conducting sniper and sapper attacks against VII MAF units and installations. The CSS areas are particularly vulnerable to those kinds of attacks. Aggressor personnel within the city are also capable of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information to the major units now advancing on the city. The scattered elements inside SYN City are believed to have at least seven operable, man-portable, surface-to-air missiles of the SA-7 type which can inhibit helicopter and low-level fixed-wing air operations over several sectors of the city. The civilian population in SYN City is growing increasingly restive, and civilians in large numbers are able to augment the MRB remanants and create situations that may require greater MAF involvement in security operations or adoption of stringent measures that can result in substantial civilian casualties. The elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH are believed to constitute one MRB and two half-strength MRRs. Tank, artillery, and AD units of the MRD are reported to be at from 10% to 50% of their initial strengths. These units are capable of harassing, delaying, or otherwise interferring with VII MAF GOP forces. In addition, they are capable of providing a reconnaissance screen or flank security for the march columns and significantly reinforcing the tank, artillery, and air defense fires of the three divisions now entering the region. The three divisions have the capability of closing the FBHL in about 48 hours and the FEBA in an additional 24 hours. They are well-protected by mobile anti-aircraft weapon systems and have strong air cover. The TAA providing their air support is able to establish air superiority over the battle zone when it launches a surge effort. The Aggressor forces are also able to launch an air assault by up to one airborne divisions, a heliborne assault by approximately one reinforced battalion, and a surface assault from ACVs by up to one light armored vehicle battal-These types of assault could be conducted separately or simultaneously. The Aggressor forces have already demonstrated their capability for operating in a chemical warfare They also have the capability to initiate nuclear warfare and are well-trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

K. . . . . .

では、これのながない。これでは、これでは、これのながられている。

(3) Indications. The physical deployment and movement of the three divisions toward SYN City strongly indicates that this is their objective. Low-level communication intercepts and interrogation of Aggressor POWs tend to confirm that evalua-The posture of the elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH area appears to support the deployment of the advancing divisions. Efforts to establish and maintain communications between the civilians and military remnants within the city and the major forces outside the city also suggest that expulsion of VII MAF from the SYN City beachhead is their objective. Deployment of ACVs in coastal areas north of SYN City gives the enemy the capability to launch surfaceborne assaults against VII MAF's seaward flanks. There are no immediate indications of a buildup for airborne assault, but the enemy is capable of deploying transport and supporting aircraft extremely fast; therefore, an airborne assault must be anticipated despite the lack of indications at present.

## c. Friendly Forces

- (1) TF 51 provides NGF support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphibious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.
- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.
- d. Attachments and Detachments. On order, 2nd Tank Bn will be attached to 7th MARDIV.

#### e. Assumptions

- (1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforced.
- (2) That the three Aggressor divisions will be delayed sufficiently by friendly action so that they will require at least 48 hours to reach the FBHL/GOPL.

- (3) That MAF security forces will be capable of delaying the attackers for at least 24 hours between the GOPL and the FEBA.
- (4) That forces in the FDA will be able to stop enemy attackers forward of the FEBA except in those areas designated as assumed penetrations.
- (5) That Aggressor forces and dissident civilian elements will not be able to prevent, completely, friendly resupply efforts.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed; a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

## 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. VII MAF will establish the GOPL along the a. All forces assigned will be mobile or trace of the FBHL. mounted. Task Forces ALPHA and BRAVO will defend the northern and southern sectors of the GOP for a minimum of 48 hours, but the two TFs will NOT be withdrawn at the same time. GOP operations will be conducted so as not to permit the enemy to close on the FEBA simultaneously from the NW and SW. Any GOP withdrawals will be accomplished as delaying actions emphasizing counterattacks by mobile strike forces. The GOP and other security forces will be tasked to delay the enemy for at least an additional 24 hours between the GOP and FEBA to gain time for preparation of the FDA. The FEBA will be established generally along the metropolitan boundary of SYN City in the outer fringe of structures. Extensive minefields, antitank ditches, roadblocks, and other obstacles will be installed to help protect the FDA and canalize hostile elements into assumed penetrations. Three such assumed penetrations will be designated by VII MAF along the axes of the main avenues of approach from the northwest, west, and southwest. Strongpoints, obstacles, direct fire weapons will be sited to stop enemy thrusts in each of the assumed penetrations. Requisite mobile strike forces will be comprised of the reinforced tank battalions after they have completed their missions as the northern and southern sector GOPs. A mounted infantry battalion (-) will also be available as a mobile reserve for commitment against penetrations that occur in built-up areas where tanks cannot be employed effectively in the northern sector.

- The GOP must be maintained for at Planning Considerations. least 48 hours without suffering significant losses and without becoming decisively engaged. Armor assets assigned to the GOP will be the nucleus of the mobile strike forces inside the FEBA, and any losses exceeding 10% to 20% of the armor in the security zone will severely limit the combat power of the strike forces. The requirements that the Aggressor forces be delayed at least 48 hours in front of the FBHL and another 24 hours between the GOP and FEBA, and that the enemy attacking from the NW and SW not be permitted to converge simultaneously on SYN City may make it necessary to reinforce one or both sectors of the GOP. Once the GOPL is engaged in force by the enemy, maximum air support will be required to inflict casualties on the attackers, protect the GOP forces, and gain additional time. That air support will be needed at the same time that Airfields 1 and 2 will be preparing for evacuation of fixed-wing aircraft, thus making it imperative that air support and redeployment operations be carefully coordinated to prevent a diminution Air defense operations will also in vital air support. require careful coordination because of the anticipated surge effort by the Aggressor TAA at this time. effort will be needed at the same time to assure that supply stocks are built up to the required levels.
- (2) Plan of Supporting Fires. The details of supporting fires will be worked out during concurrent planning. Essentially, the MCATFs comprising the GOP will include self-propelled and towed artillery to provide long-range fires forward of the GOPL; these artillery units will revert to parent unit control after withdrawl of the GOP. The 10th Marines will occupy firing positions near the FEBA, initially, to support the withdrawal of the GOP and engage the Aggressor as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Artillery units will be prepared to engage Aggressor airborne or heliborne landing inside SYN City as well as ACV-landed forces in coastal areas. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) will prevail for the employment of all conventional and chemical air, ground, and naval fire support. Plans will be prepared for the use of tactical nuclear weapons outside of SYN City in the event their use is authorized.

#### b. Tasks

Contraction of the Contraction o

. .

- (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A
  - (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 2600001P May 1981.

- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the north and northwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) any requirements for reinforcements, if necessary, to assure continuity of the GOP for at least 48 hours and/or additional delay time that might be directed to prevent the Aggressor forces attacking from the NW from closing the FEBA simultaneously with enemy forces advancing from the SW.
- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
- (f) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA and delay the enemy for at least 24 hours.
- (g) Subsequent to termination of GOP northern sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of VII MAF Reserve as directed.

## (2) GOP Southern Sector: Task Force B

- (a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1981.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the VII MAF area of influence from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOPL as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Plan for and request, if necessary, the employment of reinforcements to assure that the enemy forces converging on SYN City from the NW and SW do not arrive within supporting arms range of the city simultaneously.

10-6

- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw in a series of delaying actions on order; delay the enemy forward of the FEBA for at least 24 hours.
- (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP southern sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of VII MAF Reserve as directed.

## (3) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

- (a) Provide units to GOP and MAF Reserve, as directed.
- (b) Prepare blocking positions to protect Airfields 1 and 2, CSSAs, and Port Area.
- (c) Support withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not converge simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (d) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.
- (e) Defend the Port Area in depth.
- (f) Notify this Headquarters of the deployment of division units to assigned blocking positions or the commitment of division reserves; contain major enemy penetrations for counterattacking force.
- (g) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (h) Prepare counterlanding plans to detect and destroy enemy airborne, heliborne, or ACV attacks in assigned TAORs.
- (i) Be prepared to deploy company to battalion-sized units with supporting fires to establish secure enclaves for the landing of supplies by landing craft or helicopter.
- (j) Be prepared to deploy reconnaissance teams inside SYN City to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.
- (k) Be prepared to support the evacuation/relocation of civilians from the immediate vicinity of the FEBA;

these operations to be controlled and coordinated by CO, 4th CAG.

#### (4) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 110001P May 1981; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Designate TADC as TACC at 110001P May 1981. Implement coordination of air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon Teams as requested.
- (d) Be prepared to redeploy fixed-wing squadrons to TABs and continue air operations therefrom in support of VII MAF, while continuing to operate V/STOL aircraft from sites within SYN City.

## (5) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

- (a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of influence.
- (c) Be prepared to implant electronic intrusion devices as directed.

Annual may

- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACV-borne raiding forces.
- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, or other means of entry.
- (f) Submit recommendations for additional recommissions.

#### (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.
- (b) On order, in coordination with 4th CAG, evacuate and relocate civilians from areas on or near the FEBA to locations to be designated.

10-8

#### c. MAF Reserve

- (1) 2nd Tank Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (a) Provide one tank company and an AT platoon to 2nd Bn, 1st Marines (Strike Force).
  - (b) In coordination with the 1st Marines, prepare plans to counterattack Aggressor forces in assumed penetration X-RAY.
  - (c) Prepare blocking positions south and east of Penetration X-RAY.
  - (d) Be prepared to conduct mobile strike force operations in the vicinity of Airfield 1.
- (2) 2nd Bn, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)
  - (a) Provide a reinforced rifle company to the 2nd Tank Bn Strike Force.
  - (b) In coordination with the 2nd Marines, prepare plans to counterattack Aggressor forces in assumed penetration YOKE.
  - (c) Prepare blocking positions on the northern flank of Penetration YOKE.
  - (d) Be prepared to dismount and conduct house-to-house clearing operations in the urban area within Penetration YOKE.
  - (e) Be prepared to chop to the OPCON of the 2nd Marines.
- (3) 1st Bank Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (a) Assume OPCON of 3/2; Co B (Rein), 1st AAV Bn; and a combat engineer platoon, to be designated.
  - (b) In coordination with the 3rd Marines, prepare plans to counterattack Aggressor forces in assumed penetration ZULU.
  - (c) Prepare blocking positions on the western flank of Penetration YOKE.
  - (d) Be prepared to conduct mobile strike force operations anywhere south of South River, with priority to Penetration ZULU and Airfield 2.

## d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Contact left to right.
- (2) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.
- (3) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern and southern sectors in such a manner as to deny the enemy the capability of converging his NW and SW forces simultaneously on SYN City.
- (4) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Aggressor airborne and heliborne attacks.
- (5) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (6) Priority of fires initially to GOP, thereafter to committed mobile strike forces. All other fires according to SOP unless otherwise directed.
- (7) DIRLAUTH between MAF Reserves and associated 7th MARDIV units.
- (8) The code name for this defensive phase is BREAKER TEN.
- (9) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.

(10) This plan is effective on order.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- (1) Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.
- (2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

#### b. Logistics

- (1) Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability as well as to provide forward logistic sites near alternate defensive phase lines. Supply stocks and CSS activities near assumed penetration ZULU will be relocated to ISP 4.
- (2) Conceptually, units in the forward defense area will maintain on position sufficient quantities of Class I and V to

10-10

Advisor Describes and Control of the Control of the

support intense combat expenditures for at least three days. An additional three days of all classes of supplies will be positioned to support three days of operations at ISPs on each succeeding phase line to the rear, so that FEBA forces can fall back onto prestocked supplies or use those stockpiles to support forward defense forces with a minimum of resupply effort.

- (3) CSSAs will be drawn down to provide stocks for the ISPs while simultaneously reducing the vulnerability of the CSSAs. Roughly 3 DOS will be maintained at each of the forward positions, ISPs, and the balance of supplies (14 DOS) will be maintained at the CSSA.
- (4) A sea-based logistic system will be required to replenish the CSSAs and intermediate supply points.
- (5) Modifications in VII MAF logistic posture may be required to accommodate to the changing tactical situation.
- (6) Indigenous structures will be used whenever possible for storing supplies to deny the enemy observation and indirect fires and to protect supplies from pilferage and sabatoge.
- (7) 7th MAW will recommend supply and maintenance levels at V/STOL operating sites.
- (8) Priority support will be accorded to 4th CAG in repairing and operating essential public works, utilities, and communications that contribute to the health and welfare of the populace and safeguard VII MAF from health hazards and civil uprisings.
- (9) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.
- (10) The 34,250 civilians currently in DPRE assembly areas plus possibly an additional 30,000 evacuees will require billeting and other logistic support.
- (11) Maximum support will be accorded to indigenous firefighting units.
- (12) Supplies required for relief of civilian distress will be accorded a high priority; local SYN City representatives will distribute civilian emergency supplies.
- (13) Maximum possible use will be made of civilian labor in rear areas.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

## a. <u>Command Relationships</u>

- (1) Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.
- (2) CG, 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.
- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of influence will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.
- (4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow-on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

#### b. Signal

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Commanding 

#### Enclosures:

- 1 Operations Overlay
- 2 Logistics Overlay


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

10-12

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no.\_\_\_of\_\_\_copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

## ENCLOSURE 1 (Operations Overlay) to Outline Plan 10-81 (Operation BREAKER TEN)



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE. Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830 May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 2 (Logistics Overlay) to Outline Plan 10-81 (Operation BREAKER TEN)

Time Zone: P



★ TENTATIVE LOCATION OF ISPs

NOTE: FORWARD POSITIONAL STOCKAGE POINTS NOT SHOWN

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION. Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

# OUTLINE PLAN 11-81 OPERATION BREAKER ELEVEN

#### MISSION ELEVEN - DEFENSE OUTSIDE THE CITY

THIS CONCEPT MAY BE ADOPTED WHEN THE TERRAIN SURROUND-ING AN URBAN AREA OFFERS ADVANTAGE TO THE DEFENDER AND THE MARINE CORPS LF IS OF SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO ORGANIZE A DEFENSE OUTSIDE THE CITY. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

#### VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends FBHL to protect the approaches to SYN City from infiltration and attack until follow-on forces are landed and deployed a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter be prepared to attack to the northwest.

Note: Some of the data contained herein are similar or identical to that in VII MAF OPLAN 6-81 and Outline Plans 7-81 through 10-81. Substantive changes are indicated in the margins. It should further be noted that Outline Plan 11-81-Defense Outside the City--is, in effect, a mobile defense that does not significantly involve urban combat. Logistic and civil affairs functions would be conducted in the city much like those described in VII MAF OPLAN 6-81, but with considerably less MAF interface.

of Copy no. copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

Outline Plan 11-81 (Operation BREAKER ELEVEN)

- Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense (c)

  - JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas LFM 04/NWP 17, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

Time Zone: P

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization) to VII MAF OPLAN 6-81 as modified herein.

#### 1. SITUATION

General. This outline plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by subordinate commands. This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.

#### **Enemy Forces** Ь.

Enemy Situation. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present in the city in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy casualties in personnel and equipment, and by D+10 they were destroyed or driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL.

Those units range from 10 percent to 50 percent in combat efficiency. The principal threat to VII MAF stems from the advance of one MRD from the northwest and an airborne division on a second MRD advancing from the southwest. Those three divisions have advance elements about 150 km from SYN City at present.

(2) Enemy Capabilities. Aggressor remnants within SYN City are capable of conducting sniper and sapper attacks against VII MAF units and installations. The CSS areas are particularly vulnerable to those kinds of attacks. Aggressor personnel within the city are also capable of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information to the major units now advancing on the city. The scattered elements inside SYN City are believed to have at least seven operable, man-portable, surface-to-air missiles of the SA-7 type which can inhibit helicopter and low-level fixed-wing air operations over several sectors of the city. The civilian population in SYN City is growing increasingly restive, and civilians in large numbers are able to augment the MRB remnants and create situations that may require greater MAF involvement in internal security operations or adoption of stringent measures that can result in substantial civilian casualties. The elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH are believed to constitute one MRB and two half-strength MRRs. Tank, artillery, and AD units of that MRD are reported to be at from 10 percent to 50 percent of their initial strengths. units are capable of harassing, delaying, or otherwise interferring with VII MAF GOP forces. In addition, they are capable of providing a reconnaissance screen or flank security for the march columns and significantly reinforcing the tank, artillery, and air defense fires of the three divisions now entering the region. The three divisions have the capability of closing the FBHL in about 48 hours and the FEBA in an additional 24 hours. They are well-protected by mobile antiaircraft weapon systems and have strong air The TAA providing their air support is able to establish air superiority over the battle zone when it launches a surge effort. The Aggressor forces are also able to launch an air assault by up to one airborne division, a heliborne assault by approximately one reinforced battalion, and a surface assault from ACVs by up to one light armored vehicle battalion. These types of assault could be conducted separately or simultaneously. The Aggressor forces have already demonstrated their capability for operating in a chemical warfare environment. They also have the capability to initiate nuclear warfare and are well-trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

12.3

(3) Indications. The physical deployment and movement of the three divisions toward SYN City strongly indicates that this is their objective. Low-level communication intercepts and interrogation of Aggressor POWs tend to confirm that evalua-The posture of the elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH area appears to support the deployment of the advancing divisions. Efforts to establish and maintain communications between the civilians and military remnants within the city and the major forces outside the city also suggest that expulsion of VII MAF from the SYN City beachhead is their objective. Deployment of ACVs in coastal areas north of SYN City gives the enemy the capability to launch surfaceborne assaults against VII MAF's seaward flanks. There are no immediate indications of a buildup for airborne assault, but the enemy is capable of deploying transport and supporting aircraft extremely fast; therefore, an airborne assault must be anticipated despite the lack of indications at present.

## c. Friendly Forces

- (1) TF 51 provides NGF support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphibious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.
- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.
- d. Attachments and Detachments. In accordance with tasking delineated in paragraph 3. below.

#### e. Assumptions

- (1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforced.
- (2) That the lead elements of the advancing Aggressor divisions will not be able to close the GOP for at least 24 hours.
- (3) That GOP forces will be able to delay the attackers by at least 24 hours in front of the GOPL, an additional 24 hours on or near the GOP, and another 24 hours between the GOPL and FEBA.

(4) That the civilian population of SYN City will not create problems of sufficient magnitude to interfere significantly with VII MAF defensive operations.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends the FBHL to protect the approaches to SYN City from infiltration and attack until follow-on forces are landed and deployed, a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. VII MAF will establish the FEBA along the a. trace of the current FBHL, destroy enemy pockets of resistance forward of the FEBA to a distance of about 50 km to establish the GOPL, and operate to destroy the enemy forward of the FEBA by war of maneuver and massive application of fire power. The GOP will consist of three elements; a tank-heavy task force covering the northern sector that blocks the northern flank and major avenue of approach from the NW, a light recon task force covering the central massifs and South River fault, and a tank-heavy task force covering the southern flank and major avenue of approach The GOP will receive priority helicopter support from the SW. for maintaining OPs, supporting deep reconnaissance, and providing CSS including casualty evacuation. The GOP will engage the enemy at the maximum distance possible using offensive action, ambushes, and spoiling attacks to stop the enemy and defeat or Tank teams, supported by GOP artillery and aircraft delay him. from SYN City fields and TABs, will be responsible for delaying the enemy forward of the FEBA for at least 24 hours after initial contact and for another 48 hours before the enemy can close the The great distances involved and the preponderant strength of the Aggressor forces makes it necessary to rely on a war of movement with highly mobile security forces having substantial fire power. Six infantry battalions will establish the FEBA, improving the positions currently being developed along the FBHL with priority to the dominating terrain at the NW and SW valleys which constitute the major avenues of approach to SYN City. The barrier system will be installed primarily in those two avenues Forces manning the FEBA will support withdrawal of of approach. the GOP and endeavor to stop the attackers well-forward of the If the FEBA is penetrated, units not directly threatened will continue to defend in sector. On order, units coming under direct attack will fight a series of delaying actions to occupy supplementary positions astride assumed penetrations NORTH STAR and SOUTHERN CROSS, thereby canalizing the Aggressor forces. Mobile strike forces, constituted from the MCATFs that initially functioned as the northern and southern sector GOP forces, will counterattack the penetrations to destroy or eject the enemy.

Conceptually, the enemy will be engaged well-forward and at no time will he be permitted to establish positions within directfire-range of SYN City.

- (1) Planning Considerations. Delaying the enemy well-forward of the FEBA for a substantial period of time is essential to the success of the mission. Extensive use of scatterable mines and selected implantation of deliberate minefields, both actual and dummy, will be required in the GOP. The great distances involved, however, limit the utility of mining in view of the comparatively limited supply of mines. Large quantities of scatterable mines will be required beginning when the GOP is engaged by enemy forces, but priority for use of those mines will be accorded to the FDA forces because the terrain is more suitable for their use along the FEBA. Tentatively, 15 percent of the scatterable mines will be made available to the GOP and 85 percent will be reserved for use in support of the FDA. Air defense of GOP forces will require that HAWK Assault Fire Units (AFUs) be deployed well-forward of the FEBA and within 10 to 15 km of the GUP in both major avenues of approach. A HAWK battery (-) will be needed in the SW avenue of approach near the FEBA to thicken the AD fires in that vulnerable area. It is essential, however, that maximum overlap of HAWK coverage be obtained in the approaches to and over SYN City. Airfields 1 and 2 will require strong AD protection to assure uninterrupted air support operations from those two Mobile strike force positions and supplementary positions for FDA units astride assumed penetrations will have to be prepared before the enemy closes the FEBA. units operating inside SYN City will be responsible for their own security. It is premature to begin planning for a continuation of the attack to the NW at this time; therefore, broad guidance for concurrent offensive planning will be provided by VII MAF after the defensive battle has been joined and the situation with respect to the enemy and VII MAF has been clarified. In the interim, all units will strive to maintain a tactical and logistical posture that will accommodate offensive requirements while giving priority to the mission at hand, defending the SYN City beachhead.
- (2) Plan of Supporting Fires. The wide-open terrain forward of the FEBA lends itself to artillery raids, and defensive plans will incorporate the employment of helilifted artillery forward of the GOPL when feasible and when those operations offer good chances for deceiving the enemy or inflicting significant casualties. GOP artillery will include all of the 8" SP howitzers and a mix of 155mm SP and towed howitzers. Artillery will be positioned as near the GOP as

possible to achieve the greatest possible range consistent with good artillery practices. Echelonment to the rear of artillery units will be controlled by the Northern and Southern Sector GOP commanders. Artillery positions within the FEBA will be well-forward to achieve the best possible range advantage and cover the assumed penetrations. gunfire will be limited to coastal regions. Air support operations will be in accordance with SOP. nuclear targets are targets of opportunity. If the use of tactical nuclear weapons is approved by the NCA, nuclear fires will be conducted in accordance with SOP. No nuclear fires will be directed at the Aggressor city located 90km Chemical weapons may be employed as SSW of SYN City. required outside the metropolitan limits of SYN City and outside the limits of the nearby communities. Use of chemical weapons inside civilian-occupied areas will be in strict accordance with the ROE promulgated in VII MAF OPLAN 1-81.

#### b. Tasks

- (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A
  - (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1981.
  - (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of influence from the north and northwest.
  - (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties with prudent risk and without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy after initial contact for at least 24 hours forward of the GOP, 24 additional hours on or near the GOP, and at least 24 more hours between the GOP and FEBA.
  - (d) Maintain observation over coastal mountain area, swamp and bog area to the east.
  - (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for commencing withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
  - (f) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA using ambush and counterattack tactics to the maximum possible degree.
  - (g) Be prepared to receive reinforcements to help gain additional delay time and prevent enemy forces in the NW from converging on the FEBA simultaneously with those attacking from the SW.

(h) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission, detach units as directed and assume the mission of VII MAF Reserve/Northern Strike Force.

## (2) GOP Southern Sector: Recon Task Force

- (a) Establish central sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1981.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor activities and movements toward or within sector; coordinate and direct air attacks against any enemy troop concentrations.
- (c) Outpost the South River fault to detect and report any Aggressor movements down the river.
- (d) Be prepared to maintain the central sector GOP after withdrawal of the GOP forces in the northern and southern sectors; recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the central sector GOP; withdraw on order.

## (3) GOP Southern Sector: Task Force B

- (a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1981.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties with prudent risk and without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy after initial contact for at least 24 hours forward of the GOP, 24 additional hours on or near the GOP, and at least 24 more hours between the GOP and FEBA.
- (d) Maintain observation over the palisades and coast.
- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for commencing withdrawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
- (f) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA using ambush and counterattack tactics to the maximum possible degree.

- (g) Be prepared to request and receive reinforcements to help gain additional delay time and prevent enemy forces in the SW from converging on the FEBA simultaneously with those attacking from the NW.
- (h) Subsequent to termination of the GOP Northern Sector mission, detach units as directed and assume mission of MAF Reserve/Southern Strike Force.

## (4) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

- (a) Provide units to GOP and MAF Reserve as directed; be prepared to furnish additional mobile reinforcements to the northern or southern sectors of the GOP, or both sectors if required, on order.
- (b) Prepare obstacles and blocking positions astride assumed penetrations NORTH STAR and SOUTHERN CROSS.
- (c) Support the withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not coverage simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (d) Prepare plans to counter enemy surface landings by ACV or landing craft anywhere along the coast within the FEBA.
- (e) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.
- (f) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (g) Be prepared to deploy countersniper/countersapper teams in urban/suburban areas to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.

#### (5) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 251300P May 1981; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Coordinate air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon teams as requested.

- (d) Provide HAWK Assault Fire Unit (AFU) support to the northern and southern sectors of the GOP.
- (e) Provide FAAD teams to GOP forces as directed; resume OPCON of those teams after GOP sectors withdraw.
- (f) Be prepared, temporarily, to redeploy selected fixedwing squadrons from Airfields 1 or 2 to TABs in the event either airfield is damaged sufficiently to limit air operations; restore the airfield(s) to full operating capacity expeditiously.
- (g) Be prepared to conduct tactical nuclear strikes against targets of opportunity forward of the FEBA.

## (6) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

- (a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of influence.
- (c) Be prepared to implant electronic intrusion devices as directed.
- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACVborne raiding forces.
- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, or other means of entry.
- (f) Submit recommendations for additional recon missions.
- (7) <u>7th Force Service Support Group</u>. Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.

### c. MAF Reserve

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY O

- (1) 1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (a) Establish blocking positions NW of SYN City.
  - (b) Be prepared to attack Aggressor forces anywhere in the northern sector within the FEBA.

- (c) Be prepared to attack and destroy Aggressor forces within Penetration NORTH STAR; coordinate with 1st Marines.
- (2) 2nd Tank Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (a) Establish blocking positions SW of SYN City.
  - (b) Be prepared to attack Aggressor forces anywhere in the southern sector within the FEBA.
  - (c) Be prepared to attack and destroy Aggressor forces within Penetration SOUTHERN CROSS; coordinate with 3rd Marines.

## d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern, central, and southern sectors in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from converging on the FEBA simultaneously from the NW and SW.
- (2) Priority of air support initially to southern sector GOP.
- (3) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Aggressor airborne or heliborne attacks; open areas behind the FEBA and within SYN City are particularly vulnerable; CG, 7th MARDIV coordinates all planning and operations within the FEBA.
- (4) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (5) Report all scatterable mining through fire support channels as the mining occurs and the specific locations of the seeded minefields are known.
- (6) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.
- (7) The code name for this defensive phase is BREAKER ELEVEN.
- (8) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.
- (9) This plan is effective on order.
- (10) Be prepared to commence detailed concurrent planning to attack to the NW, upon receipt of guidance from this Head-quarters.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.
- (2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

#### b. Logistics

- (1) GOP CSSEs will carry 3 DOS of Classes I, III, and V and such amounts of other classes as deemed necessary by GOP commanders; replenishment of GOP sectors will be accomplished daily until the respective GOP sector is engaged and recommends imminent withdrawal. Resupply thereafter as requested.
- (2) Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established in each regimental sector behind the FEBA to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability; ISPs will contain 3 DOS of all classes.
- (3) CSSAs 1 and 2 will be expanded to contain 20 DOS; resupply for the GOP will be provided directly from the supporting CSSA.
- (4) Priority of engineer effort to maintaining and repairing Airfields 1 and 2; second priority to operating the Port Area.
- (5) Civil Affairs logistic support in accordance with current directives; no further evacuation/relocation of civilians is contemplated; the 34,000 DPRE now in assembly areas will continue to receive emergency relief food supplies from VII MAF as administered by designated indigenous officials and agencies.
- (6) VII MAF support of public utilities and public safety activities will continue under current directives with minimum-essential MAF support and maximum reliance on indigenous agencies and personnel.
- (7) To the maximum extent feasible, the railroads will be used to support the three sectors of the GOP and FEBA and reduce reliance on organic transportation.
- (8) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.

## 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

## a. <u>Command Relationships</u>

- (1) Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.
- (2) CG, 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.
- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of influence will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.
- (4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow-on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

## b. <u>Signal</u>

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Commanding

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Operations Overlay
- 2 Logistics Overlay


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no.\_\_of.\_\_copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 1 (Operations Overlay) of Outline Plan 11-81 (Operation BREAKER ELEVEN)





\*To pinpoint and convert a coordinate from the map listed as reference (a) on this map, add 91.15 to the E coordinate and 91.5 to the N coordinate

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)


Note: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981

ENCLOSURE 2 (Logistics Overlay) to Outline Plan 11-81 (Operation BREAKER ELEVEN)

Time Zone: P

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

UNCLASSIFIED

## CONCEPT PLAN 6-88 OPERATION MID-BREAKER SIX

#### MISSION 2

INNER DEFENSE LOCATIONS ARE SELECTED WHEN HOSTILE FORCES ARE ESPECIALLY STRONG IN LONG-RANGE FIRES FROM ARMOR AND ARTILLERY AND THE DEFENDER WISHES TO LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE FIRES. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

## VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force; with priority to Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; until follow-on forces are landed.

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988 OMW-49

Concept Plan 6-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER SIX)

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense
  - (d) JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas
  - (e) LFM 04/NWP 17, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

TIME ZONE:

#### •

#### 1. SITUATION

- General. This concept plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by sub-This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated ordinate commands. format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. The unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.
- b. <u>Enemy Forces.</u> Annex B (Intelligence).

## c. Friendly Forces

- (1) TF 51 provides NGF support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.

- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.
- d. Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

## e. <u>Assumptions</u>

- (1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforced.
- (2) That the three Aggressor divisions will be delayed sufficiently by friendly action so that they will require at least 48 hours to reach the FBHL/GOPL.
- (3) That MAF security forces will be capable of delaying the attackers for at least 24 hours between the GOPL and the FEBA.
- (4) That aside from occasional isolated acts of sabotage, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, the population of SYN City will not rise en masse against elements of VII MAF.
- (5) That Aggressor forces and dissident civilian elements will not be able to prevent, completely, friendly resupply efforts.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force; with priority to the Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; until follow-on forces are landed.

#### 3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations. Annex C (Operations). VII MAF will establish the GOP along the trace of the FBHL; the FEBA will be inside the city because of the enemy's numerically superior fire-power. The defense envisioned incorporates key elements of both the area and active defenses. GOP forces will consist of two MCATFs, one providing security north of South River (the northern sector), and the other operating south of South River (the southern sector). Their mission will be to find, fix, and fight the leading elements of the Aggressor forces, cause premature deployment of the main bodies, inflict maximum casualties, deceive the

6-88-2

enemy as to the actual location of VII MAF's security zone and main defensive positions, and gain time for establishment of the deliberate defense of SYN City.

- (1) <u>Planning Considerations</u>. Annex C (Operations).
- <u>Plan of Supporting Fires</u>. The details of supporting fires will be worked out during concurrent planning. Essentially, the MCATFs comprising the GOP will include self-propelled and towed artillery to provide long-range fires forward of the GOPL; these artillery units will revert to parent unit control after withdrawal of the GOP. The 10th Marines will occupy firing positions near the FEBA, initially, to support the withdrawal of the GOP and engage the Aggressor as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Artillery units will be prepared to engage Aggressor airborne or heliborne landing inside SYN City as well as ACV-landed forces in coastal areas. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) will prevail for the employment of all conventional and chemical air, ground, and naval fire support. Plans will be prepared for the use of tactical nuclear weapons outside of SYN City in the event their use is authorized.

#### b. Tasks

**a** 

ののでは、10mmので

- (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A
  - (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1988.
  - (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the north and northwest.
  - (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
  - (d) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
  - (e) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA and delay the enemy for at least 24 hours.
  - (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of

7th MARDIV Reserve in accordance with Annex A (Task Organization).

#### (2) GOP Southern Sector, Task Force B

- (a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1988.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the VII MAF area of responsibility from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOPL as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Plan for and request, if necessary, the employment of reinforcements to assure that the enemy forces converging on SYN City from the NW and SW do not arrive within supporting arms range of the city simultaneously.
- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw in a series of delaying actions on order; delay the enemy forward of the FEBA for at least 24 hours.
- (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Southern Sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of VII MAF Reserve in accordance with Annex A (Task Organization).

# (3) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

CONTRACTOR AND STATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PR

- (a) Provide units to GOP and MAF Reserve in accordance with Annex A (Task Organization).
- (b) Prepare blocking positions to protect Airfields 1 and 2, CSSAs, and Port Area.
- (c) Support withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not coverge simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (d) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.

6 - 88 - 4

- (e) Defend the Port Area in depth.
- (f) Notify this Headquarters of the deployment of division units to assigned blocking positions or the commitment of division reserves; contain major enemy penetrations for counterattacking force.
- (g) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (h) Prepare plans for light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP; submit plans and requests for helicopter and aviation support soonest; be prepared to execute plans on order.
- (i) Prepare plans to deploy tanks, artillery, light armored vehicles, amphibious vehicles, and infantry between the northern and southern sectors, priority to the southern sector.
- (j) Prepare counterlanding plans to detect and destroy enemy airborne, heliborne, or ACV attacks in assigned TAORs.
- (k) Be prepared to deploy company to battalion-sized units with supporting fires to establish secure enclaves for the landing of supplies by landing craft, LCAC, or helicopter.
- (1) Be prepared to deploy reconnaissance teams inside SYN City to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.
- (m) Be prepared to support the evacuation/relocation of civilians from the immediate vicinity of the FEBA; these operations to be controlled and coordinated by CO. 4th CAG.

#### (4) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 110001P May 1988; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Designate TADC as TACC at 110001P May 1988. Implement coordination of air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon Teams as requested.

- (d) Be prepared to redeploy fixed-wing squadrons to TABs and continue air operations therefrom in support of VII MAF, while continuing to operate V/STOL aircraft from sites within SYN City.
- (e) On order, support light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP.

#### (5) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

- (a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of interest
- (c) Be prepared to implant electronic intrusion devices as directed.
- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACV-borne raiding forces.
- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, or other means of entry.
- (f) Submit recommendations for additional recon missions.

## (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.
- (b) On order, in coordination with 4th CAG, evacuate and relocate civilians from areas on or near the FEBA to locations to be designated.

#### c. MAF Reserve

#### (1) 7th Light Armored Assault Bn (Rein)

- (a) Be prepared to deploy overland or by helicopter to reinforce the GOP in the northern or southern sector.
- (b) Prepare plans to deploy elements by helicopter to conduct light armored raids against enemy flanks, rear, or CSS elements.

6-88-6

UN ASSIFIED

- (c) Prepare blocking positions along main avenues of approach to the southern sector, in coordination with the 3rd Marines; be prepared to block and counterattack Aggressor penetrations into the southern sector FEBA.
- (d) Be prepared for commitment anywhere within the FEBA.

#### (2) <u>lst Tank Bn (-) (Rein)</u>

- (a) Be prepared to assume operational control of the 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines, and conduct mobile strike force operations south of South River to destroy Aggressor forces forward of the FEBA
- (b) Be prepared to attack Aggressor forces forward of the FEBA.
- (c) Prepare plans to deploy across South River to the Northern Sector; submit bridging, rafting, or other requirements to this Headquarters soonest. Be prepared to execute these plans on order.

#### (3) 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines

- (a) Prepare supporting and blocking positions in coordination with 3rd Marines; be prepared to revert to OPCON of CO, 3rd Marines.
- (b) Be prepared to deploy by LVT to reinforce ground combat forces anywhere inside the FEBA.
- (c) Be prepared to counterattack enemy penetrations into urban/suburban areas.
- (d) Be prepared to relinquish OPCON of Co B (Rein), 1st AAV Bn, and deploy by helicopter to reinforce ground combat forces anywhere inside the FEBA.
- (e) Be prepared to chop to OPCON of 1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein) and conduct mobile strike force operations south of South River.

#### d. Coordinating Instructions

| 「日本のでは、 | 日本のでは、 | 日本のできる。 | 日本のできる。

- (1) Contact left to right.
- (2) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.
- (3) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern and southern sectors in such a manner as to deny the enemy the

6-88-7

# **UNCLASSIFIED**

capability of converging his NW and SW forces simultaneously on SYN City.

- (4) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Agressor airborne or heliborne attacks.
- (5) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (6) The code name for this defensive phase is MID-BREAKER SIX.
- (7) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.
- (8) This plan is effective on order.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- (1) Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.
- (2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

#### b. Logistics

THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF

- (1) Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability as well as to provide forward logistic sites near alternate defensive phase lines.
- (2) Conceptually, units in the forward defense area will maintain on position sufficient quantities of Class I and V to support intense combat expenditures for at least three days. An additional three days of all classes of supplies will be positioned to support three days of operations at ISPs on each succeeding phase line to the rear, so that FEBA forces can fall back onto prestocked supplies or use those stockpiles to support forward defense forces with a minimum of resupply effort.
- (3) CSSAs will be drawn down to provide stocks for the ISPs while simultaneously reducing the vulnerability of the CSSAs. Roughly 3 DOS will be maintained at each of the forward positions, ISPs and the balance of supplies (14 DOS) will be maintained at the CSSA.
- (4) A sea-based logistic system will be required to replenish the CSSAs and intermediate supply points.

6-88-8

- (5) Modifications in VII MAF logistic posture may be required to accommodate to the changing tactical situation.
- (6) Indigenous structures will be used whenever possible for storing supplies to deny the enemy observation and indirect fires and to protect supplies from pilferage and sabotage.
- (7) 7th MAW will recommend supply and maintenance levels at V/STOL operating sites.
- (8) Priority support will be accorded to 4th CAG in repairing and operating essential public works, utilities, and communications that contribute to the health and welfare of the populace and safeguard VII MAF from health hazards and civil uprisings.
- (9) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.
- (10) The 34,250 civilians currently in DPRE assembly areas plus possibly an additional 30,000 evacuees will require billeting and other logistic support.
- (11) Maximum support will be accorded to indigenous firefighting units.
- (12) Supplies required for relief of civilian distress will be accorded a high priority; local SYN City representatives will distribute civilian emergency supplies.
- (13) Maximum possible use will be made of civilian labor in rear areas.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

#### a. Command Relationships

- (1) Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.
- (2) CG 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.
- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of interest will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be

subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.

(4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow-on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

#### b. <u>Signal</u>

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES
Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps
Commanding

#### **ANNEXES:**

- A Task Organization
- B Intelligence
- C Operations
- D Logistics

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

6-88-10

U. LASSIFIED

Copy no.

of

copies

```
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
                                        (VII MAF)
                                        SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
                                        250830P May, 1988
ANNEX A (Task Organization) to Concept Plan 6-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER
(XIZ
Ref: (a) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
          CG MCDEC Notional MAGIF Fingerprint, 12Sep80
Time Zone:
               P (All attachments effective 110001P May88)
VII MAF
                                                                   Lt Gen JONES
     H & S Co, VII MAF
     Radio Bn
     Special Security Communications Grp (2 Teams)
     C I Grp (4 Teams)
     Topographic Plt
     Communications Bn
     4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG) (-)
     7th FSSG
          H & S Bn
          Det. 4th CAG (Rein)
          Supply Bn
          Maint Bn
          Engr Supt Bn
          Landing Supt Bn
          MT Bn
          Medical Bn
          Dental Bn
     Naval Support Forces
          Mobile Construction Regt
          Cargo Handling/Port Terminal Unit
     FIIU
     GOP Northern Sector, TF A
                                                                 Lt Col SHUFORD
          2nd Tank Bn (-)
          2nd Bn (-), 1st Marines
          Composite Arty Bn
          155mm (SP) Howitzer Bn
155mm (T) Btry
Det., FSSG (Maint, Supply, MT/MTV)
          1st Sec., 1st Plt, FAAD Btry
```

#### GOP Southern Sector, TF B Lt Col WHITE 1st Tank Bn (-) 1st Bn (-), 2nd Marines Composite Artillery Bn 155mm (SP) Howitzer Bn 155mm (T) Btry Det, FSSG (Maint, Supply, MT/MTV) 1st Sec., 3rd Plt, FAAD Btry 7th MarDiv (-) Maj Gen SELFRIDGE HqBn, 7th MarDiv 1st Marines (-) 2nd Marines (-) 3rd Marines 10th Marines (-) 7th Combat Engr Bn (-) 1st Assault Amphibian Bn (-) 1st Recon Bn 2nd Tank Bn 1st Force Recon Co Maj DUNNING 7th MAW Forward Maj Gen MOORE HQ., 7th MAW MWHS 7 MACG 18 H&HS 18 MASS 2 MACS/MTDS 4 MACS/MTDS 18 MWCS 18 MATCS 1 2nd LAAM Bn. 1st FAAD Btry. Det. MWSG 17 Hq. Sqdn. 17 **WES 17** MT Sqdn. MAG (VH) 36 H&MS 36 MABS 36 HML 367 HMA 369 HMM 261 HMM 262

6-88-A-2

HMM 164 HMM 165

**'NCLASSIFIED** 

```
HMH 464
     HMH 363
MAG (VH) 26
     H&MS 26
     MABS 26
     HMA 269
     HMM 161
     HMM 163
     HMM 263
     HMM 264
     HMH 461
     HMH 462
     HMH 463
MAG (VF/VA) 15
     H&MS 15
     MABS 15
     VMFA 115
     VMFA 232
     VMA (AW) 224
     VMO 1
     VMA (V) 1
MAG (VF/VA) 24
     H&MS 24
     MABS 24
     VMFA 333
     VMFA 122
     VMFA 451
     VMFA 212
     VMA (V) 513
MAG (VF/VA) 14
     H&MS 14
     MABS 14
     VMFA 312
     VMA (AW) 533
     VMA (AW) 332
     VMA (V) 542
```

## VII MAF Reserve

である。 「日本のできない。」 「日本のできない。 「日本のできない。

7th Light Armored Assault Bn (Rein)
1st Plat (-), AT Co, 1st Tank BN
1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein)
1st Bn (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines

6-88-A-3

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

6-88-A-4

UN 'ASSIFIED

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May , 1988

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Concept Plan 6-88

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer
Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer
Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) Annex B (Intelligence) to VII MAF OPLAN 6-81 (Operation BREAKER SIX)

(c) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence

(d) VII MAF SOP for Intelligence (Constructive)

(e) Current INTSUMS, PERINTSUMS, and DISUMS (Constructive)

#### 1. INTELLIGENCE MISSION AND CONCEPT OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

- a. Mission. To collect, analyze, process, and disseminate intelligence data concerning Aggressor forces now converging on SYN City and all other Aggressor forces capable of influencing the action in southern Aggressorland; to evaluate civilian attitudes and capabilities for interfering with VII MAF operations; to determine Aggressor airborne, heliborne, ACV-landing capabilities; and to monitor and assess Aggressor NBC actions and capabilities.
- Concept of Operations. USPACOM and DIA, through joint and service channels, will continue to provide high-level intelligence data to VII MAF. TF 57 will provide intelligence input to the intelligence analysis center (IAC). Marine Air-Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS) segments will be provided from VII MAF assets. MAGIS will interface with the modular microprocessing and display equipment of the Tactical Combat Operations system (TCO) at MAF/Division/ Wing level, extending down to battalion/squadron level. Because of the uncertain tactical situation, the IAC, imagery interpretation segment (II), and tactical electronic reconnaissance processing and evaluation segment (TERPE) will remain at theater air bases (TABs). The IAC will process, interpret, and evaluate from these segments and from signals intelligence by appropriate LC-means and precedence in accordance with reference (d). Photo and electronic reconnaissance will be accomplished throughout the VII MAF area of interest by aircraft from the VMFP and VMAQ detachments. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company will insert teams deep in Aggressor territory to observe and report enemy activity and movement, with priority to potential NBC operations and airborne, heliborne, and ACV activity. In coordination with VII MAF ACofS, G-2, the 4th CAG will continue to develop intelligence data from civilian

6-88-B-1

sources. Intelligence data will be disseminated to subordinate units of VII MAF by Daily Intelligence Summaries (DISUMS).

#### 2. SITUATION

- a. Characteristics of Weather and Area of Operations
  - (1) Reference (b).
  - (2) The geographic features that exert the greatest influence on Aggressor attack options and VII MAF's defense of SYN City are the heavily forested mountainous areas which severely limit mobility to the broad corridors that lie between them, and the South River fault, which clearly divides the FBH into two distinct sectors. Outside of SYN City the South River can be crossed by swim-capable vehicles or rafting; the river is too wide to be bridged tactically. Treacherous swamps north of the city and coastal mountains to the south generally restrict movement to all but dismounted troops, although ACV and helicopter operations are possible in those areas.

#### b. Summary of Enemy Situation

- (1) See Appendix 1 (Situation Overlay).
- (2) Disposition. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that initially defended SYN City are still present in the city in unknown but limited numbers. In conjunction with local civilians and a few personnel from the old Army administrative garrisons and the naval station, they have formed into sniper and sapper teams which continue to operate within the city. Units of that battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy attrition during the assault on SYN City, and by D+10 they were destroyed on driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/battery are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL. Battalion-sized units, mainly tank and artillery, are located approximately 100 to 150 km NW and SW of SYN City in the broad open valleys that constitute the main avenues of approach to the city. Three Aggressor divisions have been identified moving on SYN City, one MRD approaching from the NW and an airborne division and another MRD moving in from the SW. The lead elements of these three divisions are located about 150 km from the city.
- (3) Tactical Considerations. Aggressor tactical principles continue to reflect mobility and high tempos of operation, concentration of efforts, surprise, combat activeness (initiative), preservation of combat effectiveness, conformity of the goal of the operation to the actual situation, and

6-88-B-2

coordination (mutual support/combined arms). No recent changes have been noted in Aggressor urban warfare doctrine, tactics, or techniques. In the current situation there is a strong possibility that Agressor forces will launch airborne and/or heliborne attacks directly into SYN City. In addition, the enemy has a significant capability for using ACVs, and these constitute a threat to all coastal areas within the FBHL/GOPL.

- NBC Warfare. The Aggressor forces are exceptionally well trained and equipped for operating in an NBC environment. If chemical warfare is initiated, they can be expected to use chemicals to contaminate VII MAF logistical complexes, MSRs, avenues of approach, and reserve formations. could also be attacked by chemical weapons. SCUD and FROG missiles with warheads containing persistent nerve agents can be fired on VII MAF airfields or command centers or used to seal off areas that Aggressor forces want to deny to US forces. Nonpersistent blood agents and nerve agents delivered by artillery, multiple rocket launchers, or cruise missiles can be used to produce casualties, neutralize Aggressor objectives, or eliminate elements of the MAF antitank defense. However, there is no indication that the civilian population of SYN City is equipped with defensive NBC material.
- (5) Aggressor Armor. The Aggressor main battle tank in SYN City is either the T-72 or T-80, both of which mount a 125mm main gun with an automatic loading system and both of which shoot on the move. The T-80 appears to have hydropneumatic running gear and uses an exhaust supercharger which raises the engine output to 900-1,000 HP and enables the tank to achieve road speeds up to 70 kph. Both MBTs have built-in collective defense systems, including seals and positive-pressure FILTERED-AIR supplies. The T-80 is believed to have composit armor which, with the low silhouette and degrees of obliquity make it a difficult target to kill. In addition, improved range finding and target designation provide the T-72 and T-80 with exceptionally effective PK on the first round.

An attack formation variant, noted in the Soviet press in 1975 and in the Soviet Military Herald in 1979, may have been adopted by the Aggressor tank forces for use in restricted terrain, particularly in urbanized areas. This concept provides for tanks attacking in two or three company or battalion battle lines rather than deploying into the standard line in one or two echelons. This method facilitates the use of overwatch techniques and direct fire support, particularly useful in the relatively restricted ter-

6-88-B-3

rain which characterizes suburban and urban environments. It is not likely, however, that this method would be employed in a nuclear environment because the forces are too concentrated.

- (6) Aggressor Helicopter Developments. One of the most significant tactical changes has been the increasing use of helicopters in a variety of roles, notably the gunship in close air support. A more mobile, fluid battlefield, such as that outside of SYM City, will mean opportunities for Aggressor employment of helicopterborne forces as part of an advance guard, for flanking and screening actions, for repulsing counterattacks, and for seizing river crossing sites, mountain passes, defiles and other key objectives which will enhance the mobility of their forces. Aggressor countermentain passes, defiles and other key objectives which will mountain passes, defiles and other key objectives which will enhance the mobility of their forces. Aggressor countermentain passes, defiles and other key objectives which will enhance the mobility of their forces. Aggressor counterfers, and state in proved equipment and early 1980s have been upgraded by improved equipment and training. Helicopters, and particularly gunships, also have training. Helicopters, and particularly gunships, also have useful role in urban combat operations.
- (7) <u>Might Operations</u>. Aggressor forces are well trained in night operations and are equipped with upgraded land navigation systems, night vision devices, and illumination. The technical capability exists to conduct continuous combat operations, but the troops require food and rest, which operations, but the troops require food and rest, which causes lulls in combat or periodic relief of committed forces. The advantages of technology accrue to the defender.
- (8) Radioelectronic Combat. Aggressor forces have made strides since 1980 in radioelectronic combat (REC). Their obvious goal is to preserve and facilitate the effective use of their  $\mathbb{C}^3$  while denying the enemy the use of his. Trends and applications are not clear enough to provide substantive data pertinent to SYM City, but the Aggressor's REC capabilities combined with the restricting influences of the urban environment will pose significant problems to VII MAF. The full REC capability of a Combined Arms Army (CAA) will be available to the attacker.
- Logistics. Aggressor remnants within SYN City appear to have no logistics problems; they were well stocked prior to the amphibitions assault and have established supply caches throughout their current areas of operations. The logistical status of the various surviving units from the MRD that initially defended southern Aggressorland is not clear, but those units appear to be suffering acute fuel shortages at present, due mainly to the loss of most of their CSS trains and the distances they had to travel in most of their CSS trains and the distances they had to travel in their reinforcing/counterattacking efforts and subsequent retro-

7-8-88-9

grade operations. That logistical shortfall is expected to be alleviated when the divisions now advancing on SYN City make contact with them. The two MRDs and the airborne division appear to be well-supplied, and their division trains are extremely well-defended against air attack. Within SYN City the VII MAF emergency relief food support program is now underway, and initial distribution of food by SYN City officials and agencies is expected to be completed prior to the time that the Aggressor divisions close on the city. Continued food support will be required, however, to satisfy humanitarian considerations and assure that the populace can be controlled without undue difficulty.

- (10) Air Defense. Know Aggressor air defense units in southern Aggressorland are shown in Appendix 1 (Situation Overlay). it is estimated that the sniper/sapper teams inside SYN City have at least seven MANPAD missile systems of the SA-7 follow-on type, together with enough missiles to constitute a distinct threat to friendly air operations inside the city. The three divisions advancing on SYN City are believed to have the AD support normally associated with a combined arms army. The air defense umbrella encountered by 7th MAW aircraft attacking those forces reflects a mobile, over-lapping, highly coordinated defense with excellent acquisition capabilities, rapid and accurate response, and tight firing discipline.
- Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation. steady but low-level unconventional warfare effort has been maintained by Aggressor military remnants in SYN City, aided and abetted by some civilians. Sniper teams have harassed several MAF CSS installations and emplaced mines in LOCs causing casualties and some loss of supplies and equipment. Sapper teams have conducted small-scale raids principally against headquarters and logistic facilities. The Aggressors are expected to continue these sniping, raiding, and sabotage activities. PSYWAR leaflets have been distributed surreptitiously within the city, accusing VII MAF forces of various violations of the rules of land warfare, but otherwise the Aggressor PSYWAR capability is believed to be limited in this situation. Communist-backed Aggressor psychological appeals in the United Nations are tied in with the ongoing combat operations and focus on the plight of the 250,000 civilians in SYN City. Exaggerated claims and outright distortions of fact have underscored all of the propaganda efforts.

### c. Estimate of Enemy Capabilities

RACCESS TO DESCRIPTION TO BE ARREST TO SECURITION OF THE SECURITIES.

 Ground Forces. Aggressor remnants in SYN City are capable of harassing VII MAF personnel and facilities and conducting sniper and sapper attacks. The greatest threat they pose is to rear area CSS installations and isolated units. These scattered

Aggressor teams are also capable of conducting reconnaissance in support of major Aggressor forces and communicating important current intelligence data to the advancing forces. The MRD that initially defended SYN City suffered heavy personnel and equipment casualties prior to  $D\!+\!10$  and is now believed to consist of two MRRs at about 50% combat effectiveness and one MRR now reorganized as an MRB. Divisional tank and artillery units are estimated to be at roughly 25% to 50% effectiveness. These units are located from 75 to 100 km NW and SW of SYN City. capable of conducting delaying actions, establishing blocking positions, conducting reconnaissance and raids, and providing flank security and fire support for the three Aggressor divisions converging on SYN City. These three divisions are receiving air support from the Central Front's southern Tactical Air Army At their current rate of advance lead elements of all three divisions can close the GOPL in approximately 48 hours. There are no immediate indications that the airborne division will be used in an airborne or heliborne role, but it has the capability to conduct these types of operations on short notice. The enemy also has the capability of lifting a reinforced battalion simultaneously by ACV, use of which is facilitated along the northern coast among the myriad of islands which provide excel-The entire Southern Command has been deployed lent screening. and, due to operational commitments in other regions of the country, there are no other large-scale reinforcements available to support operations in southern Aggressorland.

Air Forces. The Aggressor Air Force is deployed throughout Aggressorland at heavily defended airfields. Aircraft are generally concealed or in revetted enclosures to minimize bomb or strafing damage. One bomber division, one fighter division, and one fighter-bomber division of an Aggressor Tactical Air Army, augmented with aditional specialized aircraft, are deployed at several fields from which their aircraft can provide support in the SYN City area. The air order of battle in southern Aggressorland has the following estimated composition:

le, i

Bomber Division

Bomber Regiment (3 Sqns) 27 IL-28 BEAGLE Bomber Regiment (3 Sqns) 32 YAK-28 BREWER Bomber Regiment (3 Sqns) 28 YAK-28 BREWER

Fighter Division

Fighter Regiment (3 Sqns) 36 MIG-25 FOXBAT Fighter Regiment (3 Sqns) 41 MIG-23 FLOGGER Fighter Regiment (3 Sqns) 38 MIG-25 FOXBAT

Fighter-Bomber Division

Ftr-Bmr Regiment (3 Sqns) 36 MIG-21 FISHBED Ftr-Pmr Regiment (3 Sqns) 42 SU-19 FENCER

5-82-8-4

UN LASSIFIED

Other

**LRA AWACS ECM** Recce Transports

8 Tu-26 BACKFIRE 1 Tu-126 MOSS 5 Tu-16 BADGER F 4 Mig-25R/RE FOXBAT 1 unk AN-26 CURL

Helicopters Utility

unk Mi-8 HIP 30 Mi-24 D HIND

unk IL-76 CANDID

Attack/Transport

It is estimated that the Aggressor Air Force has the capability of generating daily sortie rates of three per operating fighter and bomber aircraft and four per fighter-bomber/ground attack aircraft. It is currently estimated that the enemy can launch 250 fighter, 250 bomber, and 190 ground attack sorties per day based upon his having lost 10% of the aircraft initially operable and assuming 90% availability of the aircraft remaining. The combined assets of TF 57 and 7th MAW are expected to be able to achieve air superiority temporarily in support of planned opera-Conversely, the Aggressor air forces are also capable of establishing air superiority over selected areas of the battlefield.

Naval Forces. Aggressor surface naval forces are either at sea or in defended ports to the north and south of SYN City. With the departure of about half of the friendly ships that supported the amphibious assault, the Aggressor naval forces constitute a much more serious threat to friendly ships than during earlier stages of this operation. They are now capable of harassing and interfering with naval logistic support operations. submarines present a threat to all surface operations in the region, particularly to fuel tankers, loss of which would seriously impinge on VII MAF ground and air operations. Aggressor Navy has the capability to reseed minefields after they have been cleared. Navy VTOL aircraft operating from carriers/ cruisers are not expected to threaten MAF units within the FBHL. Aggressor air cushion vehicles (ACV) are capable of delivering up to a reinforced battalion of light armored vehicles in raiding operations or amphibious counterattacks.

#### 3. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

References (b) and (e).

6-88-B-7

#### 4 ASSIGNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE TASKS

- a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units
  - (1) Reference (b).
  - (2) EEI to this Headquarters ASAP.
- b. Requests to Higher and Adjacent Units
  - (1) DCI is requested to continue to provide intelligence satellite support throughout Operation MID-BREAKER SIX.
  - (2) CINCPAC is requested to provide expanded communication intelligence support.
- c. Coordinating Instructions
  - (1) Priority of intelligence acquisition and reporting is:
    - (a) Aggressor NBC operations/indications.
    - (b) Major airborne preparations or activity.
    - (c) Movement or concentration of armor.
    - (d) REC operations/indications.
    - (e) Civilian unrest, sabotage, or other threats against VII MAF.

4.3

(2) Reports IAW reference (d).

#### 5. MISCELANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

- a. Commence concurrent planning immediately.
- b. Increase security measures against sabotage, and report indications of civil unrest or other civilian-related problems without delay.

6-88-B-8

**'NCLASSIFIED** 

c. VII MAF will promulgate updates every four hours on location and activities of the airborne division and two MRDs that are now converging on SYN City.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX:

1 - Situation Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration


(Constructive)

6-88-B-9

Note: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988

APPENDIX 1 (Situation Overlay) to ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Concept Plan 6-88



\*To pinpoint and convert a coordinate from the map listed as reference (a) on this map, add 91.15 to the E coordinate and 91.5 to the N coordinate

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT


BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES


L.R. DAVID

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

DISTRIBUTION Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force SYNTHETIC (SYN) CTTY, AGGRESSUREAND 250830P May, 1988

ANNEX C (Operations) to Concept Plan 6-88

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action

FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation (c) (d) FMFM 6-1, Marine Division

FMFM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations (e)

FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support

FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Antimechanized Operations (h)

FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (i)

(i)JCS Pub 8. Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas

Time Zone: P

#### 1. **GENERAL**

Purpose. This annex sets forth the principles and general concepts for conducting the defense of the SYN City FBH (Operation MID-BREAKER SIX) by the VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF).

#### Mission

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetration in force; with priority to the Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; until follow-on forces are landed.

- Area of Operations. See Appendix 1 (Operations Overlay). С.
- Situation. See paragraph 1 of Concept Plan 6-88.

#### CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 2.

VII MAF establishes the GOP on the FBHL and General Concept. a. conducts aggressive patrolling and ambushes well forward of the GOPL to delay the enemy for the maximum period of time, inflict casualties, cause premature deployment, deceive the enemy as to the actual location and strength of the GOP and FEBA, and gain time for the forward defense forces to prepare the FDA to need the expected Aggressor forces assault. Because of the enemy's numerically superior air, armor, and artillery fire power, the

6-88-C-1

FEBA will be established inside the metropolitan boundary of SYN City. The defense will be prepared in depth with major elements of the GOP MCATFs providing mobile strike forces/counterattack forces after they have withdrawn behind the FEBA. Airfields I and 2 will be held as long as feasible, but their exposed positions renders them vulnerable to long-distance fires after the GOPL is breached. Fixed-wing aircraft of 7th MAW will operate in support of VII MAF from those airfields until/unless they become untenable. In that event, those aircraft will redeploy to TABs and continue to support VII MAF from those locations. V/STOL aircraft will remain in SYN City and provide support from operating sites within the city. One of the principal roles for air and other fire support, in conjunction with maneuver by GOP units and reserves, will be to prevent the three enemy divisions from closing simultaneously on SYN City.

The GOP will be comprised of two MCATFs b. The General Outpost. under VII MAF control. Each MCATF will consist essentially of a tank battlion, an infantry battalion mounted in LVTs, a combat engineer company (reinforced), a composite artillery battalion of self-propelled and towed artillery, a FAAD section, and a CSS detachment. All personnel will be mounted. The South River fault divides the northern and southern sectors of the GOP and the main defenses within the FEBA. GOP forces will prepare blocking positions in depth from the GOP to the FEBA and will conduct rehearsals of the delaying actions that are contemplated. Simultaneously, elements of the GOP will reconnoiter in an aggressive manner to the NW and SW, along the main avenues of approach, and make contact with leading units of the two Aggressor columns (three divisions) that are advancing on SYN City. VII MAF will coordinate the actions forward of the GOPL. When/if the opportunity presents itself, elements of the Light Armored Assault Battalion, initially in MAF Reserve, will be deployed overland or by helicopter to establish ambushes in support of GOP forces. Allocation of LAA Bn asssets will be determined by VII MAF based upon the tactical situation and the imperative that the two enemy columns not be permitted to converge simultaneously on SYN City. Ambushes will be established in coordination with tank units, either with the LAA element attached temporarily to the northern or southern sector GOP, or a major LAA element under MAF OPCON and with tank elements attached temporarily for operations outside the GOPL. These complicated command relationships are necessary to assure that VII MAF retains the flexibility to affect the long-range defensive effort effectively and delay the then-existing preponderant threat to the FEBA. The GOP is charged with delaying the Aggressor forces forward of the GOP for at least 48 hours and delaying them from closing the FEBA for an additional 24 hours at a minimum. Fixedwing aircraft will support the GOP from Airfields 1 and 2 throughout the defense until the GOP has been directed to

6-88-C-2

commence delaying actions, at which time those aircraft will deploy to TABs. V/STOL aircraft will operate from sites near the GOP for as long as possible and will displace to sites within SYN City when the GOP begins to conduct delaying actions. On order, but not simultaneously, the Northern Sector GOP and Southern GOP will be ordered to withdraw from the GOPL in a series of delaying actions. Throughout the delaying actions, LAA elements may be deployed overland or by helicopter to support the delaying actions, in which cases the LAA elements will be chopped temporarily from VII MAF Reserve to the OPCON of the cognizant GOP sector commander. After GOP units have cleared the FEBA, they will revert to parent unit control unless otherwise designated by CG, VII MAF or CG, 7th MARDIV as a reserve unit.

Forward Defense Forces. The threat is weighted to the SW, but the South River fault constitutes a major obstacle to north-south movement across that river-fault and makes it more difficult for the airborne and motorized rifle division approaching from the SM to coordinate their operations with the MRD approaching from e The Port Area has the highest priority for defense, and it lies north of the river. The vast majority of the urban/suburban structures that will be useful to the defensive effort also lie north of the river. Consequently, five infantry battalions will be located north of South River and four will be positioned to the south along with LAA Bn. Extra security will be placed on all bridges spanning South River to prevent saboteurs from rendering them unusable; those bridges will facilitate VII MAF deployments between the northern and southern sectors if such deployments become necessary. Rafts will also be positioned to provide alternate crossing means. Infantry regiments will provide local security for their respective defensive sectors and will provide forces as required by CG. 7th MARDIV for the COP. The FEBA will be established essentially along the outer fringe of buildings or houses of the metropolitan boundary to take advantage of the cover and concealment offered while maintaining maximum long-range observation to the front. Strongpoints and blocking positions will be established in depth, oriented on defending Airfield 2, the CSSAs, and the Port Area. A series of phase lines will be identified to coordinate any retrograde/ delaying actions that may become necessary in any of the defen-Key sites along the phase lines will be stocked with Class I and V supplies in sufficient quantities to sustain a prolonged deliberate defense and associated counterattacks. These general sites will include appropriate strong points, blocking positions, and required alternate and supplementary positions. In any case where a defending unit is authorized to withdraw from prepared positions, the parent unit will immediately assess the opportunities and timing for launching a counterattack using local reserves to restore the lost position. Consideration will also be given to requesting 7th MARDIV or VII

MAF to commit appropriate reserve forces. All units will be prepared to engage in house-to-house and street-to-street fighting.

Reserve Forces. The 7th Light Armored Assault Battalion will be d. held in VII MAF Reserve, initially located south of South River. Depending on the rate of advance of the two enemy columns, the LAA Bn will be committed overland or by helicopter to harrass, deceive, or ambush Agressor advance guard, flank security, or CSS elements. In operations well forward of the GOPL, the LAA Bn will function under VII MAF OPCON. When/if participating in similar operations on or in rear of the GOP, the LAA Bn will temporarily be chopped to OPCON of the northern or southern sector GOP, as appropriate. After completing their GOP missions. the 1st Tank Bn will occupy positions south of South River as VII MAF Reserve, and the 2nd Tank Bn will occupy positions in the northern sector as an element of 7th MARDIV Reserve. Both tank battalions will be prepared to attack enemy units forward of the FEBA as they advance on SYN City as well as to counterattack penetrations of the FEBA. When appropriate, mounted infantry will be attached to the tank units. Otherwise, infantry forces in reserve will be prepared to move by foot, truck, LVT, or helicopter to reinforce or counterattack. In dense urban/subruban areas priority for reinforcement or counterattack will be to infantry forces, properly reinforced with direct fire weapons.

#### 3. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

PROCESSES SECTIONS NOT SECURITY SECURIT

a. Nuclear Operations. Nuclear-capable units will prepare plans to attack suitable targets outside of SYN City. Initial planning will be based on VII MAF SOP for Nuclear Operations (Constructive). Allocation of nuclear weapons will be provided separately for planning purposes and will be reflected in the operation plan for MID-BREAKER SIX. Nuclear weapons will not be employed unless authorized by National Command Authority and approved by CINCPAC. If authorized, nuclear fire support will be coordinated by VII MAF FASC.

b. NBC Defense. VII MAF SOP for Nuclear Operations (Constructive) applies. All personnel will wear protective clothing and have gas masks with them at all times. VII MAF NBC Control Center will continue to control the MAF Warning and Reporting System with 7th MARDIV COC serving as the alternate control center. Monitor/survey, assessment, NUDET, heavy rescue, labor, and decontamination teams will be brought to full strength by all applicable units, using own resources, and will function in accordance with unit SOPs. Special instructions will be issued by VII MAF in the event that weapons of mass destruction are used, but all units are responsible for their own field-expedient decontamination. Details concerning evacuation of mass

6-88-C-4

UI 'LASSIFIED

casualties will be promulgated in the case of each NBC incident, based on the tactical/NBC situation existing at the time of the incident.

- c. Electronic Warfare. Satellite and RF-18/EA-6 EW operations will continue over southern Aggressorland to detect and locate enemy emitters and develop their changing EW and operational communications OOB. Air attacks will be launched against known enemy emitters using guided weapons. Aggressor communications will be monitored or jammed, selectively, in support of VII MAF operations.
- d. <u>Psychological Operations</u>. Unless otherwise directed, all psychological operations will be planned and executed by this Headquarters.
- e. Unconventional Warfare. A Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) under CINCPAC control is conducting UW operations in Aggressorland in support of VII MAF and other ongoing operations. Information concerning those operations will be provided separately on a strict need-to-know basis.
- f. <u>Search and Rescue</u>. CG, 7th MAW will review and update current SAR plans and instructions and coordinate appropriate changes through all cognizant agencies. Direct liaison is authorized with all VII MAF, 7th MARDIV, and 7th FSSG units and with TF 57.
- g. <u>Deception</u>. Recommendations for deception operations to this Headquarters ASAP. VII MAF ACofS, G-3 will coordinate all deception planning and promulgate instructions to interested units on a need-to-know basis.
- h. Rules of Engagement. ROE currently in effect apply, subject to the following modifications. No restrictions are imposed on conventional or chemical fires outside the GOPL except that targets in the two nearby villages, the agricultural/industrial town 30 km to the west, and the city 90 km SSW of SYN City can only be attacked using observed fires after they have been identified as military targets. All fires within the boundary of SYN City must be observed. Destruction and/or booby trapping of buildings for defensive purposes is authorized, with the proviso that civilians first be evacuated from those structures.
- i. Reconnaissance. See Annex B (Intelligence).

のは、自分のことのとは、自分のことには、自分のこうとのは、自分の

j. Fire Support. In accordance with VII MAF SOP. Initially, the 1st and 3rd Marines will each have two DDs assigned. The Northern and Southern Sectors of the GOP will each have one DD assigned to cover the coastal flanks. Units of the 10th Marines will be positioned well forward, near the FEBA, to increase their

range capabilities in defense of the FEBA and support of the security forces.

- Air Operations and Air Defense. TAB-based 7th MAW aircraft and planes from IF 57 will provide deep support and barrier combat air patrols. 7th MAW fixed-wing aircraft at Airfields 1 and 2 in SYN City will provide close support of the GOP and associated light armored vehicle and/or artillery raids and operations by Force Recon teams. When/if Airfields 1 and 2 become untenable. 7th MAW fixed-wing aircraft will deploy to TABs and continue to support VII MAF from those locations. V/STOL aircraft will continue to operate from sites inside the city, although the density of aircraft may have to be thinned out to reduce their vulnerability to enemy fire. STINGER (FAAD) sections will be attached to each sector of the GOP; these sections will revert to FAAD Battery control upon withdrawal of the GOP. The LAAM Bn will locate assault fire units (AFUs) well forward between the GOP and FEBA along the main avenues of approach from the NW and SW to provide air defense support to the GOP while maintaining suitable overlapping fires for the defense of SYN City. The LAĂM Bn will coordinate displacement of the AFUs with the congizant GOP commanders when either or both GOPs are directed to commence delaying actions.
- Countermechanized Operations. GOPs, infantry regiments, and 1. reserve forces will prepare detailed countermechanized plans. Units on the GOP and FEBA will include use of ADM in their plans if appropriate. ADM will be used only if approved by the NCA and authorized by CINCPAC and this Headquarters. Barriers will be installed within the limits of time and materials. Requests for support beyond own capabilities to this Headquarters soonest. VII MAF ACofS, G-4, will coordinate and allocate the use of scatterable mines to assure equitable distribution to GOP and forward defense forces. Priority for establishment of deliberate minefields to the FEBA. Allocation of obstacle construction detachments (OCDs) in terms of personnel, material, and effort will be approximately as follows: Northern Sector--GOP 20% and FEBA 20%; Southern Sector--GOP 30% and FEBA 30%. All countermechanized planning will include appropriate provisions for fire support. CG, 7th MARDIV is responsible for maintaining observation over the South River within the FEBA during all conditions of weather and visibility. VII MAF will maintain similar observation outside SYN City. These measures are essential to assure that the countermechnized potential of the river is fully realized at all times by detecting Aggressor attempts to bridge, raft, or otherwise cross the river with mechanized forces.
- m. Minewarfare. Only limited deliberate mining is contemplated along the GOP. Scatterable mines will be employed to the maximum extent feasible in the outer security zone to minimize the

6-88-C-6

expenditure/emplacement of mines and labor-intensive effort associated with conventional mining as well as to establish minefields precisely where they are required to blunt a specific, immediate, tactical threat. Deliberate minefields forward of the FEBA will be emplaced to cover the more vulnerable avenues of approach and to canalize Aggressor forces into killing zones in front of or within the FEBA. Engineers will provide advice to combat, CS and CSS units with respect to emplacing individual mines or small minefields within urban/suburban areas to achieve optimum results with minimum assets.

Urban Defensive Operations. All units will take special precautions to detect and defeat sabotage by indigenous persons. Selected areas of the FEBA will be evacuated of civilians as soon as adequate preparations are made for their billeting in comparatively safe areas. Obstacles forward of the FEBA will be covered by observation and fire and sited to canalize attacking units into prepared killing zones where they will be subject to intensive defensive fires or counterattack. Where possible. killing zones will be prepared in relatively open areas to enhance the effectiveness of indirect fires and mobile strike Small minefields and randomly placed mines will be employed within the city in likely avenues of penetration. Dismounted infantry or other units will be prepared to counterattack in urban/suburban areas if the enemy succeeds in penetrating any of those areas. Structures that interfere with observation or of those areas. fire and which do not offer defensive potential will be destroyed or booby trapped, rigged for destruction, and used to entrap advance enemy units. Except in cases of major enemy penetrations, fixed-wing aircraft will generally not be used in support inside SYN City. Attack helicopters and Harriers will be requested to attack targets in urban areas in accordance with SOP through TACPs. Troop movements by helicopter will be carefully coordinated and requesting FASCs will prepare fire support plans and assure that appropriate air defense measures are taken. Because of the threat posed by MANPADS in the hands of Aggressor remnants inside the city and the formidable, long-range AD systems supporting the three converging Aggressor divisions, heliborne troop movements will be the exception by the time the FEBA comes under attack.

#### o. Coordinating instructions.

THE PROPERTY OF SAME PROPERTY IN THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY

- (1) See basic OPLAN 6-88.
- (2) Additional civilian evacuation/relocation under the cognizance of CO, 4th CAG in coordination with CG, 7th MARDIV and CG, 7th FSSG.

6-88-C-7

- (3) Request for assignment of artillery for direct fire roles inside SYN City through FASC channels ASAP.
- (4) GOP Sector Commanders are authorized direct liaison with COs of 1st and 3rd Marines to coordinate location and preparation of mobilie stike force areas behind the FEBA. Report conflicts in Northern sector to CG, 7th MARDIV, in Southern Sector to CG, VII MAF.

#### 4. OPERATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

- a. Limited quantities of all types of mines, particularly Claymores and scatterable mines, requires that allocation be strictly controlled.
- b. Use of heavy-lift helicopters to deploy light armored assault vehicles will be possible only under conditions of absolute air superiority.
- c. Deployment of forces between defensive sectors across South River is heavily dependent on the availability of existing bridges; their loss would sorely limit our ability to reinforce either sector and force reliance on the use of rafts, LVTs, or LAA vehicles.
- d. Numerically superior Aggressor fire power is likely to disrupt interior lines of communication to a marked degree.

#### 5. LIMITING FACTORS

- a. The presence of about 250,000 civilians severely limits the availability of buildings, structures, and other facilities for use by VII MAF.
- b. The comparatively small size of metropolitan SYN City makes it vulnerable to enemy indirect fires long before the Aggressor attacking forces reach the FEBA.
- c. Airfields 1 and 2 lie at or beyond the city boundary, and they are extremely vulnerable to enemy fire. Their continued operation will be hazardous to impossible if the Aggressor forces penetrate the GOPL, a circumstance that will make the fields untenable and require that fixed-wing aircraft be redeployed to TABs. That eventuality will reduce the number of sorties by 7th MAW fixed-wing aircraft by about one-third.
- d. Logistic resupply of VII MAF will be difficult when/if the Port Area comes within range of Aggressor supporting arms.

6-88-C-8

**'NCLASSIFIED** 

#### 6. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command. CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF. 7th MAW (Rear) will assume command of fixed-wing units that may redeploy to TABs. 7th MAW (Forward) will continue to be TACC. Changes in CPs of units subordinate to VII MAF will be reported without delay.
- b. <u>Signal</u>. In accordance with SOP and COI. Details to be promulgated in OPLAN.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### APPENDIX:

1 - Operations Overlay - GOPL


2 - Operations Overlay -Forward Defense Area

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988

APPENDIX 1 (Operations Overlay — GOPL) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Concept Plan 8-88



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION: A sendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Contructive)

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988

# APPENDIX 2 (Operations Overlay — Forward Defense Area) to ANNEX C (Operations) to Concept Plan 6-88

Time Zone: P



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Contructive)

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988

ANNEX D (Logistics) to Concept Plan 6-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER SIX)

Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map

(b) FMFM 4-1 Combat Service Support for Marine Air Ground Task Forces (Draft)

Time Zone: P

#### 1. GENERAL

- a. <u>Purpose</u>. To provide guidance for initial concurrent planning for logistic support in defense of the SYN City lodgment.
- b. Concept of Logistic Support
  - (1) Supplies and CSS activities will be widely dispersed within SYN City to reduce vulnerability to enemy mortars and artillery.
  - (2) Supplies for the GOP will be mobile loaded in the CSSE of each GOP MCATF, and additional supplies will be cached between the GOP and FEBA at predesignated dumps to support delaying actions.
  - (3) ISPs will be established in surburban areas to support the artillery and three infantry regiments plus other major units. The ISPs will stock all classes of supply and provide a full range of CSS. Three DOS at each ISPs.
  - (4) Three DOS of Classes I and V, plus limited supplies of other classes as required, will be stocked at each of 27 forward points established immediately in rear of each of the rifle companies. Stocks will include supplies for weapons companies.
  - (5) Three DOS of Classes I and V will be stocked in each of nine infantry battalion, five artillery battalion, one LAAM Bn, and two tank battalion supply dumps located generally in rear of the forward (company-level) sites and forward of the ISPs.

- (6) The remainder of the 20 DOS stockage objective of all classes of supply will be stored in CSSAs 1 and 2.
- (7) Supplies will be stored inside structures whenever possible to protect them from observation, pilferage, sapper attacks and indirect fires.
- (8) In general, company-level, battalion-level, and intermediate supply stockage sites will be located immediately in rear of successive phase lines so that in cases of retrograde movements MAF units can fall back on their supplies; in cases of continued defense or counterattack the resupply distances will be shortened.
- (9) Resupply from ship to shore will be accomplished mainly by LCAC, probably operating during hours of darkness or during inclement weather to minimize vulnerability. LCACs are expected to deliver their cargos over Beaches RED and BLUE and to dumps or sites located inland near North and South Rivers.
- (10) Containers will be landed from containerships or lighters over ELCAS at Beaches RED and BLUE or directly over the docks in the Port Area and Naval Station and transported to container marshalling yards in CSSAs 1 and 2. Some supplies will be stocked in the CSSAs in containers while the bulk of the supplies (80%) will be reconfigured into smaller loads for movement to and storage in the more forward logistic support areas.
- (11) VII MAF ACofS, G-4, in coordination with CG, 7th MAW will establish the requirements for supply stockage at the many V/STOL sites within SYN City.

## 2. SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION

#### a. Supply

- (1) See Concept of Logistic Support, paragraph 1.b., above.
- (2) Forward supply sites will be replenished from CSSAs to the maximum degree possible to keep them fully stocked without drawing down on intermediate supply stockages.

#### b. Distribution

(1) Unit distribution to company/battery level.

6-88-D-2

(2) AAFS will be stocked by tankers using bottom-laid lines for as long as tactically feasible; thereafter by Dracone or LCAC delivery.

#### 3. MAINTENANCE

In accordance with SOP. Maintenance contact teams will operate from CSSAs and ISPs.

#### MEDICAL SERVICES

- a. Medical and dental companies will be located in the CSSAs and ISPs to assure forward medical support and achieve necessary dispersion of medical assets.
- b. Medical evacuation to ships will be accomplished by helicopter, displacement landing craft, and LCAC.
- c. Civilian health care facilities in SYN City will continue to support the indigenous populace. VII MAF will provide emergency medical supply support within capabilities if required. CO, 4th CAG will coordinate all such support.
- d. Medical supply support for VII MAF will be provided by 7th FSSG.
- e. The Navy hospital ship will continue to support VII MAF.

#### MOBILITY/TRANSPORTATION

- a. Priority for mobility support will be to GOP and Combat Engineer OCDs in countermechanized operations.
- b. 7th FSSG will prepare and provide rafting service across South River to facilitate movement between defensive sectors in the event bridges become unusable.
- c. Heavy-lift helicopters will support logistic operations in accordance with the following priority: GOP, main barrier plan, and ship-to-shore resupply. As an exception, and only under conditions of absolute air superiority, heavy-lift helicopters will be used to deploy light armored vehicles forward of the GOPL.
- 6. <u>CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT PLAN</u>. Naval Support Forces will continue operating the Port Area and naval station in support of VII MAF. Priority for engineer effort is as follows: barrier plan, rapid repair of runways, maintaining port/ELCAS operability, establishment of ISPs upgrading container marshalling area survivability.

#### 7. CIVIL AFFAIRS

- a. In addition to the 34,000 evacuees and refugees now being billeted an supported, approximately 30,000 more civilians will require evacuation and relocation. Provisions will be made for their evacuation and support immediately.
- b. Emergency relief food supplies for the 250,000 civilians in SYN City have been landed and are now being distributed by indigenous authorities. Additional supplies are required, and they will be landed within five days.
- c. Public utilities will be operated and maintained by indigenous agencies for as long as possible to provide potable water and electric power to the populace.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENTANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS
Brigadier General, U. S. marine Corps
Chief of Staff

#### APPENDIX:

1 - Logistics Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive).

6-88-D-4


'NCLASSIFIED

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. \_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSOR! AND 250830P May, 1988

APPENDIX 1 (Logistics Overlay) to ANNEX D (Logistics) to Concept Plan 6-88

Time Zone: P



- ★ TENTATIVE LOCATION OF ISPs
- TENTATIVE LOCATION OF FORWARD SUPPORT POINTS

NOTE: FORWARD POSITIONAL STOCKAGE POINTS NOT SHOWN

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS
Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Contructive)

# OUTLINE PLAN 7-88

#### OPERATION MID-BREAKER SEVEN

## MISSION 7 - DEFEND KEY SECTORS

THIS CONCEPT MAY BE EMPLOYED WHEN THE MARINE CORPS LF MISSION REQUIRES THAT ONLY A PORTION OF AN URBAN AREA BE HELD OR WHEN MARINE CORPS LF STRENGTH IS INSUFFICIENT TO ATTEMPT TO DEFEND THE ENTIRE AREA. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

## VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends SYN City with priority to Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; be prepared to support the landing and deployment of follow-on forces on or after D+30.

Note: Much of the data contained herein are identical to that in Concept Plan 6-88. Substantive changes are indicated in the margin.

Copy no. \_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May 1988 LWE-27

Outline Plan 7-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER SEVEN).

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation
  - (d) FMFM 6-1, Marine Division
  - (e) FMFM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations
  - (f) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support
  - (g) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense
  - (h) FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Antimechanized Operations
  - (i) FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations
  - (j) JCS Pub 8. Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas

Time Zone: P

Task Organization: No change to VII MAF Task Organization. See VII MAF OPLAN 6-88.

#### 1. SITUATION

a. General. This outline plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by subordinate commands. This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. The unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.

## b. Enemy Forces

- (1) Enemy Situation. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present in the city in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy casualties in personnel and equipment, and by D+10 they were destroyed or driven off. No enemy combat units larter than company/battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL. Those units range from 10% to 50% in combat efficiency. The principal threat to VII MAF stems from the advance of one MRD from the northwest and an airborne division on a second MRD advancing from the southwest. Those three divisions have advance elements about 150 km from SYN City at present.
- (2) Enemy Capabilities. Aggressor remnants within SYN City are capable of conducting sniper and sapper attacks against VII MAF units and installations. The CSS areas are particularly vulnerable to those kinds of attacks. Aggressor personnel within the city are also capable of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information to the major units now advancing on the city. The scattered elements inside SYN City are believed to have at least seven operable, man-portable, surface-to-air missiles of the improved SA-7 type which can inhibit helicopter and low-level fixed-wing air operations over several sectors of the city. The civilian population in SYN City is growing increasingly restive, and civilians in large numbers are able to augment the MRB remnants and create situations that may require greater MAF involvement in internal security operations or adoption of stringent measures that can result in substantial civilian casualties. The elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH are believed to constitute one MRB and two half-strength MRRs. Tank, artillery, and AD units of that MRD are reported to be at from 10% to 50% of their initial strengths. These units are capable of harassing, delaying, or otherwise interferring with VII MAF GOP forces. In addition, they are capable of providing a reconnaissance screen or flank security for the march columns and significantly reinforcing the tank, artillery, and air defense fires of the three divisions now entering the region. The three divisions have the capability of closing the FBHL in about 48 hours and the FEBA in an additional 24 hours. They are well-protected by mobile antiaircraft weapons systems and have strong air cover. The TAA providing their air support is able to establish air superiority over the battle zone when it launches a surge effort. The Aggressor forces are also able to launch an air assault by up to one airborne division, a heliborne assault by approximately one reinforced battalion, and a surface assault from ACVs by up to one light armored vehicle

battalion. These types of assault could be conducted separately or simultaneously. The Aggressor forces have already demonstrated their capability for operating in a chemical warfare environment. They also have the capability to initiate nuclear warfare and are well-trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

Indications. The physical deployment and movement of the three divisions toward SYN City strongly indicates that this is their objective. Low-level communication intercepts and interrogation of Aggressor POWs tend to confirm that evalua-The posture of the elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH area appears to support the deployment of the advancing divisions. Efforts to establish and maintain communications between the civilians and military remnants within the city and the major forces outside the city also suggest that expulsion of VII MAF from the SYN City beachhead is their objective. Deployment of ACVs in coastal areas north of SYN City gives the enemy the capability to launch surfaceborne assaults against VII MAF's seaward flanks. There are no immediate indications of a buildup for airborne assault, but the enemy is capable of deploying transport and supporting aircraft extremely fast; therefore, an airborne assault must be anticipated despite the lack of indications at present.

## c. Friendly Forces

- (1) TF 51 provides NFG support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.
- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.
- d. Attachments and Detachments. To be published separately.

#### e. Assumptions

(1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforce.

- (2) That the three Aggressor divisions will be delayed sufficiently by friendly action so that they will require at least 48 hours to reach the FBHL/GOPL.
- (3) That MAF security forces will be capable of delaying the attackers for at least 24 hours between the GOPL and the FEBA.
- (4) That aside from occasional isolated acts of sabotage, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, the population of SYN City will not rise en masse against elements of VII MAF.
- (5) That Aggressor forces and dissident civilian elements will not be able to prevent, completely, friendly resupply efforts.

#### 2. MISSION

Secretary of the second second

VII MAF defends SYN City with priority to Port Area, Airfield 2, and CSSAs; be prepared to support the landing and deployment of follow-on forces on or after D+30.

## 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. VII MAF will establish the GOP along the a. trace of the FBHL; the FEBA will be generally parallel to but just outside of the SYN City metropolitan boundary. The defense envisioned incorporates key elements of both the area and active The GOP forces will operate well-forward of the GOPL to detect, ambush, attack, and deceive the attacking forces as to the location and strength of the GOP and FEBA. Helicopter insertion of light armored assault elements and towed artillery (with prime movers) will be attempted, when feasible, forward the This same tactic will be used between the GOP and FEBA. All retrograde movements of the GOP will be accomplished by delaying actions designed to gain time for the FEBA forces to prepare the FDA. The FDA will consist of infantry entrenchments in open terrain overlooking major avenues of approach, supported by overwatch positions manned by tank, antitank, and direct-fire This area will include the first line of artillery units. suburban structures which will provide supporting positions for The main barrier system will be the forward entrenchments. established forward of the FEBA, using buried mines and other obstacles, whereas the GOP will employ a minimal number of deliberate mines, relying principally on the delivery of scatterable Key sectors are designated as (A) CSSA 1, (B) RED Beach area, (C) BLUE Beach area, and (D) Airfield 2. If the FEBA is driven back, a series of phase lines will be established to coordinate the delaying actions that will be necessary to gain time for FEBA forces to prepare the deliberate defense.

7-88-4

**'NCLASSIFIED** 

a decide constant de la constant de

A (Port Area) and B (RED Beach and BSA) are vital and will be retained at all cost to assure that follow-on forces can be landed and deployed in accordance with the assigned mission. Key sectors C and D will be denied to the enemy in any event, since their occupation by Aggressor forces could make VII MAF's position untenable in the SYN City area.

- Planning Considerations. Extensive use of scatterable mines must be considered forward of and in rear of the GOPL. This will require that the artillery units supporting the GOP have sufficient quantities of those mines immediately available, and that provisions be made for overland or helicopter delivery of additional mines if required. The deployment of light armored assault vehicles by helicopter will make it necessary to coordinate air support during the helilift of the vehicles and their crews, together with the coordination of obscuration and other deception means to protect the Primary, movement and initial operations of LAA units. supplementary, and alternate positions will have to be prepared on and in rear of the GOP to assure that the GOP can delay the enemy for as long as possible. The engineer effort required makes it imperative that careful distinction be made between the needs of GOP and FEBA forces. the city, the outer fringe of structures includes buildings and homes that lend themselves to defensive operations and others that are either too fragile or too fammable to be used in the defense. Buildings that are useful to VII MAF In the defense will be used as strongpoints; other structures will be razed or rigged for demolition or booby traps in the event the enemy succeeds in occupying them. phase lines and associated defensive positions inside the city will be selected to deny the Aggressor forces access to good LOCs or positions that given them an advantage in urban warfare, while simultaneously denying them key facilities that are important to VII MAF's accomplishment of the Fall-back to the phase lines will uncover Airfields 1 and 2, making them untenable to VII MAF for fixed-wing operations. In that event, all aircraft except V/STOL will have to be deployed to TABs. Counterbattery and air defense fires will have to be coordinated to support logistic resupply operations as the enemy forces close on SYN City and are able to bring indirect fires and increased air attacks against naval surface movements and logistic The continuing threat of NBC warfare will support areas. require that the greatest possible dispersion be maintained between all units of the MAF.
- (2) Plan of Supporting Fires. The details of supporting fires will be worked out during concurrent planning. Essentially, the MCATFs comprising the GOP will include self-propelled

and towed artillery to provide long-range fires forward of the GOPL; these artillery units will revert to parent unit control after withdrawal of the GOP. The 10th Marines will occupy firing positions near the FEBA, initially, to support the withdrawal of the GOP and engage the Aggressor as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Artillery units will be prepared to engage Aggressor airborne or heliborne landing inside SYN City as well as ACV-landed forces in coastal areas. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) will prevail for the employment of all conventional and chemical air, ground, and naval fire support. Plans will be prepared for the use of tactical nuclear weapons outside of SYN City in the event their use is authorized.

#### b. Tasks

- (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A
  - (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 250001P May 1988.
  - (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the north and northwest.
  - (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
  - (d) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
  - (e) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA and delay the enemy for at least 24 hours.
  - (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of 7th MARDIV Reserve in accordance with Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) GOP Southern Sector, Task Force B
  - (a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1988.

7-88-6

UN ASSIFIED

- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the VII MAF area of responsibility from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOPL as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Plan for and request, if necessary, the employment of reinforcements to assure that the enemy forces converging on SYN City from the NW and SW do not arrive within supporting arms range of the city simultaneously.
- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw in a series of delaying actions on order; delay the enemy forward of the FEBA for at least 24 hours.
- (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Southern Sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of VII MAF Reserve in accordance with Annex A (Task Organization).

## (3) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

WAS A STREET PROPERTY OF

- (a) Provide units to GOP and MAF Reserve as directed.
- (b) Prepare blocking positions to protect Airfields 1 and 2, CSSAs, and Port Area.
- (c) Support withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not coverge simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (d) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.
- (e) Defend Phase Lines CUTLASS, SABER, and DAGGER on order.
- (f) Defend the Port Area in depth.
- (g) Notify this Headquarters of the deployment of division units to assigned blocking positions or the commitment of division reserves; contain major enemy penetrations for counterattacking force.

7-88-7

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

- (h) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (i) Prepare plans for light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP; submit plans and requests for helicopter and aviation support soonest; be prepared to execute plans on order.
- (j) Prepare plans to deploy tanks, artillery, light armored vehicles, amphibious vehicles, and infantry between the northern and southern sectors, priority to the southern sector.
- (k) Prepare counterlanding plans to detect and destroy enemy airborne, heliborne, or ACV attacks in assigned TAORs.
- (1) Be prepared to deploy company to battalion-sized units with supporting fires to establish secure enclaves for the landing of supplies by landing craft, LCAC, or helicopter.
- (m) Be prepared to deploy reconnaissance teams inside SYN City to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.
- (n) Be prepared to support the evacuation/relocation of civilians from the immediate vicinity of the FEBA; these operations to be controlled and coordinated by CO, 4th CAG.

#### (4) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 110001P May 1988; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Designate TADC as TACC at 110001P May 1988. Implement coordination of air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon Teams as requested.
- (d) Be prepared to redeploy fixed-wing squadrons to TABs and continue air operations therefrom in support of VII MAF, while continuing to operate V/STOL aircraft from sites within SYN City.

(e) On order, support light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP.

## (5) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

- (a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of interest.
- (c) Be prepared to implant electronic intrusion devices as directed.
- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACV-borne raiding forces.
- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, and other means of entry.
- (f) Submit recommendations for additional recon missions.

## (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.
- (b) On order, in coordination with 4th CAG, evacuate and relocate civilians from areas on or near the FEBA to locations to be designated.

#### c. MAF Reserve

# (1) 7th Light Armored Assault Bn (Rein)

- (a) Be prepared to deploy overland or by helicopter to reinforce the GOP in the northern or southern sector.
- (b) Prepare plans to deploy elements by helicopter to conduct light armored raids against enemy flanks, rear, or CSS elements.
- (c) Prepare blocking positions along main avenues of approach to the southern sector, in coordination with the 3rd Marines; be prepared to block and counterattck Aggressor penetrations into the southern sector FEBA.

(d) Be prepared for commitment anywhere within the FEBA.

## (2) 1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein)

- (a) Be prepared to assume operational control of the 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines, and conduct mobile strike force operations south of South River to destroy Aggressor forces forward of the FEBA.
- (b) Be prepared to attack Aggressor forces forward of the FEBA.
- (c) Prepare plans to deploy across South River to the Northern Sector; submit bridging, rafting, or other requirements to this Headquarters soonest. Be prepared to execute these plans on order.

## (3) 1st Bn (-) (Rein), 2nd Marines

- (a) Prepare supporting and blocking positions in coordination with 3rd Marines; be prepared to revert to OPCON of CO, 3rd Marines.
- (b) Be prepared to deploy by LVT to reinforce ground combat forces anywhere inside the FEBA.
- (c) Be prepared to counterattack enemy penetrations into urban/suburban areas.
- (d) Be prepared to relinquish OPCON of Co B (Rein), 1st AAV Bn, and deploy by helicopter to reinforce ground combat forces anywhere inside the FEBA.

**C** 3

(e) Be prepared to chop to OPCON of 1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein) and conduct mobile strike force operatons south of South River.

## d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Contact left to right.
- (2) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.
- (3) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern and southern sectors in such a manner as to deny the enemy the capability of converging his NW and SW forces simultaneously on SYN City.
- (4) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Aggressor airborne or heliborne attacks.

- (5) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (6) The code name for this defensive phase is MID-BREAKER SEVEN.
- (7) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.
- (8) This plan is effective on order.

## 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- (1) Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.
- (2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

## b. Logistics

| The Company | Manager of Man

- (1) Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability as well as to provide forward logistic sites near alternate defensive phase lines.
- (2) Conceptually, units in the forward defense area will maintain on position sufficient quantities of Class I and V to support intense combat expenditures for at least three days. An additional three days of all classes of supplies will be positioned to support three days of operations at ISPs on each succeeding phase line to the rear, so that FEBA force scan fall back onto prestocked supplies or use those stockpiles to support forward defense forces with a minimum of resupply effort.
- (3) CSSAs will be drawn down to provide stocks for the ISPs while simultaneously reducing the vulnerability of the CSSAs. Roughly 3 DOS will be maintained at each of the forward positions, ISPs and the balance of supplies (14 DOS) will be maintained at the CSSA.
- (4) A sea-based logistic system will be required to replenish the CSSAs and intermediate supply points.
- (5) Modifications in VII MAF logistic posture may be required to accommodate to the changing tactical situation.

7-88-11

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

- (6) Indigenous structures will be used whenever possible for storing supplies to deny the enemy observation and indirect fires and to protect supplies from pilferage and sabotage.
- (7) 7th MAW will recommend supply and maintenance levels at V/STOL operating sites.
- (8) Priority support will be accorded to 4th CAG in repairing and operating essential public works, utilities, and communications that contribute to the health and welfare of the populace and safeguard VII MAF from health hazards and civil uprisings.
- (9) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.
- (10) The 34,250 civilians currently in DPRE assembly areas plus possibly an additional 30,000 evacuees will require billeting and other logistic support.
- (11) Maximum support will be accorded to indigenous firefighting units.
- (12) Supplies required for relief of civilian distress will be accorded a high priority; local SYN City representatives will distribute civilian emergency supplies.
- (13) Maximum possible use will be made of civilian labor in rear areas.

\* \*

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

#### a. Command Relationships

- (1) Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.
- (2) CG, 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.
- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of influence will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.

(4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

# b. <u>Signal</u>

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Commanding

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

このはいいい は、単方ののかののの事業が

1 - Operations Overlay


2 - Logistics Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE. Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no.\_\_\_of\_\_\_copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1988

ENCLOSURE 1 (Operations Overlay) to Outline Plan 7-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER SEVEN)



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General U S Marine Corps Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to II MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830 May, 1988

#### ENCLOSURE 2 (Logistics Overlay) to Outline Plan 7-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER SEVEN)

Time Zone. P



★ TENTATIVE LOCATION OF ISPs

NOTE FORWARD POSITIONAL STOCKAGE POINTS NOT SHOWN

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

# OUTLINE PLAN 8-88 OPERATION MID-BREAKER EIGHT

#### MISSION EIGHT - ENTRAP AND AMBUSH

THIS CONCEPT REQUIRES THE PREPARATION OF A SERIES OF BLOCKING AND AMBUSH POSITIONS ALONG MAJOR ARTERIES LEADING THROUGH THE URBAN AREA (AND)...WOULD BE PREFERRED WHEN THE DEFENDER LACKS REQUISITE STRENGTH TO MAN ORGANIZED DEFENSE IN-DEPTH POSITIONS. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

#### VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter be prepared to attack to the northwest.

Note: Much of the data contained herein are identical to that in Concept Plan 6-88 or Outline Plan 7-88. Substantive changes are indicated in the margin.

Copy no. \_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988 OWE-53

Outline Plan 8-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER EIGHT)

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 5-1, Marine Aviation
  - (d) FMFM 6-1, Marine Division
  - (e) FMFM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operation
  - (f) FMFM 7-4, Field Artillery Support
  - (g) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense
  - (h) FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/Antimechanized Operations
  - (i) FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations
  - (j) JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas

Time Zone: P

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization) to VII MAF OPLAN 6-88 as modified herein.

#### SITUATION

General. This outline plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by subordinate commands. This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving These forces consisted of an MRD toward the southern region. moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. The unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.

## b. Enemy Forces

(1) Enemy Situation. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present in the city in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that

battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy casualties in personnel and equipment, and by D+10 they were destroyed or driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL. Those units range from 10 percent to 50 percent in combat efficiency. The principal threat to VII MAF stems from the advance of one MRD from the northwest and an airborne division on a second MRD advancing from the southwest. Those three divisions have advance elements about 150 km from SYN City at present.

(2) Enemy Capabilities. Aggressor remnants within SYN City are capable of conducting sniper and sapper attacks against VII MAF units and installations. The CSS areas are particularly vulnerable to those kinds of attacks. Aggressor personnel within the city are also capable of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information to the major units now advancing on the city. The scattered elements inside SYN City are believed to have at least seven operable, man-portable, surface-to-air missiles of the improved SA-7 type which can inhibit helicopter and low-level fixed-wing air operations over several sectors of the city. The civilian population in SYN City is growing increasingly restive, and civilians in large numbers are able to augment the MRB remnants and create situations that may require greater MAF involvement in internal security operations or adoption of stringent measures that can result in substantial civilian casualties. The elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH are believed to constitute one MRB and two half-strength MRRs. Tank, artillery, and AD units of that MRD are reported to be at from 10 percent to 50 percent of their initial strengths. These units are capable of harassing, delaying, or otherwise interferring with VII MAF GOP forces. In addition, they are capable of providing a reconnaissance screen or flank security for the march columns and significantly reinforcing the tank, artillery, and air defense fires of the three divisions now entering the region. The three divisions have the capability of closing the FBHL in about 48 hours and the FEBA in an additional 24 hours. They are well-protected by mobile antiaircraft weapon systems and have strong air The TAA providing their air support is able to establish air superiority over the battle zone when it launches a surge effort. The Aggressor forces are also able to launch an air assault by up to one airborne division, a heliborne assault by approximately one reinforced battalion, and a surface assault from ADVs by up to one light armored vehicle battalion. These types of assault could be conducted separately or simultaneously. The Aggressor forces have already demonstrated their capability for operating in chemical warfare environment. They also have the

capability to initiate nuclear warfare and are well-trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

Indications. The physical deployment and movement of the three divisions toward SYN City strongly indicates that this is their objective. Low-level communication intercepts and interrogation of Aggressor POWs tend to confirm that evalua-The posture of the elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH area appears to support the deployment of the advancing divisions. Efforts to establish and maintain communications between the civilians and military remnants within the city and the major forces outside the city also suggest that expulsion of VII MAF from the SYN City beachhead is their objective. Deployment of ACVs in coastal areas north of SYN City gives the enemy the capability to launch surfaceborne assaults against VII MAF's seaward flanks. There are no immediate indications of a buildup for airborne assault, but the enemy is capable of deploying transport and supporting aircraft extremely fast; therefore, an airborne assault must be anticipated despite the lack of indications at present.

## c. Friendly Forces

- (1) TF 51 provides NGF support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphibious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.
- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.

## d. <u>Attachments and Detachments</u> (effective on order)

- (1) 7th Light Armored Assault Bn reverts to OPCON of 7th MARDIV.
- (2) 2nd Tank Bn attached to 7th MARDIV.

#### e. Assumptions

(1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforced.

- (2) That the three Aggressor divisions will be delayed sufficiently by friendly action so that they will require at least 48 hours to reach the FBHL/GOPL.
- (3) That MAF security forces will be capable of delaying the attackers for at least 24 hours between the GOPL and the FEBA.
- (4) That forces in the FDA will be able to stop enemy attackers forward of the FEBA except in those areas designated as ambush routes herein, or by subordinate commands.
- (5) That, aside from occasional isolated acts of sabotage, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, the population of SYN City will not rise en masse against elements of VII MAF.
- (6) That Aggressor forces and dissident civilian elements will not be able to prevent, completely, friendly resupply efforts.

#### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed, a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

#### EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. VII MAF will establish the GOPL along the trace of the FBHL, with GOP forces operating as far forward of that line as possible. GOP forces will be charged with delaying the enemy by at least 48 hours forward of the GOPL and, in conjunction with COP forces, an additional 24 hours between the GOPL and FEBA. The FEBA will be established generally along the metropolitan boundary of SYN City in the outer fringe of structures. Extensive minefields, antitank ditches, roadblocks, and other obstacles will be installed to help protect the FDA and canalize hostile elements along designated ambush routes. VII MAF will establish a major ambush route in each of the two defensive sectors. CG, 7th MARDIV and his subordinate commanders will designate such additional ambush routes and killing zones as they deem appropriate and within their capabilities to initiate effectively. Houses, buildings, and other structures on the FEBA or within killing zones not required by 7th MARDIV will be barricade to prevent entry, thereby assuring that the Aggressor personnel cannot take cover inside those structures. Structures that are particularly vulnerable to machinegun or other direct or indirect fires will not be barricaded but will be booby trapped and covered by observation and fire. Mortar and artillery fires will

be planned for and used extensively to stop penetrations and seal off the enemy forces. Heavy use of close air support is contemplated for attacking and destroying the enemy along the two major ambush routes. Smaller-scale penetrations will require greater reliance on the use of mortars, direct-fire supporting weapons, and infantry counterattack. VII MAF will not retain a MAF Reserve but will keep a string on an infantry battalion in each of the two defensive sectors in the event that MAF intercession in the ground action becomes advisable.

- (1) Planning Considerations. Delaying the enemy well-forward of the FEBA for a substantial period of time is essential to the success of the mission. Extensive use of scatterable mines and selected implantation of deliberate minefields, both actual and dummy, will be required in the GOP to help gain that essential time. Conversely, the barrier system forward of the FEBA will require virtually all of the standard mines available to canalize the enemy along ambush routes and to impede their progress at the designated points. Additionally, large quantities of scatterable mines will be needed to blunt unexpected penetrations and provide time for friendly maneuver against such penetrations. Allocation of these limited resources must be carefully balanced to meet competing needs. Any major penetration in the southern sector will threaten Airfield 2. A defense in depth with strong mobile reserves will be required in the vicinity of that airfield to provide adequate defense. Airfield I is exposed and can easily be interdicted by the enemy as soon as the GOP is penetrated. Although continued operation of the field can be rendered untenable, thereby forcing VII MAF to evacuate all fixed-wing aircraft to TABs, the field can be denied to the enemy by direct and indirect The area in the northern sector that best lends itself to a major ambush route/killing zone is the northern industrial which, if penetrated successfully by Aggressor forces, provides ready access to the vital port area. Strong blocking positions will be required in depth east of that area to stop any penetration or to support friendly forces defending Airfield 1. Counterbattery and air defense fires will have to be coordinated to support logistic resupply operations as the enemy forces close on SYN City and are able to bring indirect fires and increased air attacks against naval surface movements and logistic support areas. The continuing threat of NBC warfare will require that the greatest possible dispersion be maintained between all units of the MAF.
- (2) Plan of Supporting Fires. The details of supporting fires will be worked out during concurrent planning. Essentially, the MCATFs comprising the GOP will include self-propelled

and towed artillery to provide long-range fires forward of the GOPL; these artillery units will revert to parent unit control after withdrawal of the GOP. The 10th Marines will occupy firing positions near the FEBA, initially, to support the withdrawal of the GOP and engage the Aggressor as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Artillery units will be prepared to engage Aggressor airborne or heliborne landing inside SYN City as well as ACV-landed forces in coastal areas. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) will prevail for the employment of all conventional and chemical air, ground, and naval fire support. Plans will be prepared for the use of tactical nuclear weapons outside of SYN City in the event their use is authorized. As a matter of priority, all units will prepare fire plans in support of ambush and entrapment operations that are envisioned in their defensive sectors.

#### b. Tasks

## (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A

- (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1988.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the north and northwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
- (e) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA and delay the enemy for at least 24 hours.
- (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission, chop to OPCON of CG, 7th MARDIV.

# (2) GOP Southern Sector: Task Force B

(a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1988.

- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the VII MAF area of responsibility from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOPL as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Plan for and request, if necessary, the employment of reinforcements to assure that the enemy forces converging on SYN City from the NW and SW do not arrive within supporting arms range of the city simultaneously.
- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw in a series of delaying actions on order; delay the enemy forward of the FEBA for at least 24 hours.
- (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Southern Sector mission, revert to OPCON of CG, 7th MARDIV.

## (3) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

- (a) Provide units to GOP as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to chop to VII MAF OPCON a battalion in each defensive sector for employment as MAF Reserve.
- (c) Prepare blocking positions to protect Airfields 1 and 2, CSSAs, and Port Area.
- (d) Support withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not coverage simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (e) Plan for ambush and entrapment operations in each battalion sector; submit concepts, fire support plans, and additional requirements soonest.
- (f) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.
- (g) Defend the Port Area in depth.
- (h) Notify this Headquarters of the deployment of division units to assigned blocking positions or the commitment of division reserves.

- (i) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (j) Prepare plans for light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP; submit plans and requests for helicopter and aviation support soonest; be prepared to execute plans on order.
- (k) Prepare plans to deploy tanks, artillery, light armored vehicles, amphibious vehicles, and infantry between the northern and southern sectors, priority to the southern sector.
- (1) Prepare counterlanding plans to detect and destroy enemy airborne, heliborne, or ACV attacks in assigned TAORs.
- (m) Be prepared to deploy company to battalion-sized units with supporting fires to establish secure enclaves for the landing of supplies by landing craft, LCAC, or helicopter.
- (n) Be prepared to deploy reconnaissance teams inside SYN City to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.
- (o) Be prepared to support the evacuation/relocation of civilians from the immediate vicinity of the FEBA; these operations to be controlled and coordinated by CO, 4th CAG.

## (4) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 110001P May 1988; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Designate TADC as TACC at 110001P May 1988. Implement coordination of air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon Teams as requested.
- (d) Be prepared to redeploy fixed-wing squadrons to TABs and continue air operations therefrom in support of VII MAF, while continuing to operate V/STOL aircraft from sites within SYN City.

8-88-8

INCLASSIFIED

- (e) On order, support light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP.
- (f) Be prepared to attack enemy forces along major ambush routes and in ambush killing zones using attack helicopters, AV-8Bs, an fixed-wing aircraft from TABs.

## (5) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

- (a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of interest.
- (c) Be prepared to implant electronic intrusion devices as directed.
- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACV-borne raiding forces.
- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, or other means of entry.
- (f) Submit recommendations for additional recon missions.

## (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.
- (b) On order, in coordination with 4th CAG, evacuate and relocate civilians from areas on or near the FEBA to locations to be designated.
- c. MAF Reserve. 7th MARDIV will designate one battalion in each defensive sector for possible assignment to VII MAF as a reserve force, if required. Tasks will be assigned to designated units by frag order.

## d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Contact left to right.
- (2) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.

- (3) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern and southern sectors in such a manner as to deny the enemy the capability of converging his NW and SW forces simultaneously on SYN City.
- (4) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Aggressor airborne or heliborne attacks.
- (5) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (6) Preparations for ambush/entrapment will commence immediately and the concepts and fire support plans will be consolidated at each level of command above battalion and forwarded to this Headquarters by 7th MARDIV.
- (7) Every effort will be made to stop the Aggressor forces forward of the FDA without permitting penetration of the FEBA; failure to do so will necessitate defending key positions in the subsector under attack in order that the enemy will be guided into ambush routes and ambush killing zones.
- (8) The code name for this defensive phase is MID-BREAKER EIGHT.
- (9) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.

. .

(10) This plan is effective on order.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.
- (2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

#### b. Logistics

- Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability as well as to provide forward logistic sites near alternate defensive phase lines.
- (2) Conceptually, units in the forward defense area will maintain on position sufficient quantities of Class I and V to support intense combat expenditures for at least three days. An additional three days of all classes of supplies will be positioned to support three days of operations at ISPs on

8-88-10

**INCLASSIFIED** 

each succeeding phase line to the rear, so that FEBA forces can fall back onto prestocked supplies or use those stockpiles to support forward defense forces with a minimum of resupply effort.

- (3) CSSAs will be drawn down to provide stocks for the ISPs while simultaneously reducing the vulnerability of the CSSAs. Roughly 3 DOS will be maintained at each of the forward positions, ISPs and the balance of supplies (14 DOS) will be maintained at the CSSA.
- (4) Supply stocks will not be established in or near assumed penetrations or ambush routes.
- (5) A sea-based logistic system will be required to replenish the CSSAs and intermediate supply points.
- (6) Modifications in VII MAF logistic posture may be required to accommodate to the changing tactical situation.
- (7) Indigenous structures will be used whenever possible for storing supplies to deny the enemy observation and indirect fires and to protect supplies from pilferage and sabotage.
- (8) 7th MAW will recommend supply and maintenance levels at V/STOL operating sites.
- (9) Priority support will be accorded to 4th CAG in repairing and operating essential public works, utilities, and communications that contribute to the health and welfare of the populace and safe guard VII MAF from health hazards and civil uprisings.
- (10) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.
- (11) The 34,250 civilians currently in DPRE assembly areas plus possibly an additional 30,000 evacuees will require billeting and other logistic support.
- (12) Maximum support will be accorded to indigenous firefighting units.
- (13) Supplies required for relief of civilian distress will be accorded a high priority; local SYN City representatives will distribute civilian emergency supplies.
- (14) Maximum possible use will be made of civilian labor in rear areas.

## 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

The Court of the C

## a. <u>Command Relationships</u>

- (1) Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.
- (2) CG, 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.
- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of interest will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.
- (4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow-on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

## b. Signal

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Commanding

## **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Operations Overlay
- 2 Logistics Overlay


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

Copy no. \_\_\_of\_\_\_copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1988

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

ENCLOSURE 1 (Operations Overlay) to Outline Plan 8-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER EIGHT)

Time Zone: P



**ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT** 

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

88-1-1


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830 May, 1988

ENCLOSURE 2 (Logistics Overlay) to Outline Plan 8-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER EIGHT)

Time Zone: P



★ TENTATIVE LOCATION OF ISPs

NOTE. FORWARD POSITIONAL STOCKAGE POINTS NOT SHOWN

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS
Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

# OUTLINE PLAN 9-88 OPERATION MID-BREAKER NINE

## MISSION NINE - DEFENSE IN DEPTH

DEFENSE IN DEPTH WILL GENERALLY BE CONSIDERED WHEN THE ENEMY POSSESSES ARMOR AND THERE ARE ADEQUATE ARMOR AVENUES OF APPROACH AVAILABLE. THIS CONCEPT REQUIRES THE LOCATING OF STRONGPOINTS IN DEPTH ALONG ARTERIES LEADING INTO THE CITY. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

## VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed, a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter be prepared to attack to the northwest.

Copy no. of copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1981 ORJ-03

Outline Plan 9-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER NINE)

See Concept Plan 6-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER SIX). At MAF level these two plans are virtually identifical.

See following page for General Considerations.

General Considerations. Cutline Clar 9 88 Operation MIC BRIAKIR MINIS ... based on defense inside the city and it is virtually identical at MAN level to Concept Plan 6-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER SIX), which calls for a defense in depth. The two missions are similar in that they require VII MAF to defend in place until follow-on forces are landed. The principal differences between the two plans are these: Concept Plan 6-88 specifies defensive priorities for the Port Area, CSSAs, and Airfield 2 whereas Outline Plan 9-88 does not list any priority areas but does state that the MAF is to be prepared to continue the attack to the northwest after follow-on forces have landed and deployed. The configuration of SYN City influences the defensive posture and limits the tactical and logistical options that can seriously be considered at MAF level. The Aggressor's substantial superiority in armor, artillery, and air defense weapon systems militates in favor of establishing the main defense inside the metropolitan boundaries of the city to take advantage of the cover, concealment, and defensive The requirement that VII MAF compartmentalization of the urban area. defend the port city to permit the landing and deployment of follow-on forces makes it necessary to provide for the defense of key areas, which, from the MAF viewpoint, are the same for a defense inside the city (See OH 8-7, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)) and for defense in depth (See USMC Study SCN 30-77-01). It should be noted that a defense in depth can be employed in any defensive concept if sufficient forces are available to achieve the desired depth.

Planning and preparing for the defensive battle against numerically superior forces will require the full attention of all VII MAF planners. The nature and duration of the urban combat cannot be predicted with any confidence at this time; therefore, specific planning for continuing the attack to the northwest will be undertaken later. In this context, the MAF plan requires no elaboration except to alert subordinate units to the need for being prepared to continue the attack (some 30-or-more days in the future). Stating this alert in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of paragraph 3 (EXECUTION) is considered to be sufficient at this time.

Tactical Considerations. The GOPL will be established along the trace of the FBHL because that line has already been secured and it constitutes the most defensible terrain in the immediate area. Although key defensive areas are not specified by higher authority in this mission, defense of the Port Area, CSSAs, and Airfield 2 is a deduced mission; their retention is essential for accomplishment of the stated mission. In all respects the tactical and logistical concepts are the same at MAF level for these specific missions (6-88 and 9-88) in the SYN City FBH.

#### OUTLINE PLAN 10-88

#### OPERATION MID-BREAKER TEN

#### MISSION TEN - MOBILE DEFENSE

MOBILE DEFENSE WOULD BE CONSIDERED IF...THE MARINE CORPS LF IS CHARGED WITH DEFENDING AND RETAINING AN URBAN AREA AGAINST A SUPERIOR FORCE OR THE SIZE OF THE URBAN AREA EXCEEDS THE LF CAPABILITY TO ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE ALONG THE FEBA. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

### VII MAF Mission

A CONTRACT OF THE PROPERTY OF

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed, a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter be prepared to attack to the northwest.

Note: Much of the data contained herein are identical to that in Outline Plan 8-88 (Entrapment and Ambush). Substantive changes are indicated in the margin.

Copy no. \_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988 MLB-10

Outline Plan 10-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER TEN)

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense
  - (d) JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas
  - (e) LFM 04/NWP 17, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization) to VII MAF Concept Plan 6-88 as modified herein.

#### 1. SITUATION

General. This outline plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance a. as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by subordinate commands. This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. The unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.

#### b. Enemy Forces

(1) Enemy Situation. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present in the city in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy casualties in personnel and equipment, and by D+10 they were destroyed or driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL. Those units range from 10 percent to 50 percent in combat efficiency. The principal threat to VII MAF stems from the

advance of one MRD from the northwest and an airborne division on a second MRD advancing from the southwest. Those three divisions have advance elements about 150 km from SYN City at present.

(2) Enemy Capabilities. Aggressor remnants within SYN City are capable of conducting sniper and sapper attacks against VII MAF units and installations. The CSS areas are particularly vulnerable to those kinds of attacks. Aggressor personnel within the city are also capable of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information to the major units now advancing on the city. The scattered elements inside SYN City are believed to have at least seven operable, man-portable, surface-to-air missiles of the improved SA-7 type which can inhibit helicopter and low-level fixed-wing air operations over several sectors of the city. The civilian population in SYN City is growing increasingly restive, and civilians in large numbers are able to augment the MRB remnants and create situations that may require greater MAF involvement in internal security operations or adoption of stringent measures that can result in substantial civilian casualties. The elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH are believed to constitute one MRB and two half-strength MRRs. Tank, artillery, and AD units of that MRD are reported to be at from 10 percent to 50 percent of their initial strengths. These units are capable of harassing, delaying, or otherwise interferring with VII MAF GOP forces. In addition, they are capable of providing a reconnaissance screen or flank security for the march columns and significantly reinforcing the tank, artillery, and air defense fires of the three divisions now entering the region. The three divisions have the capability of closing the FBHL in about 48 hours and the FEBA in an additional 24 hours. They are well-protected by mobile antiaircraft weapon systems and have strong air The TAA providing their air support is able to establish air superiority over the battle zone when it launches a surge effort. The Aggressor forces are also able to launch an air assault by up to one airborne division, a heliborne assault by approximately one reinforced battalion, and a surface assault from ACVs by up to one light armored vehicle battalion. These types of assault could be conducted separately or simultaneously. The Aggressor forces have already demonstrated their capability for operating in a chemical warfare environment. They also have the capability to initiate nuclear warfare and are well-trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

C ...

(3) <u>Indications</u>. The physical deployment and movement of the three divisions toward SYN City strongly indicates that this is their objective. Low-level communication intercepts and

interrogation of Aggressor POWs tend to confirm that evaluation. The posture of the elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH area appears to support the deployment of the advancing divisions. Efforts to establish and maintain communications between the civilians and military remnants within the city and the major forces outside the city also suggest that expulsion of VII MAF from the SYN City beachhead is their objective. Deployment of ACVs in coastal areas north of SYN City gives the enemy the capability to launch surfaceborne assaults against VII MAF's seaward flanks. There are no immediate indications of a buildup for airborne assault, but the enemy is capable of deploying transport and supporting aircraft extremely fast; therefore, an airborne assault must be anticipated despite the lack of indications at present.

### c. Friendly Forces

- (1) TF 51 provides NGF support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphibious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.
- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.

#### d. Attachments and Detachments

- (1) Co A (Rein), 7th Light Armored Assault Bn attached to GOP Northern Sector, TF A.
- (2) 7th Light Armored Assault Bn (-) attached to GOP Southern Sector, TF B.

#### e. Assumptions

- (1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforced.
- (2) That the three Aggressor divisions will be delayed sufficiently by friendly action so that they will require at least 48 hours to reach the FBHL/GOPL.

- (3) That MAF security forces will be capable of delaying the attackers for at least 24 hours between the GOPL and the FEBA.
- (4) That forces in the FDA will be able to stop enemy attackers forward of the FEBA except in those areas designated as assumed penetrations.
- (5) That Aggressor forces and dissident civilian elements will not be able to prevent, completely, friendly resupply efforts.

### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed, a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. VII MAF will establish the GOPL along the trace of the FBHL. All forces assigned will be mobile or mounted. LAA units attached to the tank-heavy MCATFs will operate as far forward of the GOP as possible to make contact with the advancing enemy and draw security elements into positions where they can be enveloped by our tanks. When possible, light armored assault vehicles will be helilifted to positions from which they can strike at the soft-skinned CSS elements of the Aggressor forces. When directed to withdraw, Task Forces ALPHA and BRAVO will defend the northern and southern sectors of the GOP for a minimum of 48 hours, but the two TFs will NOT be withdrawn at the same time. GOP operations will be conducted so as not to permit the enemy to close on the FEBA simultaneously from Any GOP withdrawals will be accomplished as the NW and SW. delaying actions emphasizing counterattacks by mobile strike The GOP and other security forces will be tasked to delay the enemy for at least an additional 24 hours between the GOP and FEBA to gain time for preparation of the FDA. will be established generally along the metropolitan boundary of SYN City in the outer fringe of structures. Extensive minefields, antitank ditches, roadblocks, and other obstacles will be installed to help protect the FDA and canalize hostile elements into assumed penetrations. Three such assumed penetrations will be designated by VII MAF along the axes of the main avenues of approach from the northwest, west, and southwest. Strongpoints, obstacles, direct fire weapons will be sited to stop enemy thrusts in each of the assumed penetrations. Requisite mobile strike forces will be comprised of the reinforced tank battalions after they have completed their missions as the northern and

southern sector GOPs. A mounted infantry battalion (-) will also be available as a mobile reserve for commitment against penetrations that occur in built-up areas where tanks cannot be employed effectively in the northern sector.

- Planning Considerations. The GOP must be maintained for at least 48 hours without suffering significant losses and without becoming decisively engaged. Armor assets assigned to the GOP will be the nucleus of the mobile strike forces inside the FEBA, and any losses exceeding 10 percent to 20 percent of the armor in the security zone will severely limit the combat power of the strike forces. The requirements that the Aggressor forces be delayed at least 48 hours in front of the FBHL and another 24 hours between the GOP and FEBA, and that the enemy attacking from the NW and SW not be permitted to converge simultaneously on SYN City may make it necessary to reinforce one or both sectors of the GOP. Once the GOPL is engaged in force by the enemy, maximum air support will be required to inflict casualties on the attackers, protect the GOP forces, and gain additional time. That air support will be needed at the same time that Airfields 1 and 2 will be preparing for evacuation of fixedwing aircraft, thus making it imperative that air support and redeployment operations be carefully coordinated to prevent a diminution in vital air support. Air defense operations will also require careful coordination because of the anticipated surge effort by the Aggressor TAA at this time. A maximum effort will be needed at the same time to assure that supply stocks are built up to the required levels.
- Plan of Supporting Fires. The details of supporting fires will be worked out during concurrent planning. Essentially, the MCATFs comprising the GOP will include self-propelled and towed artillery to provide long-range fires forward of the GOPL; these artillery units will revert to parent unit control after withdrawal of the GOP. The 10th Marines will occupy firing positions near the FEBA, initially, to support the withdrawal of the GOP and engage the Aggressor as far forward of the FEBA as possible. Artillery units will be prepared to engage Aggressor airborne or heliborne landing inside SYN City as well as ACV-landed forces in coastal areas. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) will prevail for the employment of all conventional and chemical air, ground, and naval fire support. Plans will be prepared for the use of tactical nuclear weapons outside of SYN City in the event their use is authorized.

### b. Tasks

### (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A

- (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1988.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the north and northwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.
- (d) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) any requirements for reinforcements, if necessary, to assure continuity of the GOP for at least 48 hours and/or additional delay time that might be directed to prevent the Aggressor forces attacking from the NW from closing the FEBA simultaneously with enemy forces advancing from the SW.
- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
- (f) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA and delay the enemy for at least 24 hours.
- (g) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of VII MAF Reserve as directed.

### (2) GOP Southern Sector: Task Force B

- (a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1988.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward the VII MAF area of responsibility from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOPL as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties that can be accomplished by the task force and supporting aircraft without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy forward of the GOPL for at least 48 hours.

10-88-6

# L 'CLASSIFIED

- (d) Plan for and request, if necessary, the employment of reinforcements to assure that the enemy forces converging on SYN City from the NW and SW do not arrive within supporting arms range of the city simultaneously.
- (e) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw in a series of delaying actions on order; delay the enemy forward of the FEBA for at least 24 hours.
- (f) Subsequent to termination of GOP Southern Sector mission, detach appropriate units and assume mission of VII MAF Reserve as directed.

### (3) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

- (a) Provide units to GOP and MAF Reserve as directed.
- (b) Prepare blocking positions to protect Airfields 1 and 2, CSSAs, and Port Area.
- (c) Support withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not coverage simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (d) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.
- (e) Defend the Port Area in depth.
- (f) Notify this Headquarters of the deployment of division units to assigned blocking positions or the commitment of division reserves; contain major enemy penetrations for counterattacking force.
- (g) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.
- (h) Prepare counterlanding plans to detect and destroy enemy airborne, heliborne, or ACV attacks in assigned TAORs.
- (i) Be prepared to deploy company to battalion-sized units with supporting fires to establish secure enclaves for the landing of supplies by landing craft, LCAC, or helicopter.

- (j) Be prepared to deploy reconnaissance teams inside SYN City to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.
- (k) Be prepared to support the evacuation/relocation of civilians from the immediate vicinity of the FEBA; these operations to be controlled and coordinated by CO, 4th CAG.

### (4) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 110001P May 1988; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Designate TADC as TACC at 110001P May 1988. Implement coordination of air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon Teams as requested.
- (d) Be prepared to redeploy fixed-wing squadrons to TABs and continue air operations therefrom in support of VII MAF, while continuing to operate V/STOL aircraft from sites within SYN City.
- (e) On order, support light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP.

t, )

### (5) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

- (a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of interest.
- (c) Be prepared to imlant electronic intrusion devices as directed.
- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACVborne raiding forces.
- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, or other means of entry.

10-88-8

L CLASSIFIED

(f) Submit recommendations for additional recommissions.

### (6) 7th Force Service Support Group

- (a) Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.
- (b) On order, in coordination with 4th CAG, evacuate and relocate civilians from areas on or near the FEBA to locations to be designated.

#### c. MAF Reserve

### (1) 2nd Tank Bn (-) (Rein)

- (a) Provide one tank company and an AT platoon to 2nd Bn, 1st Marines (Strike Force).
- (b) In coordination with the 1st Marines, prepare plans to counterattack Aggressor forces in assumed penetration X-RAY.
- (c) Prepare blocking positions south and east of Penetration X-RAY.
- (d) Be prepared to conduct mobile strike force operations in the vicinity of Airfield 1.

### (2) 2nd Bn, 1st Marines (-) (Rein)

- (a) Provide a reinforced rifle company to the 2nd Tank Bn Strike Force.
- (b) In coordination with the 2nd Marines, prepare plans to counterattack Aggressor forces in assumed penetration YOKE.
- (c) Prepare blocking positions on the northern flank of Penetration YOKE.
- (d) Be prepared to dismount and conduct house-to-house clearing operations in the urban area within Penetration YOKE.
- (e) Be prepared to chop to the OPCON of the 2nd Marines.

### (3) <u>1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein)</u>

□ いいかいかは 関ラシングマンタ 乗びいるとととなる

(a) Assume OPCON of 3/2; Co B (Rein), 1st AAV Bn; and a combat engineer platoon, to be designated.

10-88-9

# UNCLASSIFIED

- (b) In coordination with the 3rd Marines, prepare plans to counterattack Aggressor forces in assumed penetration ZULU.
- (c) Prepare blocking positions on the western flank of Penetration YOKE.
- (d) Be prepared to conduct mobile strike force operations anywhere south of South River, with priority to Penetration ZULU and Airfield 2.

### d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Contact left to right.
- (2) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.
- (3) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern and southern sectors in such a manner as to deny the enemy the capability of converging his NW and SW forces simultaneously on SYN City.
- (4) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Aggressor airborne or heliborne attacks.
- (5) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (6) Priority of fires initially to GOP, thereafter to committed mobile strike forces. All other fires according to SOP unless otherwise directed.
- (7) DIRLAUTH between MAF Reserves and associated 7th MARDIV units.
- (8) The code name for this defensive phase is MID-BREAKER TEN.
- (9) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.
- (10) This plan is effective on order.

#### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- (1) Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.
- (2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

10-88-10

U"'CLASSIFIED

### b. Logistics

- (1) Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability as well as to provide forward logistic sites near alternate defensive phase lines.
- (2) Conceptually, units in the forward defense area will maintain on position sufficient quantities of Class I and V to support intense combat expenditures for at least three days. An additional three days of all classes of supplies will be positioned to support three days of operations at ISPs on each succeeding phase line to the rear, so that FEBA forces can fall back onto prestocked supplies or use those stockpiles to support forward defense forces with a minimum of resupply effort.
- (3) CSSAs will be drawn down to provide stocks for the ISPs while simultaneously reducing the vulnerability of the CSSAs. Roughly 3 DOS will be maintained at each of the forward positions, ISPs and the balance of supplies (14 DOS) will be maintained at the CSSA.
- (4) A sea-based logistic system will be required to replenish the CSSAs and intermediate supply points.
- (5) Modifications in VII MAF logistic posture may be required to accommodate to the changing tactical situation.
- (6) Indigenous structures will be used whenever possible for storing supplies to deny the enemy observation and indirect fires and to protect supplies from pilferage and sabotage.
- (7) 7th MAW will recommend supply and maintenance levels at V/STOL operating sites.
- (8) Priority support will be accorded to 4th CAG in repairing and operating essential public works, utilities, and communications that contribute to the health and welfare of the populace and safe guard VII MAF from health hazards and civil uprisings.
- (9) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.
- (10) The 34,250 civilians currently in DPRE assembly areas plus possibly an additional 30,000 evacuees will require billeting and other logistic support.

10-88-11

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

- (11) Maximum support will be accorded to indigenous firefighting units.
- (12) Supplies required for relief of civilian distress will be accorded a high priority; local SYN City representatives will distribute civilian emergency supplies.
- (13) Maximum possible use will be made of civilian labor in rear areas.

### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

### a. Command Relationships

- Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.
- (2) CG 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.
- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of interest will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.
- (4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow-on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

### b. Signal

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

#### ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

■1200mmは120mmの120mmの120mmの120mmに120mmの120mmに120mmの120mm01

- 1 Operations Overlay
- 2 Logistics Overlay


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive) 10-88-12

# **INCLASSIFIED**

NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no.....of.....copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988

#### ENCLOSURE 1 (Operations Overlay) to Outline Plan 10-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER TEN)



**ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT** 

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff


DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

NOTE. Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no. \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_ copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830 May, 1988

#### ENCLOSURE 2 (Logistics Overlay) to Outline Plan 10-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER TEN)

Time Zone: P



★ TENTATIVE LOCATION OF ISPs

NOTE. FORWARD POSITIONAL STOCKAGE POINTS NOT SHOWN

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S J THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

#### OUTLINE PLAN 11-88

#### OPERATION MID-BREAKER ELEVEN

#### MISSION ELEVEN - DEFENSE OUTSIDE THE CITY

THIS CONCEPT MAY BE ADOPTED WHEN THE TERRAIN SURROUNDING AN URBAN AREA OFFERS ADVANTAGE TO THE DEFENDER AND THE MARINE CORPS LF IS OF SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO ORGANIZE A DEFENSE OUTSIDE THE CITY. (USMC STUDY SCN 30-77-01)

#### VII MAF Mission

VII MAF defends in place to protect SYN City from infiltration and penetrations in force until follow-on forces are landed and deployed, a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

Note: Some of the data contained herein are similar or identical to that in Concept Plan 6-88 and Outline Plans 7-88 through 10-88. Substantive changes are indicated in the margins. It should further be noted that Outline Plan 11-88--Defense Outside the City--is, in effect, a mobile defense that does not significantly involve urban combat. Logistic and civil affairs functions would be conducted in the city much like those described in Concept Plan 6-88, but with considerably less MAF interface.

Copy no. \_\_ of \_\_ copies VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force (VII MAF) SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND 250830P May, 1988 WEO-83

Outline Plan 11-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER ELEVEN)

- Ref: (a) Maps: Synthetic (SYN) City, 1:20,000; 60 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map; 200 Kilometer Supplemental Map to Synthetic City Base Map
  - (b) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
  - (c) FMFM 8-3, Advanced Naval Base Defense
  - (d) JCS Pub 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas Land Areas
  - (e) LFM 04/NWP 17, Doctrine and Procedures for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

Time Zone: P

<u>Task Organization</u>: Annex A (Task Organization) to VII MAF Concept Plan 6-88 as modified herein.

#### 1. SITUATION

General. This outline plan constitutes VII MAF planning guidance a. as the basis for staff action and concurrent planning by subordimate commands. This is a preliminary plan in abbreviated format which outlines salient features of the concept for defending the SYN City enclave/FBHL from infiltration or penetration in force by numerically superior Aggressor forces, to permit the introduction of follow-on forces. Concurrently with securing of the FBHL on D+6, three additional Aggressor divisions were detected moving toward the southern region. These forces consisted of an MRD moving in from the northwest and an airborne division and another MRD approaching from the southwest. By D+10 the advance elements of these divisions were generally within 150 km of SYN City. unified commander directed that VII MAF prepare a defensive operation plan for submission to him as a basis for JCS/DOD evaluation of military requirements and priorities in this region.

#### b. Enemy Forces

(1) Enemy Situation. Survivors and stragglers from the MRB (Rein) that originally defended SYN City are still present in the city in unknown but limited numbers. Units of that battalion's parent MRR and MRD suffered heavy casualties in personnel and equipment, and by D+10 they were destroyed or driven off. No enemy combat units larger than company/battery size are known to be within 75 km of the FBHL/GOPL.

Those units range from 10 percent to 50 percent in combat efficiency. The principal threat to VII MAF stems from the advance of one MRD from the northwest and an airborne division on a second MRD advancing from the southwest. Those three divisions have advance elements about 150 km from SYN City at present.

Enemy Capabilities. Aggressor remnants within SYN City are capable of conducting sniper and sapper attacks against VII MAF units and installations. The CSS areas are purchaslarly vulnerable to those kinds of attacks. Aggressor personnel within the city are also capable of obtaining and transmitting intelligence information to the major units now advancing on the city. The scattered elements inside SYN City are believed to have at least seven operable, man-portable, surface-to-air missiles of the improved SA-7 type which can inhibit helicopter and low-level fixed-wing air operations over several sectors of the city. The civilian population in SYN City is growing increasingly restive, and civilians in large numbers are able to augment the MRB remnants and create situations that may require greater MAF involvement in internal security operations or adoption of stringent measures that can result in substantial civilian casualties. The elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH are believed to constitute one MRB and two half-strength MRRs. Tank, artillery, and AD units of that MRD are reported to be at from 10 percent to 50 percent of their initial strengths. These units are capable of harassing, delaying, or otherwise interferring with VII MAF GOP forces. In addition, they are capable of providing a reconnaissance screen or flank security for the march columns and significantly reinforcing the tank, artillery, and air defense fires of the three divisions now entering the region. The three divisions have the capability of closing the FBHL in about 48 hours and the FEBA in an additional 24 hours. They are well-protected by mobile antiaircraft weapon systems and have strong air The TAA providing their air support is able to establish air superiority over the battle zone when it launches a surge effort. The Aggressor forces are also able to launch an air assault by up to one airborne division, a heliborne assault by approximately one reinforced battalion, and a surface assault from ACVs by up to one light armored vehicle battalion. These types of assault could be conducted separately or simultaneously. The Aggressor forces have already demonstrated their capability for operating in a chemical warfare environment. They also have the capability to initiate nuclear warfare and are well-trained to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

(3) Indications. The physical deployment and movement of the three divisions toward SYN City strongly indicates that this is their objective. Low-level communication intercepts and interrogation of Aggressor POWs tend to confirm that evalua-The posture of the elements of the MRD that were driven out of the FBH area appears to support the deployment of the advancing divisions. Efforts to establish and maintain communications between the civilians and military remnants within the city and the major forces outside the city also suggest that expulsion of VII MAF from the SYN City beachhead is their objective. Deployment of ACVs in coastal areas north of SYN City gives the enemy the capability to launch surfaceborne assaults against VII MAF's seaward flanks. There are no immediate indications of a buildup for airborne assault, but the enemy is capable of deploying transport and supporting aircraft extremely fast; therefore, an airborne assault must be anticipated despite the lack of indications at present.

### c. Friendly Forces

- (1) TF 51 provides NGF support for VII MAF, and supports deception operations with amphibious shipping, as required.
- (2) Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 57) supports TF 51 and VII MAF within MAF area of influence.
- (3) Theater Air Forces support VII MAF on a limited basis with priority to emergency requests.
- (4) Antisubmarine Group (TG 56.2) conducts ASW operations.
- (5) Follow-on forces, to be designated, will begin to arrive in the theater on or after D+30.
- d. Attachments and Detachments. In accordance with tasking delineated in paragraph 3. below.

### e. Assumptions

- (1) That the three Aggressor divisions observed at a distance of 150 km deploying toward the FBHL will not be materially reinforced.
- (2) That the lead elements of the advancing Aggressor divisions will not be able to close the GOP for at least 24 hours.
- (3) That GOP forces will be able to delay the attackers by at least 24 hours in front of the GOPL, an additional 24 hours on or near the GOP, and another 24 hours between the GOPL and FEBA.

11-88-3

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

(4) That the civilian population of SYN City will not create problems of sufficient magnitude to interfere significantly with VII MAF defensive operations.

### 2. MISSION

VII MAF defends the FBHL to protect the approaches to SYN City from infiltration and attack until follow-on forces are landed and deployed, a period estimated to be between D+30 and D+45; thereafter, be prepared to attack to the northwest.

#### 3. EXECUTION

Concept of Operations. VII MAF will establish the FEBA along the a. trace of the current FBHL, destroy enemy pockets of resistance forward of the FEBA to a distance of about 50 km to establish the GOPL, and operate to destroy the enemy forward of the FEBA by war of maneuver and massive application of fire power. The GOP will consist of three elements; a tank-heavy task force covering the northern sector that blocks the northern flank and major avenue of approach from the NW, a light recon task force covering the central massifs and South River fault, and a tank-heavy task force covering the southern flank and major avenue of approach The GOP will receive priority helicopter support for maintaining OPs, supporting deep reconnaissance, conducting artillery and light armored vehicle raids forward of the GOPL, and providing CSS including casualty evacuation. The GOP will engage the enemy at the maximum distance possible using offensive action, ambushes, and spoiling attacks to stop the enemy and defeat or delay him. Tank and light armored vehicle teams, supported by GOP artillery and aircraft from SYN City fields and TABs, will be responsible for delaying the enemy forward of the FEB for at least 24 hours after initial contact and for another 48 hours before the enemy can close the FEBA. The great distances involved and the preponderant strength of the Aggressor forces makes it necessary to rely on a war of movement with highly mobile security forces having substantial fire power. Six infantry battalions will establish the FEBA, improving the positions currently being developed along the FBHL with priority to the dominating terrain at the NW and SW valleys which constitute the major avenues of approach to SYN City. The barrier system will be installed primarily in those two avenues of approach. Forces manning the FEBA will support withdrawal of the GOP and endeavor to stop the attackers well-forward of the FEBA. If the FEBA is penetrated, units not directly threatened will continue to defend in sector. On order, units coming under direct attack will fight a series of delaying actions to occupy supplementary positions astride assumed penetrations NORTH STAR and SOUTHERN CROSS, thereby canalizing the Aggressor forces. Mobile strike forces, constituted from the MCATFs that initially functioned as

the northern and southern sector GOP forces, will counterattack the penetrations to destroy or eject the enemy. Conceptually, the enemy will be engaged well-forward and at no time will he be permitted to establish positions within direct-fire-range of SYN City.

- Planning Considerations. Delaying the enemy well-forward of the FEBA for a substantial period of time is essential to the success of the mission. Extensive use of scatterable mines and selected implantation of deliberate minefields, both actual and dummy, will be required in the GOP. great distances involved, however, limit the utility of mining in view of the comparatively limited supply of mines. Large quantities of scatterable mines will be required beginning when the GOP is engaged by enemy forces, but priority for use of those mines will be accorded to the FDA forces because the terrain is more suitable for their use along the FEBA. Tentatively, 15 percent of the scatterable mines will be made available to the GOP and 85 percent will be reserved for use in support of the FDA. Air defense of GOP forces will require that HAWK Assault Fire Units (AFUs) be deployed well-forward of the FEBA and within 10 to 15 km of the GOP in both major avenues of approach. A HAWK battery (-) will be needed in the SW avenue of approach near the FEBA to thicken the AD fires in that vulnerable area. It is essential, however, that maximum overlap of HAWK coverage be obtained in the approaches to and over SYN City. Airfields 1 and 2 will require strong AD protection to assure uninterrupted air support operations from those two Mobile strike force positions and supplementary positions for FDA units astride assumed penetrations will have to be prepared before the enemy closes the FEBA. units operating inside SYN City will be responsible for their own security. It is premature to begin planning for a continuation of the attack to the NW at this time; therefore, broad guidance for concurrent offensive planning will be provided by VII MAF after the defensive battle has been joined and the situation with respect to the enemy and VII MAF has been clarified. In the interim, all units will strive to maintain a tactical and logistical posture that will accommodate offensive requirements hile giving priority to the mission at hand, defending the SYN City beachhead.
- (2) Plan of Supporting Fires. The wide-open terrain forward of the FEBA lends itself to artillery raids, and defensive plans will incorporate the employment of helilifted artillery forward of the GOPL when feasible and when those operations offer good chances for deceiving the enemy or inflicting significant casualties. GOP artillery will

include all of the 8" SP howitzers and a mix of 155mm SP and towed howitzers. Artillery will be positioned as near the GOP as possible to achieve the greatest possible range consistent with good artillery practices. Echelonment to the rear of artillery units will be controlled by the Northern and Southern Sector GOP commanders. Artillery positions within the FEBA will be well-forward to achieve the best possible range advantage and cover the assumed penetrations. Naval gunfire will be limited to coastal regions. Air support operations will be in accordance with SOP. nuclear targets are targets of opportunity. If the use of tactical nuclear weapons is approved by the NCA, nuclear fires will be conducted in accordance with SOP. No nuclear fires will be directed at the Aggressor city located 90km Chemical weapons may be employed as SSW of SYN City. required outside the metropolitan limits of SYN City and outside the limits of the nearby communities. Use of chemical weapons inside civilian-occupied areas will be in strict accordance with the ROE promulgated in VII MAF OPLAN 1-88.

### b. Tasks

- (1) GOP Northern Sector: Task Force A
  - (a) Establish northern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1988.
  - (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the north and northwest.
  - (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward of the GOP as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties with prudent risk and without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy after initial contact for at least 24 hours forward of the GOP, 24 additional hours on or near the GOP, and at least 24 more hours between the GOP and FEBA.
  - (d) Be prepared to conduct light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP; airlift and air support requests to the FASC in accordance with SOP.
  - (e) Maintain observation over coastal mountain area, swamp and bog area to the east.
  - (f) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for commencing withdrawal of the northern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.

11-88-6

*YCLASSIFIED* 

- (g) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA using ambush and counterattack tactics to the maximum possible degree.
- (h) Be prepared to receive reinforcements to help gain additional delay time and prevent enemy forces in the NW from converging on the FEBA simultaneously with those attacking from the SW.
- (i) Subsequent to termination of GOP Northern Sector mission, detach units as directed and assume the mission of VII MAF Reserve/Northern Strike Force.

### (2) GOP Southern Sector: Recon Task Force

- (a) Establish central sector of VII MAF GOP by 261000P May 1988.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor activities and movements toward or within sector; coordinate and direct air attacks against any enemy troop concentrations.
- (c) Outpost the South River fault to detect and report any Aggressor movements down the river.
- (d) Be prepared to maintain the central sector GOP after withdrawal of the GOP forces in the northern and southern sectors; recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for withdrawal of the central sector GOP; withdraw on order.

#### (3) GOP Southern Sector: Task Force B

- (a) Establish southern sector of VII MAF GOP by 260001P May 1988.
- (b) Provide maximum warning of Aggressor movement toward VII MAF area of responsibility from the south and southwest.
- (c) Engage enemy forces as far forward as possible, inflict the maximum number of casualties with prudent risk and without becoming decisively engaged, and delay the enemy after initial contact for at least 24 hours forward of the GOP, 24 additional hours on or near the GOP, and at least 24 more hours between the GOP and FEBA.

- (d) Be prepared to conduct light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP; airlift and air support requests to the FASC in accordance with SOP.
- (e) Maintain observation over the palisades and coast.
- (f) Recommend to CG, VII MAF (VII MAF COC) timing for commencing withdrawal of the southern sector of the GOP; withdraw on order.
- (g) On order, conduct a series of delaying actions from the GOPL to the FEBA using ambush and counterattack tactics to the maximum possible degree.
- (h) Be prepared to request and receive reinforcements to help gai additional delay time and prevent enemy forces in the SW from converging on the FEBA simultaneously with those attacking from the NW.
- (i) Subsequent to termination of the GOP Northern Sector mission, detach units as directed and assume mission of MAF Reserve/Southern Strike Force.

### (4) 7th MARDIV (-) (Rein)

STATEMENT OF THE STATEM

(a) Provide units to GOP and MAF Reserve as directed; be prepared to furnish additional mobile reinforcements to the northern or southern sectors of the GOP, or both sectors if required, on order.

C.

- (b) Prepare obstacles and blocking positions astride assumed penetrations NORTH STAR and SOUTHERN CROSS.
- (c) Support the withdrawal of GOP forces; be prepared to shift effort to assure that the advancing enemy columns do not coverage simultaneously on the FEBA.
- (d) Prepare plans to counter enemy surface landings by ACV or landing craft anywhere along the coast within the FEBA.
- (e) Defend the FEBA against Aggressor attack, infiltration or penetration in force; if possible, restore by local counterattack any key terrain or positions that might be lost.
- (f) Notify this Headquarters by FLASH precedence of any penetration of the FEBA.

11-88-8

L 'CLASSIFIED

(g) Be prepared to deploy countersniper/countersapper teams i urban/suburban areas to locate, destroy, or neutralize civilian or paramilitary persons engaged in sniper, sapper, antiair, or subversive activities.

#### (5) 7th MAW

- (a) Assume responsibility of AADC at 251300P May 1988; coordinate air defense effort.
- (b) Coordinate air operations and airspace control for CG, VII MAF as coordinating authority for air (CAA).
- (c) Be prepared to insert and extricate Force Recon Teams as requested.
- (d) Support light armored vehicle and artillery raids forward of the GOP.
- (e) Provide HAWK Assault Fire Unit (AFU) support to the northern and southern sectors of the GOP.
- (f) Provide STINGER teams to GOP forces as directed; resume OPCON of those teams after GOP sectors withdraw.
- (g) Be prepared, temporarily, to redeploy selected fixedwing squadrons from Airfields 1 or 2 to TABs in the event either airfield is damaged sufficiently to limit air operations; restore the airfield(s) to full operating capacity expeditiously.
- (h) Be prepared to conduct tactical nuclear strikes against targets of opportunity forward of the FEBA.

### (6) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company

- (a) Be prepared to conduct deep reconnaissance, as directed.
- (b) Be prepared to conduct NBC monitoring anywhere in the VII MAF area of interest.
- (c) Be prepared to implant electronic intrusion devices as directed.
- (d) Be prepared to establish OPs in coastal regions to detect and direct supporting fires on Aggressor ACV-borne raiding forces.

- (e) Be prepared to conduct small-scale raids behind enemy lines to capture prisoners; such raids to be carried out from helicopters, submarines, or other means of entry.
- (f) Submit recommendations for additional recon missions.
- (7) 7th Force Service Support Group. Provide for the defense and security of support areas with forces assigned.

#### c. MAF Reserve

- (1) 1st Tank Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (a) Establish blocking positions NW of SYN City.
  - (b) Be prepared to attack Aggressor forces anywhere in the northern sector within the FEBA.
  - (c) Be prepared to attack and destroy Aggressor forces within Penetration NORTH STAR; coordinate with 1st Marines.
- (2) 2nd Tank Bn (-) (Rein)
  - (a) Establish blocking positions SW of SYN City.
  - (b) Be prepared to attack Aggressor forces anywhere in the southern sector within the FEBA.
  - (c) Be prepared to attack and destroy Aggressor forces within Penetration SOUTHERN CROSS; coordinate with 3rd Marines.

### d. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) VII MAF will control GOP operations in the northern, central, and southern sectors in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from converging on the FEBA simultaneously from the NW and SW.
- (2) Priority of air support initially to southern sector GOP.
- (3) All units will prepare plans to detect and destroy Aggressor airborne or heliborne attacks; open areas behind the FEBA and within SYN City are particularly vulnerable; CG, 7th MARDIV coordinates all planning and operations within the FEBA.

11-88-10

**U** CLASSIFIED

- (4) Units in or near coastal areas will be prepared to destroy enemy ACV-landed forces.
- (5) Report all scatterable mining through fire support channels as the mining occurs and the specific locations of the seeded minefields are known.
- (6) Be prepared to operate in an NBC environment.
- (7) The code name for this defensive phase is MID-BREAKER ELEVEN.
- (8) As used throughout this plan, D-day refers to the date of the initial amphibious assault, 15 May.
- (9) This plan is effective on order.
- (10) Be prepared to commence detailed concurrent planning to attack to the NW, upon receipt of guidance from this Head-quarters.

### 4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

#### a. Administration

- (1) Requests, reports, and routine correspondence in accordance with SOP.
- (2) Special administrative matters will be set forth separately.

### b. Logistics

- (1) GOP CSSEs will carry 3 DOS of Classes I, III, and V and such amounts of other classes as deemed necessary by GOP commanders; replenishment of GOP sectors will be accomplished daily until the respective GOP sector is engaged and recommends imminient withdrawal. Resupply thereafter as requested.
- (2) Intermediate Support Points (ISPs) will be established in each regimental sector behind the FEBA to disperse supply stockages and reduce their vulnerability; ISPs will contain 3 DOS of all classes.
- (3) CSSAs 1 and 2 will be expanded to contain 20 DOS; resupply for the GOP will be provided directly from the supporting CSSA.
- (4) Priority of engineer effort to maintaining and repairing Airfields 1 and 2; second priority to operating the Port Area.

- (5) Civil Affairs logistic support in accordance with current directives; no further evacuation/relocation of civilians is contemplated; the 34,000 DPRE now in assembly areas will continue to receive emergency relief food supplies from VII MAF as administered by designated indigenous officials and agencies.
- (6) VII MAF support of public utilities and public safety activities will continue under current directives with minimumessential MAF support and maximum reliance on indigenous agencies and personnel.
- (7) To the maximum extent feasible, the railroads will be used to support the three sectors of the GOP and FEBA and reduce reliance on organic transportation.
- (8) VII MAF ACofS, G-4 will arrange for desalinization equipment or water tankers, or both, to provide an emergency water supply capability in the SYN City area.

#### 5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

PROCESS - RESERVED - RESERVED

### a. Command Relationships

- (1) Since command passed ashore, CINCPAC now has operational command of VII MAF.
- (2) CG 7th MAW (Rear) is responsible to the Host-Base Commanders for compliance with local regulations. Discipline and military justice matters remain vested in CG, 7th MAW and CG, VII MAF.

C. 3

- (3) All VII MAF, CTF 57, and other US/Allied aircraft operating within VII MAF area of interest will enter the VII MAF tactical air control system (TACS) when entering and leaving the Southwest Aggressorland region. Aircraft will be subject to flight directions, air defense orders, and other control procedures established by the TACC of VII MAF.
- (4) VII MAF assumes OPCON of initial elements of follow-on forces. Command relationships after arrival of command element of follow-on forces as directed by CINC.

#### b. Signal

- (1) Unless otherwise directed, current SOP and COI will apply.
- (2) All subordinate commands will provide for alternate CPs in the event of Aggressor use of weapons of mass destruction.

11-88-12

**'NCLASSIFIED** 

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

S. R. JONES Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps Commanding

#### **ENCLOSURES:**

- 1 Operations Overlay2 Logistics Overlay

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)


NOTE: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling

Copy no.\_\_\_of\_\_\_copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1988

ENCLOSURE 1 (Operations Overlay) to Outline Plan 11-88 (Operation MID-BREAKER ELEVEN)



seed to the seeded. The best seeded to the s



ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES


S.J. THOMAS Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

Note: Overprinted SYN City map is used in lieu of overlay for ease in handling.

Copy no. of copies
VII Composite Marine Amphibious Force
(VII MAF)
SYNTHETIC (SYN) CITY, AGGRESSORLAND
250830P May, 1988

ENCLOSURE 2 (Logistics Overlay) to Outline Plan 11-88 (Operation Mid-BREAKER ELEVEN)



BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JONES

S. J. THOMAS Brigadier General, US Marine Corps Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Appendix 1 (Distribution) to VII MAF SOP for Administration (Constructive)

**UNCLASSIFIED** 

FILMED

10483

DIN 6